Corruption case against Ukraine oligarch Kolomoisky to be dropped. Another big fish looks like he will escape justice as the fraud case against top Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky looks like it will be dropped following a court ruling on November 29, the Kyiv Independent reports.
Kolomoisky was arrested on September 2 by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and charged with money laundering and fraud. He was subsequently accused of embezzling $250mn from his bank PrivatBank by National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) on September 8 in the most high profile corruption case in years.
PrivatBank, Ukraine’s biggest commercial bank, had to be nationalised and bailed out in 2016 after a bne IntelliNews cover story Privat Investigation exposed a fake loans scam at the bank, where the owners lent money to shell companies under their control leaving a $5.5bn hole in the balance sheet, resulting in the biggest bailout in Ukraine’s banking history.
Kolomoisky is also under investigation in the US, where he syphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars through shell companies in Cleveland, and is also being prosecuted in both London and Cyprus by the now state-owned PrivatBank in an effort to recover the money. A London court has frozen some $2bn of his assets as part of these cases in a case which is expected to go on for years.
Kolomoisky’s arrest in September came as an landmark event, as he is the second big fish NABU has attempted to jail. Previously NABU arrested Roman Nasirov, the government’s financial controller and former President Petro Poroshenko’s right-hand man, and charged him with embezzling millions of dollars in March 2017. However, Nasirov walked free after his wife came up with over $1mn bail in cash and the case was eventually dropped. Seen as a litmus test of the anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine at the time under the Western-leading EuroMaidan government, Nasirov’s case was judged as a failure.
Now it looks like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s efforts to rejuvenate the anti-corruption drive are going to suffer a similar humiliation. Ukraine has a corruption problem that will stymie any effort to raise private sector investment to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction, as was laid out at the Recovery conference held in London in June last year.
Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Action Center reports that on November 28, the High Anti-Corruption Court’s appeal chamber ruled that NABU had failed to meet a May deadline for completing its investigation in the case against Kolomoisky.
This ruling may invalidate the charges brought against Kolomoisky, the only charges brought against him in the PrivatBank case, despite the blatant nature of the schemes. A forensic audit of PrivatBank following its nationalisation found that 99% of the loans made by the bank to shell companies were fake.
The High Anti-Corruption Court has only been recently reactivated and its ruling means either the prosecutors or a court could close the case down, according to Vadym Valko, a lawyer at the Anti-Corruption Action Centre as cited by Kyiv Independent, although such a decision would be subject to appeal.
In a parallel decision the High Anti-Corruption Court, which is a related anti-corruption body set up at Western insistence, rejected motions to freeze Kolomoisky’s assets and impose bail and travel restrictions on them.
Charges were brought against Kolomoisky, along with several alleged accomplices, including Oleksandr Dubilet, Lyudmila Shmalchenko, Yaroslav Luhovoy, Tetiana Yakymenko and Nadiya Konopkina.
NABU’s investigation claims that Kolomoisky orchestrated a scheme in 2015 to funnel funds from PrivatBank to an offshore company and increase his share in the bank’s capital. This involved a payment of over $250mn to the offshore company under the pretext of repurchasing its bonds at an inflated cost. A portion of these funds, totalling $12mn, was then channelled to five legal entities before ultimately ending up in Kolomoisky’s personal account, according to NABU.
The NABU case against Kolomoisky is separate from the original charges brought by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) that were used to arrest him in September. The SBU is under the direct control of the president and was widely seen as an attempt by Zelenskiy to crack down on Ukraine’s oligarchs. Ukraine’s Economic Security Bureau (BEB) also cooperated in the SBU case that has similar allegations of fraud and money laundering of UAH500mn ($13.5mn) in 2019-2020. Kolomoisky has been held in pre-trial detention since September and refused to post bail. A court this week extended his detention into the New Year.
