By Ted Galen Carpenter, The American Conservative, 10/21/25

An especially damaging example of Washington’s lack of strategic empathy or even basic consideration regarding another major country has been its belligerent display of power and contempt toward Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Most analysts who examine the onset of this “second cold war” have concentrated on the rising Russian–Western tensions over Ukraine, especially since that country’s U.S.-backed Maidan Revolution in 2014.  

The focus on Ukraine during the post-2014 period is understandable, given that a full-scale proxy war between NATO and Russia over Ukraine’s geopolitical status is now taking place and alarming threats are being hurled from various capitals. But the deterioration of relations with Moscow on the part of the United States and its key European allies began long before 2014 and has involved issues not directly related to Ukraine. Moreover, policymakers in Washington deserve most of the blame for the onset of the second cold war, an outcome that is doubly tragic because it was so unnecessary. 

Moscow’s acceptance not only of Germany’s reunification but of a united Germany’s membership in NATO signaled the potential for an entirely new era in Russian–Western relations. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military alliance confirmed the Kremlin’s new, much less aggressive political and security orientation. Any lingering doubt about the possibility of warmer relations should have vanished at the end of 1991, when the USSR itself dissolved and a noncommunist Russia became the principal successor state.

Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in both George W. Bush’s administration and Barack Obama’s administration, candidly describes in his 2014 book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, some of the serious U.S. policy missteps. Gates recalled that in one of his early reports to Bush, “I shared with him my belief that from 1993 onward, the West, and particularly the United States, had badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War and then in the dissolution of the Soviet Union….” In an even more candid comment, Gates added: “What I didn’t tell the president was that I believed the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after Bush 41 [George H. W. Bush] left office in 1993.”

Saying the bilateral relationship had been “mismanaged” is putting matters gently. Indeed, even during the elder Bush’s tenure, hawkish elements within the U.S. policy hierarchy worked hard to sabotage a Western rapprochement with Russia. The elder Bush’s secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, suggested that the United States not be content with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but work to fragment Russia. Fortunately, the president and some other key advisers, most notably Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, opposed such an openly confrontational approach. Instead, they soothed Moscow and led Kremlin leaders to believe that Washington would not make any move to expand NATO beyond the eastern border of a united Germany. How sincere they were about easing Moscow’s security concerns remains uncertain to this day.

In any case, President Bill Clinton’s administration adopted a noticeably less accommodating stance toward Russia. This phase of Washington’s Russia policy was characterized by a lack of strategic empathy and tone deafness. Key policymakers, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Czech-born U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, were thoroughly marinated in the Cold War era’s anti-Soviet conventional wisdom. They transferred their ingrained hostility toward the USSR to a newly democratic Russia with scarcely any hesitation.

Albright and her supporters were exceptionally receptive to requests from anti-Russia figures in Poland, the Baltic republics, and other Eastern European countries to join NATO—especially after she became Secretary of State in 1997. It was hardly a secret that Boris Yeltsin’s administration (and most other Russians) would regard NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe as an extremely hostile act. Indeed, Yeltsin warned Clinton about the danger of a negative reaction from both his country’s population and political elite during a private summit discussion.  

Instead of heeding Yeltsin’s warning, Clinton submitted a treaty to the U.S. Senate approving the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the alliance. NATO expansion was underway. Meanwhile, Washington and its European allies also were beating up on Serbia, Moscow’s principal remaining political ally in Eastern Europe. As former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock points out, Russian public opinion shifted from being strongly favorable toward the United States to being strongly hostile during the 1990s because of such actions.

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, endorsed subsequent phases of NATO expansion, ultimately bringing the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries into a U.S.-led, blatantly anti-Russia military alliance. There were other, more mundane military measures that also antagonized Moscow. Gates specifically stated that “U.S. agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries” constituted a “needless provocation.” Indeed, the “rotations” soon were so continuous as to constitute de facto permanent U.S. garrisons in those two countries—something that U.S. officials had repeatedly assured Moscow informally was not Washington’s intention.

Not content with the level of provocation that the multiple rounds of NATO expansion had caused by incorporating former Warsaw Pact members and establishing an ongoing U.S. military presence in those new Eastern European members, Bush then proposed to offer Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO. By that time, though, Moscow’s objections to U.S. policy were becoming loud and emphatic. Even some longtime key U.S. allies, most notably France and Germany, balked at adding corrupt and politically volatile Georgia to NATO. They also argued that it was at the very least premature to suggest bringing Ukraine into the fold. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2007 address to the Munich Security Conference should have made it quite clear that the Kremlin would not tolerate NATO membership for either Georgia or Ukraine. 

Moscow then exploited a clumsy bid in August 2008 by Washington’s Georgian client regime to suppress the de facto independence of two secessionist entities: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia responded to Georgia’s ill-advised military offensive by sending Russian troops pouring into that country. The Kremlin’s action was a milestone confirming that Moscow would no longer passively accept further NATO expansion. Putin’s use of force in Georgia should have made it clear to all concerned that his warnings were not a bluff. 

Instead, the United States and its NATO allies continued to ignore or dismiss such indicators. Recklessly, they next proceeded to assist anti-Russia factions in Ukraine to overthrow the elected, pro-Russia government in Kiev and install an obedient pro-NATO replacement. Russia responded by seizing the strategically crucial Crimea peninsula from Ukraine and supporting separatist Russian speaking populations in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow also sent a modest contingent of its own troops into the Donbas to back the secessionist factions. The Western powers embraced an escalatory strategy of their own, both by imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia and by supporting Kiev’s increasingly brutal crackdown on the Donbas rebels. 

Russian–Western relations gradually but inexorably deteriorated thereafter and then utterly plunged in February 2022 when Russia expanded its invasion of Ukraine, while NATO members began to give huge quantities of military hardware and economic aid to Kiev. The confrontation between Russia and NATO took the form of a proxy war with disturbing potential for escalation into a direct conflict, making the second cold war even more dangerous and volatile than the original. 

Examining the early stages of the West’s post-Cold War confrontation with Russia underscores how easily it could have been—and should have been—avoided. Policymakers in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations deserve history’s harshest judgement for sheer ineptitude in the arena of foreign affairs. [Not sure why the Biden administration was not included in this list for dismissing Russia’s last ditch attempt at avoiding war by requesting negotiation with Washington and NATO on Russia’s legitimate security concerns in December of 2021. – Natylie]