YouTube link here.

By ERIN BANCO, ALEXANDER WARD and LARA SELIGMAN, Politico, 5/30/24

The Biden administration has quietly given Ukraine permission to strike inside Russia — solely near the area of Kharkiv — using U.S.-provided weapons, three U.S. officials and two other people familiar with the move said Thursday, a major reversal that will help Ukraine to better defend its second-largest city.

“The president recently directed his team to ensure that Ukraine is able to use U.S. weapons for counter-fire purposes in Kharkiv so Ukraine can hit back at Russian forces hitting them or preparing to hit them,” one of the U.S. officials said, adding that the policy of not allowing long-range strikes inside Russia “has not changed.”

Ukraine asked the U.S. to make this policy change only after Russia’s offensive on Kharkiv began this month, the official added. All the people were granted anonymity to discuss internal decisions that haven’t been announced.

In the last few days, the U.S. made the decision to allow Ukraine “flexibility” to defend itself from attacks on the border near Kharkiv, the second U.S. official said.

In effect, Ukraine can now use American-provided weapons, such as rockets and rocket launchers, to shoot down launched Russian missiles heading toward Kharkiv, at troops massing just over the Russian border near the city, or Russian bombers launching bombs toward Ukrainian territory. But the official said Ukraine cannot use those weapons to hit civilian infrastructure or launch long-range missiles, such as the Army Tactical Missile System, to hit military targets deep inside Russia.

It’s a stunning shift the administration initially said would escalate the war by more directly involving the U.S. in the fight. But worsening conditions for Ukraine on the battlefield –– namely Russia’s advances and improved position in Kharkiv –– led the president to change his mind.

The National Security Council did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Biden administration hinted that a decision had either been secretly made or forthcoming in recent days. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who supports a restriction lift, became the first U.S. official to publicly hint that Biden may shift course and allow such strikes, telling reporters that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would evolve as needed. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby later did not rule out a potential change.

Those messages came after top U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, said Ukraine should have the right to attack inside Russia using Western weapons. Lawmakers from both parties also supported the move publicly and privately, while top U.S. military officials briefed Congress behind closed doors that relaxing the restriction had “military value,” POLITICO first reported.

The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

Some officials are concerned that Ukraine, when it attacks inside Russia using its own drones, has hit military targets unrelated to Russia’s invasion. The U.S. has strongly delivered the message that Kyiv must use American weapons only to directly hit Russian military sites used for its invasion of Ukraine, but not civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian officials, from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on down, have pushed for the Biden administration to change its policy ever since Russia launched a large assault on Kharkiv. For weeks they’ve said an inability to attack Russian troop positions over the border complicated Ukraine’s defense of Kharkiv and the country writ large.

In a discussion with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Wednesday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov made a “hard push” to use U.S. weapons in Russia, according to a person with knowledge of the call.

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Meduza asks military expert Yuri Fedorov to explain the consequences of NATO members permitting Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia using Western weapons

Meduza, 5/29/24

In his interview with Meduza, Fedorov argues that Kyiv could gain a serious advantage against Russia’s invasion if it can strike Russia’s reserve forces, logistics centers, and major weapons stocks near the border with Ukraine, which have been crucial in the latest offensive toward Kharkiv. Ukrainian attacks on these targets inside Russia would be possible using Western-supplied HIMARS and especially ATACMs long-range, guided missiles. In addition to damaging military facilities, sustained attacks on Russian territory would force the Kremlin to reallocate air defenses to border regions, pulling those systems away from frontline areas inside Ukraine.

Moscow has threatened to respond to this escalation by the West with its own escalation, but Fedorov says Russia is running out of non-nuclear options. He suggests that the Kremlin might resort to targeting government buildings in Kyiv, possibly even the embassies of NATO members. According to Fedorov, there are almost no Russian troops currently in Belarus, and concerns that Moscow might open a new front from this direction are unfounded. He also says the Belarusian military is not trained or equipped to join the war itself, despite two years of improvements. In the meantime, Russian troops hope to advance close enough to Kharkiv to be within barrel artillery range of the city. This assault, however, is intended largely to divert Ukrainian soldiers away from the Donetsk region, where Russia hopes to reach the region’s administrative boundary.