The court’s decision and the potential closure of the NABU case are linked to the controversial “Lozovy amendments,” Kyiv Independent reports, which imposed strict deadlines for investigations and limited the terms for sending cases to trial. The Rada passed several laws this week that undermine the judiciary and its ability to vet and bar corrupt judges from office.
Anti-corruption activists argue that these amendments aimed to protect corrupt officials by hindering investigations against them. Despite calls from activists, Parliament has yet to repeal these amendments.
The ruling on the Kolomoisky case highlights different interpretations of the Lozovy amendments, with prosecutors and some courts contending that they do not apply when multiple cases are merged, and one was opened before the amendments. The Kyiv Independent reports. The Anti-Corruption Court’s appeal chamber disagreed with this interpretation.
As the case hangs in the balance, the future of Ukraine’s efforts to prosecute Kolomoisky remains uncertain, prompting concerns about the state of anti-corruption efforts in the country.
The Kolomoisky case comes as Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts are spluttering following a failure to reform the judiciary and bar corrupt judges from office. Zelenskiy has been trying to reform the High Commission and the Anti-corruption Court but is running into stiff institution resistance to any changes.
Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian and expert on international politics. He has a BA in Modern History from Oxford University, an MS in International History from the LSE, and a PhD in History from Princeton University. He has held scholarships at the Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and directed the Center for Urban History in Lviv, Ukraine. Originally from Germany, he has lived in the UK, Ukraine, Poland, the USA, and Turkey. His book ‘The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv: A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists’ was published by Cornell University Press in 2015.
Toward the end of World War II (in Europe), Germans often shared a dark joke, reflecting their well-deserved dread at the prospect of defeat: “Enjoy the war, the peace will be terrible.” Of course, despite the worst efforts of the Ukrainian far right to damage both the politics and the image of their country, no objective observer would equate Ukraine with Nazi Germany.
Nevertheless, that old German piece of gallows humor points to a question that is now pertinent for Ukraine. Even the militantly anti-Russian Economist is spotting “war fatigue” in both the US and the EU. The Western funding on which Kiev depends is in danger of drying up; and current promises of more cash are not reliable.
When and how will the war end?
Bloomberg reports a “sense of gloom” in Ukraine and the Wall Street Journal admits that “Moscow holds the advantage on the military, political and economic fronts.” The prominent American military commentator Michael Kofman, often treading a fine line between professional analysis and pro-Western bias, is close to facing reality. Still insisting that “it’s inaccurate to suggest that Russia is winning the war,” he acknowledges that “if the right choices are not made next year on Ukraine’s approach and Western resourcing, then Ukraine’s prospects for success look dim.” He also suggests that Kiev should shift to the defensive. Frankly, it has already, and it had no choice.
Yet a defensive strategy cannot achieve Ukraine’s official war aims, because they include retaking territory from Russia. For Ukraine, Kofman’s “right choices” imply giving up on that. Former war monger and Zelensky adviser – and now foe – Aleksey Arestovich, for one, has correctly spotted that fact. Such an outcome is called “losing.” Redefining it as a form of “success” – a shifting of goalposts popular in the West now – comes across as a clumsy attempt to rationalize and sell a defeat.
Regarding “right choices” for the West, despite desperate clarion calls by the Cold War re-enactor and Ukraine proxy war booster Tim Snyder and the US grand strategy maitre penseur Walter Russell Mead, the West may continue some funding of Ukraine, but it is unlikely to once again up the ante. Why would it, when all its previous strategies – economic, military, diplomatic, and by information war – have failed at great cost? What is happening instead is an American attempt to shift more of the burden of the proxy war onto the EU.
The Jews and Boris Johnson: Zelensky’s top political ally looks for scapegoats as Ukrainian elites begin to accept the war is lost
Read more The Jews and Boris Johnson: Zelensky’s top political ally looks for scapegoats as Ukrainian elites begin to accept the war is lost
If Donald Trump wins the US elections in less than a year, then that trend is certain to accelerate, as even British state broadcaster BBC has long recognized. Western observers who think that this is a reason for Russia to be in no hurry to make peace before November 2024 are probably right.
