Apparently Sergey Karaganov is doubling down on his crazy idea of Russia potentially using nuclear weapons to get the US to act more rationally. His latest article can be found here.

Emphasis via bolding is mine. – Natylie

Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP)

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Profil, 6/21/23 (translation to English via Google Translate)

Sergey Karaganov’s article “The Use of Nuclear Weapons Can Save Humanity from a Global Catastrophe” caused a violent reaction, which was probably part of the author’s plans. Public discussion about the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been taboo, in fact, since the moment when their sole use by the United States against Japan led to certain consequences.

The relations of the nuclear superpowers in the last century were based on the presumption that any use would lead to total atomic war and the destruction of civilization. Confidence in the inevitability of such a scenario, fear of its implementation, made the nuclear bomb not a battlefield weapon, but a deterrent – both the enemy and the “hotheads” at home. And when someone dares to raise the question of the need to return the nuclear component to the status of conventional weapons, albeit incredibly powerful, it causes shock and indignation.

Your humble servant is not an expert on nuclear weapons and the principles of deterrence and does not pretend to be. But the topic raised by a senior colleague affects everyone, so I will venture to speculate from the position of an informed layman.

Deterrence as a child of its time

Everyone is free to evaluate Sergey Karaganov’s arguments in their own way, especially since they range from applied to religious. You can’t argue with one thing – today the risk of nuclear war is higher than at any time since the early 1960s. The reasons for this are the general increase in aggressiveness in international politics, and strategic frivolity as a result of thirty years of peace under American hegemony, and disbelief that a full-fledged nuclear war can really happen, that is, the departure of existential fear . The latter serves as a starting point. Only the return of the real fear of a nuclear apocalypse can sober up Western elites, who are ready to impose supremacy on the rest of the world by force, no matter what.The goal stated in the article is to “break the will” of the collective West, forcing it to abandon the desire for superiority. The last resort is a nuclear strike on a “group of targets in a number of countries.”

Let’s leave aside the moral aspect, with which everything is clear, the author himself recognizes the enormity of the proposed action. Let’s focus on the conceptual scheme, how effective it could be for “sobering up”.

Nuclear deterrence and the principle of mutually assured destruction (HLG) is a product of the political and technological development of the second half of the twentieth century, the era after World War II. It was a unique period of relative orderliness of international relations, based on a system of institutions – organizations and norms of varying degrees of formalization. Thanks to this orderliness, it was possible to regulate the interaction of the main players, primarily the two superpowers.

The presence of an approximate military-political, economic and ideological balance was cemented by the nuclear factor – first the appearance of atomic weapons in the USSR, then the achievement of Soviet-American parity. The degree of orderliness should not be exaggerated, but it was greater than ever before, and probably ever in the future.

A crisis of the old order

The end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of balance in most respects, but the institutional framework remained unchanged. It was assumed that there was no need to rebuild it, because in the absence of confrontation, the institutions would finally work as they should. The nuclear factor also remained unchanged – the principle of the HLG was preserved even during the period of Russia’s maximum weakness in the first years after the collapse of the USSR.

In practice, the viability of the institutions created in the last century and working effectively then began to decline rapidly – their mechanism was intended for a different alignment of forces and interests. Theoretically, it would be necessary to discuss the other infrastructure of international organizations and agree on their structure. But the victorious West did not consider it necessary. After all, the very system of institutions, starting with the UN, initially embodied American ideas. The Soviet Union agreed to them after World War II, because it had no doubt that it would play a leading role in any design.In other words, the stability of the world order of the second half of the last century was determined by Western design and the presence of a balance of power within it, which was provided by the USSR.

Without balance, the structure staggered and began to crumble. Hence the dysfunction of structures, from the United Nations to many sectoral and regional institutions, including those that were purely Western, such as the WTO, which arose on the basis of the GATT. They cannot cope with the heterogeneity of the world. Against this background, other types of associations are beginning to take shape, less formalized, including a smaller number of participants, designed for a more flexible approach. A fixed world order is not expected in the foreseeable future – it will not be possible to regulate multi-level international strife without a qualitative simplification of the picture. And it is just not expected, if you do not consider catastrophic scenarios.

Deterrence as an institution

Nuclear deterrence is one of the fundamental institutions of the second half of the last century. It did not take shape immediately, for the first decade and a half of the existence of atomic weapons, America and the USSR probed possible boundaries by provoking exacerbations. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers faced that very fear. And they finally fixed the inadmissibility of direct conflict.

