Strana.UA, 7/10/26 (Translation by Prof. Geoffrey Roberts)

In Ukraine and the West, there’s constant talk that the current Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are creating conditions for ending the war.

Yesterday, at the NATO summit, Donald Trump stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are “an escalation that could help end” the war. And US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “this now creates space for negotiations to end the war.”

Meanwhile, Western media believe the next two months will be decisive…”By autumn”, write The Economist, “the Kremlin will decide whether to launch an autumn-winter offensive or conclude a ceasefire.”

The strategy of Kyiv and its Western partners is based on the premise that increased Ukrainian military strikes on far and middle rear areas, the threat of Crimea’s isolation, and the growing gasoline crisis will create problems for the Kremlin of such magnitude that it will be forced to either accept Kyiv and the Europeans’ conditions for a ceasefire along the front lines, or internal upheaval will erupt in Russia, making Moscow’s peace terms even worse.

Of course, both scenarios cannot be ruled out, but they are far from the only ones. One thing can be said with certainty: the current situation poses a direct threat to the Kremlin’s previous strategy of attrition, through which it intended to achieve victory within a certain period (a year, two, or three years) given its superior manpower potential, and against the backdrop of Europe’s mounting economic problems, which pose a strategic threat to the stability of its support for Ukraine – a strategy that does not require completely switching the Russian economy to a war footing or declaring a new wave of mobilisation.

This strategy is now being seriously tested. The question is whether Vladimir Putin will be able to manage the emerging problems and continue to pursue it. Or whether the strategy will have to be radically changed; or whether hostilities will have to cease along the current front lines.

Problems arise on several levels.

The first and most important is economic. Unlike Ukraine, Russia is fighting with its own money. Therefore, any blow to its economic potential is extremely damaging to its ability to continue the war. Disabling the refineries not only inconveniences the population in the form of a massive gasoline shortage, but also entails direct losses to the economy and budget, especially given the need to increase fuel imports. It also threatens the harvest (and therefore food prices and availability) and the entire logistics of goods, including essential goods. Furthermore, damage to other industrial and infrastructure facilities is also being caused. This is compounded by the drop in oil prices following the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

However, this last factor is not the most significant. Firstly, as recent days have shown, the crisis in the Persian Gulf is far from over, and prices could rise at any moment. Secondly, even if prices remain low for an extended period, the Russian budget has substantial reserves from which resources could be reallocated to the war effort, if necessary. Thirdly, in an era of increasing demand for electricity due to the development of artificial intelligence, energy resources cannot be cheap in principle, and their price increases will continue for the foreseeable future. However, right now, falling prices are significantly increasing the pressure on the Russian budget.

But, to repeat, the main problem of critical importance for the Russian economy are Ukrainian strikes on industrial facilities, the fuel crisis, and prospective problems with electricity and heating if the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are able to launch large-scale attacks on the Russian energy grid at significant depth.

The second level is the situation in Russian society. Since February 2022, the Kremlin has been trying to maintain the public’s perception that the war is taking place far away, that the country is peaceful, wages are rising, and all is well and calm. So far, this has been quite successful, with the exception of the territories bordering Ukraine. But the gasoline crisis has affected absolutely everyone. And even those Russians who try not to think about the war at all will no longer be able to ignore this obvious consequence of the war. Gasoline lines themselves could become a focal point for mass discontent with the authorities, as they did on the eve of the collapse of the USSR or in February 1917. This is especially true since this is compounded by the already pent-up frustration over the ban on Telegram and VPNs, various other restrictions, and weariness from the protracted war.

The authorities’ attempts to use the Ukrainian attacks to consolidate society under the slogan “Everyone to fight the enemy, let’s close our ranks!” are fraught with difficulties.

Firstly, for a significant portion of Russians, it’s unclear why the war is continuing at all if Kyiv is prepared to stop it at the front line, effectively sealing all of Russia’s territorial gains, which would in itself be a victory for Russia. And many don’t understand what Russia will gain from capturing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, or even all of Ukraine, if this requires many more thousands of military casualties and civilian suffering in the rear due to gasoline shortages, and even power outages in the border regions. Another segment of the population, ready to continue fighting, will ask questions: why haven’t we achieved victory yet? Perhaps our leaders are fighting the wrong way? Why haven’t they used nuclear weapons yet?