Asked about Ukraine’s recent drone attacks on two Russian early warning radar stations, Fedorov reasons that Kyiv was sending a “very serious warning” by signaling its capacity to damage extremely important facilities in Russia’s strategic defense network. He points out that Moscow hasn’t officially responded to the attacks on its strategic deterrence, even though they technically trigger Russia’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. “This means that Russia currently lacks the political will or technical or material capabilities to implement these provisions of the nuclear doctrine,” says Fedorov, adding that he believes the United States might respond with its own nuclear attack or a “devastating non-nuclear response” against Russian military targets, possibly even on Russian soil, he claims. Fedorov acknowledges that Moscow views Western consent to the use of its weapons for attacks inside Russian territory as NATO’s direct involvement in the war, but he says his own opinion is that this new weapons policy will strengthen the Ukrainian military, thereby reducing the need for more direct Western intervention.

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Permission to use Western weapons to strike Russia:
what does it mean and what will happen as a result?

Strana, 5/31/24, Translation by Geoffrey Roberts

Statements by Western countries to allow strikes on Russia with their weapons are only partly the result of military necessity.

The use, for example, of HIMARS missiles – with a range of up to 80 kilometres- in the border areas of the Belgorod region, or of Western-supplied air defence systems to shoot down aircraft over Russia, could have a certain military significance, but it would not correspond to the hyped discussion of this topic. Nor will permission from the Czech Republic or Poland to strike with their weapons change much (Czech “Vampires” have been regularly fired at the Belgorod region).

A truly serious (though also not decisive) impact could be had by permission to strike with long-range missiles, but that does not exist yet.

At this stage, the spinning of this topic in the West solves not so much military as informational and political problems.

Namely:

1. Show the immutability of support for Ukraine – to maintain morale and faith in victory in Ukrainian society in the face of a difficult situation at the front.

2. Wind-up “angry patriots” in Russia because Putin does not react to the “crossing of red lines” – to roil the situation inside the Russian Federation.

3. Signal Russia not expand the front line by attacking the Sumy region or Kyiv (Western media write that permission to use their weapons may expand if the Russian Federation attacks in new directions).

4. Demonstrate to Western waverers there is no need to fear Russian threats, that you can move step by step: permission for strikes on Russian territory with long-range missiles; convince Scholz to provide the Taurus; increase and speed up the supply of aircraft; introduce a no-fly zone over Western Ukraine; and then send in NATO troops, etc.

The last goal is the main one of the so-called “war party”, which has been saying for a long time there is no need to be afraid of nuclear threats from the Russian Federation or of Moscow’s “red lines”, but that we need to be involved “to the maximum”, right up to sending troops. This “party” avers that Putin will not dare to launch a nuclear strike.

But Russia has its own “war party,” which calls for “moving from words to deeds”: present an ultimatum to the West with the threat of using nuclear weapons. Or demonstratively apply them to Ukraine (or even one of the European countries) in order to show “seriousness of intentions”, and then put terms to the West, believing the USA and the EU, fearing a nuclear war, will make an agreement with Russia (“Caribbean Crisis 2.0″).

This “party” has been demanding such for a long time, together with corresponding statements on the topic of where our “red lines” actually lie.

Authorising strikes on Russia with Western weapons, as well as other subsequent steps to increase NATO involvement in the war, gives supporters of the Russian “war party” new arguments. Maybe they will not immediately influence the Kremlin’s decision-making, but with each new step this probability increases. Moreover, Putin and Medvedev regularly make clear the “nuclear” option is possible.

The key problem is that the war party in Russia and the war party in the West are both based on premises that may turn out to be false.

The War Party in the West believes Putin will not dare use nuclear weapons in response to NATO’s increased involvement in the war.