Nuclear weapons are indeed capable of destroying humanity, and the institution of deterrence was considered almost unshakable. You can play different games, but you can’t put the existence of the planet on the line. Yes, no one will. The same Sergei Karaganov wrote a few years ago: the depth and scale of international contradictions are such that in former times they would have led to a world war long ago, only the presence of nuclear stops weapons. Now he comes to a different conclusion. The United States is not afraid to unleash a full-fledged war against a nuclear superpower, albeit by proxy.There is only one step before a world war, it will be universal thermonuclear, it may turn out that the only way to avoid it is to arrange a preventive nuclear war, but a local one.

Here it is reasonable to ask the question: why a nuclear attack against another state / bloc possessing nuclear weapons will not lead to a rapid escalation to the very thermonuclear universal, that is, an exchange of strikes between Russia and the United States? The entire system of relations in the nuclear sphere, as noted by theorists of deterrence, is built primarily not on strategy and technology, but on psychology. And this psychological game should discourage the enemy from even the thought of a possible nuclear attack.

The use of nuclear weapons means the end of the game and, in fact, nullifies its special role, turning it into a very powerful means of destruction. And competition in the means of destruction is a “normal” war, only in this case of a cyclopean scale. Mutually assured destruction may not happen, but the all-encompassing damage will be such that the participating countries and the world as a whole will change dramatically in horrific ways.

Is it possible to go back to basics?

Sergey Karaganov emphasizes that nuclear strikes are a last resort, and expects that the movement along the “ladder of escalation” itself will force the opposite side to realize the level of threat and move on to a conversation on the merits – how to start getting out of the clinch and remove contradictions. That is, he believes it is possible to return to the original institutional meaning of nuclear weapons – the production of absolute fear that limits the behavior of participants.

But, as mentioned above, at that time it was part of the overall system of balanced management of international processes. Yes, we can say that the existence of that system was largely determined by the presence of nuclear weapons, but it was not limited to this factor. And when other elements of the structure began to fall off after the Cold War, it turned out that nuclear deterrence as such was not enough to provide the previous behavioral limitations.

It is assumed that with the help of fear, on the escalation of the terminal threat, it is possible to recreate a system of mutually acceptable rules. This logic was applied at a lower level in December 2021, when Russia put forward ultimatums on long-term security guarantees, threatening “military-technical measures” in case of refusal. The nature of the measures manifested itself with the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and shocked the Western elites, who treated the ultimatum with disdain. This, however, did not lead to a willingness to enter into a discussion with Russia about its concerns, the effect was the opposite.

It can be argued: the comparison is incorrect, since the NWO does not pose a direct threat to the United States and its NATO allies, and nuclear escalation does. But this is where the very elites whose irresponsibility Sergei Karaganov complains about come into play. No matter how you treat them, but so far they demonstrate skill in managing public opinion and mobilizing in support of their policies. Even though objectively this policy is to the detriment of the welfare and security of their citizens.

It turns out that the plan is to return nuclear deterrence to the status it had in the second half of the twentieth century by inflating the level of threat. And to return the elites of the type that were in power at that time. Something romantic-nostalgic. It is not clear where such personnel could be obtained today – just look at alternative forces in the leading Western countries. Moreover, apart from everything else, legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in someone’s eyes outside the obvious situation described in doctrinal documents (a threat to the existence of the state) looks like an impossible task.

Are we going to bang?

Immediately after the Americans detonated the atomic bomb in 1945, George Orwell wrote a short essay, “You and the Atomic Bomb.” He had no doubt that some others (at least the Russians and the Chinese) would acquire these weapons, and if they remained at the level of not only super-destructive, but also difficult to obtain and very expensive, then they could be useful: “For an indefinite period, it will put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of establishing” a world that will not be peace. That is, Orwell understood from the very beginning that the meaning of this invention is not in application, but in availability. According to Orwell, turning it into another “mere weapon”

Now nuclear weapons are becoming more and more accessible both technologically and materially. Are reflections on the likelihood of using the prerogative of only Russian minds looking for a way out of a difficult military-strategic situation? Of course not. Arguments on this subject are gradually filling the world public space. This confirms what has been said above – the institution of deterrence, like other institutions of the last century, is in crisis. A sharp increase in the degree of discussion does not lead to the strengthening of the institution, but to its final collapse. And the application will not be a way to make you come to your senses, but a formal removal of the general taboo with unpredictable consequences.Further actions will no longer be dictated by calculations of one kind or another, but by reactions to each next step of the other side. Playing nuclear peers is a gambling activity. But in the event of a breakdown, the net damage will multiply any hypothetical benefits for everyone.

