By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 10/9/23

On November 18, 2021, Putin held a meeting with Russian diplomats. Facing renewed vows that Ukraine would enter NATO and continued concerns that NATO’s “military potential and infrastructure [would be] in the vicinity of Russian borders,” Putin turned to his minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, and said, “it is imperative to push for serious, long-term guarantees that safeguard Russia’s security . . ..”

One month later, Russia presented the US and NATO with a proposal on those mutual security guarantees. A month after that, the US rejected Russia’s central demand that NATO keep its promise and not expand into Ukraine.

The US had rejected what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg would later call Putin’s “pre-condition for not invad[ing] Ukraine.” Lavrov remarked that “our Western colleagues are not prepared to take up our major proposals, primarily those on NATO’s eastward non-expansion.” But what seemed to really surprise the veteran diplomat was not that the US insisted on its “open-door policy” on Ukraine joining NATO, but that it closed the door on diplomacy: “Neither the United States, nor the North Atlantic Alliance proposed an alternative to this key provision.”

Lavrov has been Russia’s foreign minister, under Putin and Medvedev, since 2004. He is very respected and, retired US ambassador Chas Freeman told me, has a reputation amongst diplomats as being “very competent and professional.” Lavrov’s statements are important insights into Russian policy. Freeman says, Lavrov is “meticulously loyal and completely trustworthy in the eyes of his president.”

In recent weeks, Lavrov has made a number of statements that glance at what could have been in Ukraine and hint at what might provide a path out. Those statement refer to three of Ukraine’s key goals: peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Istanbul: Could Have Had Peace

In the first months of the war, before most of the death, devastation and escalation, there were several opportunities for a possible peace. The most promising were the Turkish mediated talks that were held in Istanbul in March and early April 2022.

Those talks resulted in a tentative agreement. Recently, Putin has revealed just how tantalizingly close those talks came, revealing for the first time that the agreement had been initialled by both sides. On September 23, at a press conference following the UN General Assembly High-Level week, Lavrov confirmed that crucial point: “we did hold talks in March and April 2022. We agreed on certain things; everything was already initialled.”

Lavrov also confirmed the second crucial point. There could have been peace if not for the roadblock of the political West. Putin has claimed that Ukraine abandoned the talks at the insistence of the US and UK. Well placed Turkish officials, including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and deputy chairman of Erdogan’s ruling party Numan Kurtulmus, have verified Putin’s account, saying the US put an end to the agreement because they “want[ed] the war to continue.” At his press conference, Lavrov backed Putin, using the same language as the Turkish officials. Lavrov says that two days after the agreement was initialled, the talks abruptly ended “because, I think, someone in London or Washington did not want this war to end.” Days later, during a September 28  interview, Lavrov was less speculative. He said that “in April 2022 . . . Ukraine proposed ceasing hostilities and settling the crisis based on providing reciprocal, reliable security guarantees.” He then clearly said, “But this proposal was recalled at the insistence of Washington and London.”

By April 2022, there is the tantalizing possibility that the war could have ended. At his September 23 press conference, Lavrov confirmed that the agreement had been initialled and, both then and five days later, suggested that the agreement was sabotaged because Washington and London did not want the war to end.

Minsk: Could Have Had Territorial Integrity

The Istanbul agreement was not the first agreement to be made and then not implemented. A key reason cited by Russia for launching the invasion of Ukraine is the prevention of NATO expansion into Ukraine; into “the immediate vicinity of areas of strategic importance to our security,” in Lavrov’s words; and right up to Russia’s borders. But another reason cited by Russia is the protection of the language, culture, rights, property and lives of the ethnic Russians in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine after the coup of 2014.

The protection of those rights could have been achieved, Lavrov said in his press conference at the UN General Assembly, “a year later with the signing of the Minsk Agreements.” Those agreements, if implemented, would have guaranteed Ukraine the territorial integrity – with the exception of Crimea – that they now, understandably, seek. “Had they implemented the Minsk agreements,” Lavrov said, “Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have been guaranteed, because this is what the agreements were all about.” The Minsk agreements promised to satisfy Kiev by keeping the Donbas in Ukraine and satisfy the Donbas by keeping it there with autonomy. “Territorial integrity would have been restored through the granting of special status to Donbass,” Lavrov told the press.

