By Jeff Childers, Substack, 10/25/24

🔥🔥  The historic BRICS Summit ended yesterday. Among other platforms, Business Insider ran its story headlined, “Putin has spent years championing the idea of de-dollarization — but a new reality is setting in.”

It turns out they aren’t creating a new currency to compete with the dollar. It’s much more ambitious than that.

How historic was this week’s Summit? On Wednesday, Bloomberg ran a story headlined, “IMF Sees Growth Shift Toward BRICS and Away From G-7 in New Outlook.” The G-7 has long been the world’s biggest and most influential economic alliance, composed of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and, for some reason I will never understand, that economic powerhouse, Canada.

The “Group of Seven” used to be the world’s biggest economies. (Plus Canada.) Not anymore. Bloomberg said that in just the last six months, BRICS has surged ahead of the stumbling G-7 group in IMF forecasts:

Surpassing the G-7 is happening even without whatever the BRICS are doing with their collective financial system. But once that comes online, the G-7 will  become even less relevant, and the BRICS even farther ahead.

This woeful result proceeds directly from Joe Biden’s hysterical, anti-Russia sanctions. In Putin’s own words, quoted by Business Insider, BRICS isn’t anti-dollar, but all the sanctioning by the (smaller) G-7 countries is pushing the larger BRICS economic group to necessarily develop some kind of alternative:

Yesteday BRICS released a comprehensive plan to which its members and applicant members agreed. BRICS is not, in fact, creating any new global currency. Instead, it’s creating an alternative international payments platform, for people buying and selling things across borders, or for when nations trade with each other (to buy weapons, grain, or oil, for three examples).

Right now, everyone must use a common payment settlement system called SWIFT. SWIFT is U.S. created and effectively controlled, even though it is ostensibly privately owned and supposedly located in Belgium. The thought that SWIFT is at all independent is a great gag that everyone at the State Department always guffaws about making them cough champagne up their noses.

For many countries, SWIFT has at least two huge problems. When I say the platform is effectively U.S.-controlled, you can imagine all the implications. Users’ data is supposed to be private, but for some reason everybody thinks the U.S. constantly snoops on where all the money is going to and coming from. (One possibility for why they think that is because Edward Snowden exposed it all in 2013, but I digress again.)

The second, even bigger problem is that the U.S. acts like the spoiled kid at his birthday party, refusing to let the kids he doesn’t like ride the rented pony. In other words, the U.S. forces countries to do things they hate, like teach their kids trans techniques, by threatening to cut them off from SWIFT, or snatching their money as it travels through the collected SWIFT system.

Russia, for example, is cut off from SWIFT under U.S. sanctions. And $300 billion of its money was seized while sitting in a SWIFT clearinghouse bank. The implacable Russians are great poker players, you can never tell if they’re at all mad about Biden snatching their $300 billion or exploding their undersea pipelines.

But you can imagine how mad the Russians must be.

The Russians are mad enough to spend their time and money leading a world movement to replace the G-7 and its captive SWIFT system. Which would be horrible for us.

Once BRICS has its own interbanking system, they won’t need to trade in dollars anymore, not unless they need something from the U.S. or from a G-7 country. For complicated reasons, the reduced demand for dollars just from those lost transfers will drastically worsen our debt problem. And maybe more important for BRICS countries, the U.S. won’t be able threaten sanctions to force them to swallow every lunatic social experiment that comes down the liberal U.S. pike.

The BRICS pitched their interbanking system yesterday as a non-threatening “alternative” to SWIFT, rather than any kind of direct competitor. Having choices, they stressed, just improves everyone’s outcomes. But that logic is like claiming that when you parked your taco truck right next to Jose’s taco truck, it is actually better for Jose’s taco trade since diners like different choices of tacos.

Jose is not likely to agree. Jose is likely to go loco.

BRICS is not yet ready to switch the new platform on. But this week’s Summit was so significant that many articles, while not drawing a direct comparison, mentioned “Bretton Woods.”