The taboo on the use of nuclear weapons is undoubtedly weakening. You need to prepare for everything. And rational behavior here is not to break the taboo completely, preventively, but to try to preserve it as at least some kind of limiter. This does not mean that the topic itself cannot be touched, quite the opposite. It is sanctimonious to shy away from the very thought of application – an ostrich approach. In this sense, Sergey Karaganov should be thanked for such a direct statement of position. Its discussion should become part of the development of a new understanding of strategic stability to replace the one that can no longer be restored.

Moon of Alabama, 6/30/23

Last December the commander of the Ukrainian armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, talked with The Economist. He asked for more weapons which, he said, would allow him to throw the Russian forces out of Ukraine:

“I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 IFVs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23rd.”

Some seemed to believe his talk. Following the request Ukraine received more or less all of what it had requested. Ukraine then loudly announced a counter-offensive but took several months before launching it. In the meantime it threw all available resources into a useless battle to hold onto the city of Bakhmut against the steady advance of the Wagner mercenary forces. That fight alone cost the Ukraine some 70,000 casualties. Meanwhile the Russian army engineers were building multiple reinforced defense lines which any counter-offensive will now have to overcome.

At the beginning of June, under pressure for the U.S., the Ukrainian army finally launched its counteroffensive. It was a dud. The Ukrainian troops entered the Russian security zone miles away from the real defense lines and immediately ran into mine fields and came under intense artillery fire. After 4 weeks of fighting they ‘liberated’ some 50 square miles of open land and a few small settlements. This came at significant costs:

“There were fewer than 50 men in the unit, he said, and 30 did not return — they were killed, wounded or captured by the enemy. Five of the unit’s armored vehicles were destroyed within the first hour.

…

“For the first hour and a half of the 37th’s assault near Velyka Novosilka, the Russians bombarded the unit with nonstop shelling that penetrated their AMX-10 RC armored vehicles, according to Grey, another soldier in the battalion who spoke on the condition that he be identified only by his call sign. The armored vehicles, sometimes called “light tanks,” were not heavy enough to protect the soldiers, Grey said, and had to be positioned behind them instead of in front.

…

“Everyone expected that we would have some kind of support, but unfortunately, for some reason, there was none,” Lumberjack said. His commander had little experience, he said, and had counted on assistance from artillery units. “But he got confused when he saw that there was none.”

At this speed it will take the Ukraine many years of fighting and an unlimited supply of weapons and men to kick the Russians out:

“To put the matter in perspective: Today, Russia controls about 17 percent of the territory that was previously Ukraine’s. If Ukrainian forces are no more successful in the weeks ahead than they have been so far, Ukraine will not recapture all of its territory for 16 years.”

Over the last months I used a spreadsheet to list and sum up the Ukrainian casualties as they are listed in the daily reports of the Defense Ministry of Russia. These numbers are likely a bit too high but by what percentage, 10 or 20%, is hard to say.

From June 1 to June 30 the numbers sum up to: 313 tanks, 815 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and other armored vehicles, 313 howitzer and other long range artillery systems. The Ukraine also lost some 21,900 men which gives an average of 730 per day.

During the month the Russian air defense claimed to have shot down 15 Ukraine planes, 5 helicopters, 200 HIMARS and 20 Storm Shadow ‘wonder weapon’ missiles. Those numbers do not include the significant damage Russia has done to defense repair shops, weapon and ammunition depots all over Ukraine with its constant long range missile attacks.

In total the Ukraine lost in one months more than Zaluzhny requested back in December and more than it has received during the time since.

In the Washington Post Zaluzhny is back and begging for more weapons:

“For Ukraine’s counteroffensive to progress faster, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, the top officer in Ukraine’s armed forces, says he needs more — of every weapon. And he is telling anyone who will listen, including his American counterpart Gen. Mark A. Milley as recently as Wednesday, that he needs those resources now.

“In a rare, wide-ranging interview with The Washington Post, Zaluzhny expressed frustration that while his biggest Western backers would never launch an offensive without air superiority, Ukraine still has not received modern fighter jets but is expected to rapidly take back territory from the occupying Russians. American-made F-16s, promised only recently, are not likely to arrive until the fall — in a best-case scenario.