Ukraine’s territorial integrity could have been guaranteed through the Minsk agreements. But they were never implemented. The agreements were brokered by Germany and France, agreed to by Ukraine and Russia, and accepted by the US and UN. But the US failed Ukraine by not providing it the support it needed, and Germany and France disappointed by not applying the necessary pressure on Kiev. But revelations in 2022 proved it to be much worse than that.

Germany and France didn’t disappoint by not pressuring Ukraine to implement the agreement. They never intended Ukraine to implement the agreement. That the agreement was a deceptive soporific designed to lull Russia into a ceasefire with the promise of a peaceful settlement while actually buying Ukraine the time it needed to build up an armed forces capable of achieving a military solution has now been confirmed by everyone of Putin’s partners in the negotiations, including then Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande.

In his September 28 interview, Lavrov referenced the deception and placed the blame on Europe and Ukraine for the failure of the Minsk agreement: “They have confessed after all that no one – Germany, France, let alone Ukraine – intended to implement the Minsk agreements. In 2022, this was stated in plain language by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Former French President Francois Hollande, and former Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko. They said the agreements were needed to gain time to replenish the Ukrainian regime’s military arsenals against the Russian Federation.” But for that Western deception, “Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have been guaranteed.” Instead, “President Vladimir Putin’s co-authors with regard to the Minsk agreements openly admitted that they had deceived him . . . and this is why they are to blame for destroying Ukraine’s territorial integrity, which they are so solicitous about today.”

Constitutional Commitments: Could Have Had Sovereignty

At his September 23 press conference, Lavrov was asked if Russia recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine. Lavrov answered that Russia “recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine back in 1991, on the basis of the Declaration of Independence, which Ukraine adopted when it withdrew from the Soviet Union.” He then clearly pointed out that “one of the main points for [Russia] in the declaration was that Ukraine would be a non-bloc, non-alliance country; it would not join any military alliances.”

The Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty was contingent, in part, on Ukrainian neutrality.  That neutrality was enshrined in Article IX  of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, “External and Internal Security,” that says that Ukraine “solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs. . ..” That promise was later enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution, which committed Ukraine to neutrality and prohibited it from joining any military alliance: that included NATO. However, the neutrality upon which Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty had been, in part, contingent was removed in 2019 when Ukraine amended the constitution, with neither vote nor referendum, to include a mandate for all future governments to seek as a goal membership in NATO.

After reminding the reporter that that rescinded promise was “one of the main points for Russia,” Lavrov then went on to add the key line that “In that version, on those conditions, we support Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”

Lavrov seemed to be explaining both that Ukraine’s commitment to walking through the open NATO door was part of what dissolved the commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and motivated Russia to cross its borders and that a return to the commitment not to walk through that door would achieve, in exchange, a return to Russian “support [for] Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”

In his two recent talks to the press in September, Lavrov hinted at what could have been in Ukraine. Peace was possible before the war started if Ukraine had promised not to join NATO as their Declaration of State Sovereignty and their constitution before the 2019 amendment committed it to and if Ukraine had implemented the Minsk agreements. Peace was possible after the war started if Washington and London had not pulled Ukraine back from the initialed Istanbul agreement. Lavrov’s recent comments hint not only at Russia’s perspective on the causes of the war but at Russia’s perspective on the way out.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on US foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets.

By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics Blog, 10/9/23

There is a growing danger that Ukraine’s now imminent rout on the battlefield at the hands of a far better-trained and better-equipped Russian force will lead to a period not unlike the Ruin that occurred in the latter half of the 17th century on Ukrainian territory and temporarily split Cossackdom into two several entities divided between Poland and Russia. The great Ruin involved a series of wars conducted by foreign powers — most notably Poland and Russia, but also the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Tatar Khanate — and internecine fighting and social unrest, which decimated a good part of Cossack territories, including many of those now being destroyed by NATO-Russia Ukrainian war.

With the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, high attrition and increasingly low morale among its fighting forces, declining political and military support from the West, the coming onset of winter and a possible, massive Russian offensive, the stage is being set for potential catastrophe. An all too possible path to a new Ruin could now be open and take the following course: the Ukrainian army’s collapse, a subsequent coup in Kiev, resulting in civil war, chaos and, as I have written before, the possible formation of Ukrainian guerrilla resistance forces fighting Moscow’s occupation.

