Strana.UA, 3/12/26

Translation into English by Prof. Geoffrey Roberts

In the past week, Ukrainian and Russian media and Telegram channels have been full of predictions about the Russian army’s upcoming “spring-summer offensive,” as well as analyses of possible actions by Ukraine’s armed forces.

President Vladimir Zelensky has announced that Russia is preparing a spring offensive, while Alexander Komarenko, the UAF’s Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, has promised to undertake something “the enemy won’t expect” in this year’s military campaign.

Possible directions for Russia’s “main blow” are also being discussed. The Donetsk region is usually cited as such.

At the same time, we have repeatedly written that concepts of “direction of the main blow” and “spring/summer/fall-winter offensive” are inappropriate for the current war.

Drone control over the battlefield, which is total, prevents any surprise strikes with large forces in one direction at a specific, pre-planned time.

Both combatants conduct their offensive operations in a similar manner: constant attacks with small groups of infantry infiltrating the front line while simultaneously attempting to “knock out” enemy UAV pilots (this is currently the primary objective) in order to create breaches in the “kill zone” for further advancement and consolidation.

That is, a constant identification of weak points in defences and attempts to break through as soon as they are discovered. Of the systemic factors that can contribute to the success of this tactic, the only one worth noting is the “hunt” for drone operators. The remaining factors are more or less random — errors by the enemy command, which may “sleep through” the attack and fail to deploy reserves in time, and, crucially, weather conditions.

Fog, for example, allows infantry to penetrate the front line without fear of drones. This is why the Russians made significant advances during the foggy months of October-November-December of last year, when they almost completely captured Pokrovsk, Myrnograd, and Gulyaipole.

Foliage also aids the attackers. While previously, the green cover favoured the defenders, who could easily hide in it, in the era of drone dominance, foliage helps assault groups advance relatively undetected. As recent experience shows, offensive operations do intensify in the spring, and this is likely to happen again.

However, over the past year, drone density has increased even further, meaning any offensive is slow and associated with very heavy losses. This applies to attacks by both the Russian and Ukrainian armies. The only difference is that the Russian army has greater manpower reserves (as well as greater capability to deliver fire damage to identified drone operator locations) and can, albeit with heavy losses, maintain a steady advance on many sections of the front (although this has slowed recently due to the aforementioned factors). Ukrainian counterattacks, due to a shortage of manpower and the more heavily manned Russian defensive lines, are merely localised and deterrent in nature – as happened early last year near Pokrovsk or early this year at the junction of the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe regions. Over time, these attacks stall and fail to achieve deep penetrations. Even Kupyansk, where the Russian positions were initially very vulnerable, has not yet been fully liberated, and fighting continues there (as confirmed by Ukrainian sources). Though some UAF counterattacks have had a significant impact on the situation on the front; for example, the cutting off of the Dobropol’e salient last year.

But overall, the fighting continues to be waged in a “war of attrition,” where the primary objective is not to plan large-scale offensives in the spirit of World War II, but to exhaust the enemy’s human, moral, and economic resources with the tactic of “a thousand small cuts,” so that at some point, quantity turns into quality and the enemy’s front (or rear) collapses.

This course of events can only change if one side gains a significant military-technical advantage (primarily in the use of robotic systems), which is not yet the case. Any innovation is quickly adopted, and parity is restored.

Nevertheless, as we see, everyone is now once again talking about a Russian offensive, or an offensive by the UAF.

Therefore, let’s consider what the realistic actions of the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces may be during the spring-summer campaign.

1. Russian Army Plans for 2026: Zaporozhe, the Border, and a pincer movement in Donbas

Although the Russians’ primary tactic is constant pressure along the entire front to probe for weak points, there are certainly priority areas where reserves and resources are being directed.

The Donetsk region is constantly cited as a priority for Moscow, but we have repeatedly written that concentrating efforts there from a purely military perspective is pointless for the Russians. Even the loss of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk would not create strategic problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in terms of cutting off logistics routes or making key cities vulnerable. Further down the line, the Russians would run into the Barvenkovo fortified area and other defensive lines.

The higher priority areas for the Russian Federation are obvious, and they are quite different (Kiev, as one of them, is currently being left out, as there are no signs of preparations for a ground attack on it, unless Belarus enters the war, which is also still hypothetical).

The first area is Zaporozhe and Dnipro, two key industrial centres of Ukraine. These are also the logistics centers of the UAF. Even approaching their outskirts by Russian troops (without completely capturing them) paralyses life there, which would be a painful blow to the country’s entire defence system. And capturing these cities and establishing a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper creates a threat of a Russian offensive toward Krivoi Rog and Transnistria. Furthermore, the northward movement of the front line in this area makes logistics along the land corridor to Crimea more secure for Russia and complicates Ukrainian attacks on the peninsula itself (especially on the Crimean Bridge). If we analyse the directions of Russian offensives since 2024, it is here that they have made their greatest advance, moving westward from Donetsk, Kurakhovo, Ugledar, and Velikaya Novoselka, outflanking the well-fortified defense lines of the UAF on the Southern Front from the north.

The second most important area is the border region between Ukraine and Russia. It is important for Moscow both in terms of creating a buffer zone to normalise life in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions, and in terms of facilitating attacks on UAF logistics between the Eastern Front and the rear areas in Central Ukraine. Recently, Russian activity here has increased, with advances in the Sumy region. Last August, Zelensky promised that all Russian footholds in this region would be eliminated “within a few months.”

