By Gordon Hahn, Website, 3/16/26
We often here that Russians are imperialistic, militaristic, aggressive, expansionist, paranoid in relation to foreigners and foreign states, especially the West; that Russian President Vladimir Putin carried out an ‘unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine,’ and is engaged in a massive military buildup in preparation for an invasion of Europe: ‘If he wins in Ukraine, he will not stop.’ Commentators refer to Putin’s ‘fortress Russia.’ This is a reference to an intentional government propaganda effort to convince Russians that they are being surrounded by NATO and so the country must hunker down, crush opposition, and maximize its military production and prowess, making the coubntry extremely militaristic and exceptionally aggressive. At the same time, the universal Western meme is that Ukraine is a democracy and a passive victim of that ‘bad Russia.’ Putting aside Kiev’s initiation of a civil war in Donbass in April 2014, Ukraine’s powerful and now well-armed neofascist movement, and its NATO-backed military buildup prior to the February 2022 Russian effort at coercive diplomacy, a global opinion survey shows that Russia is no outlier, even with compared to the ‘alliance of democracies’ with regard to its national secuerity culture, and where it is it is it deviates in a direction counteropposite to expansionism, militarism, and aggressiveness. Ukraine and Ukrainians turn out to be more militaristic and aggressive than Russia and Russians, refuting what the media-academia misinformation complex so tirelessly exclaims.
The Alliance of the Democracies sponsored a global opinion survey this year, the results of which were published in a report called the ‘Democracy Perception Index’ (DPI) It asked numerous questions regarding national security among the populations of almost all countries (https://allianceofdemocracies.org/democracy-perception-index and https://146165116.fs1.hubspotusercontent-eu1.net/hubfs/146165116/DPI 2025.pdf). The survey’s results demonstrate this ‘counter-intuitive’ conclusion, made counter-intuitive by decades of Western propaganda. For example, the survey asked respondents how concerned they were that their country might be invaded. Slightly more than a quarter of Russians answered they were very or extremely concerned about this (DPI, p. 31). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alleged efforts to create a ‘fortress Russia’ mentality in the Russian populace apparently is not going well. One explanation for the relative lack of concern among Russians is confidence in the Russian leadership and military to handle any foreign challenges that may arise.
On the other hand, Russians are not prone to rely on military power as the key instrument in guaranteeing their country’s national security, according to the DPI. Respondents were given a choice between: (1) military buildup; (2) maintaining or developing nuclear weapons; (3) strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships; and (4) implementing or expanding mandatory military service. The option most often chosen by Russians strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships—the only non-military response available. By contrast, Ukrainians most often chose ‘maintaining or developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent’; Ukraine was the only country in the world to choose this answer the most. Poland, Turkey, and China were the only countries on the Greater Eurasian landmass to choose military buildup most often. The rest of Europe and all of the Americas, except for Cuba, chose to rely on alliances as the Russians did (DPI, p. 32).
Respondents aged 18-55 were also asked about whether they personaly would be willing to fight if their country were attacked. A little over half in Russia responded positively, while in the US slightly less than half did so. In Ukraine, only a third responded positively. In Europe, the figure falls to 41%, with higher percentages willing to fight found in Norway, Greece, and Sweden. Globally, some of the weakest willingness to fight were France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where less than a third responded positively. Middle Eastern and North African countries responded positively on an average of 69% — “the highest regional average in the world.” (DPI, p. 33). In sum, Russian society does not register as extremely militaristic or aggressive, and its government propaganda is not yeilding one, regardless of whether it is attmepting to do so or not.
Some might retort that I myself have written that Russia has a security vigilance culture, suspicious of external and internal national security threats emanating from the West [Gordon M. Hahn, The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (Jefferson: McFarland, 2021)]. This is true, but security vigilance has little to do with militarism and agressiveness, and might devolve into them only in response to a deep, existential crisis to the Russian nation or state. To the extent Russians seems ‘aggressive’ and its government ‘militaristic’, this is a misperception of Russia’s historically learned defensiveness. Moreover, the security vigilance culture is situational, born by historical experience and heightened by concrete contemporary circumstances impacting the level of national security and Russian perceptions thereof. It waxes and wanes, becomes dominant or recessive within Russia’s security and political cultures to the extent threats emerge from the West.
The DPI’s results reflect all of this. Russians are moderately conscious of the threat environment and do not uniformly fear invasion no less exhibit some irrational paranoia. Russians prefer building alliances to massing arms. They are willing to fight for their country but not inordinately so. This is because they perceive the security environment as a result of centuries of Western lessons on invasion, intervention, domestic interference, and manipulative, ontologically threatening cultural influence. If Russians see their government takes the required measures to address potential and kinetic threats, they are less inclined to succumb to militarism and aggressiveness and more inclined to hold to a more or less healthy patriotism and security vigilance.