COLLAPSE OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMY

The failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive has major implications for the further course of the war, in particular the health and internal stability of Ukraine’s military establishment. First and foremost, the counteroffensive has brought the Ukrainian army perhaps as many as 70,000 casualties, nearly exhausted the army’s reserves, depleted its short- and medium-range artillery capabilities, led to the destruction of perhaps more than 5,000 pieces of military equipment. There is growing discontent in the middle-officer ranks and among the rank-and-file as a result of bad strategic and tactical operation of the counteroffensive, which led to throwing small wave after small wave along the same difficult, often heavily mined terrain without air cover and artillery suppression against far superior force in order to take and re-take small patches of territory and insignificant, depopulated, and almost completely destroyed villages.

Psychologically, Ukrainian soldiers are demoralized because of the high casualties and insignificant gains they brought on the background of the leadership’s claims that Western military equipment and training would lead to a successful counteroffensive as demoralized Russian forces would be routed and retreat as they did in Kharkiv and Kherson last year. Ukrainian society has been treated to this spectacle, exposure of wide-scale corruption in civilian and even military leadership circles, brutal forced recruitment tactics contrasted against the privileged party life abroad enjoyed by government officials, oligarch, and these elites’ sons and daughters. If the army comes from society and a demoralized army meets an outraged society, the will of both the army and society to keep up the fight cannot but be shaken.

These trends wll be made even more powerful, as the war leads to greater militarization of society. One manifestation of such a development that will intensify politicization in the military is the recruitment of military personnel, including officers, by political parties. Reports suggest that Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy is preparing to jettison his now exceedingly corrupt and thus unpopular ‘Servants of the People’ Party and form a new one which will be based largely on those who served in the military (https://t.me/rezident_ua/19475). Other Ukrainian parties are likely to follow this example, further militarizing society and politicizing the army.

As the position of Ukraine’s army deteriorates along the 600-mile front, the likelihood of a military insurrection and/or popular revolt becomes quite high.

KIEV COUP

Wars tend to politicize militaries, and there can be nothing worse for civil-military relations in any country than a mix of the collapse or even just the failure of a military campaign run by a civilian leadership along with a failing but increasingly politicized military. As the civilian leadership continues to flail in the running of the war, with Zelenskiy’s less than competent leadership and his alienation of allies, the issue of its replacement by a military leadership or a new civilian one brought to power by the military cannot but appear on the agenda. Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen. Valeriy Zalyuzhnyi was opposed to the timing of this summer’s failed counteroffensive but was careful to publicly point the finger only at Ukraine’s Western allies for pushing the counteroffensive without providing Ukraine’s army the necessary weapons for artillery and air support for carrying out. But there should be no doubt that he also blames the civilian leadership for succumbing to such pressure, overpromising the results of such a hasty and poorly thought out offensive, and perhaps even for Zelenskiy’s failure to resist the West’s pressure to continue the war rather than conclude the March 2022 Istanbul talks for an agreement that would have avoided the disaster now hanging over Kiev. There can also be little doubt that many other military officers as well as rank-and-file soldiers fell the same way.

From the other side of Ukraine’s political spectrum on this issue, the ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists who comprise the vanguard of the ‘war party’ in Kiev form a good part of the Ukrainian army, though surely many have perished in the fighting over the past 19 months. This element has less commitment to the rule of law, and many of the so inclined have long asserted that the Miadan revolt was just the first phase of Ukraine’s ‘national revolution’, which needs to be completed by the final neofascist takeover. On this background, the risk of a palace and/or military coup runs high. Forces such as Right Sector, Azov, the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, and a host of smaller ultranationalist and neofascist parties and organizations, with access to arms could return to Kiev and seize power in tandem with some moderate military officers. After all, these elements have been a source of political violence, mass disturbances, and protests of neofascist intimidation for a decade or more. Indeed, they played the lead role in transforming the peaceful Maidan demonstrations, motivated by European aspirations and distaste for corruption, into a violent false flag terrorist attack that targeted protesters and police, sparking the outrage that led to fall of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. There is no reason why they cannot convert a new cycle of upheaval, even chaos into a new overthrow of the political leadership.

