By Andrew Day, The American Conservative, 8/12/25
Russian forces in recent days punched through Ukraine’s defensive line near its key stronghold Pokrovsk, a city in the eastern Donetsk province, according to news reports on Tuesday.
The breakthrough—Russia’s biggest in many months—comes ahead of a Friday summit in Alaska between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The timing suggests Moscow is pushing for battlefield gains to enhance its bargaining position in peace talks. Putin has demanded that Kiev cede the entire Donetsk province, including parts that Ukraine still controls.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky warned Monday evening that Russia was “redeploying their troops and forces in ways that suggest preparations for new offensive operations.”
Russian troops now nearly surround Pokrovsk, which had served as a logistics hub for Ukrainian troops. Kiev may need to order a withdrawal from the semi-encircled swath of territory or risk exposing its forces there to capture or bombardment.
***
Alaskan Waste
By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 8/13/25
Battlefield
Russian activity in Ukraine has been intense in the lead-up to Friday’s scheduled meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Alaska, centering most in and around Pokrovsk. Russian sabotage and reconnaissance forces are attacking the south of the city in what may be artillery preparation for a major offensive, and have already penetrated to its center.
To the immediate north of the city Russia has secured Sukhetske and is extending west towards Novooltksandrivka and Shevchenko, while further north still it is extending via Zatyshok and Zapovidne into Novo Shakove, Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Shakove and Kucheriv Yar.
From Pokrovsk, northwest to Novekonomichne, Russia is forming a cauldron centered on Balchan. To the west of Novekonomichne, Russia is battling to take Rodynske (it is reported to have secured 60% of the settlement), which lies to the south west of Fedorivke and Rezine) and battling southwards to Myrnohrad, close enough to the northeast of Pokrovsk to be considered a suburb.
Although Russia has reportedly taken 150-200 square kilometers in the past 24 to 48 hours, further westward advances from Pokrovsk may be awaiting the arrival of units of the main Russian army, particularly in view of unresolved issues that lie to the east of Pokrovsk, northeast of Maisk, around Volodymyrivka and Shakove, Toretske and Solivka – all lying southwest from another targetted settlement, Kostiantynivka (west of Chasiv Yar, now in Russian Hands).
A Ukrainian Azov-led counter-offensive is expected in this area starting from Ivanopillia (north of Russian-held Toretsk) towards Solivka and on down to Russian-held Fedorivka. Anticipating and heading off this move, Russian forces need to progress towards Toretske and Solivka but must first complete their struggle for Kucheriv Yar. Russian forces may also move up towards Solivka from Rusyn Yar.
Southwest of Pokrovsk, Russian forces have taken 60% of Udachne and are moving towards Novoserhaivka and Novomykolaivka in a possible bid to cut the M30 supply route to Pokrovsk.
Preparing to move on Kostiantynivka to the north east of Pokrovsk, Russian forces are attacking Plebsn Byk from Russisn-held Katerynivka. East of Kostiantynivka, Russia has taken full control of Stupechky and Pyredechyne.
Russian forces have taken the Southern Torkse Forest east of Lyman and are bombing Siversk.
Alaska
There is intense chatter as to the potential outcomes of Friday’s Presidential meeting. I maintain my judgment that the meeting is ill-advised, is dangerous as well as largely pointless for Putin to attend, and has been very poorly prepared. I note Larry Johnson’s coverage in his Sonar21 report yesterday of a story of a potential assassination plot, and although he himself is skeptical as to its veracity, it demonstrates the absurd ease with which potential assassins, professional or amateur, may disrupt the summit.
Trump’s anticipatory statements and positions veer wildly from day to day. Yesterday’s phone conversation between European leaders, Zelenskiy and Trump have confirmed that Europe supports Zelenskiy’s completely obstructionist mode that, in turn, will likely reduce the possibility of anything close to a meaningful concession from Trump to Putin, while Putin will find it extremely difficult to move away from his terms laid out in June 2024, perhaps only to the extent of offering to withdraw Russian troops from his ““buffer zone” in Kharkiv and Sumy in return for a concession from Ukraine – which seems very unlikely to be offered – to withdraw its troops from those parts of Kherson and Zapporizhzhia in which Ukraine still maintains a military presence (and which Russia is otherwise almost guaranteed to take in the very near future in any case).
Does Russia have good reasons to participate in this summit? One can think of reasons, but none of them are convincing. Perhaps Putin wants to prepare Trump for the post-conflict scenarios that may unfold if and when the Ukrainian army collapses and Russia moves to the Dnieper or even further west. Is Putin concerned to make sure that Russian territorial acquisitions will be internationally recognized? Perhaps. Trump recognizing them will not guarantee or even incentivize European or UN recognition. Does Putin want to talk about arms control? Fat chance he will find an enthusiastic listener in Trump who is in charge of the most aggressive military-industrial (MICIMATT) incubus the earth has ever seen and whose profits sustain the US corporate-plutocratic ruling tyranny and who would love to encourage a nice, deceptive Russian “pause” to its currently accelerating growth in military capability. Does Putin want to talk about joint exploitation in the Arctic? Then he should first be talking to his friends in the BRICS and to those allies who will be most central to the construction of BRICS-friendly south-north trading routes at the very same time as Trump is attempting to sabotage Russian and Chinese interests in west-east trading routes from the always malevolent influence of Turkey through the south Caucasus, with a view to disrupting Russian-Iranian transportation route and destabilizing Iran’s Azeri northwest.