The war party in Russia believes that the West will not go nuclear in the event of a threat (an ultimatum or a “demonstration” nuclear strike), but that it will make an agreement with Moscow.

Neither assumption may be warranted, and there could begin a real nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for humanity. Do the two sides have enough intelligence and political will to stop the war? That is the main question.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 5/25/24

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski revealed in his latest interview with The Guardian that “The Americans have told the Russians that if you explode a nuke, even if it doesn’t kill anybody, we will hit all your targets [positions] in Ukraine with conventional weapons, we’ll destroy all of them. I think that’s a credible threat.” If true, and there’s no reason to suspect that he simply made that up, then this amounts to the US playing a dangerous game of nuclear chicken with Russia.

As was explained in this analysis here about why Russia is presently undertaking tactical nuclear weapons exercises, it hopes to deter NATO from a conventional military intervention in Ukraine, barring which it wants to signal that it could resort to these arms if those forces cross the Dnieper. From Russia’s perspective, the reportedly 100,000-strong force that NATO is preparing to invade Ukraine if its “red lines” are crossed could pose a threat to its territorial integrity if they attack its newly unified regions.

So long as they stay on the western side of the Dnieper, then there’d be no reason for Russia to countenance using tactical nuclear weapons, but they could realistically be employed in the event that they cross the river and credibly appear to be approaching that country’s new borders. In that scenario, Russia would have reason to drop them on the invading forces as a last resort out of self-defense to preemptively neutralize this threat in accordance with its nuclear doctrine.

Having brought the reader up to speed about the context within which Sikorski shared the US’ planned response to Russia potentially exploding nukes in Ukraine, it should now be easier to understand why this amounts to a dangerous game of nuclear chicken. Essentially, the US wants Russia to stand down from its signaled intent of possibly using tactical nuclear weapons if NATO’s reportedly 100,000-strong invasion force crosses the Dnieper, which could occur if Russia achieves a military breakthrough.

If this sequence of events unfolds – the front lines collapse, NATO conventionally intervenes in Ukraine, its reportedly 100,000-strong invasion force crosses the Dnieper, Russia drops tactical nukes on them, and then the US hits all of its forces in the newly unified regions – then World War III would break out. There’s no way that Russia would sit back and let the US directly attack any target within its borders since it’ll either respond in a tit-for-tat fashion or jump to the chase by launching a nuclear first strike.

The only way to avoid this worst-case scenario is for NATO to eschew its invasion plans under any circumstances, including a potential Russian military breakthrough. If they still go through with them, however, then they should keep their forces on the western side of the Dnieper and ideally rely on a neutral mediator like India to convey to Russia that they don’t intend to cross even if they approach it. Anything less is a dangerous game of nuclear chicken that could literally provoke the apocalypse.

YouTube link No. 1 here.

YouTube link No. 2 here.

by Larry C. Johnson, Substack, 5/20/24

A key task in any analysis is to identify your underlying assumptions about the activity or person you are assessing. If you indulge false assumptions, then your entire analytical narrative will be wrong. It is like looking through a pair of prescription glasses — you’re myopic — and prescription is hyperopic. Personally, I prefer to deal primarily with facts and shy away from conjecture.

I want to focus on one recent article that illustrates this point. I thank Andrei Martyanov , who flagged this latest windbag puffery from the U.S. European Commander, Christopher Cavoli. Cavoli insists that, “Russia’s ongoing offensive in Ukraine doesn’t have the legs for a breakthrough.” [https://www.politico.eu/article/top-nato-commander-christopher-cavoli-russian-offensive-war-in-ukraine/]

“I know the Russians don’t have the numbers necessary to do a strategic breakthrough,” . . . .

“They don’t have the skill and the capability to do it, to operate at the scale necessary to exploit any breakthrough to strategic advantage,”

And his source of this insight? If you guessed, “The Ukrainians,” give yourself a gold star. Cavoli is dead wrong about the numbers, but I am getting ahead of myself.

Admiral Rob Bauer, a NATO dilettante, weighed in with this wowser — which I suspect is also courtesy of the Ukrainians.