Bretton Woods was the famous (or infamous) 1945 meeting where the winning countries after World War II created the international banking system, the IMF, and the World Bank. Yesterday, BRICS argued that things have changed since 1945. It’s like the G-7 is a seasoned citizen still using an iPhone 7. You can’t install any new apps. The international monetary system needs an upgrade.

The U.S. could shut this BRICS initiative down easily and immediately. All we need to do is reform SWIFT. If the U.S. stopped using SWIFT to sanction other countries, and SWIFT opened up its system transparently, and the U.S. stopped using SWIFT for spying, then BRICS would be unnecessary.

And everyone would keep trading in dollars.

In other words, we could rescue the dollar. We only need to give up the ‘dirty tricks’ tool we use to force other countries to make their kids sit through drag queen happy hours. But Biden’s neocons won’t try that simple remedy, will they? They’ll let the dollar be destroyed before they give up their economic wonder weapon.

By Ted Snider, Responsible Statecraft, 10/8/24

It is said that Henry Kissinger asserted that little can be won at the negotiating table that isn’t earned on the battlefield.

In several wars in recent weeks, U.S. officials have echoed that approach. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller recently said that the U.S. “supports[s] a ceasefire” in Lebanon while simultaneously recognizing that “military pressure can at times enable diplomacy.” Meanwhile, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expressed the doctrine as doing “all that we can to strengthen Ukraine’s position on the battlefield so it has the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.”

But during the Biden administration, the iteration of Kissinger’s doctrine has gone well beyond the generals supporting the diplomats. The diplomats are now outpacing and pushing the generals. In the Biden administration, despite the promise to open “a new era of relentless diplomacy,” the State Department has metamorphosized into the hawkish arm of the Pentagon.

In the debate within the Biden administration over whether permission should be granted for Ukraine to fire Western supplied long-range missiles deeper into Russian territory, it is the diplomats who have pushed for escalation, and the Pentagon and intelligence community who have argued for caution.

Blinken has promised that “from day one… as what Russia is doing has changed, as the battlefield has changed, we’ve adapted… And I can tell you that as we go forward, we will do exactly what we have already done, which is we will adjust, we’ll adapt as necessary, including with regard to the means that are at Ukraine’s disposal to effectively defend against the Russian aggression.”

It is the Pentagon that has counseled restraint. They have argued that the uncertain benefits of longer range strikes do not outweigh the risk of escalation. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has maintained that “long-range strikes into Russia would not turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor,” and agrees with the intelligence community that Russia is capable of quickly moving most of its assets out of range.

This is not the first time the debate on escalation has featured unexpected sides. While, soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Department argued that “real diplomacy” does not take place at times of aggression, it was General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who advocated for diplomacy and said that the goal of a sovereign Ukraine with its territory intact would require “a long, very difficult, high casualty-producing war.”

Milley further argued that “You can achieve those objectives through military means…. but you can also achieve those objectives maybe possibly, through some sort of diplomatic means.” Once again, it was the top general who advocated for diplomacy while the top diplomat argued for more war.

It is also not the first debate on long-range missiles. On May 15, before the U.S. had approved even limited longer-range strikes into Russia, it was the State Department that first floated giving the green light. Asked about the U.S. ban on Ukraine’s use of American equipment to strike into Russian territory, Blinken replied that, “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine,” before adding, “but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war…. these are decisions that Ukraine has to make, Ukraine will make for itself.”

The State Department has from the start abdicated diplomacy. We know that on December 17, 2021, Putin proposed security guarantees to the United States with a key demand of no NATO expansion to Ukraine. But rather than negotiate, Derek Chollet, counselor to Secretary Blinken, later revealed that the U.S. at the time did not consider NATO expansion to be on the bargaining table.

At the end of a full term in office, the Blinken State Department does not have a single diplomatic victory to boast about. At the start of his term, Biden promised to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy.” He promised he would “promptly reverse the failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” He promised a different foreign policy than Trump’s “abject failure” in Venezuela. And he promised a new approach to North Korea that “is open to and will explore diplomacy.”

