September opinion polls in Russia continue to show Putin maintaining high popularity and trust ratings, despite slow progress and significant setbacks such as in Kharkiv. Nevertheless, those ratings have taken a hit in response perhaps to that taken by NordStream, and they are only likely to fall further as a result of October 7th attack on the Crimean bridge. Putin’s best opinion survey performance came in the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM) survey for September, which showed Putin’s approval rating falling from 80 percent before declaration of the partial military mobilization (September 18) to 75 percent in its immediate wake (September 25). The survey registered a fall in trust in Putin from 77 percent to 74 percent. Before the ‘special military operation, Putin’s approval and trust ratings ranged between 58 and 63 percent, according to FOM. Perhaps, most disturbingly, the percentage of Russians who expressed “concern” over developments grew from 35 percent to 69 percent (www.ng.ru/editorial/2022-10-03/2_8555_editorial.html). This latter shift means a fertile field now exists for further downward trending in Putin’s ratings. The Levada Center recorded a decline among survey respondents in Putin’s approval rating from 83 percent in August to 77 percent in September and a decline of respondents who feel Russia is moving in the right direction from 67 to 60 perrcent in the same period (levada.ru). The exception to this new downward trend was in the September 26 – October 2 VTsIOM polling, which found slight boost for Putin’s approval and trust ratings of approximately one percent to around 80 percent (https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-doverija-politikam-ocenki-raboty-prezidenta-i-pravitelstva-podderzhka-politicheskikh-partii-20221007). It seems to this observer that the first two surveys are more reliable for this general period. Taking into account that this downward trend was registered before the Kerch bridge attack, we can expect perhaps a further decline to come, with the caveat that the damage to the bridge turned out to be relatively limited and failed to cut off the Crimea supply line.
However, in addition to public angst, the Russian patriotic and official intelligentsia is beyond impatient with Putin’s restrained ‘special military operation’ and slow progress on the front. Russian state television channels’ various political talks shows and the social web are now filled with angst over the troops’ slow advance, the withdrawal from Kharkiv, the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines’ destruction, and the terrorist attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea with the Russian mainland. For example, during Sunday’s program ‘Evening with Solovev’, one participant argued that the country was on the verge of a wave of repressive reaction from below, as people were beginning to blame less patriotic citizens for any war failure, demanding to know ‘what have you done to bring victory and if nothing then you are not with us but against us. The participant feared that people may soon act in accordance with these feelings, and reprisals could eat the country up. The popular and elite sense is that it is time to take the gloves off, enter the Russian army’s infantry proper (not rely on Chechens, Wagner, and DPR and LNR forces alone) and mount a major combined arms offensive to destroy Ukraine’s civilian and military infrastructure and the Ukrainian army.
After publishing “On John Lennon’s Birthday, a Few Words About War” last night, old friend and former Moscow Times editor Matt Bivens* and I discovered we’d written on the same topic. You can find Matt’s excellent essay here. He notes a big thing I missed. A series of ominous statements was buried in Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s recent joint press conference with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly, trumpeting the “tremendous opportunity” the Nord Stream blasts afforded to remove “the dependence on Russian energy.” A few public figures questioned those comments, but Blinken said something else that was worse. The relevant passage:
I also made clear that when Russia made this move, the United States and our allies and partners would impose swift and severe costs on individuals and entities – inside and outside of Russia – that provide political or economic support to illegal attempts to change the status of Ukrainian territory…
We will hold to account any individual, entity, or country that provides political or economic support for President Putin’s illegal attempts to change the status of Ukrainian territory. In support of this commitment, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce are releasing new guidance on heightened sanctions and export control risks for entities and individuals inside and outside of Russia that support in any way the Kremlin’s sham referenda, purported annexation, and occupation of parts of Ukraine.