It’s unclear whether all this will lead to rebellion or internal upheaval, but such a situation poses a serious challenge for Putin. Especially given the approaching State Duma elections, which the Kremlin has no plans to cancel.

Another risk factor is the ambiguous situation within the elites. Some of them are also tired of the war and want it to end as quickly as possible. And some, just as they did during the preparations for Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, are trying to create as many difficulties as possible for Putin to force him to make personnel decisions, replacing the prime minister and the army command, and then effectively remove him from real power.

If unrest erupts in society, this could also potentially significantly impact the governance of the state system.

While the “peace party” within the Russian elite is generally loyal to Putin and can only create relatively minor problems for the Kremlin through quiet grumbling behind the scenes, the second group, as Prigozhin’s rebellion demonstrated, is far more dangerous: it is linked to many security officials and pro-war Telegram channels, which are already stirring up panic about what’s happening in the country and promoting the idea that the current Russian government is incapable of adequately addressing the emerging problems of wartime. If these problems continue to mount, it cannot be ruled out that this group, which once actively supported Prigozhin, could resort to active pressure on the Kremlin to force personnel changes in the government and army command, and if they fail, a new attempt at rebellion. Incidentally, representatives of this so-called “party of turmoil” are more vocal than others about the unacceptability of stopping the war along the front lines and demanding a fight to the bitter end. This is entirely logical: the longer and more difficult the war is for Russia, the easier it will be for them to destabilise the situation. Conversely, the sooner the war ends, the easier it will be for Putin to stabilise the situation, quickly resolve the problems caused by the war (fuel shortages, etc), consolidate his power, and thereby minimise the likelihood of any rebellion.

The third factor is the front. For now, problems in the rear are not directly affecting the situation at the front, where the Russians continue their offensive in many directions, albeit slowly. However, it cannot be ruled out that these problems will manifest themselves in the future, especially on the southern front in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the UAF is trying to increase pressure on Russian troops.

If nothing fundamentally changes at the front, the continuation of Russia’s current sluggish advance will become a problem for the Kremlin – because it’s currently promoting the idea of ​​imminent collapse of the UAF, which suggests patience and endurance of the gas shortages, as victory is already near.

But if the Russian army doesn’t demonstrate any major breakthroughs in the coming months, many in Russia will once again ask: why is this war continuing at all if it’s unknown how long the fighting will last? How long will Russian soldiers last without declaring mobilisation? How much longer will Russia be able to replenish its army and replace losses solely with civilian contractors?

Overall, Russia now finds itself in its most dire situation since the fall of 2022, when the UAF launched its counteroffensive. Back then, the problem was resolved through mobilisation, which eliminated Ukraine’s manpower advantage at the front. What will the Kremlin do now?

Based on the signals coming from Moscow, one can conclude that it is relying on mitigating the aforementioned problems, aiming to maintain the previous war strategy without resorting to mobilisation or other radical measures.

A key element of this approach is minimising the impact of air strikes on targets in the Russian rear and along logistical routes to Crimea. Judging by hints from Russian military Telegram channels, work in this area is intensifying, primarily through strengthening the air defense system, and the first results are expected within a month or a month and a half. If results are achieved, this could significantly improve Russia’s position.

By solving his most dangerous problem, Putin will shatter his opponents’ scenario and be able to continue the war of attrition, whereas in Europe and Ukraine a sense of defeat could prevail as a result of the failure of the current euphoria to materialise. Calls for compromise with the Kremlin will grow louder. At the same time, existing problems within the country (accusations of corruption against Volodymyr Zelensky, protests against “busification”) and in Kyiv’s relations with European partners, such as the Poles, will worsen.

In such a scenario, there will also be a small chance that Trump, seeing the strategy of forcing Russia to peace failing, will return to the “spirit of Anchorage” and pressure Kyiv and the Europeans to implement the Alaskan agreements on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbas, among other things.

But whether this would actually result in a reduction in the number of [drone strikes] and resolve the gasoline shortage and other key issues, remains to be seen. So far, this hasn’t happened. Oil refineries are still being hit regularly. The pace of Ukrainian drone strikes, whose production Europe is now also ramping up, is only increasing, and it’s unclear whether it’s even possible to reduce the number of strikes to zero in this situation. The month to six weeks allocated for setting up a new countermeasure system is a long time, which Russia will still have to somehow survive amid fuel shortages. Moreover, this will coincide with peak consumption—the holiday season and harvest season. This means critical problems could arise much earlier than the end of summer.