The Blinken State Department has delivered on none of these promises and has failed to attain a ceasefire in Gaza or in Ukraine. Instead, it has availed itself of a one tool tool box of coercion, be it sanctions or military force. It has fallen to the Pentagon to suggest diplomacy and to question unrestricted use of force.

Meanwhile, it was General Charles Q. Brown Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior Pentagon officials who recently raised the question at the White House of whether over-reliance on military force has emboldened America’s partners to be increasingly aggressive and cross American red lines.

Diplomacy has often in the past partnered with military force. But in the Biden administration, the State Department has abdicated diplomacy and reduced itself to the hawkish arm of the Pentagon which has, paradoxically, been the louder voice for diplomacy.

Russia Matters, 10/25/24

Russia in Review, Oct. 18-25, 2024

5 Things to Know

1. Russia hosted the first BRICS summit since the group’s expansion to nine members with leaders from 32 countries, including China and India, as well as the U.N. General Secretary, participating in the event that took place in Kazan this week. The Oct. 22–24 summit, which has become the largest geopolitical event hosted by Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, symbolized Kremlin’s efforts to promote a multipolar world order as an alternative to U.S. dominance. One key item on the summit’s agenda was discussion of Russia’s “BRICS Bridge” proposal, aiming to create a blockchain-based payment system to bypass the U.S. dollar. However, practical progress on implementing Russia’s financial proposals was reportedly limited, as countries face U.S. pressure not to collaborate with Russia’s financial system. Putin, Xi and some other leaders of the BRICS countries’ would like this group to become a competitor to Western-led international organizations, while others, such as Modi, are careful to avoid turning the group into an alternative to global organizations. Lack of consensus on the issue is reflected in the Kazan summit’s declaration. It contains 20 references to multipolarity and multilateralism, calling for a more just world order. The declaration’s signatories also offer some implicit criticism of the West by asserting that “we are deeply concerned about the disruptive effect of unlawful unilateral coercive measures, including illegal sanctions, on the world economy, international trade and the achievement of the sustainable development goals.” However, while shaming, the declaration doesn’t name any particular group of countries.* 
2. Some 1,500 servicemen of North Korea’s Eleventh Army, an elite unit known as the “Storm Corps,” are undergoing training in Russia as part of a 10,000–12,000-strong unit that will be tasked with helping Russia to re-take parts of its Kursk region held by Ukrainian armed forces, according to South Korean intelligence as cited by Bloomberg and FT. The balance of forces in this region, where the Ukrainian army has already had to cede up to half of its gains, is already reportedly tilting slowly in Russia’s favor. U.S. officials have earlier this week acknowledged the presence of North Korean servicemen in Russia, but have not given any hints on whether and how Ukraine’s allies may respond if the DPRK personnel are employed to fight on Russia’s side. Meanwhile, Putin has appeared to acknowledge that North Korean troops had been deployed to his country, according to NYT. Alluding to the DPRK-RF treaty, which has a mutual assistance clause, Putin said on Oct. 24 that he “never doubted at all that the North Korean leadership takes our agreements seriously.”¹
3. A U.S. official told Fox News that America’s Intelligence Committee (IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) have recommended against modifying a U.S. policy that would allow Ukraine to strike targets deep within Russia using U.S.-made long-range missiles. According to the IC and DOD analysis, a change in policy would not have a strategic impact nor would it change the course of the war. In addition, “[i]t would be irresponsible if we didn’t take into account what Russia would do,” the official said. Russia is a “nuclear power capable of doing very bad things both to Ukraine and to the U.S.,” Fox News quoted the U.S. official as saying shortly after the Biden administration had announced a new $400 million shipment of arms to Ukraine. The new package includes ammunition for missile and artillery systems, armored personnel carriers, and satellite communication equipment, according to ISW.
4. Russia is open to a “reasonable compromise” but won’t make any concessions to end its war in Ukraine, Putin said in a TV interview that aired after he completed hosting the BRICS summit in Kazan. “We are ready to make reasonable compromises, but I don’t want to go into details right now because there are no substantive negotiations,” Putin was quoted by Bloomberg as saying in this TV interview broadcast Oct. 25. One day prior to the broadcast, Putin had told a BRICS summit press conference that “We are ready to consider any options for peace agreements, based on the realities that are developing on the ground,” repeating his earlier demands that Ukraine accept Russia’s land grabs. Last week, Putin said Russia is ready to hold a dialogue on a peaceful settlement, but only based on draft agreements Russian and Ukrainian negotiations discussed in Istanbul in spring 2022.
5. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that if Russia and Ukraine can agree to refrain from attacking each others’ energy infrastructure, it could lead to the cessation of hostilities and peace talks, FT reported. “We saw during the first [peace] summit that there could be a decision on energy security. In other words: we do not attack their energy infrastructures, they don’t attack ours. Could this lead to the end of the war’s hot phase? I think so,” the Ukrainian leader was quoted by this U.K. newspaper as saying.