There’s no way to know what a State Department official might believe meets the definitions of “political support,” support “in any way,” the “Kremlin’s sham referenda,” or any of a half-dozen phrases in that passage. This is why the negative precedent of government watch lists after the PATRIOT Act was important. By making lists, officials can seriously impact your life without notice or right of appeal. Even if courts later strike down the activity, it may take nearly 20 years to get there, and that’s assuming a) the state discloses enough to make a court challenge possible and b) they abide by any judicial rulings.
From Google and Twitter to the Departments of Justice and State, we’ve become a blacklisting society, and it’s beginning to look like the excesses of the Bush years were just a warmup.
Meeting of Russian Prime Ministers with Deputy Prime Ministers. The agenda includes the results of a government commission’s work to determine the cause of the incident and eliminate the consequences of the damage caused to the Crimean bridge, managing traffic across the Kerch Strait, supporting tourists and tourism organisations in Crimea, resettlement from dilapidated housing, and planned priority measures to ensure the operation of the economy during partial mobilisation.
Mikhail Mishustin’s opening remarks
Marat Khusnullin’s remarks
Minister of Transport Vitaly Savelyev’s remarks
Dmitry Chernyshenko’s remarks
Excerpts from the transcript:
Mikhail Mishustin: Colleagues, last Saturday, a terrorist attack occurred in Crimea aimed at destroying the Russia’s critical civilian infrastructure. This resulted in the temporary suspension of transport links between the peninsula and the Krasnodar Territory. At the President’s instruction, a government commission was created, headed by Marat Khusnullin, to organise relief efforts as soon as possible. Within a few hours of the incident, it was possible to completely extinguish the fire thanks to the coordinated efforts of all services and the heads of regions’ prompt action. I would like to specifically thank the governors of the Krasnodar Territory, the Republic of Crimea, and Sevastopol.
Specialists arriving at the site carried out an initial assessment of the technical condition of the railway section of the bridge and the undamaged part of the roadway. Emergency repairs were performed. Already during the first day, train services resumed, as well as vehicle traffic in temporary reverse mode. At the same time, ferry service across the Kerch Strait was also launched. It will take over part of the passenger and freight traffic load.
Mr Khusnullin, you visited the site and know the situation on the ground. Please tell us how the work is being organised, what is being done to restore the bridge, and about any latest updates.
Marat Khusnullin: Mr Mishustin, colleagues, on Sunday, 8 October, as soon as you established a governmental commission for the situation on the Crimean Bridge, under the President’s instructions, I held a field meeting with the commission members at the site of the incident, where we personally inspected the nature of the damage and adopted the necessary decisions.
Let me briefly describe today’s transport situation. Within 24 hours we have repaired the barriers, restored the lighting and painted temporary road markings. This made it possible, as you said, to reopen one-way vehicle traffic on the same day and two-way traffic on one side the next day after the terrorist attack. To cut inspection and waiting times on the approaches to the bridge, the Interior Ministry, FSB, and the Ministry of Transport were instructed to hire additional personnel.
We are inspecting the railway tracks, and preliminarily, we see that we will need to replace two spans, but the Crimean Railway restored both freight and passenger service along one track on the first day. The repair operations are not influencing cargo or passenger service. Lorries and buses are also being transported by ferry. We are stepping up this alternative.
Regarding the damage, we continue to analyse how serious it is. Divers have been checking the bridge supports since yesterday morning. Following diagnostic inspections, it has been found necessary to remove damage from the expansion joint on one of the supports. We estimate that the damage will be removed by the end of this week. But this does not affect the safety of traffic on the side that has been opened. Two full shifts are working around the clock. Twice a day, at 8 am and 8 pm, the supervisors submit progress reports. They have already removed the asphalt from the cantilever sections of the motorway spans. We have employed about 150 people to work on this. A plan and schedule to dismantle the damaged sections is being drafted. We expect it to be operational within three days. By that time, additional construction equipment, such as floating cranes and other equipment, will arrive. We have contacted the building material suppliers. I want to thank everyone for expediting this work. We expect the steel components to begin arriving from Tyumen, Kurgan, and Voronezh by the end of this week.
