Meduza, 6/28/24

On June 27, Russia’s Federal Statistics Service (Rosstat) published the country’s annual mortality data for 2023. Like that of the previous year, the new data shows a sharply elevated excess mortality rate among young men relative to the situation before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Last year, Meduza and journalists at Mediazona worked with Tubingen University statistician Dmitry Kobak to estimate the Russian military’s total losses in 2022. The new Rosstat data allows us to continue the analysis. According to the 2023 numbers, excess male mortality didn’t just remain high last year — it nearly doubled compared to 2022.

How we use all-cause mortality data to estimate military deaths

The demographic data Rosstat published online on June 27 includes Russia’s total number of deaths in 2023 broken down by gender, age, and region (including Crimea but not the other Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia). The method we use to estimate Russian military deaths based on these numbers was developed by statistician Dmitry Kobak and his colleagues in 2023. Among other things, it effectively eliminates the impact of COVID-19, which contributed significantly to the overall number of deaths in Russia in 2022, especially among older age groups. By isolating the excess deaths among men that were not a result of the pandemic, we can determine the approximate number of combat-related deaths.

We began by calculating the ratio of male deaths to female deaths in each age group while accounting for existing long-term trends. Men in Russia have always had a higher mortality rate than women in almost all age groups — and this isn’t unique to Russia. In the years before the full-scale war in Ukraine, however, this ratio was steadily decreasing, primarily due to a reduction in mortality rates among men. The trend was especially strong among young people, whose deaths are less common overall and mostly result from external rather than natural causes. After Russia launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, the male-to-female mortality ratio surged.

Because women have been almost completely absent among the military deaths confirmed by Mediazona and BBC News Russian, mortality among women can be used as a “benchmark” for calculating the expected number of deaths among men. To do this, Kobak and his co-authors use the long-term trend of the male-to-female mortality ratio to predict what it would be in a given year without the war. They then multiply this ratio by the current number of deaths among women that year. The difference between the actual number of deaths among men and the number we would expect in a hypothetical scenario where there is no war gives us the excess mortality rate for men.

The results of these calculations, conducted a year ago by Kobak and his co-authors with the data from 2022 and again this year using the data from 2023, indicate:

-24,000 excess deaths among men in 2022 (with a 95 percent confidence interval between 22,000 to 26,000)

-40,500 excess deaths among men in 2023 (with a 95 percent confidence interval between 39,000 and 42,000)

-64,000 excess deaths among men over both years (with a 95 percent confidence interval between 61,000 and 67,000)

The highest number of excess deaths over this two-year entire period was among men ages 35–39. This group had nearly 17,000 excess deaths — approximately one quarter of all of the excess deaths among Russian men. The biggest increase between the two years was among men ages 25–29: excess mortality in this group nearly doubled compared to expected levels.

What’s new in this data? And how does it compare to other military death calculations?

The calculations based on the new Rosstat data generally confirm other estimates of Russia’s military deaths calculated by Meduza and Mediazona based on records from Russia’s National Probate Registry. In the last update to these calculations, we estimated Russia’s total losses in the full-scale war up to the end of 2023 at between 66,000 and 88,000 people, with the figure most likely around 75,000.

This is somewhat higher than the 64,000 deaths that the Rosstat data suggests. The discrepancy could be due to a number of factors:

-The estimates based on Probate Registry data involve a degree of randomness, as the registry records inheritance cases, not deaths, and there are a number of reasons a person might choose to file an inheritance claim or not.

-The composition of Russia’s military personnel may have changed in ways that our model based on the Probate Registry failed to compensate for. We took into account changes in the age distribution of soldiers as well as their previous military affiliation (for example, the large influx of prisoners in 2023 and the sharp decrease in the proportion of career military personnel in 2022). The military’s makeup has undergone numerous changes throughout the course of the war, however, and our model cannot identify and compensate for all of them. For example, we have no information about the differences in the income level or property of the soldiers going to war today compared to two years ago.

-Rosstat may have excluded some “military” deaths from this dataset and instead included them in the statistics for Russia’s “new regions” (the Kremlin’s term for the Ukrainian territories Russia has annexed). There have been isolated cases that suggest this practice exists, but there’s currently no reliable data on how widespread it is.

It’s worth noting that one of the conclusions of our analysis based on Probate Registry data was recently confirmed by previously unreleased Wagner Group financial documents obtained by Mediazona. We estimated that the total number of deceased prisoners from June 2022 to July 2023 was approximately 16,000 individuals. Taking into account random error, this coincided closely with the figure listed in Wagner Group’s documents: 17,251.

