By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 6/29/26
Uriel Araujo is an Anthropology PhD and a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
While the spotlight remains on Iran and the Middle East, the proxy Western war against Russia in Ukraine could be gaining traction again. In recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to project strength: with a fresh EU financial package in hand, he has portrayed Ukraine as building decisive long-range strike capabilities that could shift the momentum against Russia.
In his June 24 speech, Zelensky highlighted expanding long-range strike capabilities and argued that (with the right support from G7 partners), his country could “force Russia to choose peace”. He pointed to Ukraine’s growing ability to hit “deeper” inside Russian territory as evidence of increasing pressure, while emphasizing plans to bolster domestic weapons production.
It is true that Kyiv has intensified its long-range campaign, striking military, defense-industrial, and energy targets inside the Eurasian great power. For example Ukraine struck targets in Ufa on June 25, hitting Rosneft-linked refineries.
These developments generate striking images and tactical disruption. Yet the reality on the ground is something else: Ukrainian drone warfare has had an impact, but this has not prevented Russian forces from continuing offensive operations, artillery barrages, missile strikes, and their own drone attacks along the front.
Russian advances have in fact been steady: for one thing, its Armed Forces have reported control over settlements including Krasny Liman, Konstantinovka, among others. And the territorial gains continue in key sectors.
Zelensky is, in any case, leveraging the new EU support (roughly $102 billion) to present Ukraine as standing a credible chance.
One may recall that countries such as Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (and initially Hungary) had opted out of financially participating in the EU’s joint package. Post-Orbán, Hungary has reversed its obstruction and facilitated implementation, though Budapest still raises concerns over minority rights in Ukraine and accession issues.
Against this backdrop, UK Prime Minister Starmer announced his resignation, while French President Macron is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term in 2027.
All of that adds uncertainty to the politics and the financial angle of the conflict, in a continent that has long been experiencing “Ukraine fatigue”.
No wonder Zelensky works hard to account for these funds by showcasing military progress.
Kyiv is also purchasing drones (including Hornet ones) in large quantities. The Kremlin, however, still maintains a larger drone inventory for close-range and other responses, not to mention ballistic missiles.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces face a serious shortage of interceptor missiles, including for Patriot systems, with no quick domestic fix in sight; and making their own Patriot missiles would be no solution, as Jennifer Kavanagh (a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities) points out.
Moreover, Kyiv is unlikely to receive major new air defense or offensive systems like Tomahawks in the near term.
Thus, Zelensky, again, seeks to create the appearance of successful defense and even turning the tide. This effort helps justify the massive aid to EU creditors amid Europe’s growing fatigue with the conflict and its economic fallout.
Be as it may, Ukraine’s manpower challenges are underreported, with skilled fighters in short supply after years of attrition.
As I’ve argued, too much is often made of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy assets: while visually dramatic, damage to refineries has proven relatively limited and repairable. Russia has after all absorbed dozens of such strikes, mitigating impacts through spare capacity, rerouting, increased crude exports, and adjustments at other facilities.
The point is that Kyiv can temporarily disrupt operations, but Moscow can count on dozens of refineries, redundant capacity, large reserves, and the ability to adapt. Analysts from the International Energy Agency, for instance, have confirmed that outages cause temporary dips without crippling the sector.
In other words, tactical successes far from the front do not automatically translate into battlefield victory. Wars are still decided by manpower, artillery, logistics, industrial output, and territorial control. Moscow continues expanding production of tanks, shells, glide bombs, missiles, and drones; its defense industry has shifted to wartime footing, with ammunition and drone output rising significantly despite sanctions. In addition, Russia has adapted by dispersing assets, hardening sites, enhancing electronic warfare, and speeding repairs, thus reducing the long-term bite of strikes.
Additionally, Moscow still fields larger strike campaigns with hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic systems in major waves, retaining superior long-range capacity overall. Kyiv in turn faces persistent constraints: personnel shortages, air defense gaps, ammunition imbalances, and aid dependence.
While drone strikes matter, territorial advances remain the more telling indicator, which is why organizations such as the Institute for the Study of War track control maps so closely.
All of this means that Ukraine’s “deep” strikes carry real psychological weight and can impose costs, but they should not be confused with decisive strategic effects.
Moscow after all holds advantages in aggregate resources, industrial base, and in operational momentum across many front sectors. Ultimately, the conflict’s outcome depends less on dramatic drone footage than on hard realities of attrition and negotiation.
The Ukrainian leader’s latest push may buy time and headlines, but the ground situation suggests a far more difficult path ahead, from Ukraine’s perspective. Europe’s patience and resources, in turn, are not unlimited, and the political landscape could face changes soon.