By Sarah Lindemann-Kamarova, Echo of Siberia Blog, 10/26/22

Sarah has lived in Siberia since 1992. Was a community development activist for 20 years. Currently, focuses on research and writing.

Photos available at original publication.

October 22 was an unseasonably warm Saturday night in the Altai Republic. 8PM and thousands of well-wishers crowded the Victory Square to see their mobilized men off. The first of two ceremonies, this one was for men from the outlying districts. Many of them are Altai and this will be their second farewell of the day.

The first came in the morning with a sendoff from their villages. The one I attended the mobilized young men stood on one side of the road smoking and palling if they were waiting outside school for the bell to ring. One young woman hung onto the arm of her man. The children and grandchildren of these men will see pictures where the line is straightened and a few of the men have wrapped their arms around each other with big smiles while others stare with looks of duty and resignation into the cameras.

On the other side of the road relatives were distraught and silent except for comforting those who were crying. Both sides of the road shared a disbelief that this was happening. A short speech by the Mayor, final hugs, and the minibus pulled away with very sad people left behind waving and horns honking.

As farewell number two began there were surprisingly few tears at Victory Square. Those devastated by this parting hold them back. The focus here is on how proud they are of their husband, son, brother, friend. There are scattered conversations among the crowd that includes many who just wanted to be supportive, “are you seeing someone off?” “Yes, my son in law”, “Contract?” “No, mobilized”. A mother explaining to her young son “these men are going off to something terrifying”.

There were also surprisingly few flags and the ceremony was kept to a civilized 30 minutes. Music was a mix of patriotic and hard rock. The usual suspects spoke, there was no self-indulgence. The Governor defined their purpose, “… to protect the Motherland, its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity” that will now include Kherson and Zaporozhets as well as the Donbass, Luhansk, and Crimea. A returned participant in the special military operation and recipient of the Order of Courage told the mobilized, “We had a motto, ‘No one but us’, now that applies to all of Russia!”.

Born in 1936, Boris Konduleevich Alushkin, Chairman of the Republican Council of Veterans and the Union of Journalists, reflected on a childhood memory “I was a first-grader, when we had to see off our fathers and older brothers during the Great Patriotic War. Together with grandmothers and mothers, we remained in the rear. Today the situation has arisen so that you have to go to the front line of Russia’s defense. You can rely on us. We will take care of your children, families…. Today, the entire Altai Mountains and Russia, representatives of all faiths, are praying for you. I wish you to return to Altai with victory, may the great achievement of our older generation keep you safe.”

Then came the call to board the buses, the final final goodbye. The friends slap backs, laugh, “we’ll be meeting you soon there”, and hug. A small crowd surrounded a not so young man as everyone got a proper, individual goodbye. The longest is for what seemed to be his wife who can no longer hold back her tears as he bends down to the grandchildren and then back up to hug the friends and other relatives.

A couple of wives and girlfriends lingered inside the buses until they were forced to leave when they were fully loaded. Outside, small children sat on shoulders for a last wave to Daddy, brother, or Uncle. Here, as in the morning, there is a contrast between the people going, band of brothers camaraderie, and those staying many of whom have finally allowed themselves to cry. Everyone waved goodbye as the buses pulled out for the 450 km trip to Novosibirsk where the mobilized will spend the next month training.

As this scene played out, “Farewell of Slavianka” blasted from the loudspeakers . The doleful march was written to honor the women seeing their men off to the First Balkans War. A reminder, as if one was needed, that this ritual has been repeated throughout history. There are undoubtedly wives, children, fathers, mothers, and friends waving goodbye to their loved ones in Ukraine. Some of those getting on the buses in Ukraine may be relatives or friends of those getting on the buses on this unseasonably warm Saturday night in the Altai Republic.

from The National Security Archive, 10/27/22

Washington, D.C., October 27, 2022 – The most dangerous 24 hours of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on Saturday, October 27, 1962, 60 years ago today, as the U.S. moved closer to attacking Cuba and nuclear-armed flashpoints erupted over Siberia, at the quarantine line, and in Cuba itself—a rapid escalation that convinced both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev to strike the deal that would stop events from further spiraling out of control.

The surviving notes of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on that day, October 27, provide a six-and-a-half-hour cascade of crises where human error, miscalculation, reckless deployment of nuclear weapons, and testosterone ruled the day. The JCS notes from October and November 1962, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive, are all that survive after the Chiefs’ decision, in the 1970s, to destroy the tapes and transcripts from over two decades of JCS meetings.

The notes depict how top U.S. military officials reacted to the unfolding crisis in real time, including the shootdown of a U-2 spy plane over Cuba that afternoon—seen as a major escalation—while at the same time the JCS were unaware that U.S. naval forces were dropping grenades on a Soviet sub armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo near the quarantine line. As they continued to prepare for a full-scale invasion of Cuba, JCS chairman Maxwell Taylor told the Chiefs that President Kennedy was “seized with the idea of trading Turkish for Cuban missiles” and “has a feeling that time is running out.”

Today’s posting features the JCS notes along with photographs and additional context about the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, and the sequence of events that persuaded both Kennedy and Khrushchev to reach the trade that would ultimately end the superpower confrontation.