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 6/26/24

Islamist extremists killed at least 21 people in coordinated attacks against minority Christians and Jews in Russia’s southernmost, multiethnic but mainly Muslim republic of Dagestan on Sunday – the third major terrorist incident in Russia in as many months, according to the government.

Sunday’s deadly attacks appear to have been directed equally against the republic’s small communities of Jews and Orthodox Christians. The attackers struck a police station and four places of worship in two Dagestani cities, demonstratively executing an Orthodox priest and burning down the only synagogue in the ancient city of Derbent. Last October, rioters at the airport in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala, unsuccessfully tried to storm an airliner that had just arrived from Tel Aviv in what was widely viewed as an antisemitic reaction to the war in Gaza.

Leaders of both groups were quick to point to a wider threat to Russia’s social stability.

The attackers’ “undoubted goal is to kindle the flames of hostility, to sow the seeds of hatred and mutual hostility,” Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill told journalists. “The future of Russia largely depends on suppressing attempts to radicalize religious life and all manifestations of extremism and ethnic hatred.”

The president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, Rabbi Alexander Boroda, similarly warned that singling out places of worship threatens to raise social tensions. “People start to be afraid, stop trusting each other. This generates hatred and aggression, which undermines harmony in society and poisons relations between people.”

Russian society seems quite stable on the surface. The country is overwhelmingly secular. Almost 80% of Russians are Slavs, most self-identifying as Orthodox Christians, although most say that they seldom go to church.

There are around 100 other ethnic groups, and three other recognized state religions – Judaism, Buddhism, and Islam – which in some places constitute local majorities in 21 ethnic republics spread across the country. About 18% of Russians are Muslim, but they are mostly concentrated in several republics, including Dagestan, one of the poorest, and Tatarstan, one of the richest.

Some analysts worry that violent Islamist extremism may be reviving after nearly two decades of relative quiescence following Russia’s suppression of Islamist rebellion in the Caucasus republic of Chechnya in the early 2000s. During the previous decade, thousands died in Moscow and other cities across Russia, in airliner bombings, apartment explosions, sieges of a school and a theater, metro bombings, and other attacks by Chechen-linked militants.

Barely three months ago, Islamist extremists struck a Moscow concert venue, killing 130 people. Moscow rhetorically blames the attack on Ukraine and the West but admits it was actually carried out by Tajik citizens linked to the international organization known as Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), which is based in Afghanistan and has been declared a terrorist group by Moscow. Earlier this month, ISIS-linked prisoners took two guards hostage in a southern Russian jail, leading to a special services assault that killed six.

Grigory Shvedov, editor of The Caucasian Knot, which produces independent reporting from the wider Caucasus region, says that the Ukraine war is one factor in the emerging trend, perhaps because security services are distracted. But the war in Gaza has also seriously riled up populations in heavily Muslim regions, especially more impoverished and tradition-minded places like Dagestan.

“People are watching the news daily and seeing what is happening in the Gaza war, and when these attacks against Jews occur, they approve of it,” he says. “The riot at the airfield last October was unarmed, but the attacks against the synagogues last weekend were with deadly force, and people were killed. This is a new target, and I guess it’s because ISIS and local Islamists perceive that this is a vulnerable issue, and the public mood will support attacks on synagogues.”

Though interethnic strife tends to be rare, hostility toward Russia’s large communities of migrant workers, who tend to be mostly Muslims from former-Soviet Central Asia, has been on the rise since the Moscow attack by Tajik citizens in March.

“In our surveys, we note an increase in public concern about becoming victims of a terrorist attack,” says Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Center, Russia’s only independent [western backed] polling agency. “Popular dislike of migrant workers is always high, but the fear of interethnic tensions within Russia is still minor, though growing somewhat.”

Bastrykin has an interesting (and not in a good way) past as a government official according to Richard Sakwa’s book The Putin Paradox. I wouldn’t be surprised if Putin at some point moves Bastrykin to some other post where he can howl into the ether but not do much of consequence (e.g. Dmitry Medvedev). Putin doesn’t like officials or anyone else with significant influence who gets too extreme or becomes counter-productive to Putin’s agenda of balanced moderation and stability. In any event, it will be interesting to sees how Bastrykin’s career plays out, – Natylie

The Bell, 7/1/24

A string of hardline proposals from Russia’s chief investigator

Russia is never short of outrageous proposals from officials looking to grab the headlines. But last week was impressive even by those standards, with Russia’s Chief Investigator Alexander Bastrykin rafting off a string of ultra-hardline initiatives he wants the country to adopt. In the space of just three days he hurled abuse at parliamentarians, called for the return of the death penalty, urged for a ban on niqabs on the pretense of combating terrorism, and complained that migrants should not be hired lest they take over Russia with their ideology and religious sites.

