This is not the article I originally intended to post today, which had to do with four Russian women visiting a city in the Bay Area and having an exchange with a local audience on Russia and U.S.-Russia relations.  That post will be moved to later in the week.  Due to the grave nature of possible escalations between the U.S. and Russia over an incident that supposedly occurred in the town of Douma in Syria this past weekend, I feel compelled to provide information and analysis on that.

Off-Guardian has provided a good time-line of the alleged chemical attack and contextual events surrounding it, which I excerpt below:

• February-April 2018: The Syrian Arab Army has been making quick, decisive gains on the ground in recent weeks. Eastern Ghouta has all but fallen. Barring foreign intervention, the Syrian government’s victory is now all but assured.

• March 13th 2018 Russian military command claims US is aiming to strike Damascus on an “invented pretext”. Advises them against it.

• March 13th 2018 Syrian forces reported finding caches of chemical weapons in labs around liberated areas of Ghouta.

• March 19th 2018 Russian and Syrian military figures reported they feared the rebels would stage a “false flag” chemical attack in order to drag US/NATO into action in Syria.

• March 30th 2018 Donald Trump told a crowd at a speech in Ohio – and later repeated in a tweet – that the USA would be pulling out of Syria “very soon.” This is met with consternation in the capital and across the media.

• April 6th 2018 UNSC meeting convened – at Russian request – to discuss the alleged attack in Salisbury, UK. Every member of the UNSC who spoke was categorical in their condemnation of any use of chemical weapons.

• Night of April 7th/morning of April 8th…a chemical attack is reported by the US/UK funded “White Helmets”. The US blames Syrian govt. and holds Russia “responsible”.

Off-Guardian then proposes some questions that readers should be asking in light of the above time-line.   Read it here:

Douma Chemical Attack: Timeline of facts so far

CommonDreams posted a subsequent article summarizing the Russian government’s publicly stated position about the alleged chemical attack in Douma and its possible use as a casus belli for a U.S./NATO attack on Damascus in the near future which, would threaten Russian personnel stationed there.

Staking out its position ahead of an emergency UN Security Council meeting later in the day, Russian government officials early on Monday are warning the U.S. government and President Donald Trump from direct retaliation or further intervention in Syria following an alleged weekend gas attack outside Damascus that has caused heartbreak and uproar inside the war-torn nation, across the region, and beyond.

While Trump declared Sunday there would be a “big price to pay” for whoever was responsible for Saturday’s attack in the city of Douma—where local aid groups said at least 49 people were killed and footage emerged of people, including young children, who appeared to be victims of a chemical weapon or agent—the Russian foreign ministry responded by warning of “most serious consequences” if the U.S. took military action against the Syrian government of President Bashar Al-Assad before all the facts are known.

In the midst of what foreign policy analyst Phyllis Bennis described to Common Dreams as an “extremely perilous moment” in the region and for global conflict between major powers, the foreign ministry in Moscow said in a statement that elements of the chemical attack were “fabricated”—suggesting it was a false flag operation perpetrated by rebel militant forces within Syria—and designed to provoke further intervention or a retaliatory strike against Assad’s forces.

“It is necessary to warn again that military intervention under invented and fabricated pretexts in Syria, where at the request of the lawful government there are Russian military personnel, is absolutely unacceptable and can lead to the most serious consequences,” read the statement. “The aim of these false speculations, that have no basis, is to shield the terrorists and the irreconcilable radical opposition, who reject a political solution, at the same time while trying to justify possible armed strikes from outside.”

At a Monday morning press conference, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the Russian and Syrian government have been trying to warn the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has been investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria, that such an event was likely coming.

“We already had a chance to comment on the current situation before this current situation became reality,” Lavrov told reporters. “Our servicemen staying in the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘on soil,’ repeatedly warned—and the Syrian government also said about it—that a serious provocation is being prepared, aimed at blaming Damascus for the use of a chemical poisoning agent against civilians.”

U.S. ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley threatened unilateral action by Washington if the UN Security Council did not act against the Assad government for the unproven accusations against it.

Russia analyst Gilbert Doctorow detailed the response of the Russian ambassador to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya,  in a recent article :

To anyone watching the UN Security Council “debate” last night it is crystal clear we are in the last days before all hell breaks out. The wall of mutual contempt between Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya and US Ambassador Nikki Haley was on full display. Nebenzya took to pieces the entire argumentation of the US side regarding Douma and the ‘chemical attack.’ He detailed the rebel caches of chemical weapons and equipment for their manufacture that Russian troops have found in recently liberated territory of Eastern Ghouta and elsewhere. He spoke about the past provocations of faked chemical attacks including the one used to justify the US cruise missile launches on the Syrian air base at Sheirat a year ago. He linked the US training and support for terrorists in fabrication of chemical arms to the faked nerve agent attack on the Skripals in the UK, which he described as a vaudeville act. He heaped scorn on Haley for her denying Russia the status of “friend,”  saying that the US has no friends, only sycophants, whereas Russia has genuine friends, and seeks nothing more in relations with the United States than civilized discourse.  In response to this unprecedented denunciation of the USA and its policies of global hegemony, we heard from Nikki Haley the familiar story of how the UN Security Council could now either adopt a US resolution condemning the Assad regime, in effect, or admit its total irrelevance while the US continued on its own unilateral path to resolving the Syrian question.

In the meantime, there are reports of Russia successfully jamming U.S. drones in Syria and Washington sending a second missile destroyer to the Syrian coast to meet up with the USS Donald Cook, which is already there:

The next few days may see already a second US Navy destroyer entering the Mediterranean Sea, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing sources at the Pentagon.

“The US already has one guided-missile destroyer, the USS Donald Cook, in the eastern Mediterranean, where it could take part in any strike on Syria, according to US defense officials. A second, the USS Porter could get there in a few days,” the newspaper wrote.

The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet wrote that Russian warplanes had allegedly buzzed the Donald Cook at least four times, but the report was later denied by the Pentagon.

Newsweek is now reporting that, in response to Washington’s threats, Russia has placed its military on high alert:

 The Russian military has reportedly gone on high alert in anticipation of a potential U.S. attack on the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a Moscow ally accused of using chemical weapons in a seven-year civil war.

Leading Russian politicians and military officials reacted to President Donald Trump’s promise Monday to respond “forcefully” within “the next 24 to 48 hours” to the Syrian military’s alleged use of toxic gas earlier this week in rebel-held Douma, a suburb of Damascus.

 

Vladimir Shamanov, head of the lower parliamentary house’s defense committee and a former airborne troops commander, said Russia had an obligation to protect its ally. Syria has denied the chemical weapons charges and has called for the U.S. to withdraw from the country.

….ABC News reported Tuesday that the Syrian military deployed missile defense systems near Assad’s presidential palace in Damascus and that the U.S. destroyer was in striking distance of the country. Russian Beriev A-50 early-warning aircraft were deployed to the coast, according to Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency. The elite Black Sea Fleet has declared a state of alert, according to Al Jazeera.

Police officers stand outside a branch of the Italian restaurant Zizzi where an ex-Russian spy and his daughter had dined before becoming ill. Picture: Getty ImagesSource:Getty Images

By now you’ve probably all heard the most recent provocative news story that is causing the latest psychotic episode for the West with respect to Russia.  Former Russian spy Sergei Skirpal and his daughter, Yulia, having been seriously poisoned in Salisbury, England earlier this month.   Of course, the British government led by PM Theresa May immediately blamed the Russian government before a thorough and independent investigation could have been completed.  And FM Boris Johnson has been publicly running with the accusations like a bull in a china shop, claiming inside information that the government has solid proof of the poisoning agent and its origins.

We’ve all been down this road before – laying the blame for an event at the doorstep of an adversary or the latest country/leader out of favor with the U.S. elite – before anyone could possibly know with certainty who the guilty party is.  Pretty convenient, eh?

Of course, I’ve seen plenty of articles propagating the British government’s line on the matter, along with plenty of skeptics putting forth good points on why we should not jump to conclusions about Russian government guilt.  But perhaps the best write-up I’ve seen in the latter category is by Rob Shane over at the Blogmire.com, called 30 Questions that Journalists Should Be Asking About the Skirpal Case:

[T]ere are a number of oddities in the official narrative, which do demand answers and clarifications. You don’t have to be a conspiracy theorist or a defender of the Russian state to see this. You just need a healthy scepticism, “of a type developed by all inquiring minds!”

Below are 30 of the most important questions regarding the case and the British Government’s response, which are currently either wholly unanswered, or which require clarification.

1. Why have there been no updates on the condition of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the public domain since the first week of the investigation?

2. Are they still alive?

3. If so, what is their current condition and what symptoms are they displaying?

4. In a recent letter to The Times, Stephen Davies, Consultant in Emergency Medicine at Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust, wrote the following:

“Sir, Further to your report (“Poison exposure leaves almost 40 needing treatment”, Mar 14) may I clarify that no patients have experienced nerve agent poisoning in Salisbury and there have only ever been three patients with significant poisoning.”

His claim that “no patients have experienced nerve agent poisoning in Salisbury” is remarkably odd, as it appears to flatly contradict the official narrative. Was this a slip of the pen, or was it his intention to communicate precisely this — that no patients have been poisoned by a nerve agent in Salisbury?

5. It has been said that the Skripals and Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey were poisoned by “a military grade nerve agent”. According to some claims, the type referred to could be anywhere between five and eight times more toxic than VX nerve agent. Given that just 10mg of VX is reckoned to be the median lethal dose, it seems likely that the particular type mentioned in the Skripal case should have killed them instantly. Is there an explanation as to how or why this did not happen?

6. Although reports suggested the involvement of some sort of nerve agent fairly soon after the incident, it was almost a week before Public Health England issued advice to those who had visited The Mill pub or the Zizzi restaurant in Salisbury on the day that the Skripals fell ill. Why the delay and did this pose a danger to the public?

7. In their advice, Public Health England stated that people who had visited those places, where traces of a military grade nerve agent had apparently been found, should wash their clothes and:

“Wipe personal items such as phones, handbags and other electronic items with cleansing or baby wipes and dispose of the wipes in the bin (ordinary domestic waste disposal).”

Are baby wipes acknowledged to be an effective and safe method of dealing with objects that may potentially have been contaminated with “military grade nerve agent”, especially of a type 5-8 times more deadly than VX?