Read the document here.

Link here.

Col. MacGregor discusses his latest article, which can be found here.

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 10/20/22

Eight months ago when Russia invaded Ukraine, one of its key fronts was launched from Belarus. Since then, Russia’s only major ally has remained on the sideline of the conflict between its two neighbors.

But now, Belarus appears to be edging toward directly joining in the war, under pressure from Moscow. And experts say that by doing so, it may ultimately be hastening its own absorption by Russia.

At a meeting this month to discuss the “increasing threat level” emanating from NATO states to the west, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to create a joint “regional group of forces,” to augment Belarus’ 70,000-strong army with about 9,000 Russian troops.

Social media has been full of reports of Russian troops arriving in Belarus, and also difficult-to-interpret videos apparently showing trainloads of Belarusian heavy equipment moving eastward. Experts differ as to whether this means Russia is drawing on Belarus’ large stocks of Soviet-era tanks, mobile artillery, and armored vehicles to replenish its own forces, or if the equipment is being sent for modernization in Russian factories.

The level of military cooperation, which will create at least one joint Russian-Belarusian division-sized force, is something new.

Russian troops invaded Ukraine last February from Belarusian territory, but Belarus’ own forces did not participate. Kyiv is warning that the new military grouping might be preparing to open a whole new front against Ukraine. Even if Mr. Lukashenko remains disinterested in committing his army to the war, the existence of a credible striking force hovering in the north will be a continuing worry for Kyiv.

Few options for Minsk

Minsk insists that it fears Western “provocations,” given the concentration of exiled Belarusian opposition figures in neighboring NATO countries such as Poland and Lithuania, who might try to create trouble for Russia amid the current Ukraine war turmoil through political destabilization in Belarus.

Belarus has theoretically been part of a “union state” with Russia since 1999, one that confers a lot of advantages to Minsk. But in practice, Mr. Lukashenko has resisted full integration and political subordination, playing a complicated game of ceding to the bare minimum of Moscow’s demands while flirting with the West and keeping the levers of local control firmly in his own hands.

Yet his ability to do that was deeply compromised when his rule was threatened amid mass protests two years ago. He quashed the uprising, but doing so left the West enraged at his suppression of opponents and Russia as his only source of political and economic support.

Even though Mr. Lukashenko’s rule seems more entrenched than ever, the insertion of Russian troops into the country is a new move and suggests that a permanent merger of the two security establishments is in the offing.

“We are moving toward the full-fledged erosion of Belarus’ military and political sovereignty at the very least,” says Artyom Shraibman, a Belarusian political scientist who currently lives in Ukraine. “The options for Lukashenko are narrowing. Much will depend on the results of the war. Will Russia be able to stabilize the front? How will Russia’s mobilization work out? Will Belarus get directly involved or not? What if Russia loses the war, or it reaches a stage of nuclear escalation with the West? Too many questions without answers.

“But it’s becoming harder and harder for Lukashenko to play the game of keeping his autonomy while using Russian resources,” he says. “For now, Belarusian trade with Ukraine is about zero, while sanctions have greatly reduced trade with the West. Russia is increasingly the only option for trade, finance, and political support, and the only question is how long it will take to completely absorb Belarus into Russia’s sphere. I suppose Russia might lose the war before Belarus completely loses its sovereignty, but the process right now is very alarming.”

An unpopular conflict?

Russia’s wartime exigencies may be not only accelerating the pace of Russia’s efforts to integrate Belarus, but also changing Moscow’s concept of the future Russian Federation. If Moscow wins the war in Ukraine, it will result in large parts of eastern Ukraine being permanently digested by Russia. With that process underway, Moscow’s planners may have less patience for the bureaucratic complexities of the union state, and look for more direct ways to incorporate Belarus into an expanded Russia.

“What we are seeing right now is connected with urgent military needs,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “The big new military grouping in Belarus could be used to attack Ukraine from another angle, or at least divert Ukrainian forces from other fronts. I don’t think either Putin or Lukashenko is entertaining any grand long-term thoughts.

“Lukashenko has clearly made the decision to be helpful because he has no other options but to bet on Putin and Russia,” he says. “The future of Belarus’ relationship with Russia – whether it will become part of Russia or something else – will depend on how things progress on the battlefield. If Russia fails in Ukraine, that will have huge repercussions in all areas, including Belarus.”

Most analysts doubt that Mr. Lukashenko wants to get directly involved in the conflict.

“The Belarusian army is about 70,000 men, but its combat-ready component is much smaller,” says Andrey Suzdaltsev, an independent Belarusian expert living in Moscow. “The army is really too weak to actually face the Western-armed Ukrainian forces with their fighting experience. By forming this joint grouping with Russia, Lukashenko wants to imitate participation in the special operation without actually doing anything.”

A random telephone survey of 1,000 Belarusians conducted in September by Andrei Vardomatsky, a leading Belarusian sociologist currently living abroad, found that support for Russian actions in Ukraine is roughly split, with 41.3% approving and 47.3% opposed.