***
With Desertions, Low Recruitment, Ukraine’s Infantry Crisis Deepens
By Yauhen Lehalau, RFE/RL, 8/10/25
As Russia presses its offensive, Ukraine faces a crisis that experts say is as critical as its shortages of ammunition and weapons: a dwindling supply of infantry.
“Drivers, artillerymen, and cooks” are holding the line, says Bohdan Krotevich, an officer formerly with the Azov Brigade’s headquarters. “A maximum of 12 fighters hold sections 5-10 kilometers wide.”
The lack of manpower is allowing Russia to employ what Ukraine’s commander in chief, Oleksandr Syrskiy, recently called “total infiltration” tactics. Small infantry groups make it through Ukrainian lines — including into Pokrovsk, the key city in the Donetsk region that is likely the main target of Russia’s current offensive.
One of the brigades responsible for defending the area had “run out of infantry,” according to Ukrainian conflict-monitoring group DeepState, allowing the Russians through. A video from July, geolocated to a gas station in the southern part of the city, shows a Ukrainian transport coming under fire from one of the infiltration groups, and other units had to be sent in to attempt to clear the area.
The Manpower Gap Flips In Russia’s Favor
Early in the war, the balance was radically different. In the lead-up to the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia’s army had about 1 million troops, with some 150,000 – 190,000 concentrated along Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus.
At the time, Ukraine’s military had some 260,000 in active service, but the country mobilized up to 700,000 men by mid-summer, handing it a manpower advantage over the invading Russian forces, who had by then been expelled from the Kyiv region. Russia was forced to conduct a “partial mobilization” of about 300,000 reservists to stabilize the front line after yielding thousands of square kilometers of territory in eastern Ukraine.
In 2023, Russian recruitment picked up, introducing thousands of prison inmates to the army as well as mercenary groups like the infamous Wagner private military company and offering significant sign-up bonuses to volunteers. Ukraine, on the other hand, was struggling to find new recruits to replace losses. As analysts from the investigative group, the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) observed, this was the year that momentum shifted in Moscow’s favor, as Russia’s recruitment drive neutralized Ukraine’s manpower advantage while Kyiv faced mounting difficulties replenishing its ranks.
In 2025, according to The Military Balance, an annual assessment of military capabilities worldwide, Russia’s numbers of active-duty personnel reached over 1.13 million — with Syrskiy claiming that some 640,000 of them were on Ukrainian territory, a figure echoed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. While Ukraine’s total troop strength is officially over 1 million, the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) says not more than 300,000 of them are deployed on the front lines.
Russia Recruiting More Than Ukraine
According to the OSW, Ukraine needs to recruit some 300,000 soldiers to replenish its brigades, some of which are only at 30 percent strength. Last year, it managed 200,000, a number that “proved insufficient to maintain unit strength at an adequate level” given “the scale of desertions and personnel losses,” the OSW report says. Currently, Ukraine is estimated to recruit 17,000 to 24,000 people per month, or between 204,000 and 288,000 per year.
While it has had to increase its sign-up bonuses, Russian recruitment is estimated to have increased to a rate of about 30,000 per month –- an advantage of roughly 70-150,000 per year.
Thousands AWOL
Beyond the gap in recruitment figures, Ukraine’s army has a desertion problem, with tens of thousands of instances of soldiers going Absent Without Leave (AWOL) recorded per year. According to popular Ukrainian war correspondent Yuri Butusov, the Anne of Kyiv brigade, trained in France, had up to 1,700 soldiers go AWOL between March and November 2024 — a staggering figure, given that Ukraine’s average brigade strength is between 4,000 and 5,000.
The founder of the Frontelligence Insight group says cases of forced mobilization, where Ukrainian men are taken off the street to a recruitment center, contributes to the desertion problem, with mobilized recruits often less motivated than those who volunteer. A Ukrainian commander told CNN that “the majority” of these recruits leave their positions. “They go to the positions once and if they survive, they never return. They either leave their positions, refuse to go into battle, or try to find a way to leave the army.”
Can Ukraine Close The Gap?
Ukraine has adopted several policies to address the recruitment and desertion issues. Soldiers who went AWOL have been allowed to avoid prosecution by voluntarily returning to their units. Tens of thousands have done so — although the numbers of those deserting are still higher.
Despite pressure from both the Trump and Biden administrations, Ukraine has so far resisted lowering its draft age to 18 — a move that would be deeply unpopular with the public. Ukrainian men aged 25 and above can be drafted after the age was lowered from 27 in April 2024. However, the military has begun offering monthly salaries of 120,000 hryvna (about $2,900) and other financial incentives to incentivize those aged between 18 and 24 to volunteer.
Presidential military adviser Pavlo Palysa said in April that the new program had drawn just 500 recruits in the first weeks since it was launched, and it’s unclear whether the figures have picked up since then.
While US President Donald Trump has recently threatened increased pressure on Moscow if a cease-fire deal is not agreed to soon, analysts haven’t seen a shift in the Kremlin’s policy yet. “I do not observe any substantive change in Russian tactics toward Trump or Ukraine,” Tatyana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said on X.
With no indication that Putin is willing to back down or accept a cease-fire along current lines — his forces have so far failed to take much of the four Ukrainian regions Russia officially claimed to have annexed in 2022 — Ukraine will need to deal with its manpower shortage to hold the line.