The Ministry of Transport and the road police have been instructed to escort the shipment of these large components so they arrive promptly and without delay. The governmental commission has also discussed the necessary organisational measures with the heads of the Republic of Crimea and the Krasnodar Territory. We have made arrangements to inform the local residents about the developments and to organise, jointly with the Interior Ministry and the Emergencies Ministry, temporary parking lots, food points, and intercept parking with the necessary amenities.
The commission has instructed the Ministry of Transport to work out the entire logistics of freight deliveries to the peninsula. We have an alternative route running through the liberated territories. This year, we began repairs and restoration work on about 500 kilometres of roads in the new territories. We are planning to be finished in November or December, including 180 of the 359 kilometres of this alternative route. Work is under way on this road, with individual stretches opening every day. But we can still use these roads safely now. The Ministry of Transport will report on logistics details.
Mikhail Mishustin: Thank you, Mr Khusnullin, for your promptness and for the overall management of these efforts. Of course, the Crimean Bridge is crucial in connecting the peninsula with other regions of the country. It is necessary to restore its full working capacity in the shortest possible time. Please keep these issues under your personal control.
Mr Savelyev, please report on the work done within your area of responsibility. How is passenger transportation being organised, including alternative routes, and delivery of goods to the peninsula? And in general, what is the situation with logistics?
Vitaly Saveliev: Mr. Mishustin, colleagues,
Together with the Deputy Prime Minister Mr Khusnullin, we are working on repairing the damage to the Crimean bridge in terms of logistics for passengers and freight during the period when the full resumption of traffic is being carried out.
As for road traffic, on 8 October, from 4 pm reversible passenger car traffic was launched with an interval of 40 minutes on and off in a single lane. Fixed lighting was fully restored as of 9 pm. On 9 October, two-way traffic was provided as of 4pm. As of 8 am this morning, 6,851 vehicles have passed through. To increase the capacity of the Crimean Bridge, we expect to receive a mobile inspection unit from the Federal Customs Service on 10 October. No cargo or passenger buses will be allowed on the Crimean bridge for the time being. A decision has been taken to send them to the Kerch ferry crossing, where sea ferries have resumed operation. I would like to point out in particular that cargo vehicles carrying perishable goods will be sent on the ferries as a matter of priority.
In terms of ferry service. Three passenger vessels with capacity of 100, 200, and 250 passengers started operation on 8 October. By 7 am on 10 October, 2,882 people were transported by passenger ferries and other vessels that that were activated for this. Two car ferries with total capacity of up to 50 cars started operating on 9 October. By the morning of today, 407 trucks and 1,756 passengers were carried in both directions. On 10 and 15 October two more automobile ferries are scheduled to arrive. The arrival of three railway ferries is expected approximately on October 12 and 15. Two ferries arriving on October 15 have limitations: the depths in the port of Kerch are insufficient. A Rosmorport dredging vessel from Gelendzhik has been engaged to carry out dredging works. Estimated time for the works to be completed is October 14.
Railway ferry operation is not critical for the situation today, as one line of the railway covers all transport needs. We will keep them as part of our reserves.
On the evening of 8 October, railway traffic was resumed along one railway line of the Crimean bridge. Today the movement of freight and passenger long-distance trains is carried out according to the standard schedule in both directions. This guarantees that the residents of Crimea will be provided in full with goods transported by rail.
Suburban passenger traffic along the section of the Crimean bridge has also been fully restored. The trains travelling through the damaged section do so at a speed of 40 km per hour. It is expected that the Russian Railways company will conclude their survey and assessment of condition of the faulty track by 13 October. I would like to express my gratitude to the Russian Railways and personally to General Director Oleg Belozyorov, as well as to the staff of the Crimean Railways for the prompt work done.