By Yves Smith, Naked Capitalism, 8/8/24

Poison pill noun

a financial tactic or provision used by a company to make an unwanted takeover prohibitively expensive or less desirable

-Merriam Webster

Yours truly must confess to having overlooked a critical component of Putin’s proposed peace terms, which he articulated on June 14, and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just reiterated in an exclusive interview to Newsweek, which was his position on sanctions. Admittedly, Putin included it almost as an afterthought.

First, let’s look at Lavrov’s recap, since it’s more compact than Putin’s formulation (which Putin set forth in two places in his speech, so it was not a tidy, self-contained list). From Newsweek:

“On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement as follows: complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic], LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic], Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and removal of all sanctions against Russia.”

Aside from Putin setting forth all these issues, including recognition of the four oblasts plus Crimea as being part of Russia, in his June 14 speech, important media outlets also stated the key points (see for instance the Anadolu Agency writeup).

We will skip over the fact that Putin warned, not long after the Istanbul talks collapses, that the longer the war went on, the harder it would become to negotiate with Russia. By implication, just by virtue of Putin’s last offer being made in June and it now being October, with Russia having made considerable breakthroughs on the ground, that Russia would insist on even tougher terms now. That is confirmed by Russia’s position that it would not negotiate with Ukraine at all as long as it has forces in Russia. And many commentators have said opinion in Russia hardened even more against Ukraine after the Kursk invasion, and more citizens wanting Russia to fully subdue Ukraine and dictate terms that before.

Currently, Western commentators are focusing on what is sure to continue to an area of no bargaining overlap: that of Ukraine neutrality and foreswearing membership in NATO. That was tentatively agreed in Istanbul in March-April 2022 because the US and NATO were allowing Ukraine the appearance of autonomy. That is no longer very much the case. NATO and other Western officials now regularly yammer that Russia has no business deciding whether any country joins NATO. Of course, a Ukraine under different management (including most Banderites dead or run out of the country) could but the US and NATO would not give any security guarantees. Some Western pundits and officials are engaging in new versions of cope, such as advocating Ukraine cede the Russian-occupied land (temporarily!) for NATO membership. Amusingly, Zelensky and the Azov types are incandescent.

The part of Putin’s proposal that I saw as particularly cheeky but got comparatively little attention in the Western press was the condition that Ukraine withdraw from all of the four contested oblasts, which goes beyond what Russia occupies and that that be recognized as Russian territory. For those who have not been paying careful attention, the Banderites have threatened Zelensky if he gives up any part of Ukraine.

From the Kremlin translation of the Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials:

“Certainly, the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine must be fully protected. The new territorial realities, including the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, Kherson, and Zaporozhye regions as parts of the Russian Federation, should be acknowledged. These foundational principles need to be formalised through fundamental international agreements in the future. Naturally, this entails the removal of all Western sanctions against Russia as well.”

You will see that Putin goes from agreement terms that can be granted by Ukraine alone, to ones to be granted by other countries, admittedly down the road. Even if a future Ukraine agrees to recognize the four oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia, it seems well-nigh impossible that the US and EU would ever concede that. However, most BRICS members probably would, so that would confer considerable legitimacy

It’s thus odd to see Putin, who obviously know what he is doing, toss in the idea of reversing all Collective West sanctions almost as an afterthought. These were formally imposed on a state by state basis. The US, UK, EU, Australia, Japan and South Korea all implemented sanctions packages. That included the seizure of Russian central bank assets by the EU, US, and UK, with the EU holding the bulk of the frozen lucre.