“His troops also should be firing at least as many artillery shells as their enemy, Zaluzhny said, but have been outshot tenfold at times because of limited resources.”

Zaluzhny wants F-16s and more ammunition but also more of ‘every weapon’. Here are the problems.

When Zaluzhny will get his F-16s he will immediately learn that the Russian Su-35 is by far superior to them. Its radar can see farther than the F-16’s and its long range over-the-horizon missiles can kill the F-16s before they even have a chance to fire their own ones.

The ‘west’ is currently unable to produce as much ammunition as Ukraine wants to fire. And while the U.S. still has some Bradleys and Abrams battle tanks in its reserves the depots for ‘every weapon’ in other NATO countries are already empty. There are no more tanks, armored vehicles or howitzers they could give away.

In total there simply is not enough to replace the losses the Ukraine has on a daily basis. Meanwhile Russia is already producing more of every weapon than its military needs for its daily operations.

There is no way the Ukraine can win this fight or even hold on to its current positions. That was easy to foresee and predict. Those who urged Ukraine on should be condemned for the murderous slaughter they caused.

Ukraine needs to make peace with Russia. Yes, it will come with conditions that are not easy to swallow. Still, there is no other way out.

To continue the fight, with ever increasing losses of men and land, is not a sustainable alternative.

By Dmitry Trenin, RT, 6/22/23

Dmitry Trenin is a research professor at the Higher School of Economics and a lead research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He is also a member of the Russian International Affairs Council.   

Professor Sergey Karaganov’s “Tough-but-necessary decision” article – which claims that by using its nuclear weapons, Russia could save humanity from a global catastrophe – has provoked plenty of reaction both at home and abroad. Partly because of the author’s status – he has been an advisor to both President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin – and also due to the belief that his opinion may possibly be shared by some people in positions of power.

Dmitry Trenin, an extremely respected Russian expert who served in the Soviet military gives his response.

***

Professor Sergey Karaganov’s recent article brought into public focus the thorny issue of the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict. Many reactions to the piece boil down to the well-known reasoning that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and thus it cannot be fought.

Against this background, President Vladimir Putin, responding to a question at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, said that nuclear weapons are a deterrent and the conditions for their use is defined in a published doctrine. He explained that the theoretical possibility of using these weapons exists, but there is no need to use them now.

In principle, nuclear weapons have been “on the table” for Russia from the very beginning of the Ukrainian conflict precisely as a means of deterring the US and its allies from becoming directly involved. Nevertheless, repeated public reminders from Putin and other officials about Russia’s nuclear status have so far not prevented a growing escalation of NATO’s participation. As a result, it has become clear that nuclear deterrence, on which many in Moscow have relied as a credible means of securing the country’s vital interests, has proven to be a much more limited tool than they expected.

In fact, the US has now set itself the task – unthinkable during the Cold War – of trying to defeat another nuclear superpower in a strategically important region, without resorting to atomic weapons, but instead by arming and controlling a third country. The Americans are proceeding cautiously, testing Moscow’s responses and consistently pushing the boundaries of what is possible in terms of arms supplied to Kiev, as well as the choice of targets for them. From starting with anti-tank ‘Javelins,’ to eventually cajoling allies to send actual tanks, the US is now apparently pondering transferring F-16 fighter jets and long-range missiles.

It is likely that this US strategy is based on the belief that the Russian leadership would not dare use nuclear weapons in the current conflict, and that its references to the nuclear arsenal at its disposal are nothing more than a bluff. The Americans have even been calm – at least outwardly about the deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. Such “fearlessness” is a direct result of the geopolitical changes of the last three decades and the change of generations in power in the US and the West in general.

The fear of the atomic bomb, present in the second half of the twentieth century, has disappeared. Nuclear weapons have been taken out of the equation. The practical conclusion is clear: there is no need to be afraid of such a Russian response.

This is an extremely dangerous misconception. The trajectory of the Ukrainian war points to an escalation of the conflict both horizontally (by expanding the theater of military action) and vertically (by increasing the power of the weapons used and the intensity of their use). It must be soberly acknowledged that this momentum is heading towards a direct armed confrontation between Russia and NATO. If the accumulated inertia is not stopped, such a clash will take place, and in this case the war, having spread to Western Europe, will almost inevitably become nuclear. And after some time, a nuclear war in Europe will most likely lead to an exchange of blows between Russia and the US.