Now on the various forms of traffic. Passengers who were travelling to Crimea, but who were redirected to Anapa, have been delivered and accommodated in hotels. Eight buses were used and more than 2,000 people were transported to their place of accommodation and back to the trains. In addition, buses have been prepared for ferry transportation to and from the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Crimea.
The prompt communication to the public about the situation regarding the liquidation of damage to the Crimean Bridge and the restoration has been organised.
Work is underway to bring regulations in line with the provisions of the Presidential Executive Order dated 8 October 2022.
Alternative routes are being developed, as Mr Khusnullin has just said.
Mr Mishustin, the logistics decisions that we have already made helped us fulfil the priority tasks for the stable supply of goods to the population of Crimea. We are working closely with respective subjects of the Russian Federation. The Unified Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, in cooperation with the Crimean government, and the administration of the Krasnodar Territory, are engaged in providing temporary parking, meals, and accommodation for passengers, and the delivery of passengers by alternative routes to their destinations. This work will continue.
Mikhail Mishustin: Thank you, Mr Savelyev.
It is very important to reopen traffic to and from Crimea in full volume and to analyse all the details to the greatest possible extent in order to prevent any further incidents. Please continue to coordinate this effort.
Although traffic has been partially restored on the Kerch Strait Bridge, many Russian citizens visiting Crimea or planning to visit the peninsula have been forced to change their plans.
Mr Dmitry Chernyshenko, please report on efforts to keep the public apprised of the situation and what support measures have been implemented.
Dmitry Chernyshenko: Mr Mishustin, as per your instructions, we got to work quickly, and we issued the relevant instructions to the Federal Agency for Tourism, the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media, the Ministry of Transport and to the regional authorities on how to support our tourists.
What has been done? First, about 50,000 tourists from various regions were staying in Crimea at the time of the terrorist attack. It was suggested that those guests planning to complete their vacation in Crimea stay at hotels and health centres free of charge. About 1,000 people agreed and extended their stay by 24 hours.
Due to the long delays, passengers from two trains were accommodated at hotels in Feodosia and Simferopol and were provided with hot meals. They have now departed safely on trains to their respective destinations.
As instructed by the Head of the Republic of Crimea, hotels will be reimbursed from the republic’s budget for accommodating tourists.
Second, the Federal Agency for Tourism has been instructed to monitor the situation in the tourism industry and to submit damage assessments to the Government. The Ministry of Finance and we have already decided to allocate 1.6 billion roubles by redistributing funds under the national project on tourism. The money will be used to support the Crimea and Sevastopol tourism industries. The Federal Agency for Tourism will draft and submit the relevant regulatory documents on Wednesday.
I would like to note that, so far, we are not seeing any major decline in the number of tourists planning to visit Crimea. An insignificant number of ticket reservations for later dates have been cancelled so far.
Third, on the morning of 8 October, the Federal Agency for Tourism, with support from the communications ministry, was instructed to open a federal hotline service. Along with the republican call centre, tourists can receive updates. Most calls were received on 8 October. About 1,300 people from various Russian regions called this federal number: 8 (800) 707 9741.
The situation with transport availability is constantly updated. I would like to note that the hotline will continue to operate.
Mikhail Mishustin: Thank you, Mr Chernyshenko. I would also like to ask you to monitor the operation of Rosturism’s hotline so that it works properly and help the region’s tourism industry to work stably.
Now, colleagues, a few words about important measures aimed at supporting businesses in the context of partial mobilisation announced by the president. They will help ensure the stable operation of the Russian economy. The corresponding priority action plan was approved by the government.
A draft federal law will be prepared, according to which people will be able to remain owners of their businesses and engage in entrepreneurial activities, both personally and through third parties.
When individual entrepreneurs and heads of businesses, the sole founders of their companies, are called up for military service, they will have several days to issue a power of attorney to the new head. And if they have already been called up, the deadlines for paying taxes, insurance premiums, and other obligatory payments, as well as submitting declarations or other reports, will be extended for such organisations.