8. Initial reports suggested that Detective Sergeant Bailey became ill after coming into contact with the substance after attending the Skripals on the bench they were seated on in The Maltings in Salisbury. Subsequent claims, however, first aired by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Lord Ian Blair on 9^th March, said that he came into contact with the substance at Sergei Skripal’s house in Christie Miller Road. Reports since then have been highly ambiguous about what should be an easily verifiable fact. Which is the correct account?

9. The government have claimed that the poison used was “a military grade nerve agent of a typedeveloped by Russia”. The phrase “of a type developed by Russia” says nothing whatsoever about whether the substance used in the Salisbury case was produced or manufactured in Russia. Can the government confirm that its scientists at Porton Down have established that the substance that poisoned the Skripals and DS Bailey was actually produced or manufactured in Russia?

10. The former ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, has claimed that sources within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) have told him that scientists at Porton Down would not agree to a statement about the place of origin of the substance, because they were not able to establish this. According to Mr Murray, only under much pressure from the Government did they end up agreeing to the compromise wording, “of a type developed by Russia”, which has subsequently been used in all official statements on the matter. Can the FCO, in plain and unambiguous English, categorically refute Mr Murray’s claims that pressure was put on Porton Down scientists to agree to a form of words and that in the end a much-diluted version was agreed?

I strongly encourage readers to read the rest of the post with the remaining 20 questions here

Craig Murray has been following the story from the beginning and has been providing great feedback with an insider’s perspective.  A recent post from him points out that a judge’s ruling within the past couple of days has proven that Boris Johnson and the British government’s pronouncements of certainty about the specific type of poison used and its origins are false:

…due to the judgement at the High Court case which gave permission for new blood samples to be taken from the Skripals for use by the OPCW. Justice Williams included in his judgement a summary of the evidence which tells us, directly for the first time, what Porton Down have actually said:

The Evidence
16. The evidence in support of the application is contained within the applications themselves (in particular the Forms COP 3) and the witness statements.

17. I consider the following to be the relevant parts of the evidence. I shall identify the witnesses only by their role and shall summarise the essential elements of their evidence.

i) CC: Porton Down Chemical and Biological Analyst

Blood samples from Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal were analysed and the findings indicated exposure to a nerve agent or related compound. The samples tested positive for the presence of a Novichok class nerve agent OR CLOSELY RELATED AGENT.

The emphasis is mine. This sworn Court evidence direct from Porton Down is utterly incompatible with what Boris Johnson has been saying. The truth is that Porton Down have not even positively identified this as a “Novichok”, as opposed to “a closely related agent”. Even if it were a “Novichok” that would not prove manufacture in Russia, and a “closely related agent” could be manufactured by literally scores of state and non-state actors.

This constitutes irrefutable evidence that the government have been straight out lying – to Parliament, to the EU, to NATO, to the United Nations, and above all to the people – about their degree of certainty of the origin of the attack. It might well be an attack originating in Russia, but there are indeed other possibilities and investigation is needed.

The Russian government has, of course, denied the attack with Putin stating that if the Russian government had pulled off such an assassination attempt with such a deadly type of agent, it would have been successful and the Skirpals would be dead.  He also reiterated that Russia’s chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed under the oversight of the OPCW.   Indeed, readers can go here to see the announcement last October by the OPCW that the destruction process had been completed.

In sum, we need to see more actual evidence of such a serious accusation against a foreign government, especially when unsubstantiated claims have already been made, turning said government into a bogeyman (e.g. Russiagate).   It’s not like the U.S. and UK governments wouldn’t lie to us about grave matters involving life and death regarding foreign governments.   Remember Iraq and Libya.

**************************************************************************

Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter has written an article providing his expertise on the claims made by Putin in his recent Address to the Federal Assembly regarding nuclear weapons and defense capabilities.  As I stated in a blog post about this issue, it would be foolish for people to assume that Putin is bluffing.  Ritter comes to the same conclusion and questions the reaction of our highest-ranking defense officials:

The intellectual stasis displayed by both Mattis and Pompeo is disturbing. These are not so-called “experts” drummed up by the New York Times to further the anti-Putin narrative that has become the centerpiece of the Times’s coverage over the years, but rather serious professionals who hold the security of the United States in their hands. Putin’s pronouncements during his State of the Nation address weren’t a spur-of-the-moment articulation of fantasy, but rather, as he made quite clear, the byproduct of more than a decade of focused intent to counter the threat posed to Russian national security by America’s ballistic missile defense programs. Not only had Russia not masked its intentions in this regard, it had gone out of its way to make sure that the United States was aware of what it was doing and why. In 2007, Russia purposely leaked details about the RS-28 “Sarmat” heavy missile that featured prominently in Putin’s 2018 State of the Nation address to the CIA in a futile effort to get the United States to seriously engage in arms control negotiations.

The RS-28 is a direct descendant of the R-36 heavy ballistic missile, better known by its NATO reporting name, the SS-18 “Satan,” which over the course of its nearly 45 years in service has been an acknowledged game changer in terms of American-Russian strategic balance. The R-36’s large throw-weight (almost 20,000 pounds) allowed it to carry either a single extremely large warhead of 20 megatons or 10 independently targetable warheads of 500 to 750 kilotons each (by way of comparison, the American atomic bombs used to destroy the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War possessed yields of 21 and 15 kilotons, respectively). When the R-36 became operational, it gave the Soviets a genuine first-strike capability, able to eliminate over 60 percent of American missile launch control facilities and missile silos while retaining the capability to launch another 1,000 warheads as a second strike, should the United States choose to retaliate.

From its inception, the United States considered the R-36 the single most destabilizing strategic weapon in the Soviet arsenal and eliminating and/or limiting it became a focal point of American arms control efforts. The START I Treaty saw the number of R-36 missiles deployed reduced from 308 to 154, and the entire R-36 arsenal was scheduled to be eliminated under the terms of the START II Treaty. The decision by the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2002, however, resulted in Russia withdrawing from the START II Treaty in response, and as such maintaining its fleet of R-36 missiles. Russia had planned on allowing the R-36 missile to be retired through obsolescence with no intended replacement; this was the intent behind its START II negotiating position.

Read the full article here

**************************************************************************

On March 8th, a week after Putin’s announcement of Russia’s capabilities, 4 U.S. Senators broke ranks with the strident and overwhelming anti-Russia sentiment in Washington and wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,  encouraging him to enter into new arms control negotiations with the Russians.   As a reminder of how bad the state of our mainstream media has become, the letter by Senators Bernie Sanders, Dianne Feinstein, Jeff Merkley, and Edward J. Markey got little to no major press coverage.   The full text of the letter is reproduced below:

As posted on the website of Senator Merkley 

March 8, 2018

The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Tillerson:

We write to urge the State Department to convene the next U.S.-Russia Strategic Dialogue as soon as possible.

A U.S.-Russia Strategic Dialogue is more urgent following President Putin’s public address on March 1st when he referred to several new nuclear weapons Russia is reportedly developing including a cruise missile and a nuclear underwater drone, which are not currently limited by the New START treaty, and would be destabilizing if deployed.   There is no doubt we have significant disagreements with Russia, including Russia’s brazen interference in the 2016 U.S. elections; continued violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF); invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea; and destabilizing actions in Syria. However, it is due to these policy rifts, not in spite of them, that the United States should urgently engage with Russia to avoid miscalculation and reduce the likelihood of conflict.

First, we encourage the administration to propose alternative solutions to address Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov admitted to the existence of this ground launched cruise missile (GLCM), but contended that the system was INF Treaty compliant.

Senior officials from the United States and Russia have said that the INF Treaty plays an “important role in the existing system of international security.” As such, we urge the State Department to resolve Russia’s violation through existing INF Treaty provisions or new mutually acceptable means.

Second, we urge the United States to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).  The Trump administration’s own 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) references Russia’s robust nuclear modernization program as a main justification behind the U.S. need to recapitalize its three legs of the nuclear triad.  An extension of New START would verifiably lock-in the Treaty’s Central Limits – and with it – the reductions in strategic forces Russia has made.

The New START Treaty, which entered into force in 2011, provides transparency and predictability into the size and location of Russia’s strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and facilities. New START’s robust verification architecture involves thousands of data exchanges and regular on-site inspections.The United States confirmed in February that Russia met New START’s Central Treaty Limits and it stated that “implementation of the New START Treaty enhances the safety and security of the United States.” These same Central Treaty Limits could also govern two of the new types of nuclear weapons referenced by President Putin on March 1st – a case the United States can argue through the Treaty’s Biannual Consultative Commission (BCC).

Lastly, as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes, Russia maintains a numerical advantage to the United States in the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Senate, in its Resolution of Ratification on New START in 2010, took stock of this imbalance and called upon the United States to commence negotiations that would “secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.” Attempts by the Obama administration to negotiate an agreement on this class of weapons met resistance from Russia.  However, even absent the political space for a formal agreement or binding treaty with Russia, we urge the State Department to discuss ways to enhance transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Extending New START, resolving Russia’s INF violation, and enhancing transparency measures relating to non-strategic nuclear weapons will also help quiet growing calls from many countries that the United States is not upholding its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.  The Treaty’s three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of the atom, and disarmament can only be advanced through U.S. leadership on all three.

There is no guarantee that we can make progress with Russia on these issues.  However, even at the height of Cold War tensions, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to engage on matters of strategic stability.  Leaders from both countries believed, as we should today, that the incredible destructive force of nuclear weapons is reason enough to make any and all efforts to lessen the chance that they can never be used again.

Sincerely,

Senators Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont)

After Putin won re-election on March 18th, President Trump called him to congratulate him on his victory, reportedly against the advice of his national security staff.  Commenting on the call afterward, Trump stated publicly that he would probably be meeting soon with Putin to discuss the “arms race that is getting out of control.”

Sputnik News reported that the Kremlin characterized the conversation between the two presidents as “constructive and focused on addressing the problems in Russia-US relations.”

**************************************************************************

Conditions in Ukraine generally continue to deteriorate economically and in terms of human rights, but it’s also difficult to keep up with the general crazy twists and turns among the political class.  Granted, Ukraine has been a nation with significant divisions ever since its’ independence in the early 1990’s, mostly due to the fact that it’s western areas were historically under the control and influence of either the Poles or the Austro-Hungarian empire and the south eastern parts under the control and influence of the Russian empire.   It has not been uncommon to see corruption and fistfights in the Parliament throughout Ukraine’s post-Soviet history.   But since the Maidan and its reliance upon muscle from the far-right (e.g. Pravy Sektor,  Svboda and later the Azov battalion and the like), things are even more unstable.