But what if the West and Ukraine suddenly come up with a whole new suite of brilliant, game-changing strategies? After the “miracle weapons” have crashed, perhaps we’ll see “miracle ideas”? We won’t. Because if Western elites could have them, they would have utilized them already.
Concerning Ukraine, Maryana Bezuglaya, a member of parliament, has just caused a stir by accusing the military of failing to produce any genuine plan for 2024. Clearly, this attack is part of a power struggle – and blame game – between President Vladimir Zelensky and commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny. But Bezuglaya is not lying, just exploiting facts.
Regarding the West, after initial Russian blunders, it has not only been out-fought but also been out-thought by Moscow. Keeping alive the persistently unsophisticated Western tradition of stereotyping Russia at great cost, NATO think-tankers like Constanze Stelzenmüller at the Brookings Institution may go on underestimating Moscow as “not that strategic and not that intelligent” but merely very “determined.” On that assumption, Westerners – including think tankers – stymied by what they insist on imagining as not-so-smart Moscow, must conclude they are even less bright.
But if nothing succeeds like success, the opposite is also true – nothing fails like failure: Ukraine’s and the West’s setbacks are a self-reinforcing trend already. Hence, the pertinent question now is: when the current war ends, most likely with a Ukrainian (and Western) defeat, what will come after it? It’s a question that is both timely and difficult to answer.
For one thing, there are still all too many, in Ukraine and the West, who believe – or pretend to believe? – that the war should and can continue, perhaps for years. German chancellor Olaf Scholz, for instance, has just claimed that the EU must go on supporting Ukraine because it is essential for the bloc that Russia must not win. Such intransigent positions – or rhetoric – betray an unrealistic assessment of Ukrainian, Western, and Russian capacities. They also imply sacrificing more Ukrainian lives in the EU’s interests.
Scholz, for one, is speaking from an almost touchingly perfect position of weakness. His personal approval ratings have just hit a record low; the coalition government he is trying to lead is not doing much better. No wonder: the International Monetary Fund is now expecting Germany to end up as the world’s worst-performing major economy this year, while the government’s unconstitutional financial trickery has triggered a severe budget crisis that will cause painful cuts in public spending.
Scholz may, of course, be lying. There also are unconfirmed reports – or leaks? – that Berlin plans to join Washington in forcing Ukraine to come to terms.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba may still boldly deny feeling any pressure from his country’s Western sponsors.
In reality, multiple signals point in another direction: Western leaders are at least considering the option of cutting their losses by making Ukraine give up territory.
Conversely, Western stay-the-course talk on the war in Ukraine has an ever-hollower ring to it. It is ironic that only a few months ago – but before the predictable failure of Ukraine’s summer offensive turned into an undeniable fact – Foreign Policy surmised that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine policy was falling prey to the sunk cost fallacy. By now it is clear that it is the West that is experiencing a feckless gambler’s reluctance to give up before incurring even greater losses. Cynicism, the will to squeeze the last bit of blood from Ukraine, and an obstinate refusal to acknowledge past errors are certain to also play a role.
Yet it should be noted that even some observers who are not suffering from such Western biases are pessimistic about a quick end to the war. That’s because they believe that ultimately Washington will keep fueling its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, whoever is or seems to be in charge in the White House. For Ukraine and Ukrainians, such a strategy would still mean defeat, but after even more losses and suffering.
On the other hand, given the dire state of Ukraine’s manpower and other resources, a sudden change in the situation on the ground cannot be ruled out. The war could enter a new phase marked by (initially) local breakdowns of Ukrainian forces and such significant Russian breakthroughs that Kiev would have to accept defeat in one form or another, whether under the Zelensky regime or a successor.