They will also be able to arrange a repayment holiday, rent deferral, and if it is impossible to further fulfil their obligations due to the mobilisation of the company owner, such businesses will have the right to change the terms of contracts and write off the incurred penalties. This rule will affect government contracts concluded before the end of next year.
Grant support conditions may also be readjusted. It will be possible to extend the implementation of such projects, reduce requirements for them, and eliminate penalties.
Colleagues, all planned decisions and legislative initiatives must be prepared as soon as possible.
One more issue. The government continues to work on resettling people from emergency housing, which was identified as unfit for living before 1 January 2017.
We are building new, comfortable and safe residences to replace these buildings. However, due to the imposed external sanctions, the cost of building materials and equipment has recently increased significantly. In order to compensate the regions for the increase in spending, the government will allocate an additional 24 billion roubles for such purposes on behalf of the head of state. Until the end of the year, 43 Russian constituent entities that need federal funding most urgently will receive funds.
The situation in this area was discussed in detail at the June meeting of the Presidential State Council Presidium. As a result, a number of decisions were made. And in August we launched another programme to reduce the emergency housing, which has been recognised as such over the past five years, or, to be more precise, before 1 January 2022.
In these conditions, it is necessary to monitor the effective use of each rouble. I would like to ask Mr Khusnullin to have a constant personal control of how the work is progressing.
Has ‘partial mobilization’ breathed full-blooded democracy into Russia’s parliamentary government structure and broader society?
It is normal to think of wartime as a period of tightened censorship and imposition of ever greater controls on society at large. Indeed, Western journalists have in the past half year focused attention on the closure of several notorious anti-Putin broadcasting companies and print media in Russia, including Rain (Dozhd’) and Novaya Gazeta. They have covered the flight of editors and staff abroad after they were labeled as ‘foreign agents’ and could expect invitations to appear before the courts.
However, in the days since the announcement by the Kremlin of ‘partial mobilization’ of the reserves, it is increasingly clear to any outside objective observer that a full blast of social activism is underway, and that the dikes of state controls on free speech are being swept away. A week ago, following reversals on the battlefield and loss of territory to the enemy that could not be ignored, members of the State Duma openly denounced the Ministry of Defense for dispensing ‘fairy tales’ about the progress of the campaign in Ukraine and demanded transparency in communications to the public. Speaker of the Duma Volodin, who is a leader of the ruling United Russia party, must have been in shock.
Meanwhile, we see on state television news reporting on the formation of private committees across the country to raise funds, procure goods and directly deliver to the new recruits clothing and other gear which the Army is not providing as it sends them off to the front. This is presented as representing a patriotic upsurge in Russian society, but on closer view it is a damning criticism of the incompetence of the powers-that-be for sending citizens off to war without the kit they need.
*****
In the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe, the escalating confrontation between Russia and NATO in and over Ukraine is presented as a repetition of the actors and principles underlying the outbreak of World War II. Putin is the modern day Hitler and Western leaders must defend democratic institutions against authoritarian regimes which commit aggression against neighbors.
In Russia, the escalating confrontation is seen in different terms, as a repetition of World War I, when the leaders of the Great Powers ‘sleep walked’ into the greatest tragedy for civilization of all time by failing to see the abyss before them. If the Kremlin is not careful, the likeness of today’s developments on the home front to the situation at the start – and more importantly, at the end – of WWI may yet be proven. That war did not end well for the tsarist regime and to a very considerable extent it was brought down precisely by patriotic society.
Current Russian television footage of the send-off of the reservists in provincial cities, with busloads of recruits driving past cheering citizenry waving little flags and bouquets of flowers, bears an uncanny resemblance to vintage photos taken in Russia at the outset of The Great War. The patriotic organizations formed by local politicians to support the war effort in 1914 over time became hotbeds of open criticism of the army leadership and of the tsarist dynasty, leading to the February Revolution and forced abdication of Nicholas II. Kremlin elites have excellent memories and surely are concerned.