For instance, Nadia Savchenko, once considered a hero of the Ukrainian nationalist movement who was convicted and jailed in Russia for her role in directing deadly military fire onto two Russian journalists and later released in a prisoner exchange, became a member of the Rada (Ukrainian parliament) and subsequently stated publicly that the far right groups on the Maidan were responsible for the murder of security agents and protesters.  She has now been stripped of her immunity as a parliamentarian and arrested for planning a terrorist attack against the government.  The Irish Times reported the following details:

Less than two years after Nadezhda Savchenko returned from a Russian prison to a hero’s welcome, the ex-military pilot dubbed “Ukraine’s Joan of Arc” is now accused of plotting to blow up Kiev’s parliament and massacre its deputies.The latest extraordinary claims from Ukrainian prosecutor general Yuri Lutsenko – who recently accused former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili of planning a coup in Ukraine – are stoking a febrile political atmosphere that bodes ill for Ukraine’s stability ahead of major elections in 2019.

“The investigation has irrefutable evidence that Nadezhda Savchenko, a deputy of Ukraine, personally planned [and] personally gave instructions on how to commit a terrorist act here in this hall,” Mr Lutsenko told parliament.

He said that after using grenades and mortars to destroy much of the main chamber and the glass dome of the building in central Kiev, she intended to “use automatic rifles to finish off anyone who survived”.

Within days, it was reported by the Russian news agency Tass, that Savchenko had in fact been stripped of her parliamentary immunity and arrested:

KIEV, March 22. /TASS/. Ukrainian MP Nadezhda Savchenko has been detained in Kiev. Earlier in the day the Ukrainian parliament has upheld three requests from Prosecutor-General Yuri Lutsenko for the indictment of parliament member Nadezhda Savchenko and for her detention and arrest.

The decision to strip Savchenko of immunity was carried by a 291 majority vote. Her detention was supported by 277 legislators, with 11 opposing it; 268 voted for her arrest, and six, against.

….In her final statement Savchenko said that Ukraine should reform its political system and give voters a chance to revoke legislators and hold referendums. 

“Ukraine does have a way out without terrorist attacks and other problems that may ruin it. There is a simple and legal way – a reform of the political system,” she said.

Last month, Ukrainian president Poroshenko said he expected US arms shipments to arrive within weeks.  It was also reported by  Defense News that DARPA, the Pentagon’s “hi-tech office” has been operating in Ukraine to help Kiev with its “hybrid” warfare against the Donbas.  Neither of these actions bodes well for the prospects of peace in Ukraine.

As my fellow blogger and geopolitical writer, Greg Maybury pointed in a recent article at Consortium News, a confluence of factors make an escalation by Kiev in the Ukrainian civil war more likely:

Earlier this year, Gilbert Doctorow reported that a new draft law adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament and awaiting president Petro Poroshenko’s signature, threatens to escalate the Ukrainian conflict into a full-blown war, pitting nuclear-armed Russia against the United States and NATO. “Due to dire economic conditions,” Doctorow says, “Poroshenko and other government officials in Kiev have become deeply unpopular, and with diminished chances for electoral success may see war as politically advantageous.”

As history indelibly reminds us, this is an all too frequently recurring scenario in the conduct of international affairs. In a statement that undercuts much of the furor over the Russia-gate imbroglio, Doctorow observes that in contrast to the image of Trump administration policies being dictated by Moscow as portrayed by proponents of Russia-gate conspiracy theories, “the United States is moving towards deeper confrontation with the Kremlin in the geopolitical hotspot of Ukraine. For its part, the Kremlin has very little to gain and a great deal to lose economically and diplomatically from a campaign now against Kiev. If successful, as likely would be the case given the vast disparity in military potential of the two sides, it could easily become a Pyrrhic victory.” [My emphasis]

Read the full article here

The scapegoating of Russia has taken on an air of bigotry and ugliness, based largely on Cold War-era stereotypes. In this article, Natylie Baldwin counters this intolerance with some of her positive impressions having traveled the country extensively.

By Natylie Baldwin

Over the last year and a half, Americans have been bombarded with the Gish Gallop claims of Russiagate. In that time, the most reckless comments have been made against the Russians in service of using that country as a scapegoat for problems in the United States that were coming to a head, which were the real reasons for Donald Trump’s upset victory in 2016.  It has even gotten to the point where irrational hatred against Russia is becoming normalized, with the usual organizations that like to warn of the pernicious consequences of bigotry silent.

The first time I realized how low things would likely get was when Ruth Marcus, deputy editor of the Washington Post, sent out the following tweet in March of 2017, squealing with delight at the thought of a new Cold War with the world’s other nuclear superpower: “So excited to be watching The Americans, throwback to a simpler time when everyone considered Russia the enemy. Even the president.”

Not only did Marcus’s comment imply that it was great for the U.S. to have an enemy, but it specifically implied that there was something particularly great about that enemy being Russia.

Since then, the public discourse has only gotten nastier. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper – who notoriously perjured himself before Congress about warrantless spying on Americans – stated on Meet the Press last May that Russians were uniquely and “genetically” predisposed toward manipulative political activities.  If Clapper or anyone else in the public eye had made such a statement about Muslims, Arabs, Iranians, Jews, Israelis, Chinese or just about any other group, there would have been some push-back about the prejudice that it reflected and how it didn’t correspond with enlightened liberal values. But Clapper’s comment passed with hardly a peep of protest.

More recently, John Sipher, a retired CIA station chief who reportedly spent years in Russia – although at what point in time is unclear – was interviewed in Jane Mayer’s recent New Yorker piece trying to spin the Steele Dossier as somehow legitimate. On March 6, Sipher took to Twitter with the following comment: “How can one not be a Russophobe? Russia soft power is political warfare. Hard power is invading neighbors, hiding the death of civilians with chemical weapons and threatening with doomsday nuclear weapons. And they kill the opposition at home. Name something positive.”

In fairness to Sipher, he did backpedal somewhat after being challenged; however, the fact that his unfiltered blabbering reveals such a deep antipathy toward Russians (“How can one not be a Russophobe?”) and an initial assumption that he could get away with saying it publicly is troubling.

Glenn Greenwald re-tweeted with a comment asking if Russians would soon acceptably be referred to as “rats and roaches.”  Another person replied with: “Because they are rats and roaches. What’s the problem?”

This is just a small sampling of the anti-Russian comments and attitudes that pass, largely unremarked upon, in our media landscape.

There are, of course, the larger institutional influencers of culture doing their part to push anti-Russian bigotry in this already contentious atmosphere. Red Sparrow, both the book and the movie, detail the escapades of a female Russian spy. The story propagates the continued fetishization of Russian women based on the stereotype that they’re all hot and frisky. Furthermore, all those who work in Russian intelligence are evil and backwards rather than possibly being motivated by some kind of patriotism, while all the American intel agents are paragons of virtue and seem like they just stepped out of an ad for Nick at Nite’s How to be Swell.

The recent Academy Awards continued their politically motivated trend of awarding Oscars for best documentary to films on topics that just happen to coalesce nicely with Washington’s latest adversarial policy. Last year it was the White Helmets film to support the regime change meme in Syria. This year it’s Icarus about the doping scandal in Russia.

Similarly, Loveless, the new film by Russian director Andrey Zvyagintsev (director of Leviathan) is being reviewed – as Catherine Brown points out – by writers from the mainstream American media in a predictably biased fashion. The film focuses on the disintegration of a married Moscow couple’s relationship and the complicated web of factors involved which have tragic ramifications for the couple’s 12-year old son.

American reviewers manage to paint the factors detailed in the film that are prevalent in most modern capitalist cities (e.g. being self-centered, materialistic and preoccupied with technological gadgets) as somehow uniquely Russian sins. They also ignore a prominent character in the film that defies their negativity about modern Russia – a character that represents altruism and the growth of civil society in the country.

A common theme in all this is that Russia is a bad country and Russians can’t help but be a bunch of good-for-nothings at best and dangerous deviants at worst. Indeed, according to media depictions, sometimes they manage to be both at the same time. But what they don’t manage to be is positive, constructive or even complicated. Sipher knows that the average American has been deluged with this anti-Russian prejudice, as reflected in his challenge at the end of his initial tweet about the largest country, geographically at least, in the world: Name something positive.

Countering the Negative

Most people know, at least in the abstract, that few individuals or groups are purely good or bad. Most are a complex combination of both. But many – including those who normally consider themselves to be open-minded liberals – have allowed their lizard brains to be triggered by the constant demonization of Russia in the hopes of taking down Trump whom they deem to be a disproportionate threat to everything they hold dear. So as a counterweight to all the negative constantly pumped out about Russia and to take Sipher up on his challenge, I will list some positive things about Russia and the contribution of the country and its people to the world.

Continue reading the article here

Russian President Vladimir Putin, photo courtesy of the Kremlin website

There is much hoopla surrounding what Putin said about defense and nuclear weapons in his recent Address to the Federal Assembly, which is the equivalent of our State of the Union.  Of course, we are greeted with the usual distortion and misrepresentation in most of the western corporate media in its coverage of the speech.

Ironically, the majority of Putin’s speech (given in the run-up to the presidential election) – 2/3 – was about an ambitious program of domestic development meant to build on the progress of the last 17 years of Russia digging itself out of the collapse of the 1990’s and catapulting itself into a modern, stable country with a high standard of living.   Putin and the average Russian know that the only way they can proceed with this program of development is to be left in peace to do so by those in the world with an interest in maintaining  hegemony in a zero-sum game.  We won’t mention any names just yet.

The speech certainly raised an eyebrow but it did not shock me that Putin, while publicly pursuing negotiations with Washington for years – and rebuffed by both parties – would also ensure behind the scenes that the means would be developed to adequately defend Russia if no deal could be made.  It’s like the old adage:  hope (and push) for the best, but prepare for the worst.   Putin is no fool and for those MSM pundits who want to soothe their imperial egos, Putin is not a bluffer and he especially wouldn’t bluff about something like Russia’s security and survival.  It would go against his personality and his credibility.  Those who want to believe otherwise are making a very dangerous assumption.