The fear of some Western officials that Ukraine could “unravel” as early as this winter is not baseless. In that scenario, fighting would be over comparatively soon, i.e. at the latest at some point next year, even if it might take much longer (compare the Korean case) to replace a formal state of war with peace in the full sense of the term. As John Mearsheimer has warned, a genuine or inherently stable peace may well be impossible, but a de facto cessation of hostilities – call it a frozen conflict, if you wish – can precede it. It may not be pretty, but it would make a big difference, nonetheless.
All of the above entails a paradox. We cannot yet tell if the end of the war is close, but it is not too early to think about the post-war period. The unknowns of the current situation also complicate the question of what exact shape that post-war era will take.
The fate of Ukraine’s military and NATO ambitions
Let’s assume the following: first, while a formal state of war may continue, the more important question is what it will take to end the actual fighting. Kiev would lose territory and, in general, would have to make additional concessions to Russia. The one that is easiest to predict is Ukraine reverting to neutrality and, in particular, giving up on its NATO ambitions (and, of course, its current de facto integration in the alliance). The second outcome that Russia is bound to pursue is capping Kiev’s military potential. The third result that Moscow will not let go off is to either completely neutralize (probably impossible) or strongly diminish the influence of Ukraine’s far right.
Thus, post-war Ukraine will be smaller, neutral, militarily weak, and its official politics and institutions (especially those with arms, such as the police and army) will have to let go of far-right personnel and influence, at least on the surface. No more ‘Black Suns’ on display, except maybe at private parties. If these conditions are not met, fighting may still temporarily cease, but not for long.
Regarding NATO (that is, the US), the fundamental question here is whether Russia will even seek a grand settlement again, a principal reset, but this time from a position of increased strength or, instead, leverage its advantage to achieve the more limited aim of pursuing its security interest by shaping “only” the settlement in and about Ukraine.
Russia may or may not want – or be able to – also make NATO explicitly give up on Ukraine and, more broadly, its misconceived strategy of expansion. Moreover, Moscow may or may not try to insist once more on a fundamental revision of Europe’s security architecture and its relationship with the US and NATO, as in its prewar proposals of late 2021.
What is certain is that once Moscow has created facts on the ground in Ukraine and Kiev has to revert to neutrality (in word and deed), NATO’s posturing will lose much of its relevance. There are unofficial signals that the bloc may be considering admitting only a part of Ukraine (neither Kiev nor its Western backers will recognize Crimea or other Moscow-controlled territories as Russian and will probably refer to them as ‘occupied’). If such a Plan B is serious, despite the fact that it would break NATO tradition and be foolish, Ukraine is rejecting it. And again, any signs of its implementation would be likely to restart the fighting quickly. It is true that some smart observers have speculated that Moscow may be willing to live with a reduced Ukraine being part of NATO. But on this, they are likely to be wrong.
Whatever approach Russia chooses, the key point is that it now has the initiative. That, dear NATO, is what happens when you lose a war: The agenda won’t be the West’s to set.
The future of Kiev’s EU membership bid
What about the EU? After all, one key cause of the current war and preceding crisis was a regime change in Kiev in 2014, which was triggered by a conflict over Ukraine entering into a special association with the bloc. At this point, the EU shows no intention to change this course. Indeed, it seems to be about to open a formal process leading to full membership. There is resistance from some member states, however. Open pushback is coming from Hungary, whose Prime Minister Viktor Orban is threatening to block this policy as well as more money for Kiev. Where Orban is sticking out his neck, he may not be alone in having misgivings about integrating a large, poor, very corrupt, devastated, and revolution-prone new member state with a security issue from hell.
In any case, let’s assume that, for now, the EU elite gets its way – for instance by releasing more frozen funds for Hungary – and Ukraine enters into official membership talks. As has long been pointed out, starting accession talks is not the same as getting membership. At least years, possibly decades, can separate one point from the other, and the process can also get stuck in the mud. Moreover, as the recent electoral successes of Slovakia’s Robert Fico and the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders have once again demonstrated, the ground is also shifting inside the EU. Add the AfD’s surge in Germany, and the EU’s own ability to stick to the plan is very much in doubt.