A military coup or military-backed coup could also come about as a result of the disintegration and isolation of one or more large Ukrainian military contingent, which manages to set up a separate or even separatist enclave, for example in western Ukraine or parts thereof, under the patronage and leadership of a local politician, oligarch and/or military commander establishing himself as warlord. In this way and others political schism could spark internecine warfare and civil war.

CIVIL WAR

Any successful coup in Kiev or separatist entity could generate an opposition, sparking civil war. Along with the breakup of the army or simply given the ubiquity of weapons in Ukraine, such a rejection of the coup leadership by one or more forces would almost certainly lead to internecine violence. Ukrainian culture is touted by many in the West as essentially a Western one, characterized by values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This is inaccurate. Ukrainian political culture is equally dominated by an anarchic democracy, which can confound republicanism and the rule of law. The various neofascist, ultranationalist, moderate nationalist, national democratic, and liberal democratic elements in Ukrainian culture and society have not been successful in forging a political and cultural consensus over the course of thirty post-Soviet years. Although the separation of the pro-Russian and Soviet nostalgic east and Crimea eliminated one of the points around which conflict swirled in Ukrainian state and society, the others noted above remain and are incompatible with each other. To be sure, the war consolidated Ukrainian society in the first year of the war, as the rise of Zelenskiy’s catastrophic approval ratings at the time demonstrated. However, the ‘bump’ from the shock of the war’s onset has largely dissipated, and defeat at the front is likely to return Zelenskiy’s ratings to their pre-war low. Zelenskiy’s new face and fresh energy temporarily consolidated Ukrainian society and dampened its schismatic, conflictive, and anarchic cultural elements. Now, however, deep divisions, high political tensions, internecine violence, and the threat of civil war are being revived. The threat of civil war raises the specter of chaos and quagmire.

THE POTENTIAL OF A UKRAINIAN QUAGMIRE FOR RUSSIA

There is real potential for any internecine conflict or civil war to devolve into political and social chaos and state breakdown or failure. In a failing or failed war-torn, even civil war-torn Ukraine, we could see one or more remnants of the army, one or more guérilla or partisan armies carrying out combat, sabotage, and terrorist attacks against any Russian occupying force. The farther west Russian forces move and attempt to occupy and annex territories, the likelihood of the emergence of an underground partisan army in the tradition of the Ukrainian Partisan Army of World War II and post-World War II anti-Soviet resistance grows. Even in the Russia-annexed southern regions of Kherson and Zaporozhe — where there is considerable, though likely not majority pro-Russian sentiment – pro-Russian administrations have been plagued by assassinations of their officials and other cases of support for Kiev. Underground resistance to Russian rule also likely would emerge in Mikolaev and Odessa in the south, Kharkov, Sumy, and Chernigov in the north, as well as in central, not to mention in very anti-Russian western Ukraine.

Depending on how the war plays out, Russia may be forced to send forces into one or more of these areas, crossing the Dnepr around Kiev and moving further west would guarantee the Russians a difficult occupation. If Ukrainian armed factions are roaming and fighting, growing millions of refugees and general chaos, the Russians could find themselves in a situation like that which faced the US and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, contending with a long, drawn out armed guerrilla insurgency, underground terrorism, and nation-building.

But it is not just Russia that will feel the repercussions of such developments. Belarus, Moldova, and Europe’s NATO and EU states will see an even greater influx of Ukrainian refugees. Poland will simply be inundated, and with great mutual antagonism lying just below the surface of Polish-Ukrainian relations, there would be potential for Ukrainian political violence in Poland. 

CONCLUSION

The above is no longer an unlikely scenario; several of its elements are beginning to shift over into the likely category. For Russia, a quagmire would lengthen and raise the costs of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. Moscow cannot let a new anti-Russian regime to emerge in Kiev or allow chaos and state collapse to persist on its border. Russia could end up facing a second Afghanistan, with all the domestic political risks such a development would be fraught. Imagine a scenario in which Moscow has been saddled with Ukrainian conflict, chaos, and state-building for 5-10 years and Putin’s health begins to wane or fails. Not a preferred scenario, you would agree.