Why is there today such a public display of civic activism? What has happened to the passive Russian public? The one-word answer is mobilization. As Sergey Mikheev, a panelist in last night’s Vladimir Solovyov talk show explained, the mobilization has turned what was a technical operation manned by professional soldiers into a ‘people’s war’ and the people now want a say in how it is conducted.
That is a sea change in Russian domestic politics. But it was to be expected, and its emergence so quickly is precisely why the Kremlin postponed mobilization as long as it could.
A little less than a year ago, I published an essay about the passivity of the Russian citizen-taxpayer under the piquant heading “no representation without taxation,” standing on its head the call to arms that once motivated American Revolutionaries against their colonial masters in England – https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2021/11/03/no-representation-without-taxation/.
For a number of reasons, the lion’s share of the Russian state budget comes from export taxes on gas and oil, with a relatively low share coming from taxes on the average Russian citizen: income tax is set at a flat rate of 15% and property taxes on houses and apartments are close to nil, while the government assures welfare state benefits of free medical care and education to the broad population. But when the Russian citizen has a direct interest in the game, as is now the case with the mobilization of husbands and fathers, that passive citizenry can become very emotional, involved and vocal.
*****
Last night’s political talk show hosted by Vladimir Solovyov was outstanding for giving voice to precisely the thoughts you otherwise hear in people’s home as they talk in their kitchens with relatives and close friends. There were several noteworthy contributors to the discussion, but the most comprehensive contribution was made by Sergey Mikheev, whom I briefly cited above. He was given the microphone for ten minutes or more, was not interrupted by the host or fellow panelists, which is common practice on these talk shows, and he delivered a stirring programmatic speech which, if you take it apart, was severely critical not of the generals for unprofessional management of field operations but of the country’s political leadership, going straight back to Vladimir Putin, for deeply flawed concepts on how the war should be prosecuted.
The mobilization, per Mikheev, is merely an extension or escalation of the failed policies to date, namely the attempt to conduct an artillery and infantry war with successes measured in destruction of Ukrainian military assets, instead of conducting total war, with the emphasis placed on destruction of the entire Ukrainian power generation, logistics and other infrastructure so as to demoralize the Ukrainian population and deprive its army of the wherewithal to continue fighting.
Mikheev attributed to his opponents in the Kremlin the argument that what they are doing is more humane, that Russia has no intention of leaving the broad Ukrainian public without heat or electricity in winter, or of causing unnecessary civilian deaths in its missile strikes. He insisted that the more humane way would have been to inflict massive pain on Ukraine back in March and April, so as to bring the conflict to an early conclusion. Escalation by baby steps is only prolonging the war and raising the risk of nuclear Armageddon.
Mikheev said that the loss of territory during the recent Ukrainian counteroffensives has many citizens scratching their heads. Why is Russia not using the technological superiority of its weaponry to greatest advantage? Why is it instead only increasing the numbers of its front line fighters as if this were a 20th century rather than a 21st century war?
Doubts about how the war is being conducted are causing ordinary Russians to lose confidence in their leadership and to look for hidden traitors. People are asking whether the oligarchs are influencing how the war is being fought so as to protect their interests. There is no room for private interests in what has been described as an existential conflict, says Mikheev. How is it that the truck loaded with explosives was allowed onto the bridge despite what had been described as tightest security? People are thinking that someone was paid off to let this vehicle through without inspection. Such corrosive doubts can be cut short only by a change in the way the war in being conducted.
It is hard to imagine a more damning statement than what Sergey Mikheev was allowed to present live on air on the Solovyov show. All reports about secret messages of criticism to Putin from within the Kremlin ranks that our newspapers feature pale in significance by comparison.