• Alexander Bastrykin, who studied law alongside Vladimir Putin in Leningrad in the 1970s heads Russia’s Investigative Committee, the agency responsible for not only investigating Russia’s most notorious crimes but also bringing cases against the opposition and regime critics. Despite his status as Russia’s chief investigator, Bastrykin himself has been frequently embroiled in scandal. For example, in 2012 his security guards dragged journalist Sergei Sokolov into the woods where Bastrykin personally issued a “grave threat” to his life. Bastrykin allegedly drove one investigator to hospitalization with his criticism and another was reportedly pushed to suicide.
• Bastrykin was one of the main guests at last week’s three-day Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum (though judging by the program, it wasn’t very international), where he succeeded in whipping up a new scandal almost every time he opened his mouth.
• On the first day, Bastrykin spoke at length about alleged crimes being carried out in Russia by migrants. He blasted Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, for failing to pass laws to halt what he said was an influx of foreigners to the country. “I’d really like to know when our State Fools will introduce good laws,” Bastrykin said, with a pun on the similarity between the words for parliament (“Duma”) and fool (“Dura”) in Russian. In response, Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that since deputies were elected by the Russian people, Bastrykin had “insulted the public.” 
• On the same day the top investigator, notorious for xenophobic remarks, described holders of newly-issued Russian passports from Central Asia as “so-called Russians” and said as many as possible should be sent to the war in Ukraine. Addressing Russian businesses, he urged them to pay higher salaries in order to attract indigenous Russians and not to hire migrants. “They create buildings of their culture, places of worship,” he said. “They physically occupy our territory, not just with their ideology but with specific buildings.”
• On day two, Bastrykin called for an end to Russia’s moratorium on the death penalty, in place since the mid 1990s. He claimed that in Soviet times criminals were executed for killing two or three people, while those suspected of carrying out the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack — in which more than 140 were killed — will get life imprisonment. He lambasted that prisoners can expect “three meals a day, two-hour walks and medical examinations, including a dentist” — something which requires a “colossal budget.” In order to reinstate the death penalty, some experts say a constitutional amendment may be required, or at the very least a ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court. But Bastrykin insisted that the moratorium could be canceled by a simple presidential decree. Valery Zorkin, the chairman of Russia’s Constitutional Court, dismissed this, saying the moratorium was “unshakeable.”
• Undeterred, on day three Bastrykin again came out firing, harking back to recent terrorist attacks to urge for an “immediate” ban on wearing the niqab. He said the clothes could be used to conceal “some kind of terrorist sleeper cell.” On this front he was criticized by Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the predominantly Muslim region of Chechnya, who told Bastrykin “not to confuse religion with the extravagant ideas of rabid fanatics and Shaitans.”
• For an encore, Bastrykin also shared his thoughts on gender issues and how he sees a women’s role in the world. “A man is always right,” he said and spoke of his support for “Domostroy,” a 16th-century code that, among other things, offers advice on how men can “correctly” beat their wife.

Why the world should care

It’s hard to see Bastrykin as an official who is particularly close to Putin. However, several of his previous proposals which seemed appalling at the time have ended up becoming part of Russian legislation. For example, in 2015 Bastrykin suggested abandoning the rule of law in the Russian constitution. Such amendments were adopted in the 2020 changes that enabled Putin to extend his term as president. And in 2018, before the widespread blocking of Western social media outlets following the invasion of Ukraine, he suggested banning Instagram inside Russia.

Iryna Farion, a Ukrainian Nazi leader, was recently assassinated. Is Zelensky trying to take out his right-wing opposition?

YouTube link here.

The Bell, 5/31/24

Russia’s landmark tax reforms to raise revenue, change economy 

Russian officials this week announced a long-expected tax reform plan, which puts an emphatic end to a status quo that has lasted two decades. On Tuesday, the Finance Ministry announced the changes it was seeking to implement, and the government approved the necessary legislation two days later. Formal approval from parliament should be received by the end of the summer, and the changes will come into force early next year.

What are the changes?