Let’s engage in some thought experiments. The EU has been desperately trying to “Trump-proof” various Ukraine arrangements. If Trump were to become President and be willing to meet Russia way more than halfway and give some sanctions relief, you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump, particularly where it has more degrees of freedom, as with the sanctions. Remember also that Ursula von der Leyen is about as hysterically anti-Russian as the Baltic states, and has filled the top ranks of the Commission with female uber-hawks. EU experts please pipe up. I assume modifying or ending the sanctions would require a unanimous EU vote, and not just a qualified majority, which amounts to na ga happen.

Mind you, I expect this implacable rejection to continue even when it became more self-destructive than now. What if things get so ugly in the Middle East that oil goes over $120 a barrel and stays there? Yes, China will be hurt, but so too would be the recessionary EU. But it seems vanishingly unlikely that they’d roll back the Russian oil sanctions, or that Germany would accept gas from the still-working one of four original Nordstream 2 pipelines.

Given all that, one has to think that Putin clearly understood that his Western potential interlocutors would reject not just some but all of his deal points with prejudice. So why make an offer that the other side is set to reject? First, Putin (as we and others have stressed) finds it important to make clear to his Global South economic partners that he’s not being the difficult party, that Russia is not the impediment to ending the war. Most of these countries are still viscerally uncomfortable with Russia invading and occupying a neighbor even if they understand why intellectually.

To put it another way, setting out terms, even if they are objectively reasonable, or at least a not-crazy opening position for talks, that the other side looks set to reject, looks like an exercise in papering the record, rather than negotiating. Lavrov underscored the idea with Newsweek: “At present, as far as we can see, restoring peace is not part of our adversary’s plan.”

So one can argue that Putin had concluded before June 14 that the only way to resolve the conflict was through a battlefield victory. His provisions were a way to make that official without saying so.

But second, this may have been Putin doing his own early Trump-proofing. Remember, he made this speech before the Biden-second-term-killing debate with Trump. Trump then looked to have good odds against Biden due among other things lack of enthusiasm for Biden dampening Democratic party fundraising. And Trump has told anyone who would listen that he can secure a peace in Ukraine in 24 hours.

So was this outline of terms a bit of Russian Trump-proofing? Recall how Putin over time found dealing with Macron’s various peace schemes to be tiresome. So he might want to short-circuit similarly pointless talks with Trump by pointing to his position and playing broken record.

Moon of Alabama, 10/23/24

The actor who has been playing the President of Ukraine for a while is getting cold feet. Winter is coming and the energy networks of Ukraine are near to the point of total breakdown.

There could have been agreements in place to prevent that. But the Ukrainian side had botched those deals. Now Zelenski is begging to renew them.

In late 2022 the Russian military launched a bombing campaign against electricity switching stations in Ukraine. A lot of transformers got blown up. The Ukrainian military responded by concentrating its air defenses near electricity stations. That was exactly the effect the Russian’s had asked for. The air defense installations, not the electricity stations, had been their real target.

After splitting from the Soviet Union, Ukraine had had the best air defenses money could buy. During the fall and winter of 2022 most of it had been destroyed. The Russian campaign against electricity stations came to a halt.

In 2023/24 the Ukrainian military started its own campaign against infrastructure in Russia. Several refineries were hit by drones and went up into flames. Gasoline production in Russia was falling significantly and export of gasoline had to be stopped for a while.

The Russians retaliated by renewing their campaign against Ukraine’s electricity network. But this time the targets were not just switching stations but the generation facility themselves. The non-nuclear electricity production in Ukraine got decimated.

In its daily briefings the Russian Ministry of Defense called the attacks on Ukrainian electricity stations a direct retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian proper. For example:

This morning, in response to the Kiev regime’s attempts to damage objects of Russian power infrastructure and economy, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation delivered a group strike by long-range precision weaponry at objects of the Ukrainian military-industrial infrastructure and AFU aviation bases.