There have been a few excellent write-ups on Putin’s speech in the independent media.  (See here, here and here).  The one I will mention is by Gilbert Doctorow (third link above).  As Doctorow notes, Americans who ought to be the ones paying attention to these kinds of things (e.g. military and intelligence leaders) have been caught flat-footed again and again by Putin’s counter-moves that have effectively blocked Washington’s imperial plans:  Ukraine/Crimea, Syria, and now missile defense.

It is due to this combination of ignorance, self-delusion and hubris – a belief in their own exceptionalism – that the idea of them not being able to successfully control everything and impose their will and ways on all is impossible to even consider.  They, therefore, not only believe that they have no need to listen to anyone who doesn’t reflect back their own views, but they have no need to even truly know anyone else.  Hence their incompetent advisers, eschewing of diplomacy, sloppy and deceptive intelligence, pulling the same schemes over and over regardless of the disastrous consequences, and the prostituted media that enables them.  This is why they’ve been outsmarted each time by a determined and resourceful man who – whatever his faults may be – will do whatever it takes to defend and develop his country.

The question now is can the collection of arrogant mediocrities in Washington humble themselves enough to learn the much-needed lessons to avoid WWIII?

Without further ado, here is the last 1/3 of Putin’s speech which comprises the entire section dealing with foreign policy and security:

The operation in Syria has proved the increased capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In recent years, a great deal has been done to improve the Army and the Navy. The Armed Forces now have 3.7 times more modern weapons. Over 300 new units of equipment were put into service. The strategic missile troops received 80 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, 102 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and three Borei nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Twelve missile regiments have received the new Yarsintercontinental ballistic missile. The number of long-range high-precision weapons carriers has increased by 12 times, while the number of guided cruise missiles increased by over 30 times. The Army, the Aerospace Forces and the Navy have grown significant stronger as well.

Both Russia and the entire world know the names of our newest planes, submarines, anti-aircraft weapons, as well as land-based, airborne and sea-based guided missile systems. All of them are cutting-edge, high-tech weapons. A solid radar field to warn of a missile attack was created along Russia’s perimeter (it is very important). Huge holes appeared after the USSR disintegrated. All of them were repaired.

A leap forward was made in the development of unmanned aircraft; the National Defence Control Centre was established; and the operational command of the far maritime zone was formed. The number of professional service members has increased by 2.4 times, and the availability of equipment in the Armed Forces grew from 70 percent to 95–100 percent. The years-long queue for permanent housing was eliminated, and the waiting period was cut by 83 percent.

Now, on to the most important defence issue.

I will speak about the newest systems of Russian strategic weapons that we are creating in response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the practical deployment of their missile defence systems both in the US and beyond their national borders.

I would like to make a short journey into the recent past.

Back in 2000, the US announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia was categorically against this. We saw the Soviet-US ABM Treaty signed in 1972 as the cornerstone of the international security system. Under this treaty, the parties had the right to deploy ballistic missile defence systems only in one of its regions. Russia deployed these systems around Moscow, and the US around its Grand Forks land-based ICBM base.

Together with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the ABM Treaty not only created an atmosphere of trust but also prevented either party from recklessly using nuclear weapons, which would have endangered humankind, because the limited number of ballistic missile defence systems made the potential aggressor vulnerable to a response strike.

We did our best to dissuade the Americans from withdrawing from the treaty. All in vain. The US pulled out of the treaty in 2002. Even after that we tried to develop constructive dialogue with the Americans. We proposed working together in this area to ease concerns and maintain the atmosphere of trust. At one point, I thought that a compromise was possible, but this was not to be. All our proposals, absolutely all of them, were rejected. And then we said that we would have to improve our modern strike systems to protect our security. In reply, the US said that it is not creating a global BMD system against Russia, which is free to do as it pleases, and that the US will presume that our actions are not spearheaded against the US.

The reasons behind this position are obvious. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, which was known as the Soviet Union or Soviet Russia abroad, lost 23.8 percent of its national territory, 48.5 percent of its population, 41 of the GDP, 39.4 percent of its industrial potential (nearly half of our potential, I would underscore), as well as 44.6 percent of its military capability due to the division of the Soviet Armed Forces among the former Soviet republics. The military equipment of the Russian army was becoming obsolete, and the Armed Forces were in a sorry state. A civil war was raging in the Caucasus, and US inspectors oversaw the operation of our leading uranium enrichment plants.

For a certain time, the question was not whether we would be able to develop a strategic weapon system – some wondered if our country would even be able to safely store and maintain the nuclear weapons that we inherited after the collapse of the USSR. Russia had outstanding debts, its economy could not function without loans from the IMF and the World Bank; the social sphere was impossible to sustain.

Apparently, our partners got the impression that it was impossible in the foreseeable historical perspective for our country to revive its economy, industry, defence industry and Armed Forces to levels supporting the necessary strategic potential. And if that is the case, there is no point in reckoning with Russia’s opinion, it is necessary to further pursue ultimate unilateral military advantage in order to dictate the terms in every sphere in the future.

Basically, this position, this logic, judging from the realities of that period, is understandable, and we ourselves are to blame. All these years, the entire 15 years since the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, we have consistently tried to reengage the American side in serious discussions, in reaching agreements in the sphere of strategic stability.

We managed to accomplish some of these goals. In 2010, Russia and the US signed the New START treaty, containing measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. However, in light of the plans to build a global anti-ballistic missile system, which are still being carried out today, all agreements signed within the framework of New START are now gradually being devaluated, because while the number of carriers and weapons is being reduced, one of the parties, namely, the US, is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.

Despite our numerous protests and pleas, the American machine has been set into motion, the conveyer belt is moving forward. There are new missile defence systems installed in Alaska and California; as a result of NATO’s expansion to the east, two new missile defence areas were created in Western Europe: one has already been created in Romania, while the deployment of the system in Poland is now almost complete. Their range will keep increasing; new launching areas are to be created in Japan and South Korea. The US global missile defence system also includes five cruisers and 30 destroyers, which, as far as we know, have been deployed to regions in close proximity to Russia’s borders. I am not exaggerating in the least; and this work proceeds apace.

So, what have we done, apart from protesting and warning? How will Russia respond to this challenge? This is how.

During all these years since the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, we have been working intensively on advanced equipment and arms, which allowed us to make a breakthrough in developing new models of strategic weapons.

Let me recall that the United States is creating a global missile defence system primarily for countering strategic arms that follow ballistic trajectories. These weapons form the backbone of our nuclear deterrence forces, just as of other members of the nuclear club.

As such, Russia has developed, and works continuously to perfect, highly effective but modestly priced systems to overcome missile defence. They are installed on all of our intercontinental ballistic missile complexes.

In addition, we have embarked on the development of the next generation of missiles. For example, the Defence Ministry and enterprises of the missile and aerospace industry are in the active phase of testing a new missile system with a heavy intercontinental missile. We called it Sarmat.

Sarmat will replace the Voevoda system made in the USSR. Its immense power was universally recognized. Our foreign colleagues even gave it a fairly threatening name.

That said, the capabilities of the Sarmat missile are much higher. Weighing over 200 tonnes, it has a short boost phase, which makes it more difficult to intercept for missile defence systems. The range of the new heavy missile, the number and power of its combat blocs is bigger than Voevoda’s. Sarmat will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic, and the most modern means of evading missile defence. The high degree of protection of missile launchers and significant energy capabilities the system offers will make it possible to use it in any conditions.

Could you please show the video.

(Video plays.)

Voevoda’s range is 11,000 km while Sarmat has practically no range restrictions.

As the video clips show, it can attack targets both via the North and South poles.

Sarmat is a formidable missile and, owing to its characteristics, is untroubled by even the most advanced missile defence systems.

But we did not stop at that. We started to develop new types of strategic arms that do not use ballistic trajectories at all when moving toward a target and, therefore, missile defence systems are useless against them, absolutely pointless.

Allow me to elaborate on these weapons.

Russia’s advanced arms are based on the cutting-edge, unique achievements of our scientists, designers and engineers. One of them is a small-scale heavy-duty nuclear energy unit that can be installed in a missile like our latest X-101 air-launched missile or the American Tomahawk missile – a similar type but with a range dozens of times longer, dozens, basically an unlimited range. It is a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries. It is invincible against all existing and prospective missile defence and counter-air defence systems. I will repeat this several times today.

In late 2017, Russia successfully launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at the Central training ground. During its flight, the nuclear-powered engine reached its design capacity and provided the necessary propulsion.

Now that the missile launch and ground tests were successful, we can begin developing a completely new type of weapon, a strategic nuclear weapons system with a nuclear-powered missile.

Roll the video, please.

(Video plays.)

You can see how the missile bypasses interceptors. As the range is unlimited, the missile can manoeuvre for as long as necessary.

As you no doubt understand, no other country has developed anything like this. There will be something similar one day but by that time our guys will have come up with something even better.

Now, we all know that the design and development of unmanned weapon systems is another common trend in the world. As concerns Russia, we have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths (I would say extreme depths) intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels, including some of the fastest. It is really fantastic. They are quiet, highly manoeuvrable and have hardly any vulnerabilities for the enemy to exploit. There is simply nothing in the world capable of withstanding them.

Unmanned underwater vehicles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets, including aircraft groups, coastal fortifications and infrastructure.

In December 2017, an innovative nuclear power unit for this unmanned underwater vehicle completed a test cycle that lasted many years. The nuclear power unit is unique for its small size while offering an amazing power-weight ratio. It is a hundred times smaller than the units that power modern submarines, but is still more powerful and can switch into combat mode, that is to say, reach maximum capacity, 200 times faster.

The tests that were conducted enabled us to begin developing a new type of strategic weapon that would carry massive nuclear ordnance.

Please play the video.

(Video plays.)

By the way, we have yet to choose names for these two new strategic weapons, the global-range cruise missile and the unmanned underwater vehicle. We are waiting for suggestions from the Defence Ministry.

Countries with high research potential and advanced technology are known to be actively developing so-called hypersonic weapons. The speed of sound is usually measured in Mach numbers in honour of Austrian scientist Ernst Mach who is known for his research in this field. One Mach is equal to 1,062 kilometres per hour at an altitude of 11 kilometres. The speed of sound is Mach 1, speeds between Mach 1 and Mach 5 is called supersonic, and hypersonic is above Mach 5. Of course, this kind of weapon provides substantial advantages in an armed conflict. Military experts believe that it would be extremely powerful, and that its speed makes it invulnerable to current missile and air defence systems, since interceptor missiles are, simply put, not fast enough. In this regard, it is quite understandable why the leading armies of the world seek to possess such an ideal weapon.