The Americans and their allies are truly playing Russian roulette. Yes, so far the Russian response to the bombing of Nord Stream, the drone attack on the strategic Engels airbase, the entry of Western-armed saboteurs into the Belgorod region and many other actions by the Washington-backed and controlled side has been relatively restrained.

As Putin recently made clear, there are good reasons for this restraint. Russia, the president said, is capable of destroying any building in Kiev, but will not stoop to the methods of terror used by the enemy. But Putin added that Russia was considering various options for destroying Western warplanes if they are based in NATO countries and directly take part in the war in Ukraine.

So far, Moscow’s strategy has been to allow the enemy to take the escalatory initiative. The West has taken advantage of this, trying to wear down Russia on the battlefield and undermine it from within. It makes no sense for the Kremlin to go along with this plan. On the contrary, it’s a better idea to clarify and modernize our nuclear deterrence strategy, taking into account the practical experience of the Ukrainian conflict. The existing doctrinal provisions were formulated not only before the start of the current military operation, but also apparently without a precise idea of what might happen in the course of such a situation.

Russia’s external strategy includes a basket of foreign diplomacy, information campaigns and other aspects – in addition to the military elements. The main adversary should be given an unambiguous signal that Moscow will not play by the rules set by the other side. Of course, this should be accompanied by a credible dialogue with both our strategic partners and neutral states, explaining the motives and objectives of our actions. The possibility of using nuclear weapons in the current conflict must not be concealed. This real, not just theoretical, prospect should be an incentive to limit and stop the escalation of the war and ultimately pave the way for a satisfactory strategic balance in Europe.

Regarding Russian nuclear strikes against NATO countries, as raised by Professor Karaganov: Hypothetically speaking, Washington would most likely not respond to such an attack with a nuclear response of its own against Russia – for fear of a Russian retaliatory launch against the US itself. This would dispel the mythology that has surrounded Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for decades and lead to a profound crisis for NATO – possibly even the dissolution of the organization. It is possible that, in such circumstances, the Atlantic elites of NATO and the EU would panic and be swept aside by patriotic forces that would see for themselves that their security does not in fact depend on a non-existent US nuclear umbrella, but on building a balanced relationship with Russia. It is also possible that the Americans could decide to leave Russia alone.

It could well be that the calculation just described would ultimately be correct. But it is unlikely.

Yes, a US nuclear strike on Russia would probably not follow immediately. It is unlikely that the Americans would sacrifice Boston for Poznan, just as they were not going to sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg during the Cold War. But there will probably be some sort of response from Washington. Perhaps of the non-atomic type, which, without speculating too wildly, could be sensitive and painful for us. It is likely that with it, Washington would try to pursue a goal similar to ours: paralyzing the Russian leadership’s will to continue the war and creating panic in our society.

Moscow’s leadership is unlikely to capitulate after such a blow, since, at this stage, Russia’s very existence would be at stake. It is more likely that a retaliatory strike would follow, and this time, one can assume, against the main adversary rather than its satellites.

Let us pause before this point of no return and summarize our analysis tentatively.

Should the nuclear bullet be demonstrably inserted into the cylinder of the revolver that the US leadership is recklessly playing with today? To paraphrase a late American statesman: Why do we need nuclear weapons if we refuse to use them in the face of an existential threat?

On the other hand, there is no need to scare others with words. Instead, we have to prepare practically for any possible turn of events by carefully considering the options and their consequences.

The war in Ukraine has become protracted. As far as we can tell from the actions of the Russian leadership, it expects to achieve strategic success by relying on Russian resources, which are many times greater than those in Ukraine. It also relies on the fact that Moscow has much more at stake in this war than the West. This calculation is probably correct, but it should be taken into account that the opponent assesses Russia’s chances differently than we do and may take steps which could lead to a direct armed clash between Russia and the US/NATO.

We must be prepared for such a development. To avoid a general catastrophe, it is necessary to put fear of armageddon back into politics and the public consciousness.

In the nuclear age, it is the only guarantee of preserving humanity.