• Russia’s flat income tax rate of 13% (the only exception, introduced in 2020, was a 15% rate on salaries over 5 million rubles ($55,300) a year) will be replaced by a progressive system. For salaries up to 2.4 million rubles, income tax will remain at 13%. All earnings above that threshold will be taxed at incrementally higher rates, ranging from 15% to 22%.
• Income from dividends, deposits, or transactions involving securities and real estate will not be affected by the new rules (the maximum tax on them remains at 15%).
• Corporate income tax will increase from 20% to 25%. From a revenue point of view, this is the most important change (it is predicted to generate 1.6 trillion rubles next year).
• Small and medium-sized businesses will be able to access tax breaks, but will also have to pay VAT on revenues over 60 million rubles ($670,000). 

How will they work?

The Finance Ministry promises that the changes will only increase taxes for 3% of the population. In reality, though, this group is likely to be bigger. First, because of inflation. There is no plan to index tax thresholds, which means that the number of individuals facing higher tax bills will increase even if real incomes remain the same, never mind if they continue to rise by 8% a year as at present. Secondly, high inflation (and with it, high interest rates) will push up unearned incomes.

There will be no personal tax-free threshold (like, for example, France or Germany). And initial proposals to cut taxes on the poor were dropped. Instead, the government is pushing ahead with a system of support for large, low-income families, and is planning to offer a rebate on taxes paid by low-income families with two or more children. These individuals will pay income tax at a rate of 6% instead of 13%. According to the Finance Ministry, this will help almost half of Russian families with 2 or more children. 

Increasing corporate income tax will reduce company profits by an average of 6.3%. Although tax breaks are available when money is spent on scientific research and Russian technologies, these – by definition – apply to only a small number of companies. The trade and service sector – the bulk of medium-sized business in Russia – is unlikely to benefit.

How much money will it raise?

The Finance Ministry expects the changes to provide an additional 2.6 trillion rubles. That’s one trillion more than the projected budget deficit for 2024. If current growth estimates hold up, the additional revenue would be about 1.4% of GDP.

However, the bond market did not react to this potentially significant boost to state finances. Apparently, the market expects the government to increase its spending at a similar rate, which means the need for borrowing will remain. 

Why the world should care

As we’ve explored many times in this newsletter, state spending is the basis of Russia’s current economic growth. And the new tax system is designed to allow the Kremlin to continue spending for longer. However, this is not the only goal. It looks like the government hopes the tax changes will tilt the economy’s focus toward the development of domestic manufacturing – in particular military production – at the expense of trade, services and other bourgeois pleasures.

Europe poised to target Russian oil export insurers

The EU is again considering sanctioning Russian insurance company Ingosstrakh, Bloomberg reported Wednesday. Such a step would be significant because Ingosstrakh is one of the largest insurance providers for Russian oil transportation. 

• Since 2022, the G7’s price cap on Russian oil exports has prevented international insurers – who make up 95% of the market – from insuring transit for Russian oil traded at more than $60 a barrel. Russian oil sold above this price is ferried by a “shadow fleet” of tankers that can only be insured by Russian companies. Ingosstrakh is one of the leading insurers of this shadow fleet.
• The proposal reported by Bloomberg to target Ingosstrakh comes from an unidentified European Union country. However, the insurer was not mentioned in the EU’s discussions around the next round of sanctions on Russia (which must be approved by all member states). There was a previous attempt to sanction Ingosstrakh in Feb. 2023, but this was opposed by some member states. Further sanctions against Russian oil tankers are opposed by countries such as Hungary and Austria, which are seen as more “pro-Russian,” as well as countries with a large maritime sector (particularly Greece). 
• The Financial Times reported in March that Ingosstrakh’s insurance for Russia’s shadow fleet does not cover possible oil spills, and therefore poses a threat. A similar study in Denmark has highlighted environmental risks.

Why the world should care

Sanctions against Russian insurers would be in line with an apparent pivot in Western tactics toward targeting the profits Russia makes from oil exports (by increasing costs). However, restrictions on Ingosstrakh, one of Russia’s leading insurance companies, may affect more than just shipping: they could also impact passenger aviation within Russia and beyond.

Figures of the week

Between May 17 and 21, inflation in Russia was 0.1% compared with 0.11% the preceding week. According to the Central Bank, year-on-year inflation on May 27 was 8.15% (compared to 7.84% at the end of the previous month). These numbers increase the likelihood that the Central Bank will raise interest rates at its next board meeting on June 7.

A total of 110 billion rubles were loaned under Russia preferential mortgage schemes for new-build apartments in April, according to the Central Bank. That’s up 15% from March.

In the first four months of this year, a total of 22,000 foreigners were deported after breaking the law in Russia. That’s almost twice the number from the equivalent period in 2023, according to a report from the Interior Ministry.