Friends, Russia already has such a weapon.

The most important stage in the development of modern weapons systems was the creation of a high-precision hypersonic aircraft missile system; as you already know for sure, it is the only one of its kind in the world. Its tests have been successfully completed, and, moreover, on December 1 of last year, these systems began their trial service at the airfields of the Southern Military District.

The unique flight characteristics of the high-speed carrier aircraft allow the missile to be delivered to the point of discharge within minutes. The missile flying at a hypersonic speed, 10 times faster than the speed of sound, can also manoeuvre at all phases of its flight trajectory, which also allows it to overcome all existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems, delivering nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometres. We called this system Kinzhal (Dagger).

Video, please.

(Video plays.)

But this is not all I have to say.

A real technological breakthrough is the development of a strategic missile system with fundamentally new combat equipment – a gliding wing unit, which has also been successfully tested.

I will say once again what we have repeatedly told our American and European partners who are NATO members: we will make the necessary efforts to neutralise the threats posed by the deployment of the US global missile defence system. We mentioned this during talks, and even said it publicly. Back in 2004, after the exercises of the strategic nuclear forces when the system was tested for the first time, I said the following at a meeting with the press (It is embarrassing to quote myself, but it is the right thing to say here):

So, I said: “As other countries increase the number and quality of their arms and military potential, Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation weapons and technology.

In this respect, I am pleased to inform you that successfully completed experiments during these exercises enable us to confirm that in the near future, the Russian Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, will receive new hypersonic-speed, high-precision new weapons systems that can hit targets at inter-continental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they travel. This is a very significant statement because no country in the world as of now has such arms in their military arsenal.” End of quote.

Of course, every word has a meaning because we are talking about the possibility of bypassing interception boundaries. Why did we do all this? Why did we talk about it? As you can see, we made no secret of our plans and spoke openly about them, primarily to encourage our partners to hold talks. Let me repeat, this was in 2004. It is actually surprising that despite all the problems with the economy, finances and the defence industry, Russia has remained a major nuclear power. No, nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem, and nobody wanted to listen to us. So listen now.

Unlike existing types of combat equipment, this system is capable of intercontinental flight at supersonic speeds in excess of Mach 20.

As I said in 2004, in moving to its target, the missile’s gliding cruise bloc engages in intensive manoeuvring – both lateral (by several thousand km) and vertical. This is what makes it absolutely invulnerable to any air or missile defence system. The use of new composite materials has made it possible to enable the gliding cruise bloc to make a long-distance guided flight practically in conditions of plasma formation. It flies to its target like a meteorite, like a ball of fire. The temperature on its surface reaches 1,600–2,000 degrees Celsius but the cruise bloc is reliably guided.

Play the video, please.

(Video plays).

For obvious reasons we cannot show the outer appearance of this system here. This is still very important. I hope everyone understands this. But let me assure you that we have all this and it is working well. Moreover, Russian industrial enterprises have embarked on the development of another new type of strategic weapon. We called it the Avangard.

We are well aware that a number of other countries are developing advanced weapons with new physical properties. We have every reason to believe that we are one step ahead there as well – at any rate, in the most essential areas.

We have achieved significant progress in laser weapons. It is not just a concept or a plan any more. It is not even in the early production stages. Since last year, our troops have been armed with laser weapons.

I do not want to reveal more details. It is not the time yet. But experts will understand that with such weaponry, Russia’s defence capacity has multiplied.

Here is another short video.

(Video plays.)

Those interested in military equipment are welcome to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge system.

Of course, we will be refining this state-of-the-art technology. Obviously, there is far more in development than I have mentioned today. But this is enough for now.

I want to specifically emphasise that the newly developed strategic arms – in fact, new types of strategic weapons – are not the result of something left over from the Soviet Union. Of course, we relied on some ideas from our ingenious predecessors. But everything I have described today is the result of the last several years, the product of dozens of research organisations, design bureaus and institutes.

Thousands, literally thousands of our experts, outstanding scientists, designers, engineers, passionate and talented workers have been working for years, quietly, humbly, selflessly, with total dedication. There are many young professionals among them. They are our true heroes, along with our military personnel who demonstrated the best qualities of the Russian army in combat. I want to address each of them right now and say that there will absolutely be awards, prizes and honorary titles but, because I have met many of you in person many times, I know you are not after awards. The most important thing is to reliably ensure the security of our country and our people. As President and on behalf of the Russian people, I want to say thank you very much for your hard work and its results. Our country needs them so much.

As I have already said, all future military products are based on remarkable advances that can, should and will be used in high-technology civilian sectors. I would like to stress that only a country with the highest level of fundamental research and education, developed research, technology, industrial infrastructure and human resources can successfully develop unique and complex weapons of this kind. You can see that Russia has all these resources.

We will expand this potential and focus on delivering on the ambitious goals our country has set itself in terms of economic, social and infrastructure development. Effective defence will serve as a guarantee of Russia’s long-term development.

Let me reiterate that each of the armament systems I referred to is uniquely important. Even more importantly, taken together all these advances enable the Defence Ministry and General Staff to develop a comprehensive defence system, in which every piece of new military equipment will be assigned a proper role. On top of strategic weapons that are currently on combat alert and benefit from regular updates, Russia will have a defence capability that would guarantee its security in the long term.

Of course, there are many things that we have to do in terms of military construction, but one thing is already clear: Russia possesses a modern, high-technology army that is quite compact given the size of the territory, centred on the officer corps, who are dedicated to their country and are ready to sacrifice anything for its people. Sooner or later, other armies will also have the technology, the weapons, even the most advanced ones. But this does not worry us, since we already have it and will have even better armaments in the future. What matters is that they will never have people or officers like the Russian pilot Major Roman Filipov.

I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives.

It was our duty to inform our partners of what I said here today under the international commitments Russia had subscribed to. When the time comes, foreign and defence ministry experts will have many opportunities to discuss all these matters with them, if of course our partners so desire.

For my part, I should note that we have conducted the work to reinforce Russia’s defence capability within the current arms control agreements; we are not violating anything. I should specifically say that Russia’s growing military strength is not a threat to anyone; we have never had any plans to use this potential for offensive, let alone aggressive goals.

We are not threatening anyone, not going to attack anyone or take away anything from anyone with the threat of weapons. We do not need anything. Just the opposite. I deem it necessary to emphasise (and it is very important) that Russia’s growing military power is a solid guarantee of global peace as this power preserves and will preserve strategic parity and the balance of forces in the world, which, as is known, have been and remain a key factor of international security after WWII and up to the present day.

And to those who in the past 15 years have tried to accelerate an arms race and seek unilateral advantage against Russia, have introduced restrictions and sanctions that are illegal from the standpoint of international law aiming to restrain our nation’s development, including in the military area, I will say this: everything you have tried to prevent through such a policy has already happened. No one has managed to restrain Russia.

Now we have to be aware of this reality and be sure that everything I have said today is not a bluff ‒ and it is not a bluff, believe me ‒ and to give it a thought and dismiss those who live in the past and are unable to look into the future, to stop rocking the boat we are all in and which is called the Earth.

In this connection, I would like to note the following. We are greatly concerned by certain provisions of the revised nuclear posture review, which expand the opportunities for reducing and reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear arms. Behind closed doors, one may say anything to calm down anyone, but we read what is written. And what is written is that this strategy can be put into action in response to conventional arms attacks and even to a cyber-threat.

I should note that our military doctrine says Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons solely in response to a nuclear attack, or an attack with other weapons of mass destruction against the country or its allies, or an act of aggression against us with the use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. This all is very clear and specific.

As such, I see it is my duty to announce the following. Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range at all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the attendant consequences.

There should be no doubt about this whatsoever. There is no need to create more threats to the world. Instead, let us sit down at the negotiating table and devise together a new and relevant system of international security and sustainable development for human civilisation. We have been saying this all along. All these proposals are still valid. Russia is ready for this.

Our policies will never be based on claims to exceptionalism. We protect our interests and respect the interests of other countries. We observe international law and believe in the inviolable central role of the UN. These are the principles and approaches that allow us to build strong, friendly and equal relations with the absolute majority of countries.

Our comprehensive strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China is one example. Russia and India also enjoy a special privileged strategic relationship. Our relations with many other countries in the world are entering a new dynamic stage.

Russia is widely involved in international organisations. With our partners, we are advancing such associations and groups as the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. We are promoting a positive agenda at the UN, G20 and APEC. We are interested in normal and constructive cooperation with the United States and the European Union. We hope that common sense will prevail and our partners will opt for honest and equal work together.

Even if our views clash on some issues, we still remain partners because we must work together to respond to the most complex challenges, ensure global security, and build the future world, which is becoming increasingly interconnected, with more and more dynamic integration processes.

Russia and its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union seek to make it a globally competitive integration group. The EAEU’s agenda includes building a common market for electricity, oil, petroleum products and gas, harmonising financial markets, and linking our customs authorities. We will also continue to work on a greater Eurasian partnership.

Colleagues, this is a turning period for the entire world and those who are willing and able to change, those who are taking action and moving forward will take the lead. Russia and its people have expressed this will at every defining moment in our history. In just 30 years, we have undergone changes that took centuries in other countries.

We will continue to confidently chart our own course, just as we always have. We will stick together, as we always have. Our unity is the most durable foundation for future progress. In the coming years, it is our goal to further strengthen this unity so that we are one team that understands that change is necessary and is ready to devote its energy, knowledge, experience and talent to achieving common goals.

Challenges and big goals give special meaning to our lives. We must be bold in our plans and actions, take responsibility and initiative, and grow stronger, which means being of use to our families, children, the whole country; changing the world and our country for the better; and creating the Russia that we all dream about. Only then will the next decade and the entire 21^st century undoubtedly be an age of outstanding triumphs for Russia and our shared success. I believe it will be so.

Thank you.

Order book here

Academic Susan Butler’s Roosevelt and Stalin:  Portrait of a Partnership is dense, covering a lot of historical background on how the Allies worked together and prevailed in WWII, the groundwork laid for the United Nations, and the origins of the Cold War and how it possibly could have been avoided had FDR lived another year or longer.  But it’s also a compelling read – I often had trouble putting it down and often found myself wanting to quickly pick it back up to find out what came next.