Post-war Ukraine will probably not be a full member of the European Union. Either for a long time or maybe forever.
Will Zelensky’s regime survive?
What about Ukraine at home? It is hard to imagine the political survival of the current President Vladimir Zelensky in a post-defeat Ukraine. Even now, internal Ukrainian government polling quoted by The Economist shows a drastic decline in his approval ratings. What is worse, while Zelensky is down to 32%, commander-in-chief Zaluzhny still scores 70%, and the especially sinister head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kirill Budanov, who proudly runs assassination programs, has a solid 45%.
And, of course, The Economist publishing such figures is yet another sign that Zelensky is also losing Western support. The initially intense personality cult Zelensky enjoyed in the West as an almost miraculous leader may have fooled him into a false sense of security and irreplaceability. In reality, it now makes him the perfect scapegoat. As we know from classical tragedy, with great elevation, comes the potential for a deep fall.
What would come after the Zelensky regime? This is where it’s time to stash away the crystal ball because things become simply too opaque. One thing that true friends of Ukraine should hope for is that whatever is next will actually still be some form of coherent and minimally effective government. Those with ill-conceived fantasies of a “South Korean miracle” in what will be left of Ukraine, may want to refocus on more elementary, Hobbesian issues: In a country full of disappointed citizens and veterans and awash in arms, with a far right second to none in the world, things could turn very ugly indeed.
The White House has sent a letter to congressional leaders warning that it’s running out of money to fund the proxy war in Ukraine and pleading for Congress to authorize more spending.
“I want to be clear: without congressional action, by the end of the year we will run out of resources to procure more weapons and equipment for Ukraine and to provide equipment from US military stocks,” wrote Shalanda D. Young, the head of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget. “There is no magical pot of funding available to meet this moment. We are out of money — and nearly out of time.”
According to Young, Congress has authorized $111 billion to spend on the war since the Russian invasion, but the vast majority of the funding has been used up.
“As of mid-November, DOD has used 97 percent of the $62.3 billion it received, and State has used 100 percent of the $4.7 billion in military assistance it received. Approximately $27.2 billion, or 24 percent, has been used for economic assistance and civilian security assistance (such as demining) to Ukraine, which is just as essential to Ukraine’s survival as military assistance. State and USAID have used 100 percent of this amount,” she said.
Based on recent comments from Pentagon officials, the Biden administration still has a few billion to ship weapons to Ukraine directly from US military stockpiles, part of $6 billion that became available due to a so-called “accounting error” that overvalued earlier arms shipments. But Young said the US has had to limit the weapons packages it’s been sending Ukraine.
“Already, our packages of security assistance have become smaller and the deliveries of aid have become more limited. If our assistance stops, it will cause significant issues for Ukraine. While our allies around the world have stepped up to do more, US support is critical and cannot be replicated by others,” she said.
The administration has been arguing that funding the war in Ukraine is beneficial to the US “Defense Industrial Base,” which Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) pointed out is another term for the Military Industrial Complex.
“The President’s most recent national security supplemental request will build on our successful efforts to date and will direct over $50 billion into our nation’s DIB, which builds on the funding that has already been invested in manufacturing lines across 35 states,” Young wrote in the letter.
President Biden has asked Congress to authorize about $61 billion in additional funding for Ukraine as part of a massive $106 billion spending bill, which also includes military aid for Israel and Taiwan and spending on border security. Biden requested the funds in October, but Congress has yet to approve it as Republicans are looking to separate aid to Israel and want more concessions on border issues.
The idea of the $61 billion is to fund the proxy war for another year despite it being clear that Ukraine has no chance of winning the war or driving Russia out of the Ukrainian territory it has captured.
Klitschko used his credibility with Westerners to confirm that Zelensky has indeed turned into a dictator, Stoltenberg is preparing them for bad news from the front, while Brown is telling them to expect a political compromise with Russia.