This post was originally published by Russia in Global Affairs

By Scott Ritter, Substack, 6/28/23

The dust has settled following last weekend’s abortive insurrection by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the private military company known as the Wagner Group, and some 8,000 fighters he employed, against Russian President Vladimir Putin. A clearer picture has since emerged about what exactly transpired during this coup, and why these events unfolded as they did. It also has allowed time to shine a light on Wagner Group, revealing it as something more than the invincible band of heroic Russian patriots celebrated by Russian society at large. Instead, a less complimentary image of Wagner emerges, one which portrays it as a business venture run by a corrupt narcissist who used Russian state funds to build a cult of personality that hypnotized an unwitting Russian populace into believing that Wagner was the sole source of salvation for Russia from the threat posed by the war with Ukraine.

As a military analyst with no small amount of experience in covering armed conflict, I don’t believe that I am susceptible to being star-struck in the presence of men who have earned, through experience, reputations as warriors of formidable stature. I was myself a US Marine, a member of a fraternity of sea-going warriors proud of both their martial history and military abilities, which are held to be second to none. I have served in harm’s way with special operators from America’s most elite military units and have worked closely with similarly skilled professionals from other nations. I think I have a good judge of what constitutes military competence and am not hesitant to give credit to where it is due.

As someone who follows events in the Middle East closely, I had been tracking the activities of the Wagner Group in Syria since their initial deployment in 2015. Their reputation as skilled fighters was earned in the blood of dozens of their comrades who lost their lives fighting terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. As such, when in 2022 rumors started to circulate about the presence of Wagner Group fighters operating alongside the Russian Army in the region of the Donbas, I took notice. It was difficult to find credible sources of information, and the Wagner Group was reticent about anyone giving out information about its activities. But eventually I was able to piece together an understanding of the role played by Wagner in the Donbas, along with the impact Wagner had on the war. My analysis, both spoken and written, reflected the high regard I had for the Wagner Group as a combat formation, and the heroism and skill of the soldiers it employed.

Prior to my recent visit to Russia, my host informed me that the Wagner forces engaged in the fierce fighting around Bakhmut spoke highly of my analysis and could be counted among my biggest fans. Indeed, during my visit, I was introduced to several Wagner veterans, and a few serving Wagner employees, all of whom wanted to shake my hand, and many of whom presented me with gifts signifying the depth of their appreciation for my work. Whether it was a combat knife, a chrome-plated sledgehammer (an unofficial symbol of the Wagner Group), or various Wagner combat patches (including one embroidered with my name), I was taken aback by the level of genuine and heartfelt affection these Wagner men—noted for their toughness under fire—showed for me.

When the events of June 23-24 unfolded before me, I was taken aback. An organization that I held in the highest esteem was engaged in an act of self-destruction before my very eyes, engaged in conduct—an armed insurrection against a constitutionally-mandated government—that any military professional imbued with a respect for the chain of command and the nation he or she served would find reprehensible. Like many others, I was compelled to reexamine my understanding of the Wagner Group, the people it employed, and its history in the service of Russia.

Relatively little is known about the formation of the Wagner Group. What little information is available comes from Yevgeny Prigozhin himself and, as such, must be seen in the context of his tendency for self-promotion. Prigozhin long denied any involvement with Wagner Group, and indeed initiated legal action against journalists (including Bellingcat) who reported on his involvement. This changed in September 2022, when Prigozhin openly discussed his role with Wagner Group in a post published on his Telegram page.

Wagner’s origins date back to February 2014, following the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s constitutionally-elected President, Viktor Yanukovych, by Ukrainian nationalists backed by the United States and European Union. At that time, Crimea was part of Ukraine. Shortly after the Maidan revolution ousted Yanukovych, right-wing Ukrainian nationalists attempted to take control of Crimea, which had a majority ethnic-Russian population whose loyalties leaned decisively toward Moscow. The nationalists were confronted by so-called “self defense units” drawn from the local pro-Russian citizenry.

But there were other actors on the ground as well. Concerned that the Ukrainian government would call out the Ukrainian army to intervene, the Russian government mobilized a force of several hundred “little green men,” consisting of elite Russian special forces who, because of constitutional limitations regarding the deployment of regular Russian army forces on the soil of a foreign nation, were “sheep dipped” (a US term made popular during the CIA’s covert war in Laos in the 1960’s and 70’s, where active duty US Air Force officers would be transferred to the CIA’s “Air America” proprietary company for operations inside Laos.)