He said Russia has managed to muster additional forces,“but the quality of the troops is lower than the troops they started the conflict with” due to the number of officers “that were killed in the beginning of the war” and so aren’t able to train newer soldiers.

Once again we are witnessing a display of projection — i.e., assigning to Russia what the Ukrainians are experiencing. Russia has been adding tens of thousands of troops per month since September 2022. Unlike Ukraine — which snatches guys off the street, shoves them into vans, hauls them to a military center, kits them out in uniforms, gives them a gun, and provides only cursory training — Russia is giving recruits at least six months of training and then placing those new soldiers in units with combat veterans. The ranks of the Ukrainian military are being depleted every single day, while Russia is building up its forces.

So let’s deal with some facts. Look at the numbers of soldiers in the Russian Army vs the supposedly invincible U.S. Army, and you will realize Cavoli’s buffoonery. (Yes, I am assuming these numbers are accurate, because they are provided by Western sources.)

“As of 2024, the Russian Armed Forces have 3.57 million troops, with 1.32 million active military, 2 million reserve, and 250,000 paramilitary. This is the second increase in the size of the Russian military since 2018, with the previous increase of 137,000 troops in August 2022.”

And the United States?

“As of July 31, 2023, the United States Army (USA) has 452,689 active duty personnel, 325,218 Army National Guard personnel, and 176,968 Army Reserve personnel, for a total of 1,073,200 uniformed personnel.”

Cavoli, a biology major, and Bauer, apparently are not very good at math. The Russian armed forces, now, are three times the size of that fielded by the United States, both in terms of active duty and reserve. But, the advantage for Russia is not just in terms of manpower. Consider this — Russia’s forces are located primarily in Russia (yes, there are a few in Syria) and Russia’s General Staff can bring the full might of 1.3 million soldiers to the frontlines far more quickly than the U.S. and NATO could mobilize and move. U.S. forces are scattered around the globe. If the United States decided to fight Russia, the Russians, as defenders, will have at least a three-to-one advantage over the United States.

Cavoli’s flawed assumption? He is looking at what the Russians have done over the past two years and assumes that Russia is operating at full tilt. It is not. He is assuming that because Russia has not committed a million plus soldiers to the battle, that the training is inadequate and the troops unskilled. And, worse of all, he believes the Ukrainians. I want to remind you that Colonel Alex Vershinin, writing at RUSI, provided a detailed account that totally rebuts Cavoli’s wishful thinking — The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine.

“Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.

“The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.”

Simplicius the Thinker, who writes at Substack, did a deep-dive on Vershinin’s analysis and explained what it means for Russia:

“Not only do we have confirmation from Western think tanks, and the highest offices of Ukraine itself, that Russia abides by strict brigade staffing and restoration policies, rotating troops constantly and never letting brigades get critically depleted in the way the AFU is forced to do. But recall how Russia utilized experienced Wagner vets in precisely the fashion described above. They ‘distributed’ Wagner and other experienced fighting units throughout the entire formation, adding them to both the Akhmat forces, Rosgvardia, and others, even bringing them to train Belarusian troops.

In short, Russia is strictly adhering to the playbook for ideal husbanding of both forces and battlefield knowledge, wisdom, and experience—doing the utmost to make sure the utterly vital knowledge gained by the most experienced warriors is never squandered but always multiplied throughout and utilized to its fullest.”

Cavoli is lost in some out-dated World War II fantasy. He expected the Russians to launch a blitzkrieg and, when they did not, assumed they were incapable of doing so because of poorly trained, ill-equipped soldiers. If history is any judge, Russian Generals are far superior to any the West has to offer. While the Americans were ousted from Vietnam and Afghanistan, the Russians have been chewing up Ukrainian forces and depleting NATO warehouses of critical weapon supplies. Russia has the means to do a breakthrough, but that is not its stated objective. Attrition! Russia is going to bleed Ukraine and its NATO allies white, rather than risk high-casualty maneuver assaults favored by the likes of Cavoli.