Zelensky was accused by an unnamed close aide in late October of having messianic delusions of victory over Russia according to Time Magazine’s damning cover story about him, and while he’s since sobered up a bit after Politico just mocked him, the Ukrainian leader still doesn’t realize that his side lost. Kiev Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg, and the US’ top general Charles Brown Jr. all debunked his remaining delusions in each of their statements over the past few days.
Beginning with the first, this famous boxing champion told Der Spiegel that “Ukraine is on the path to authoritarianism” and that the local authorities are now “under enormous pressure” from the center. This makes Klitschko the latest of Zelensky’s rivals after former advisor Alexey Arestovich and Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny. His importance amidst Ukraine’s growing political divisions is that he could one day leverage his enormous respect among the capital’s residents to lead future protests.
As for the second, he told Germany’s Das Erste TV that “wars are difficult to plan” so “we have to be prepared for bad news” from Ukraine. This follows his admission last week that “even with this substantial significant military support from NATO Allies, [Ukraine has] not, over the last year, been able to move the front line. And that just reflects the fact that we should never underestimate Russia.” He’s basically preconditioning the public for the possibility of a Russian counteroffensive sometime soon.
Rounding everything out with the new Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, this leading military official told the Reagan National Defense Forum in response to a question about the Ukrainian endgame that “any military conflict, you don’t solve it completely by military means. It ends up with a diplomatic solution.” He then added that America’s armed aid to that country is aimed at “shaping” the outcome. Simply put, he tacitly admitted that Zelensky’s envisaged maximalist victory over Russia isn’t realistic.
Putting these three statements together, they collectively contributed to debunking the Ukrainian leader’s remaining delusions by informing the public of how ridiculous each aspect thereof is. Klitschko used his credibility with Westerners to confirm that Zelensky has indeed turned into a dictator, Stoltenberg is preparing them for bad news from the front, while Brown is telling them to expect a political compromise with Russia. All told, there’s no doubt that the Ukrainian Conflict is winding down.
Pitching Congress with a proposal for more aid for Ukraine, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin conjured up a threat from Russia.
Austin said that if Congress does not appropriate $61 billion in aid for Ukraine it is “very likely” US troops on the ground in Europe will be fighting Russia.
Republican senators – for various reasons, including especially a dispute over whether to tie the aid to US border security – walked out of the briefing after only twenty minutes.
The threat that Austin imagined is that Russia, after it finishes with Ukraine, will launch attacks in Europe. Objectively, though, there is no evidence that Russia threatens anyone in Europe.
That’s not to say there aren’t a lot of Russians who think their generals should be threatenng Europe. After all, Europe is providing massive military aid, intelligence and technical help to Ukraine in the war with Russia, along with training Ukrainian troops and helping Ukraine develop its war plans. Stocks of European weapons, meant for NATO defense, have been shipped to Kiev. Most of them won’t be replaced for decades, if ever.
From Russia’s point of view the real land grabber is NATO. After all, despite Russia’s warnings and promises made to Russia that were blatantly violated, NATO expanded in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. (The Russians were frequently assured, starting with a vow from former President Bill Clinton [it was the Bush I administration which first made the promise, not Clinton – NB], that NATO would not expand.)
Expansion has meant arming the new NATO members with top quality western weapons, building bases for NATO on their territories and threatening Russia directly.
One of the reasons Russia took over most of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II was to create a security buffer. That was not the only reason, of course; the Russians also were anxious to get hold of resources in these countries. One recalls that Russia suffered huge devastation and depopulation thanks to the Nazis and their allies.
None of this means Russia would not like to get back what it lost to NATO’s expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, yes, it is quite true that Russia’s “Special Military Operation” can be regarded as a land grab in Ukraine.
But there is little sign that Russia intends any expansion in Eastern Europe or the Baltic States and virtually no intelligence of any kind supporting the Austin invasion thesis. If there were any concrete intelligence you can safely bet the Biden administration would let Congress know (especially when it has its hands out for more money for the war).