With their generation capacity in danger and under the threat of blackouts the Ukrainian government got to its senses – at least for a while. Secret negotiations were arranged in Doha, Qatar, to stop the infrastructure attacks on both sides.

In August 2024, shortly after the Ukrainian army had launched an incursion into the Kursk oblast of Russia, the Washington Post reported:

Ukraine and Russia were set to send delegations to Doha this month to negotiate a landmark agreement halting strikes on energy and power infrastructure on both sides, diplomats and officials familiar with the discussions said, in what would have amounted to a partial cease-fire and offered a reprieve for both countries.

But the indirect talks, with the Qataris serving as mediators and meeting separately with the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, were derailed by Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia’s western Kursk region last week, according to the officials.

…

For more than a year, Russia has pounded Ukraine’s power grid with a barrage of cruise missiles and drone strikes, causing irreparable damage to power stations and rolling blackouts across the country. Meanwhile, Ukraine has struck Russia’s oil facilities with long-range drone attacks that have set ablaze refineries, depots and reservoirs, reducing Moscow’s oil refining by an estimated 15 percent and raising gas prices around the world.

…

A diplomat briefed on the talks said Russian officials postponed their meeting with Qatari officials after Ukraine’s incursion into western Russia. Moscow’s delegation described it as “an escalation,” the diplomat said, adding that Kyiv did not warn Doha about its cross-border offensive.

Ukraine had to pay a heavy price for the Kursk incursion. The elite troops it had sent failed to reach their target, a nuclear power station near Kursk, and soon got decimated. The attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure continued with full force.

Three month later, with the Kursk incursion as well as its electricity network near to total failure, the Ukrainian government is again changing course. It is begging to renew the deals it had botched.

As the Financial Times reports (archived):

Russia putting an end to aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy targets and cargo ships could pave the way for negotiations to end the war, the Ukrainian president has said.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists in Kyiv on Monday that “when it comes to energy and freedom of navigation, getting a result on these points would be a signal that Russia may be ready to end the war”.

…

If Moscow and Kyiv agreed to end strikes on their respective energy infrastructures, it would be a significant step towards de-escalating the conflict, Zelenskyy said in reference to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Well – he could have had that deal three month ago. Now it will be more difficult to achieve it. A total retreat of Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region will be the minimum prerequisite Russia will ask for to renew the talks.

Zelenski also wants to renew the Black Sea agreement.

The August Washington Post report reminded of that:

Ukrainian and Russian officials haven’t met face to face for talks since the first months of the war, when delegations from both sides convened for secret talks in Istanbul. Those negotiations eventually fell apart. Later, the two sides agreed to a grain deal that led to Russia temporarily lifting a naval blockade, allowing Ukraine to transfer grain through the Black Sea. That, too, collapsed months later when Russia pulled out of the deal.

The Black Sea deal included a western promise to not hinder Russian exports through the Black Sea. That hindrance however continued as insurance for freighters continued to be denied. Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet also continued. Russia pulled out of the deal and reestablished its rather leaky blockade of Ukrainian ports.

During the last half year Ukraine had started to rebuild its supply line through the Black Sea. Dozens of ships with dry cargo arrived in Odessa and other Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The Russians soon assumed, correctly, that those ships were transporting weapons and ammunition for the Ukrainian military. Iskander missiles were sent to destroy the loads as soon as the ships arrived. Over the last months some 20+ dry good freighters were hit, damaged or sunk. Secondary explosions after the strikes confirmed that explosive freight had been involved.

The Russian naval blockade has been renewed – not by intercepting ships on their way to Ukraine but by hitting them while they unload.

During the war Russia had offered Zelenski at least two small deals which were largely in favor of Ukraine. The Black Sea grain deal failed because Ukraine and its ‘partners’ failed to do fulfill their part of the arrangement. The infrastructure peace deal failed because Ukraine decided to attack towards Kursk.

Now Zelenski is begging to renew both deals.

That may well be possible. But Russia will surely ask for a very steep price.