The overriding theme of the book is Roosevelt’s deliberate and painstaking efforts to win Stalin’s trust in order to not only achieve victory in the war but to implement his vision of a post-war world order in which the UN would mediate international conflicts to prevent war and eventually facilitate disarmament.

Roosevelt was under no illusions that Stalin or the Soviet Union would become the U.S.’s friends, but that the world’s other emerging superpower needed incentive to cooperate with his post-war vision in which all nations could be reined in.

In order to achieve his goals, however, FDR would have to navigate a potential minefield of distrust between Britain and Russia as historic imperial rivals, as well as the personal dislike between their leaders.  FDR was confident in his ability to serve as a mediator between the two and his confidence turned out to be well-placed.

According to observers, FDR was by turns charming, audacious and used subterfuge in order to gain Stalin’s trust and keep Churchill at bay:

“FDR was a master manipulator of people.  He instinctively knew how to keep Stalin and Churchill working together…Roosevelt was brilliant at sizing people up.  He could intuit other people’s views of reality and appeal to them.  He could lay out a path that made sense from where other people stood; in the process of understanding, he could lead them forward to accept his goals as theirs.” (p. 324)

Roosevelt began working his diplomatic skills with Stalin at the Tehran Conference in 1943 and through the Yalta Conference of 1945, including many direct and indirect communications in between.  Consequently, Stalin developed a deep respect for the American president, eventually finding him to be fair and trustworthy.  Roosevelt was aware that the British had a habit of not keeping their word with Russia and that he could, in contrast, obtain the trust and backing of the Soviet leader with honorable behavior.

Stalin had reportedly never heaped as much praise on anyone, with the exception of Lenin, as he did on Roosevelt.  The two leaders developed a genuine personal rapport.  Stalin expressed sympathy for FDR’s disabilities after chatting with him at his bedside during a health setback at Yalta, commenting to his ambassador:  “Why did nature have to punish him so?  Is he any worse than other people?” (p. 370)

As a reflection of the respect and fondness for Roosevelt felt by both Stalin and the Soviet people, the USSR mourned his passing in April of 1945:

“Virtually the entire Soviet nation, people at every level of society, reacted as if they had lost a real friend.  It was “suggested” by the all-powerful Council of People’s Commissars that all government agencies hang flags of mourning from their buildings, which of course they did.  Not just flags flew black borders, but the front pages of all Soviet newspapers announcing the president’s death were bordered in black as well: his death dominated the news for days.  The front page of Izvestia on April 13 featured Stalin’s condolence letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, in which he called the president “the great organizer of the struggle of freedom-loving nations against the common enemy…the leader of the cause ensuring security world over.”” (p. 466)

By 1939, FDR and some of his advisers had recognized the serious threat to world peace that Hitler’s Germany posed.  They also realized why Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with the Nazis, though FDR made a personal appeal to Stalin not to.

Origins of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939

Stalin was well aware of Hitler’s anti-Slavic views as reflected in Mein Kampf.  Along with Jews, Slavs were considered sub-human.  Through trade with the U.S., Stalin hoped to obtain materials that might be useful in the event of war with Germany.

But however sympathetic FDR might have been on the matter, he faced domestic obstacles that included strong isolationist sentiment and possible accusations of being a communist sympathizer.

The desire of the Bolshevik leadership for trade and cordial relations with the U.S. to balance out anti-Russian dynamics in Europe and in the Pacific started with Lenin as early as 1919:

“It is only the United States of America that may help the Soviet Government since they need friendship with the Republican Russia in the interests of their domestic and foreign politics.  They need: first, markets for the products of their industry; second, opportunities for profitable investment of their capitals; third to weaken English influence in Europe…The relations between the United States and Japan are not sincere…The war between them is inevitable….Entering into relationship with the United States is the issue of paramount national importance and the fate of Soviet Russia depends on its successful resolution.” [emphasis in the original] (pp. 149-50)

Lenin still advocated for such a policy in 1921.  After his death in 1924, Stalin proceeded to seek official recognition of the Soviet government but didn’t succeed until after Roosevelt took office in 1933.

Moreover, after Hitler had taken Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudetenland, Stalin vigorously sought a security pact with Britain and France to counter any potential German aggression.  But Prime Minister Chamberlain continually rebuffed such offers.  The fact that the British and French elites tended to be fearful of communism and even sympathetic to fascism didn’t help matters.  It was also a problem that, in terms of defending border countries, the Polish leadership would not agree to Soviet troops on its soil even in the event of a German invasion.

Finally, at the end of July of 1939, diplomats from France and Britain were sent to the Soviet Union, but Chamberlain had them placed on a slow freighter instead of quicker transport that was available.  Upon arrival, a further delay occurred when it was realized that the British diplomat did not have documents authorizing him to officially negotiate.  When Soviet officials were finally told that Britain had minimal divisions available for potential military operations, revealing serious weakness, the Soviets concluded that Britain was not acting in good faith.

It is believed by some that the British leadership didn’t foresee any potential for a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union and felt that the approaching autumn/winter weather would preclude any possibility of a German attack.  Thus, the mere appearance of negotiations between Britain and the Soviet Union were thought to be a sufficient deterrent.

Meanwhile, FDR saw the decision of Britain and France to not ally with the Soviet Union to counter Germany as a grave miscalculation and thought a war was inevitable.  Consequently, he “quietly” signed orders creating military infrastructure that could be utilized for action in the future. He also attempted to persuade key senators to repeal the American Neutrality Act so as to allow transfer of weapons to vulnerable European nations based on diplomatic information from Belgium that such a move would make Hitler think twice about further aggression. But he was unsuccessful in those efforts.

Sensing the futility of his attempts to ally with Britain and France, Stalin fired the pro-British Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Minister and appointed Molotov who was more sympathetic to Germany.  Stalin also knew that as the Soviet official who was by far the closest to him, he would get more detailed reports of negotiations from Molotov. Talks on trade with Germany were eventually begun and those on political issues soon followed.

When Stalin signed the pact with Germany on August 24, 1939, he believed that he was buying time to prepare for any invasion.  He clung to the delusion that Germany would seek to take out Britain first and Hitler intentionally gave that impression.

Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of the Soviet Union

Stalin’s denial in the face of continual warnings of an imminent German attack from his own generals and multiple intelligence and diplomatic sources, including information passed on to the Soviet Ambassador from the U.S. State Department, which had surreptitiously obtained a copy of Hitler’s Directive for Operation Barbarossa, is simply mind-boggling.

Due to pressure from General Georgi Zhukov and Semyon Timoshenko, Stalin agreed to some modest defensive preparations.  But he was so convinced that Germany would not yet attack the Soviet Union that he even granted a German request to search for bodies of German soldiers who’d died in WWI in Russia. Zhukov and Timoshenko were flabbergasted at this blatant attempt to survey Russian military positions and troop levels.  Stalin’s justification was that he was appeasing Germany to avoid giving it a pretext for an early attack.

The books’ description of Germany’s vicious assault on the Soviet Union as it began in early summer, and its devastation to the western part of the country in short order, is one of the most sobering accounts I’ve read of these events:

“Beginning at 3:15 on the morning of June 22 three million German soldiers, plus another half million Romanian, Finnish, Hungarian, Italian and Croat troops, coordinating their attack from the Finnish border to the Black Sea, equipped with 700,000 field guns –some marching on foot, some riding in one of 3,600 tanks or one of the 600,000 motor vehicles, some mounted on one of the 600,000 horses – spilled over the Soviet western border.  Over their heads flew 500 bombers, 270 dive-bombers, and 480 fighters.

“Because the Germans, using various pretexts, had been allowed to fly reconnaissance missions over the Russian border and had checked out the airfields, army bases, and command centers for the better part of a year, the Luftwaffe easily and quickly found its targets; the immediate devastation was huge:  twelve hundred Soviet planes were lost the first day. The commander of the western front’s air forces was so stunned he committed suicide….

“In three days the Wehrmacht advanced 150 miles.  Within a week the Germans had captured 400,000 soldiers, damaged more than four thousand planes beyond repair, and penetrated 300 miles into Russia, capturing Minsk.  Another 200,000 soldiers were captured the second week.” (p. 191)

It took several days for the profound error in judgment he’d made to sink into Stalin, during which he retreated to his dacha, drank heavily, and reportedly suffered a nervous breakdown.  Molotov was forced to give the first post-invasion speech to the Soviet population.  When finally Molotov, Beria – the head of the NKVD (precursor to the KGB) – and another Soviet official entered his dacha, Stalin feared they had come to arrest him.  Upon realizing that they had not come to depose him but expected him to assume his duties as the Soviet leader, he managed to pull himself together.

Stalin proceeded to put in 18-hour days and got himself quickly up to speed on all relevant military and logistical matters. He immediately made efforts to reach out to the U.S. and Britain for an alliance.

By mid-September, however, Kiev had been captured and over 400,000 Soviet soldiers taken prisoner after which they were held in open air fields where they were shot or allowed to starve or die from exposure.

Everyone has heard of the infamous Siege of Leningrad.  However, in September of 1941, the siege of Moscow began and would kill 926,000 before ending.

“By October 5 three German fronts were close to encircling the city.  Zhukov, ordered by Stalin to return to Moscow, arrived on October 8.  On that day 600,000 Muscovites were mobilized to mine the main bridges and tunnels, build barricades, create obstacles, dig trenches, and destroy all remaining industrial sites.  In all, 498 companies and 210,000 workers were packed up, put on rails, and transported to the east.” (p. 213)

By the middle of the month, Stalin was forced to order the evacuation of the city.

“October 16 was a day of terror in Moscow.  The Moscow police had been sent to the front. The city closed down:  there were no buses, no trolleys; the metro stopped running.  The streets were jammed with panicked people – families, possessions, baggage – all trying to move out of the city, amid a rain of soot swirling overhead as office workers set their files on fire.” (p. 216)

In early November the anniversary of the 1917 revolution was coming up, which was normally commemorated with an elaborate celebration in the capital.  Stalin decided to hold the traditional march in Red Square with a military parade. Molotov and Beria were incredulous at the idea.

