YouGov, 3/21/24

A new YouGov survey asked Americans about the possibility of another world war, the role that other countries might play, the roles they themselves might play, and how the U.S. should respond to hypothetical nuclear attacks abroad and at home. The majority of Americans believe that another world war is at least somewhat likely to happen in the next five to 10 years, but most don’t think they would volunteer to serve in military roles or non-combatant roles if the U.S. were to be involved.

22% of Americans think it’s very likely that there will be another world war within the next five to 10 years; 39% say it’s somewhat likely. One-third of Republicans think it’s very likely that there will be another world war in the next decade; 20% of Independents and 16% of Democrats agree.

If another world war were to break out, 77% of Americans believe the U.S. would be involved. Just 6% say the U.S. would not be involved, and the remaining 18% are unsure.

72% believe that if another world war were to break out, Russia would be involved and would be on a different side than the U.S. A similar percentage (69%) say the same of China.

The countries that Americans are most likely to say would be involved in a hypothetical global conflict and on the same side as the U.S. are the United Kingdom (67%), Ukraine (58%), and Israel (58%).

If there were to be a world war in which the U.S. and their allies were fighting against Russia, China, or both, Americans are more likely to say that the Western nations would win than to say they would lose.

In the case of a war involving Russia and its allies, 53% think Western nations and their allies would win. If the war were to be China and their allies facing Western nations and their allies, 48% of Americans think the Western nations would win. If both China and Russia — and their allies — were fighting Western nations and their allies in a world war, 45% of Americans say the Western nations would win. In each hypothetical war, 12% or fewer expect a loss for the Western nations.

Republicans are particularly likely to say Western nations and their allies would win against Russia (60%), China (56%), and both China and Russia together (55%).

A similar YouGov poll conducted in the U.K. found that Britons also are more likely to say Western nations and their allies would win in each scenario than say they would lose. 44% think they would win over Russia, 38% say the same about a conflict with China, and 31% think Western nations would win over China, Russia, and their allies. However, 21% of British adults believe that Western forces would lose to China, Russia, and their allies in the event of a world war.

If a world war involving the U.S. were to break out, 6% of Americans say they would volunteer for military service, 9% say they would not volunteer but would serve if called up, and 13% say they would not volunteer and would refuse to serve if called up; 60% say they don’t believe the armed forces would want them to serve due to age or disability. However, if the U.S. were under imminent threat of invasion, the percentage of people who would volunteer for military service is higher: 16%. 47% say that even in this case, they don’t believe the armed forces would want them to serve due to age or disability.

Americans are more open to the idea of serving in non-combat roles in the event of a world war. 19% say they would volunteer for this type of role; 12% would not volunteer but would serve if called up. If the U.S. were under imminent threat of invasion, 26% would volunteer for non-combat service. 42% of Americans say the government would not want them for non-combat roles for reasons related to age or disability; 38% say the government would not want them to serve for these reasons even if the U.S. were under imminent threat of invasion.

Many Americans believe that nuclear weapons would play a role in potential global conflicts. 68% of Americans say it’s likely that a future world war would involve the use of nuclear weapons, including 64% of Democrats and 78% of Republicans.

https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/sOyNW/1/

YouGov’s survey also asked about specific scenarios related to the use of nuclear weapons by Russia and China.

If Russia were to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine — which Russia president Vladimir Putin has said his country is ready to do if Russia’s sovereignty or independence is threatened — most Americans say the U.S. should take action of some kind, though few favor the use of nuclear weapons in response.

If Russia were to use a small nuclear weapon against a Ukrainian military target — and if the U.S. and Western nations were not already at war with Russia — 11% of Americans think the U.S. should launch a nuclear retaliation against Russia. 21% say the best course of action would be to declare war against Russia, but not use nuclear weapons, while 30% say the U.S. should take action short of declaring war.

If Russia were to use a nuclear weapon against a city in Ukraine, 13% think the U.S. should launch a nuclear retaliation and 22% think the country should declare war but not use nuclear weapons. 28% think the U.S should take action short of declaring war.

Similar majorities of Americans think the U.S. and other Western nations should take action of some kind in the event of China using nuclear weapons against Taiwan — but use of nuclear weapons in response is unpopular. If China were to use a small nuclear weapon against a Taiwanese military target, 11% think the U.S. should launch a nuclear retaliation and 22% think the U.S. should declare war but not use nuclear weapons. 27% think the U.S. should take action short of declaring war and 13% say it should take no action.