Even If there’s no change within six weeks, and the gasoline shortage persists, and Ukraine continues to destroy industrial facilities, this won’t mean Russia can no longer wage war but It will mean Putin can no longer wage it the way he did before.

And then the Kremlin will be faced with a choice between two options for continuing the war.

The first is a sharp tightening of internal regulations, but within the framework of a conventional war i.e. a new wave of mobilisation, new restrictions, imprisonment of dissidents, the introduction of elements of a planned distribution system in the economy (for example, gas rationing), and massive spending cuts on all non-military needs will follow.

However, it’s not clear that would fundamentally change the situation for Russia, since with drones dominating the skies, even sending hundreds of thousands of new soldiers to the front may not lead to a breakthrough. And if strikes on oil refineries and other industrial facilities escalate, even planned and administrative measures won’t help keep the economy afloat.

The second is a sharp escalation, which could either complement the first scenario or occur independently. For example, in the form of the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and/or Europe.

Both of these scenarios are extremely dangerous for both Russia and Putin personally.

The alternative is an end to the war along the front lines.

As we have written repeatedly, despite the demands for a ceasefire, Kyiv and the Europeans actually have a completely different baseline scenario: they are proposing a ceasefire only in the hope that Putin will reject it, and they can use his refusal to destabilise the situation within Russia, and then, if successful, impose far harsher conditions than a simple ceasefire. In reality, they don’t want a ceasefire, believing it would be a victory for Russia, something Kyiv sometimes openly admits.

But if Putin suddenly agrees to a ceasefire, then given Trump’s insistence on it and Zelenskyy’s already conditioned the public to believe that Ukraine’s goal is a swift end to the war, it will be difficult for Kyiv and Europe to make a sharp about-face and abandon the ceasefire. At least until the Congressional elections. But that’s if Putin agrees. For now, he’s dismissing this option, even though it’s far less dangerous for him than the two options involving mobilization and escalation. Chatter that the Russian people, not understanding renunciation of initial demands, would perceive it as betrayal, is groundless. The overwhelming majority of Russians would fully support such a solution as a way to save them from mobilisation, from gasoline shortages, and from nuclear war…

Most likely, Putin is hoping for something more than just a ceasefire that will consolidate current gains. And by the end of the summer, and perhaps even much sooner, it will become clear whether he can achieve this “much more” by continuing to wage the war as usual, pursuing a strategy of attrition without mobilising or converting the entire country to a war footing.

If the answer to this question is no, Putin will have three options: mobilisation with a sharp reduction in civilian spending, escalation (nuclear strike, war with Europe), or ending the war along the front lines.

As of now, no one can say with certainty which option he will choose.

***

Kiev Instability amidst Mobilization and Kremlin Caution (Excerpt)

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 7/16/26

The Federov Scandal

In the wake of the Lvov street uprising by citizens against military conscription efforts, we now have street protests across Ukraine against Zelenskiy’s dismissal of Defense Minister Miykhailo Fedorov in favor of the current Minister for the Interior, Ihor Klymenko. At the moment, even as street protests widen and Zelenskiy, in a rare show of humility, has said it is perfectly proper for people to protest, Fedorov has definitely been dismissed, but his replacement by Klymenko has not (yet) been confirmed.

Both these issues suggest that for Zelenskiy what mostly matters right now, despite the apparent success of recent Western-orchestrated drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and on shipping in the Azov and Black Seas (to which Russia has responded with some success by closing down the functionality of the port complex of Odessa) is Ukraine’s continuing ability (or is it inability?) to mobilize.

Klymenko, as a former chief of police, is directly implicated in providing police support for the brutal recruiting tactics (press gangs) that Kiev has long resorted to in order to solve its dire shortage of manpower on the front lines. It is difficult to imagine that his skills will magically enable a significant uptick in military conscription without inciting a popular revolution against Kiev and even if he does, Russia’s response might be it own mobilization with a view to increasing the current Russian force of 800,000 men in Ukraine to an entirely do-able, say, 1,600,000.

The dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov marks a massive political crisis in Ukraine, triggering widespread protests by civilians, veterans, and military personnel. Fedorov, previously known for modernizing the digital sector, served just six months in the defense role but became highly popular for aggressively pushing a high-tech, data-driven approach to the war which Western propaganda, at least, says has had devasting consequences for Russia.