The third area is Khar’kov. – another major industrial centre, to the south of which are also located Ukraine’s main gas fields. As with Zaporozhe and Dnipro, even the approach of Russian troops to the outskirts of the city paralyses life and economic activity there, given that Russia now has a much larger arsenal of firepower (drones, KABs) than it had in 2022, when the Russian army was already at the former capital. However, Khar’kov differs from Zaporozhe and Dnipro in that a well-thought-out and layered defense has been built to its north in recent years. Meanwhile, in the Zaporozhe Oblast (if we take the direction of Russia’s advance from the east), the situation is very loose, with no serious fortifications in place. It will be difficult for the Russians to break through to Khar’kov, despite the relatively short distance, but attempts will certainly be made, especially if Russia succeeds in advancing in other areas of the border region and gaining fire control of the roads from Khar’kov to the west.

The fourth most important direction is the Donetsk Oblast. The main threat here for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not a frontal Russian advance from the east toward Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, but rather the creation of a “pincer” by the Russians if they manage to advance in the area of ​​Svyatogorsk and Liman on one side, and capture Dobropol’e on the other and advance north. After this, the large UAF group in Kramatorsk, Slavyansk, Druzhkovka, and Konstantinovka would find itself encircled, with all roads under drone fire. The Ukrainian army would then either be forced to retreat from these cities or suffer heavy losses trying to hold them under unfavourable conditions (as occurred in the final months of the UAF’s Kursk bridgehead). Seemingly, the Ukrainian command understands this, which is why it made every effort last year to cut off the Dobropol’e salient. However, the Russians are now attacking in this direction again.

Another important section of the front lies west of Pokrovsk. An advance here will enable Russia to prepare a broad-front offensive against the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The fifth axis is the frontline section near Oskol, including Kupyansk. It is the least important of all. Essentially, it serves as a subsidiary to the other two Russian axes of action: the second (the buffer zone along the border) and the fourth (the offensive in the northern Donetsk region).

2. UAF Strategy for 2026: Donbas, Counterattacks, and the Iranian “Wild Card”

UAF strategy largely stems from the fundamental threats described above.

That is, to prevent Russia from advancing toward Zaporozhe and Dnipro, to prevent Russian forces from advancing into the borderlands and Khar’kov (and to attempt to enter Russian territory themselves), and to prevent the creation of “pincers” in Donbas. In fact, the UAF’s main activity over the past six months has been in these areas (plus Kupyansk, which, admittedly, is more of informational and political significance).

Hence we should expect a further concentration of efforts in these areas.

However, UAF command has already made it clear that it does not intend to limit itself to defence.

“If we don’t have the initiative and instead simply fight back, sooner or later we’ll be finished off. Therefore, we’re planning different actions that will force the enemy to change their plans and act in ways they didn’t plan. And these won’t necessarily involve direct troop actions; we’re also planning asymmetrical actions. Something they won’t expect,” stated the aforementioned Komarenko.

He didn’t specify what these actions would be, but based on past experience it’s clear that Kiev is combining two approaches.

The first is strikes against Russia. These include attacks on industrial enterprises and infrastructure facilities, as well as strikes in the style of Operation “Spiderweb”: bold and daring actions deep in the Russian rear. In addition to inflicting direct damage on Russia, these are intended to bolster morale among the Ukrainian population.

The second is counterattacks at the front. While they don’t result in major advances, they also help maintain morale and slow down Russian offensive actions. But Ukrainian experts have criticized these constant counterattacks, which achieve only limited success and are associated with significant personnel losses (with drones dominating the skies, casualties during assault operations are many times higher than during defensive operations). Critics believe that such tactics lead to the UAF’s weakening and undermine Ukraine’s chances of surviving a war of attrition.

However, the formula currently promoted by Ukraine’s military-political leadership—”we are not just sitting on the defensive, but liberating territory and seizing the initiative”—has been integrated into Kiev’s overall strategy for this year.

Ukrainian authorities assumed that Russia’s growing financial and economic problems would deplete its resources, necessitating belt-tightening among the population, leading to widespread discontent and, possibly, destabilisation within Russia. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin would be forced to make significant concessions regarding the terms of ending the war or even find itself on the brink of defeat due to destabilisation of the rear.

Constant counterattacks by Ukraine’s armed forces, which, at the very least, slow Russia’s advance and even allow it to liberate some territory, fit seamlessly into this strategy, as they are intended to demonstrate to the Kremlin and Russian society the futility of continuing the war.

However, even in Ukraine, not everyone is ready to validate this strategy and its predictions of “Russia’s imminent collapse”.

Indeed, after the start of the war in Iran and the rise in oil prices (plus the predicted problems with Western arms supplies due to the United States’ own increased needs), the strategy finds itself on the brink of collapse.

True, Kiev is hoping for a quick end to the Gulf War, after which, Bankova calculates, everything will quickly return to normal. But if the war drags on, that strategy will have to be completely altered. Either toward compromise with Russia (including on Donbas) on peace terms that would allow for a ceasefire in the near future. Or toward maximum belt-tightening for the population and the militarisation of the entire country, prepared to wage a protracted war of attrition in worsening conditions. This, among other things, implies limiting personnel losses, and thus a change in tactics on the front lines.