If China were to use a nuclear weapon against a city in Taiwan, 14% think the U.S. should launch a nuclear retaliation, 23% think it should declare war but not use nuclear weapons and 25% think it should take action short of declaring war.

There is far more support for nuclear retaliation — though still far less than majority support — in the case of a hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. were the target of a nuclear attack. If another country were to use a small nuclear weapon against a U.S. military target, 27% would support nuclear retaliation and 30% think the U.S. should declare war but not use nuclear weapons.

If a nuclear weapon were used against a city in the U.S., 38% think the best option would be to launch a nuclear retaliation against that country and 27% think the U.S. should declare war but not use nuclear weapons.

— Taylor Orth and Carl Bialik contributed to this article

Related:

• How Americans view the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine wars
• AI doomsday worries many Americans. So does apocalypse from climate change, nukes, war, and more
• Which U.S. military interventions do Americans think have been successful?

See the results for this YouGov poll

Methodology: The YouGov poll was conducted online on February 1 – 7, 2024 among 1,000 U.S. adult citizens. Respondents were selected from YouGov’s opt-in panel using sample matching. A random sample (stratified by gender, age, race, education, geographic region, and voter registration) was selected from the 2019 American Community Survey. The sample was weighted according to gender, age, race, education, 2020 election turnout and presidential vote, baseline party identification, and current voter registration status. Demographic weighting targets come from the 2019 American Community Survey. Baseline party identification is the respondent’s most recent answer given prior to November 1, 2022, and is weighted to the estimated distribution at that time (33% Democratic, 31% Republican). The margin of error for the overall sample is approximately 4%.

Image: Getty (Fox Photos / Stringer)

By Glenn Diesen, Twitter/X, 4/24/24

Glenn Diesen is a Norwegian academic and political scientist. He is a professor at the School of Business of the University of South-Eastern Norway.

The idea that NATO can continue to send ever-more powerful and long-range weapons to Ukraine without any retaliation from Russia is premised on the dangerous self-delusion that NATO is not a participant in the conflict.

But if we accept that this is also a NATO War, then it is obvious that Russia will eventually feel compelled to retaliate against NATO to restore deterrence, which could trigger a nuclear war.

Consider the following:

– Immediately after President Yanukovich had been toppled with the support of the US, the first thing the new US-backed Ukrainian intelligence chief did was to call CIA & MI6 for a partnership against Russia – and secret CIA bases were established along the Russian border (this partnership was established before Russia responded by taking back Crimea). (NY Times)

– This occurred as the US asserted ever-greater control over the Ukrainian government and its policies: The leaked Nuland call revealed that Washington dictated who would be part of the post-coup government and who had to stay out. American citizens also took several top positions in the new government (such as the finance minister post). Ukraine’s General Prosecutor Shokin argued the US was running Ukraine as a colony as new appointments had to be approved by Washington. Biden even fired Shokin when he investigated the Ukrainian energy company Burisma where Biden had placed his son Hunter

– Over the next decade, the US and its allies built a powerful Ukrainian army while sabotaging the Minsk agreement and later (after the Russian invasion) also sabotaged the Istanbul negotiations. Weapon systems poured in, Ukrainian ports were modernised to fit American warships, and Ukraine was becoming a de facto NATO member. Top Ukrainian officials like Arestovich argued openly they were preparing for a war with Russia. A top adviser to former president Nicolas Sarkozy, warned that the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership of November 2021 “convinced Russia that it must attack or be attacked” (NY Times)

– Since the Russian invasion, the mantra from NATO has since been that weapons are the path to peace while refusing to engage in negotiations or diplomacy for more than 2 years. Our media keeps ignoring the horrific Ukrainian losses and instead chant that Ukraine is winning to maintain public support for the war. NATO has supplied the weapons, intelligence, and participated in in the war planning. A source in the Ukrainian general staff even argued that NATO pressured Ukraine to carry out disastrous counter-offensives.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/20/ukraines-sluggish-counter-offensive-is-souring-the-public-mood

– More powerful and long-range weapons are now sent and Blinken argues that Ukraine can use them to strike inside Russian territory. Leaked calls from German officers reveal that long-range missiles are to be used to destroy the Crimean bridge and that either Germans or Americans can assist in operating them

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian-tape-of-secret-german-meeting-reveals-berlins-thinking-on-sending-missiles-to-ukraine-a3a02cc3

– Putin is saying that the US objective was “to spark a war in Europe, and to eliminate competitors by using a proxy force… They plan to finish us once and for all”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/18/russia-ukraine-war-us-involvement-leaked-documents

– The US should ask itself: How would Washington respond if Russia was engaged in a similar proxy war against the US on its borders in Mexico? The conviction in our own virtue, that we are merely “helping Ukraine”, blinds us to the fact that we are taking giant steps toward nuclear war.