There are three reasons for crediting the opposite hypothesis, namely that Russia has no intention of expanding outside of the Ukraine conflict area.
The first reason is behavioral. With NATO’s war stocks at an all time low, Russia could have taken advantage of this vulnerability and moved its forces against NATO targets – for example NATO operations in Poland or in the Balkans – but have not done so.
The Russians have exercised unprecedented restraint and even tolerated aggressive intelligence flights and NATO naval exercises in the Black Sea, an extraordinarily sensitive Russian security worry. The Black Sea is not only the back door to Ukraine, it is also a route to challenge Russia itself.
Russia even exercised restraint when Ukraine used drones to hit an airfield inside Russia where nuclear bombers are based. Two of these bombers were either damaged or destroyed. Such an attack needed intelligence support from NATO, primarily the US, and the Russians no doubt understood that quite well. Yet the Russians tolerated the attack to a degree and took no steps to widen the conflict.
There is some evidence that the attack on the Soltsy-2 airbase was launched by the Ukrainians from Estonia, as Ukrainian drones did not have the range to reach the airbase.
Other examples of Russian restraint include the sinking of Russia’s flagship Moskva with US help, multiple attempts to destroy the Kerch Strait bridge connecting Russia to Crimea and multiple attacks on Moscow, including an attempt to hit Putin’s Kremlin office in what Russia says was an attempt to assassinate Putin.
The second reason to view Russia as reluctant to expand the conflict is that doing so would be immensely costly. Russia has already learned just how expensive the Ukraine war is, even though it is finally winning the war after nearly two years of fighting. But a war in Europe would add US and European fighter aircraft and bombers to Russia’s misery – even if NATO ground forces would have significant problems, according to a RAND study.
The greatest cost for Russia is manpower and casualties from the war. Figuring out actual casualties is difficult, because the Ukrainians and Russians alike either don’t tell the truth or say nothing.
Yet the fact that Russia needs to step up its military recruiting – has even filled gaps with prisoners – says that the war has taken many lives. It also means that the war’s popularity in Russia may be threatened if the numbers of killed and wounded grow too high.
It is hard to believe Russia would crank up a bigger war, given the impact on manpower. Nor would the war keep the support of the Russian people, who know how to oppose a conflict when it starts to bite them at home. That’s what forced Russia to leave Afghanistan, starting the withdrawal in May 1988 and completing it in February 1989. (That wasn’t enough to save Gorbachev or prevent a coup attempt and it led to the disintegration of the USSR.
The third reason that speaks against Russia expanding the conflict is the unanticipated wild card of Western sanctions on Russia.
In effect, responding to Putin’s “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, NATO and many other countries aligned with the United States or with the European Union imposed heavy sanctions on Russia. This drove Russia into the arms of China and forced Russia to rethink its future. Above all it meant a realignment of Russia’s resources, trade and monetary system away from Europe and the west.
This is a decisive new factor that changes the strategic roadmap for Russia. It directly undermines the argument that Russia has something to gain from any attack on Europe. The truth is that the Russians are less and less interested in Europe or the United States. One can safely say that the extra-legal Western sanctions were a major strategic blunder for NATO and its partners and friends, as well as for the EU.
Even if a peace deal is made with Ukraine and Europe and the US lifts sanctions on Russia, it is probably too late to recover from the damage done to any future ties. Russia won’t reject trade with the West, but it is likely to make business deals only on its own terms. It is unlikely Russia will again allow western companies to operate inside Russia, and the country will increasingly team with China for technology and weapons development. In short, the west filed for divorce and the Russians accepted the final decree.
The Austin argument is, for the above reasons, false and misleading.
When the Republicans walked out of the secret briefing staged for the Senate to try and sell them on supporting more money for Ukraine, many argued that the Biden administration’s arguments were stale and unconvincing. The Biden effort to intimidate the Senate simply didn’t work.