The significance of Fedorov’s dismissal stemmed from an irreconcilable clash with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Fedorov favored startup-style management, prioritizing autonomous drones, competitive procurement, and asymmetric warfare to bridge personnel shortages. Syrskyi represents traditional, Soviet-style military hierarchy focused heavily on human resources and manpower. Fedorov’s removal has shocked civil society, who viewed him as an anti-corruption crusader. His dismissal sparked large-scale street protests across major cities like Kiev, Lvov, and Odessa. Soldiers and drone commanders on the front lines have openly criticized the move, fearing that his replacement – Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko – will cause military innovation to stagnate.

Fedorov had stated that he proposed replacing Gen. Syrsky and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov, citing a need to modernize command structures. According to Fedorov, Gen. Syrsky responded with an ultimatum to President Zelensky: “Him or me”. Zelensky chose to back his top army commander and dismissed the defense minister.

President Zelensky has publicly appealed for unity, acknowledging the public’s right to protest while stressing that wartime leadership should not be forced to choose between political and military commands.

During his brief tenure, Fedorov is credited with cutting through bureaucratic red tape, overhauled the military procurement system to save billions of hryvnias, and heavily restricted Russian access to Starlink networks. Protesters and defense experts fear that his departure will stall these critical reforms.

The ouster represents a significant gamble for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is actively undergoing a major cabinet reshuffle. Demonstrators have explicitly directed their anger at the president’s choice to side with traditional generals over innovative reformers.

Surovikin Lining

On the other side of the ledger, there is some speculation that Russia may bring General Sergei Surovikin back to a central position. This is based on his recent return from what was widely viewed as a post-mutiny exile. Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon,” was sidelined in 2023 following a brief rebellion by the Wagner Group, to which he had close ties. Following his dismissal as head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Surovikin was sent to Africa, where UK Defense Intelligence confirmed he was operating as the head of Russian military specialists.

Reports from independent defense analysts suggest that after completing his mission in Africa, he could return to Russia to assume a high-level state or military position., Observers have noted that President Vladimir Putin frequently demotes disgraced or controversial commanders to peripheral roles rather than discharging them entirely. This pattern allows the Kremlin to utilize their expertise and bring them back into the fold when needed.

Given Surovikin’s reputation for ruthless efficiency in conflicts like Syria and as the architect of Russia’s primary defensive lines in Ukraine, some Russian military bloggers speculate that his tactical experience is being rehabilitated to aid broader strategic goals. Given his role in managing the controversial and politically very awkward Russian withdrawal from the city of Kherson west of the Dnieper in the fall of 2022, Surovikin may be just the kind of military intelligence that is needed now in Zapporizhzhia and Kherson.

On the Battlefield

There has still been no evidence of another massive Russian attack, much touted, on Kiev. Last night, Russia fired a total of 164 drones and missiles on targets in Kiev and Odessa – high, but not in the “massive” range (when we are talking about 500 or more). Missiles included Iskander and S400. Industrial facilities were hit in Kiev, and many vessels were damaged or destroyed in the Odessa ports of Yuzhne and Chornomorsk. Ukrainians, in turn, appear, at least temporarily, to have ended their attacks on ships in the Azov Sea and are concentrating more on Russian vessels in the east of the Black Sea where more than 10 vessels were damaged or destroyed in the past 24 hours. Military Summary channel assesses that we can expect either a shutdown of the Black Sea for both Ukraine and for Russia, or else a resort to some kind of “grain deal” that will allow safe passages for grain vessels to their destinations in countries of the South.

In Zapporizhzhia, Russia has resumed its offensive north of Stepovoye and Malye Shcherbaki towards Orikhiv, so that Orikhiv is now threatened by Russia from the east, south and west. Altogether, we can say that Russian forces are moving in the directions of Pavlivka, Novopavlivka and Orikhiv, while bombing Yuviivka and Kamyshuvakha.

Ukrainian forces are trying to take back control over the settlement of Stepnogorsk and have entered Plavni which is an impediment to Russian progress toward the city of Zapporizhzhia, though Russia is subjecting the city to constant bombardment. In the Dnipro area, Russian forces are moving towards Bilytske and consolidating their positions north and northeast of Hryshyne.

In the Donetsk area, Russians have taken Vasiutyvske, and are only five kilometers from the city of Kramatorsk itself, which Russians maintain under constant bombardment. To the north there are minor Russian advances in the Kupyansk, Kharkiv and Sumy areas.