RT, 4/3/24

The Russian economy is growing while becoming less reliant on oil and gas exports, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin told lawmakers on Wednesday. The government’s revenue is increasing, allowing Moscow to finance growth and development projects, and to meet social obligations, he added.

The federal budget income surpassed 29 trillion rubles ($314 billion) in 2023, a rise of almost 5% compared to the previous year, the head of the Russian government said, as he presented his report to the State Duma. “Non-oil-and-gas income grew by a quarter,” he told MPs.

The economy, he said, “is becoming less dependent on the export of the raw materials.” According to Mishustin, the nation’s GDP increased by 3.6% last year, more than double the average growth reported by most developed nations over the same period, which amounted to 1.6%.

Total industrial output grew by 3.5%, the prime minister said, adding that the manufacturing sector demonstrated growth of 7.5%, while the unemployment rate was cut in half by the end of 2023 and amounted to 3%.

Russia also witnessed record high investments last year, which grew by 10% and reached the highest level in 12 years, according to the official. He added that the policies of the Russian central bank also allowed for inflation to be reined in, reducing it from 11.9% to 7.4%.

The nation’s debt, which is 17% of GDP, remains at a “secure level,” Mishustin noted, pointing out that it is far lower than in the West. Earlier this week, the central bank reported that as of January 1, “the external debt of the Russian Federation amounted to $316.8 billion, having decreased by $68.2 billion, or by 17.7%, over the course of [2023].”

Moscow has also managed to circumvent what Mishustin called a trade blockade imposed by the West in the form of sanctions. Russia’s trade volume with “friendly nations” surpassed $548 billion last year, which was roughly equal to the turnover Russia had with the whole world, including Western nations, four years ago, according to the prime minister.

In early March, The Economist reported that the Russian economy had “defied the doomsayers” and returned to its pre-conflict performance levels despite unprecedented sanctions imposed by the US and its allies over the Ukraine conflict.

In late February, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia was on track to become the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). The nation had already become the biggest economy in Europe in terms of PPP, he added.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 5/2/24

The Georgian security services thwarted an attempt by rioters to storm parliament on Wednesday in response to their country’s impending foreign agents law that’s modeled off of the US’ one but has been spun by Western media as being “Russian-inspired”. This J6 redux was met with a shrug by the US and the EU in a tacit sign of support for the protesters’ increasingly violent demonstrations. Here are some background briefings on this rolling Color Revolution to bring everyone up to speed about it:

* 8 March 2023: “Georgia Is Targeted For Regime Change Over Its Refusal To Open A ‘Second Front’ Against Russia”

* 9 March 2023: “Georgia’s Withdrawal Of Its US-Inspired Foreign Agents Bill Won’t End Western Pressure”

* 11 March 2023: “Russia Called The US Out For Double Standards Towards Georgia-Moldova & Bosnia-Serbia”

* 3 July 2023: “Georgia’s Ruling Party Chairman Discredited The ‘False Flag Coup’ Conspiracy Theory”

* 4 October 2023: “Armenia’s Impending Defection From The CSTO Places Georgia Back In The US’ Crosshairs”

Basically, the West’s attempted regime change against the Georgian government is driven by the former’s hatred of the latter’s balanced approach towards the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine. Tbilisi’s refusal to impose sanctions against Moscow, which would crush its own economy, is twisted as alleged proof of its leadership taking orders from the Kremlin. Ditto their American-inspired foreign agents law that’s simply meant to inform the populace of who’s funding which information products.

The larger geopolitical agenda at play is to replace the Georgian government with Western puppets in order to facilitate NATO’s military logistics to neighboring landlocked Armenia, which the bloc envisages turning into their new regional bastion for dividing-and-ruling the South Caucasus. The failure thus far to overthrow the ruling Georgian party caused the Armenian leader to get cold feet and finally begin delimiting his country’s border with Azerbaijan, which will foil NATO’s plans if successfully completed.