But Stalin ordered a fighter “umbrella” to protect the city from German bombers.  Stalin then gave a 30 minute speech broadcast all over the Soviet Union.  A reporter for Overseas Press, Ralph Parker, relayed the impact of the speech on heretofore despondent Muscovites:

“The war is won,” a Red Army colonel said to him as they stood at a railway station east of Moscow….

All around him, Parker noticed, “people stood transfixed by their leader’s voice and turned rapt faces towards Moscow whence it came.”

By November 23^rd things were looking extremely grim as German soldiers were close enough to see the highest points of the capital city and Russian officials had asked British diplomats for help in destroying the oil wells in the Caucasus.  Then something fateful happened:  the temperature dropped to -4 F.  German soldiers weren’t prepared for the Russian winter, their leaders assuming they would have captured Moscow well before then.  At this point, General Zhukov was finally able to mount a successful counter-attack and go on the offensive.  Moscow then handed the Wehrmacht its first major defeat.

FDR’s Response to German Invasion of Soviet Union

“Roosevelt knew that if Hitler emerged victorious from the Soviet Union, with the oil of the Caucasus, the grain of the Ukraine, and the manpower of Russia at his fingertips, with Hirohito and Mussolini as his allies, he would not rule just Western Europe but the world.  Therefore, the Soviet Union had to be helped.” (p. 194)

Though Roosevelt understood the grave implications if Hitler succeeded in his conquest of the Soviet Union, he had to deal with the deep anti-Russian sentiment that permeated much of the State Department.  Indeed the prejudice interfered with the foreign service staff’s ability to perform its duties competently.  Comprised mostly of “conservative, wealthy socially prominent eastern establishment families that were bitterly anti-New Deal,” the staff’s assessment of Stalin’s proclivities on foreign affairs and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. turned out to be dead wrong.  (p. 113)

FDR appointed Sumner Welles as Under Secretary of State to lead a reorganization of the department’s staff.  But the results were less than successful and FDR was forced to find ways to circumvent the stonewalling he encountered within the State Department and other agencies when trying to implement policies to assist the Soviet Union.

For the time being, FDR had to work with Harry Hopkins to expand the Lend-Lease program to provide direct assistance as quickly as possible to the Soviet defense.  Hopkins convinced FDR to let him go to Moscow as soon as possible for a direct meeting with Soviet officials.  Hopkins subsequently had a 2-hour meeting with Stalin to coordinate assistance.  During this meeting the Soviet leader said he would allow American troops to operate in any part of Russia under American command if they were willing to do so.

Roosevelt still encountered attempts to sabotage his robust efforts to supply the Soviet Union lower down the chain of his administration.  Nevertheless, by the fall, the Lend-Lease program and the “Moscow Protocol” were providing “massive” supplies to Russia in the fight against Germany.

“The list of goods that Roosevelt committed to send to the Soviet Union was astounding.  It included shipments every month of 400 planes, 500 tanks, 5,000 cars, 10,000 trucks, and huge quantities of antitank guns, anti-aircraft guns, diesel generators, field telephones, radios, motorcycles, wheat, flour, sugar, 200,000 pairs of boots, a million yards of woolen overcoat cloth, as well as 500,000 pairs of surgical gloves and 15,000 amputation saws.  Shipments began virtually immediately.  By the end of October ships carrying 100 bombers, 100 fighter planes, and 166 tanks – all with spare parts and ammunition – plus, 5,500 trucks were on the high seas.” (p. 210)

Later at the Tehran Conference, Stalin would acknowledge the critical contribution of Lend-Lease to the Soviet defense:

“I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war.  The most important things in this war are machines.  The United States has proven that it can turn out from 8,000 to 10,000 airplanes per month.  Russia can only turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month.  England turns out 3,000 to 3,500, which are principally heavy bombers.  The United States, therefore, is a country of machines.  Without the use of these machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.” (p. 117)

FDR also felt he had to come up with ways to prevent any senior military officials from working to oppose his plans.  For example, the Map Room was set up for important diplomatic messages to be passed and military information to be tracked via charts and maps displayed on the walls.  Only FDR, Hopkins and Admiral Leahy were allowed access to this room outside of the staff of code officers and 6 watch officers – 3 from the army and 3 from the navy.  To prevent any military officials from knowing his complete correspondence with Churchill, Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek, incoming messages were relayed through the War Department and outgoing messages through the Navy Department.

The U.S. Officially Enters the War

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration faced few domestic political obstacles to any military assistance against the axis powers.  In early 1942, discussions were underway for a cross-channel attack on Germany the following year, opening up a western front in Europe.  The plan was known as Operation Overlord and was supported by most of the American military leadership, including Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall and Eisenhower who was then a colonel/brigadier-general.  Eisenhower drafted the plan for spring of 1943.  However, British cooperation was necessary and Churchill argued for delay of the plan as the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew he would.

Churchill’s main delaying tactic was to argue for a diversion of troops to capture islands in the Mediterranean, a further push into Italy, and increasing supplies to “partisans” in the Balkans in the hope of provoking a Balkans split from Germany thereby pushing Turkey into the war. None of the other allied political or military leaders were convinced of the feasibility of Churchill’s plan, but his opposition to Overlord prevented its implementation at that time.  It was only at the Tehran Conference at the end of 1943 that Churchill begrudgingly agreed to the operation.

After being talked out of opening the second front in Europe in 1942, FDR went into North Africa.

Though Stalin was hoping for a second front to take the pressure off of the Soviet Union in the east, Molotov reportedly later admitted that he knew the second front plan was not viable for the U.S. at the time but public acknowledgment that they were planning to do so served an important political purpose: “I remained calm and realized this was a completely impossible operation for them.  But our demand was politically necessary…I don’t doubt that Stalin too believed they would not carry it out.” (p. 246)

By the time of the Tehran Conference in December of 1943, indirect communications were being conducted regularly between FDR and Stalin via diplomatic personnel and cables back and forth.  The nature of these contacts made Stalin realize that the Soviet Union was being viewed as an equal.  As a result of concerns communicated that would smooth the way for productive negotiations at Tehran and the basis for a quid pro quo relationship, Stalin began to allow for some freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and he dissolved the Comintern.

The concession on religion came about due to FDR’s suggestion that to do so would quell domestic criticism about assisting the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, Stalin was already inclined to dissolve the Comintern due to a belief that each nation should have its own communist party and it was not the Soviet Union’s responsibility to export revolution.  In addition, some of the duties of the Comintern could be reassigned to other Soviet agencies.

FDR turned down Churchill’s offer to let him stay at the British embassy in Tehran for the conference, instead he “charmed” Stalin into inviting him to stay at the Russian embassy.  On the day of his arrival, FDR had the first of three meetings with Stalin without Churchill.  FDR, of course, was deliberately keeping Churchill at arm’s length in order to begin his plan to gain Stalin’s trust and cooperation by building a rapport.  Naturally, Churchill resented such treatment by the American president.

The first meeting lasted around 40 minutes.  China, colonialism, mutual dislike of the French leadership, opening up a western front, and Stalin’s wish to become a post-war trading partner with the U.S. were all discussed to varying degrees.

First impressions of Stalin by American officials were largely positive, noting the Soviet leader’s patience and friendliness.  His intelligence was also observed:

“[Stalin] had the ability to grasp and retain certain information and had the additional gift of a photographic memory.  At meetings he worked “with no papers, no notes,” “missed nothing”; he had a “memory like a computer,” according to Andrei Gromyko, later to be Soviet ambassador to the United States.  Beria said that Stalin “dominated his entourage with his intelligence.” (p. 73)

Of course, Stalin had his match in FDR whom associates described as being a quick study even when it came to complicated matters, possessing remarkable listening skills, mastery of detail, and ability to switch gears from one issue to another.

During the second meeting without Churchill, FDR detailed his vision of the post-war world order and more specifically the United Nations.  He relayed his idea of the “4 Policemen” of the world, consisting of the U.S., Britain, China and the Soviet Union, overseeing the peace in their respective regions.  All four would become members of what would become the Security Council of the UN.  FDR had already described his UN vision with Molotov the year before, noting that initially the 4 Policemen would be the only nations allowed to have arms, with others possibly being allowed the privilege in the future if they’d demonstrated trustworthiness; the UN would conduct inspections and “if any nation menaced the peace, it could be blockaded and then if still recalcitrant bombed.”  (p. 236)

It became clear to FDR during their conversations that Stalin had to be convinced of any post-war order being able to block the resurgence of Germany, which Stalin believed would be able to rebuild within a generation unless prevented from doing so.  Stalin was not initially persuaded by FDR’s idea of the UN being able to accomplish this.  Moreover, Stalin was skeptical of China as one of the four policeman.

FDR, however, believed that China’s population alone meant that it would eventually become a serious power.  Additionally, he believed that a non-white nation must be represented on the Security Council and that China could balance out the Soviet Union’s power in Eurasia.

During the third meeting, the UN was discussed further as well as Poland and the Baltics.  Roosevelt was willing to accept Soviet control of Poland as long as it was “peaceful and its institutions preserved.” FDR and Harriman acknowledged that the UK-recognized Polish government-in-exile was problematic in terms of its leaders tendency to be strident and Russophobic in addition to expecting the U.S. and UK to “restore their position and their landed properties, which were extensive, and prop up the feudalistic system that had existed in Poland earlier in the century.”  (p. 124) Mindful of domestic politics in an upcoming election year, FDR did not discuss borders at the conference in order not to upset Polish-Americans.  He did, however, show openness to the idea of ceding Polish territory in the east to the Soviets and adding German territory in the west as compensation.

As far as the Baltics, FDR initially wanted them to be independent but eventually gave up that request.  Roosevelt got Stalin to agree to the UN as a universal global organization rather than having regional bodies in return for Soviet Control of Poland and the Baltics.

By the time of the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, the Polish question would be worked out in more detail.  By then, the Red Army had pushed the Germans out of Poland and Stalin had established the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) to govern.  At Yalta, Stalin and Churchill butted heads on the issue.

Not only had Stalin personally seen Russia’s vulnerability to attack and invasion during the Russo-Japanese war, WWI and WWII, he had a library containing more than 20,000 books on history and political theory, many of them with heavy personal annotation.  Protecting Russia’s future security with all the resources at his disposal was one of two top priorities for Stalin after the war ended.  This had everything to do with his attitude toward Poland.