Another noteworthy panelist in last night’s show was the general director of Mosfilm, Karen Shakhnazarov, who, like Mikheev, is a regular visitor to the program. Shakhnazarov had two points to convey, one minor, and strictly professional from his domain, the world of entertainment, and the other major, and likely more broadly representative of thinking among Russia’s ‘creative classes.’ The minor point was to call out the absence today of a comprehensive patriotic management of the war effort. With all due respect to the mastery of foreign film directors and production companies, how can it be, he asked, that our television stations, including the private station NTV, are showing Rambo films these days? Such adulatory films of American daring-do could and should be put on hold till after this war is over.
Shakhnazarov’s major point was that Russia erred in not taking up Elon Musk’s latest proposal for ending the war. This was a missed Public Relations opportunity of great potential value in the Information War. Yes, Russia does not accept certain points in the plan, in particular, regarding holding new referendums in the four newly annexed territories. But it would have served Russia very well to say ‘yes, the plan is worth considering, and we are ready to go the extra mile in pursuit of peace’ when Zelensky unreservedly rejected the Musk plan. Said Shakhnazarov, Musk has tens of millions of followers and they could have been won over to Russia’s cause had the Kremlin given a qualified yes to the plan.
Finally, I call attention to the remarks made by a retired military intelligence officer, hero of the Russian Federation, who gave highly relevant explanations to the alleged Russian targeting of purely civilian targets like children’s playgrounds and opera houses in its missile strikes on cities across Ukraine a day ago in revenge for the bombing of the Crimea bridge. As he noted, Ukrainian authorities have claimed that the Russians fired 72 missiles that day, of which 42 were supposedly knocked out by the Ukrainian air defenses. Meanwhile the Russian authorities have said nothing about possible losses of their missiles to Ukrainian defenses and only said that all of the targets on their list were destroyed.
Let us say, this general argued, that the Ukrainian figures were inflated and that they shot down not 42 but 21 of our missiles. That would take the loss rate into typical range given that Ukraine still has a powerful anti missile defense in Kiev and elsewhere, which has been strengthened in recent weeks by more advanced systems sent in from NATO countries. “Shot down” is a deceptive term: usually this means not total destruction but the break-up of the incoming missile into fragments which contain explosives and land wherever gravity brings them down. Accordingly it is entirely possible that fragments of such Russian missiles indeed landed in civilian, residential neighborhoods with associated loss of life. Though the general did not mention it, exactly the same scenario occurred in Donetsk and other cities in the rebel provinces when they came under attack from Ukrainian Tochka-M rockets early in this war. The rockets were intercepted by Russian air defenses, but the fragments landed in city streets and caused significant loss of life as well as damage to infrastructure.
Finally, this military intelligence expert had some interesting and possibly valuable words to say about the newly appointed head of military operations in Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin, whom he met several times in the past and for whom he has great respect. Surovikin has been given this assignment after serving as chief of the Aerospace Forces, which was in itself an unusual career move for an officer whose basic education and experience was in charge of ground forces. In this appointment, we may well see better coordination and use of the two different branches of the military, which have been criticized in Western expert circles for precisely a lack of effectiveness. As regards the coincidence between the new assignment and the dramatic ratcheting up of Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian cities a day ago, the general insisted that from one day to the next a new appointee cannot master all aspects of the ongoing complex military operations, so that Surovikin cannot be the author of these strikes.
Having some experience as an historical researcher in Russian government archives from the tsarist period, I learned one lesson that bears on today: in government offices there are always competent and highly experienced officials who draft legislation or orders that sit idly in their desk drawers but which can become government policy in a matter of hours if events outside the bureaucracy force a change. I believe that is precisely what happened with respect to Russia’s massive attack on Ukraine of late.
With this, I rest my overriding point from the foregoing summary of the 10 October Solovyov show: Russian state television is essential reference material to anyone seeking to make sense of this war and to see where it may lead.