Therein lies the reason why the West revived its Color Revolution against Georgia at this precise moment, not only because its foreign agents bill is planned to enter into law by sometime this month, but also to signal to Armenia that it should freeze its border talks since NATO aid might be incoming. This timely legal pretext is therefore being exploited for geopolitical ends, though it remains unclear whether it’ll topple the Georgian government and/or influence the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijan negotiations.

The latest riots in Tbilisi were importantly preceded by Congress tabling the “Azerbaijan Sanctions Review Act”, which was yet another signal to Armenia to hold out until help from NATO arrives. Simply put, what’s presently taking place is the geostrategic reorientation of the region away from Western hegemony, which is being accelerated by Armenia beginning its long-delayed border talks with Azerbaijan. If NATO can’t “poach” Armenia from the CSTO, then its whole regional policy will collapse.

The blatant double standards on display as regards false claims of Azerbaijan “ethnically cleansing” Armenians from its previously occupied western regions and shrugging in the face of Georgia’s latest J6 redux are evidence of the West’s ulterior geopolitical motives in the region. The goal is to “poach” Armenia from the CSTO in parallel with overthrowing the Georgian government, though the latest developments suggest that this will be much more difficult to achieve than the West expected.

By Victor Take, Landmarks Magazine (Substack), 4/6/24

[Editor’s note: this is the fourth installment of the Simone Weil Center’s Symposium on ‘Containment 2.0.’ The first two installments can be read here, here, and here]

Victor Taki is a historian interested in imperial Russia’s Balkan entanglements and the intellectual history of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. His latest book Russia’s Turkish Wars was published by the University of Toronto Press in 2024.

It has become customary in certain quarters to contrast the current international imbroglio to the good old days of the Cold War: in comparison with the present-day protagonists, the two superpowers of yore might indeed appear as paragons of self-restraint. By the same token one might be tempted to contrast George Kennan’s foreign political wisdom to the collective folly of the mainstream media experts in the West. However, I would emphasize the continuity.

Late in his life, Kennan was a rare voice of caution advising the Clinton administration against the first post-1991 round of NATO expansion, yet his “Long Telegram” never really impressed me as a fair description of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. The following words in particular strike me as a fundamental misperception: “[We] have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.”

This misperception reflected a profound difference of political cultures of the two countries shaped by very different historical experiences and geographic conditions. Despite its initial parochialism, post-Petrine Russia ultimately became an integral part of European great power politics. Both in its pre-1789 “balance of power” variant, and in its post-1815 “Concert of Europe” version, this great power politics was nothing other than a modus vivendi of a handful of states whose rulers for all practical purposes abandoned the hope of imposing their will (rules, norms) on the rivals. Two centuries of this historical experience produced among Russian elites a notion of great power equality that was strong enough to prevail over the early Soviet revolutionary messianism and become a defining characteristic of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. It stood behind the Soviet interest in “peaceful co-existence of the two systems,” just as it informs present-day Moscow’s rhetoric of “indivisible security.”

It is precisely this notion of great power equality that the American political establishment never accepted, as is clear (among other things) from both Kennan’s initial concept of containment and the current attempts to revive it. The basic reasons for this are easy enough to see. Unlike Russia, the United States has never been part of the European balance of power or the European Concert. In a century of self-chosen isolationism, they turned from a country, which had been smaller and weaker than a European great power, into a country that eclipsed all of them by its economic and ultimately military might. In itself, this difference of scale and potential is not a barrier to the development of a modus vivendi mentality – the powers that balanced each other in Europe were after all vastly different in terms of territory, population, wealth, etc. However, the discrepancy in scale was further enhanced by a highly advantageous geographic position of the United States and a messianic collective psychology that has its roots in the Calvinist concept of double predestination. As a result, American foreign policy makers have been quite insensitive to Moscow’s post-1945 security concerns and, at the same time, tempted to exploit its strategic vulnerabilities.

Decades of Cold War “containment” have manifestly failed to make Russian elites abandon their great power mentality, yet this policy may still succeed in making the Russian perception of the United States similar to Kennan’s initial (mis)perception of the post-WWII Soviet Union. In fact, the Foreign Affairs proposal for a new containment may stimulate the Russian leadership to conclude that “we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if American power is to be secure.” Once the master of the Kremlin makes this conclusion, the authors of “new containment” may rightfully celebrate an important step forward in their efforts to reshape the world in America’s image, yet will the world become a safer place?