Still supporting the Polish government-in-exile with its Russophobic elements, however, Churchill stated his vision of a post-war Poland under such leadership:

“The Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished…that Poland be mistress in its own house and captain of its own soul…” (p. 375)

Stalin subsequently delivered a lengthy and impassioned rebuttal about Russia’s security:

“It was a question of strategic security…because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia…During the past thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor…Poland was weak.  Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland…” (pp. 375-6)

Of course, “independent” and “democratic” meant a Poland that was friendly toward the Soviet Union and did not contain elements within its leadership who were members of the pre-1939 government which had harbored pro-German sympathies and actively spoke of “the next war against Russia.”  (p. 376)

FDR supported the removal of anti-Russian elements in any future Polish government and developed a rapport with the leader of the Polish Peasant Party who favored amiable relations with the Soviet Union as a possible solution.  But the leadership of the Polish Peasant Party was unable to secure significant support from the émigré community to agree to certain conditions.  Consequently, the Party was unable to successfully work with the Soviet-sponsored PCNL, cementing FDR’s resignation on Poland that it simply be allowed the outward trappings of “free and fair” elections.

Stalin’s other top priority was the reconstruction of the Soviet Union which had seen a third of its vast country destroyed by the war.  He sought a major loan from the U.S. to help with this, although it never came to fruition.  A peaceful post-war period was therefore in Stalin’s interest in order to rebuild.  He also believed it would facilitate Europe’s evolution toward communism as a superior economic system.  This may seem laughable to readers today, but at the time Stalin had good reason to think this was a very real possibility in light of all that he was able to achieve in terms of the Soviet Union’s industrial and social development within 10 short years:

“His belief was founded on the fact that he had eliminated unemployment in the Soviet Union, provided food, shelter, education, and health care where there had been minimal or none before.  He had presided over the top to bottom reorganization of Soviet society.  His five-year plans had produced remarkable results, although at great cost, little comprehended at the time.  The execution of these plans required great courage and utter ruthlessness, according to Joseph E. Davies.  Stalin had turned the Soviet Union, a backwards society, into an industrial state that had to be reckoned with.  Collectivizing the farms – involving the murder and deportation of millions of agricultural workers, the virtual extinction of the kulaks – in the end worked to change Russia forever.  In 1928, the Soviet Union had produced 4.3 million tons of steel; by 1938 that figure had risen to more than 18 million tons.  The production of trucks went from 700 per year to 182,000.  In the space of ten years Soviet Russia, an agricultural society, had become an industrial society.” (p. 261)

FDR’s main focus at Yalta, which despite his ailing health he was enthusiastic to attend, was the establishment of the UN and its potential for ushering in a new age of peace and stability.  Not only did FDR want to obtain Stalin’s buy-in for the UN and keep the other superpower in check, he also wanted to gradually push Churchill into relinquishing some of the British colonies.  Along with Stalin, FDR believed that the “pursuit and maintenance of colonial empires was a root cause of WWII.”  (p. 352)

FDR was also personally opposed to colonialism and the racism that undergirded it.  Moreover, he felt that maintaining colonial empire was against the unfolding direction of history.  Hopkins – whose views on the subject were considered to be in sync with Roosevelt’s – once told Ambassador John Winant, with respect to negotiations with the Soviet Union about the post-war future:  “The days of the policy of ‘the white man’s burden’ are over.  Vast masses of people simply are not going to tolerate it and for the life of me I can’t see why they should.” (p. 244)

However, Churchill was a virulent racist and believed whole-heartedly in the colonial system.

The most infamous example of this thinking by Churchill was his attitude toward and actions against the Indians whom he had once referred to as “pernicious vermin.” During the war, Churchill had knowingly set in motion policies that led to massive starvation in the Bengal region. As word got out of the genocidal levels of the enforced famine, offers of food aid were made by the U.S., the House of Commons voted to take steps to alleviate the starving, and appeals were made by the local viceroy and the Archbishop of Canterbury.  All of these were actively blocked and ignored by Churchill, leading to an ultimate death toll that reached into the millions.

Churchill’s cynicism about FDR’s motives were reflected in his belief that moral and practical opposition to colonialism/imperialism were not possible and that FDR merely wanted the colonies of Britain to be released so they could then become dependent politically and economically on the U.S.

FDR was ultimately able to get Churchill to allow India to sign on separately to the UN.

In preparation for the conference, FDR had his ambassador Averill Harriman communicate the issues he most wanted to discuss to FM Molotov and Soviet ambassador Maisky:  In addition to the future of international security (UN), FDR had wanted to resolve the issues surrounding Germany, namely reparations and partitioning.

Roosevelt had decided by early 1943 his policy of total surrender of the axis powers, which would obviate the need for a peace conference and give him the freedom he needed to implement his post-war plans.  But it was also for psychological reasons as he pointed out in an exchange with a journalist in 1944:  “Practically all Germans deny the fact they surrendered in the last war, but this time they are going to know it.” (p. 260)

Partition of post-war Germany into 4 or more sections was discussed, with the possibility of Britain and even France presiding over areas being entertained.  In the end, it was divided between the U.S.(later under a more general U.S.-led western/NATO umbrella) and the Soviet Union.

Japan

After the allied victory in Europe, FDR and Stalin began working out how the Soviet Union would contribute to the war against Japan.  U.S. military leaders were keen on getting Soviet assistance in order to decrease the number of American casualties in the planned invasion of Japan’s main islands.  Previous experience fighting the Japanese saw a 98% death rate for Japanese soldiers who would fight to the death rather than surrender.  In a series of memos from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to FDR on this subject, the JCOS suggested that Stalin be asked what steps should be taken to best facilitate quick and effective collaboration between the U.S. and Soviet Union and to provide feedback on any prior problems with the U.S. that had been observed by Soviet officials that could hamper such an effort.

The joint military action to take out Japan was expected to be relatively quick with Stalin offering the use of the largest army in the world.  Allied intelligence would, in fact, reveal that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan would push the latter to surrender.

In return, Stalin wanted the return of the Kurile Islands which it had lost to Japan in 1875 and territory lost in the 1905 war, as well as control of a couple of ports.  Return of the Kuriles was eventually agreed upon, along with the southern portion of Sakhalan and an internationalized free warm water port at Dairen, the use of which was to be shared with China.

The Atomic Bomb

By the time of the Yalta conference, there had been much discussion within the Roosevelt administration about the advantages and disadvantages of revealing to the Soviet Union the existence of the program to build the bomb.

By 1940, Soviet officials had already developed suspicions based on the sudden absence of any discussion of nuclear fission in American physics journals and the simultaneous disappearance of top physicists from academia.  The Soviet Union had started a program, but with the invasion of Germany, resources were diverted to other more immediate needs and it was not restarted until after the defeat of the Nazis.

After receiving a letter from Albert Einstein in 1939 about the dangers of Germany developing a nuclear weapon and the need for the U.S. to preempt it, along with advice from his economist friend Alexander Sachs, FDR ordered a team of scientists to work on the project, which would later become part of the war effort.  Ironically, the Manhattan Project would come to rely heavily on the expertise of émigré scientists forced out of Europe by Hitler.  At its peak, the Manhattan Project “employed 120,000 people and built and ran 37 installations, at a cost of $2 billion.” (p. 308)

Early on, FDR struggled with whether to share information with his Soviet ally.  The question was not only over whether to reveal the existence of the program but how much information to share.  After receiving feedback from relevant scientific and military leaders, there was majority opinion that the Soviet Union should be informed.  The reasoning that underscored this opinion was that the Soviet Union would likely be able to build their own such weapon within a matter of a few years and if no moves toward openness about the existence of such a weapon on the American side had been made, the anger and distrust would make a dangerous arms race inevitable.

Roosevelt was inclined to follow this advice, but Churchill was again the spoiler, persuading FDR in September of 1944 to hold off on revealing the program at that time.  With advisers suggesting that a successful detonation would not occur until spring, it is believed that FDR thought that a delay in sharing the information with the Soviet Union until then made sense.  By the time of the Yalta Conference, of course, this had not happened.  Even by the time of FDR’s death, it had not happened.

Unfortunately, Harry Truman did not have FDR’s understanding of the nuances of the international arena or the Soviet Union’s security concerns, much less his diplomatic skills. Truman ordered the leaders of the Manhattan Project to push the testing of the bomb up so he could use it as leverage at the Potsdam Conference.

He also refused counsel from many more knowledgeable and wiser individuals who had been part of the Roosevelt administration.  Instead, Truman was more comfortable taking advice from those who confirmed his own “gut” feelings on matters.  He therefore listened to more conservative and anti-Russian voices, like Leslie Groves.

Unfortunately, FDR did not live long enough to attend the UN Conference that April.  Some believe that he intended to step down as president after the war’s end and serve as the organization’s first Secretary General.

By the time of the conference, there were still a few issues to be ironed out between the two superpowers.  The first was the Soviet position on the scope of a veto as a Security Council member. The Soviets, who believed that as the only Communist member (Stalin did not view China’s communists as genuine) they could be ganged up on, wanted the veto to extend beyond actions to also cover discussion of particular issues.  This position was a non-starter for the U.S.

Furthermore, Truman had been dismissive of Molotov during his first meeting with the Soviet FM and made comments that seemed to indicate a backtracking of what had been agreed to at Yalta on the Polish issue.

During the UN conference, Hopkins had to fly to Moscow to assuage Stalin’s growing concerns about the attitude of the president after he ordered the immediate halt of Lend-Lease – an order he quickly reversed after being advised of its irresponsibility.

Stalin also wanted the Soviet republics of Belorussia and Ukraine to have separate votes in what would become the General Assembly.  Doing so, especially in the case of Ukraine, would give Stalin a domestic boost.

After a series of six meetings with Hopkins, Stalin finally relented on the veto issue and reiterated his promise to enter the war against Japan.  He also would later get agreement on the two Soviet republics.

Eventually, Stalin also signed on to the Declaration of Liberated Europe, which called for the formation of “interim government authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people” as well as facilitating such elections.  (pp. 430-1)

Supposedly Stalin signed the declaration in the belief that the Soviet Union’s influence on the governments of eastern Europe would be, at a minimum, tolerated due to the Red Army’s contribution to their liberation and the assumed success of communist parties in free elections.  Not to mention, Stalin wanted to maintain good relations with the U.S. in the hopes of economic assistance.

But under the Truman administration, relations continued to deteriorate and a “cold war” emerged.