But when asked about direct participation in the war, Mr. Vardomatsky says, “85% of respondents gave a negative answer, and 11% said they would react positively to it. Asked how they feel about using Belarus’ territory and military infrastructure to implement Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, more than 62% said they were against and 29% said they were positive.”

“He’s in the same boat with Putin”

Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, says he does not know the purpose of the joint force currently gathering in Belarus. But he suggests it’s probably a hedge against unexpected developments on Russia’s western flank and a bid to bolster Mr. Lukashenko’s grip on power. If it worries the Ukrainians and makes them divert forces, so much the better, Mr. Khramchikhin adds.

Russia is facing troubles around the post-Soviet region, aggravated by Western meddling, and needs to take actions to boost stability, says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Kremlin-funded Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow.

“The situation is causing a more rapid consolidation of ties with friendly countries, like China and Belarus,” he says. “Lukashenko has realized that he’s in the same boat with Putin, and he faces threats from NATO. That’s why this military grouping has been formed, and the integration process in general is speeding up.”

By Ray McGovern, Antiwar.com, 10/21/22

A Rose has bloomed In the Blinken/Sullivan/Biden desert of ideas on Ukraine. I refer to Rose Gottemoeller, 69, who was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control during the Obama/Biden second term and knows much more about the real world than the boys Biden has in the back room (if I may risk damning her with faint praise).

Looking for adults in the room? Gottemoeller could be the woman of the hour, if Biden’s ivy-mantled advisers would stop preening, sit down, and listen.

Lowering the Nuclear Temperature

Writing in The Financial Times two weeks ago, Gottemoeller referred to the “quiet bargain” that ended the Cuban missile crisis of exactly 60 years ago. As for Ukraine, she dismisses military options:

“Which brings us to diplomacy. Is there any chance that negotiation could change Putin’s calculus? The Cuban missile crisis ended with a quiet bargain … some quiet nuclear diplomacy might produce results.

“Two years ago, Putin offered to remove Russia’s new ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missile from Europe under verifiable conditions, thus underpinning a moratorium on such missiles in Europe. When Putin and Xi Jinping met in Beijing prior to the February invasion, they spoke of extending such a moratorium to Asia.

“Perhaps it is time to launch discreet talks, if only at a technical level, to explore what the two men had in mind. It would not solve the horrendous crisis in Ukraine, but it might lower the nuclear temperature.”

Now get this. Gottemoeller’s very sensible suggestion found its way past the Washington Post censors. Columnist Ishaan Tharoor was able to tack some of the former Under Secretary of State’s thoughts onto the end of an article Tuesday titled “The uncomfortable need to talk about diplomacy with Russia.” Common sense in the Post on this issue is something of a breakthrough.

Biden: Still Looking for an Off-Ramp?

The day before Gottemoeller’s article appeared, President Biden lamented:

“First time since the Cuban missile crisis, we have a direct threat of the use (of a) nuclear weapon if in fact things continue down the path they are going … I’m trying to figure out what is Putin’s off ramp?”

It should be no secret to Biden that there is, as Gottemoeller suggests, in so many words – an off-ramp for both – a ramp with time-tested guardrails called “inspections.” Trust but verify.

As I noted in an earlier piece, which compared the Cuban crisis to the current one in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned on Dec. 21, 2021 that “if US and NATO missile systems are deployed in Ukraine, their flight time to Moscow will be only 7–10 minutes, or even five minutes for hypersonic systems.” [Emphasis added.] (Shades of MRBMs detected 60 years ago in Cuba.)

On December 30, 2021, Biden and Putin talked by phone at Putin’s urgent request. The Kremlin readout stated: “Joseph Biden emphasized … that Washington had no intention of deploying offensive strike weapons in Ukraine.” [Emphasis added.]

The mood in the Kremlin was upbeat. The Geneva negotiations, just ten days away were off to a good start. Oops! A couple of days after those talks started, Biden’s promise on the non-deployment of strike weapons systems on Ukrainian territory had fallen into the cracks. This became clear during the next conversation between Biden and Putin (Feb. 12).

Putin may feel diddled – and not for the first time. Yet, his chief strategic concern, in my view, is the medium-range ballistic missiles (cruise and hypersonic) that can be inserted virtually overnight into capsules in Romania, Poland, and eventually elsewhere on Russia’s periphery. The evidence suggests that, in due course, Putin would be willing to deal on this issue.

Is Biden, Like Dan Quayle, ‘No John Kennedy’?

The jury is out. Harvard’s Graham Allison claims that:

“In Biden, we have a seasoned cold warrior who has thought about the Cuban Missile Crisis and has thought about nuclear war. He has thought about what a full-scale war would look like, he’s even gone through scenarios on this — I know, personally.”

In my view, much will depend on whether President Biden can be brought to recognize how poorly served he, and the country, have been by his current coterie of advisers. Gottemoeller has a generation more experience than Jake Sullivan. She has dealt extensively with the Russians and with NATO. (From 2016 to 2019 she was Deputy Secretary General at the UN, so she knows how to mold the malleable Jens Stoltenberg, as well.)

Will the Biden boys let an adult into the room. They had better.