Obviously, a Russian quagmire in Ukraine will offer opportunities for the West to continue attempting to exact costs on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. Washington, Brussels, London and Warsaw could supply and fund anti-Russian partisan and terrorist activity. A recent U.S. strategic plan for the future of Ukraine being discussed in the wake of Kiev’s failed, ill-conceived counteroffensive already proposes creation of a “national level resistance plan,” that, according to Politico, “could allude to ordinary Ukrainians fighting back if Russia gains more territory” and about which “(t)he State Department official would not clarify that point” (www.politico.com/news/2023/10/02/biden-admin-ukraine-strategy-corruption-00119237). It cannot be excluded that in tiring of Zelenskiy’s less than competent, increasingly erratic, and unpopular leadership the West may back a coup plot against him. After all, Washington for its part has a long track record of doing so. In any civil war scenario, the West likely would attempt to ensure that pro-Western, anti-Russian Ukrainians came to power, arming and funding one or another group as has now become the tradition. Most disturbingly of all, a scenario of social chaos and state failure will heighten the fog of war and politics to a peak of uncertainty in which the risk of miscalculation by Russia and/or the West becomes even greater than it is now. This risks the spread of the Ruin scenario beyond Ukraine’s borders to the detriment of Russia, the West, and perhaps all the rest of us.

Link here.

By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 10/30/23

One of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s closest aides has told Time Magazine that the Ukrainian leader has deluded himself into thinking Ukraine can win an ultimate victory against Russia after the failed counteroffensive and amid waning support for the conflict in the West.

The report said that despite the setbacks, Zelensky “does not intend to give up fighting or to sue for any kind of peace. On the contrary, his belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia has hardened into a form that worries some of his advisers. It is immovable, verging on the messianic.”

The aide said Zelensky “deludes himself,” adding, “We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” The report said that the idea of negotiating peace or a temporary truce with Russia remains taboo to Zelensky.

“For us it would mean leaving this wound open for future generations,” Zelensky told Time. “Maybe it will calm some people down inside our country, and outside, at least those who want to wrap things up at any price. But for me, that’s a problem, because we are left with this explosive force. We only delay its detonation.”

A senior Ukrainian military officer told the magazine that the armed forces has had to second guess orders that came from Kyiv’s political leadership, including an order to capture the Donetsk city of Horlivka. “They don’t have the men or the weapons,” the officer said. “Where are the weapons? Where is the artillery? Where are the new recruits?”

Ukraine is not just running low on weapons to fight the war but also manpower. One of Zelensky’s aides said even if Ukraine’s Western backers supplied all the arms they need, “we don’t have the men to use them.”

The report also detailed the corruption in the Ukrainian government that led to Zelensky’s recent move to sack former Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. The author of the Time story, Simon Shuster, said he naively thought a Ukrainian official would think twice before taking a bribe, but an adviser to Zelensky told him otherwise. “Simon, you’re mistaken,” the adviser said. “People are stealing like there’s no tomorrow.”

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 10/9/23

A recent poll found that the number of Ukrainians who want to fight Russia until the end of the war has fallen to 60%. President Volodymyr Zelensky has tight control over media in Ukraine, and his regime has targeted dissenters against fighting the war. 

The Gallup survey results released on Monday shows support for “fighting until the war is won” has fallen to 60% from 70% last year. The number of Ukrainians wanting to seek a diplomatic resolution has increased from 25% to 31% over the past 12 months. Support for finding an end to the war is strongest in the regions where fighting is ongoing. 

The waning approval of fighting comes as Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive resulted in substantial casualties and minimal territorial gains. Kiev’s Western backers knew the military operations were unlikely to succeed and would result in high casualties. In August, the Washington Post reported the counteroffensive’s failures had blunted morale.

The slipping support for Zelensky’s pledge to retake the Donbas and Crimea through military means comes as Kiev has tight control over Ukrainian media. Shortly after the start of the war, Zelensky nationalized the media and only allowed outlets to operate with state licenses. Additionally, Ukrainian police have rounded up citizens who expressed dissatisfaction with the war. 

Approval of aiding the war in Ukraine is shrinking in the US as well. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 41% of Americans support sending more arms to Ukraine, while 35% oppose further military assistance. When the same survey was conducted in May, 46% of Americans backed sending arms, while 29% were opposed.