The man put in charge of these “sheep dipped” special operators was Dmitry Utkin, a recently-retired Lieutenant Colonel who had previously commanded a Russian special forces (Spetznaz) unit affiliated with Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). Utkin and his “little green men” played a leading role in the Russian takeover of Crimea on February 26, 2014, four days after Yanukovych fled Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, Utkin’s “little green men” were dispatched to Lugansk, where they were tasked with providing training and assistance to the pro-Russian fighters that had taken up arms against the Ukrainian nationalists who had seized power in Kiev.

As the fighting expanded, so, too, did the role of the “little green men,” and by April it became clear that the Russian government would need to create a more formal organization which would serve as the conduit for military assistance to the pro-Russian militias fighting in the Donbas. On May 1, 2014, a new entity, known as the “Wagner Group” (named after the call sign—“Wagner”—used by Utkin) was created and given a contract with the Ministry of Defense to serve in this role. While Utkin served as the military commander of this new organization, “Wagner Group” itself was managed by a group of civilian businessmen headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who by that time had established himself as a successful restaurateur whose clients included Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Wagner was heavily involved in the fighting that raged in the Donbas from May 2014 through February 2015, when a ceasefire came into effect after the signing of the Minsk 2 accords. With the fighting in Ukraine winding down, Prigozhin and Utkin sought to exploit Utkin’s own past experience as a mercenary in Syria. The ability to deploy a professional military unit capable of operating on foreign soil where regular Russian forces were prohibited was attractive to the Russian Ministry of Defense, who contracted with Wagner to provide military assistance to the embattled Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad. Wagner’s success in Syria led to additional “support contracts” being executed for operations in several African countries. In addition to being paid by the Russia government, Wagner Group was able to arrange its own economic relationships with its African clients, which led to several profitable ventures designed to enrich its owners, including Prigozhin.

On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to commence what was being called a “Special Military Operation” (SMO) against Ukraine. The Russian military began deploying onto the soil of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (which were both recognized by Russia as independent states days prior to the SMO being kicked off), where they fought alongside local militias. Wagner Group continued to operate on the territory of the Donbas in a reduced capacity from 2015 until the SMO’s initiation.

After the collapse of the April 1, 2022, peace negotiation between Russia and Ukraine scheduled to take place in Istanbul, Turkey, the Russian military was instructed to begin large-scale offensive operations intended to liberate the territory of the Donbas still occupied by Ukraine. On May 1, 2023, a new contract was signed between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Wagner Group for some 86 billion rubles, or $940 million, to expand the scope and scale of its Ukrainian operation from advisory and assistance to that of a combat unit of roughly division-size capable of largescale fighting against regular Ukrainian forces. To sweeten the deal, the Russian Ministry of Defense signed a separate 80-billion-ruble deal (some $900 million) for the provision of food to the Russian Army using Prigozhin’s catering company.

War, it seems, had become very profitable business for Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Wagner played a major role in many of the battles waged in the spring and summer of 2022 which, collectively, became known as the Battle of the Donbas. Wagner was initially organized as a battalion-sized unit of several hundred highly-trained military veterans. As the fighting dragged on, the Wagner forces began to expand in size and capabilities, soon acquiring their own armor and artillery forces, as well as dedicated fighter aircraft. By the time the Lugansk city of Sievierodonetsk fell to Russian forces, on June 25, 2022, the Wagner Group was a division-sized unit which had developed a reputation for expertise in urban warfare, taking the lead in clearing Ukrainian troops who were dug in among the ruins of that city. By the fall of the neighboring city of Lysychansk, on July 3, 2022, the Wagner Group had become synonymous with operational excellence.

The fighting in Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk, however successful it was for the Russians and Wagner, had proven to be extremely costly from the standpoint of casualties. It became apparent to both the military command structure of Wagner, built around a cadre of experienced military veterans known as the “commanders council,” and Wagner’s corporate owners, headed by Prigozhin, that Wagner would suffer both in terms of military efficiency and profitability if it had to recruit and train seasoned veterans to replace those who had fallen in battle. During the house-to-house fighting that defined the Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk battles, Wagner’s small unit commanders had developed tactics which combined firepower (indirect artillery and direct fire support from tanks) with aggressive infantry assaults which could overwhelm Ukrainian defenders.

Rather than waste experienced fighters in this style of fighting, Prigozhin began recruiting new fighters from Russian prisons, promising them expungement of their criminal record in exchange for a six-month contract to fight on the frontlines. The Wagner commanders would train these inmate recruits over the course of a 21-day program that focused on the rudimentary combat skills needed to execute the Wagner urban warfare tactics, before organizing them into “shock” units which would be fed into the fighting. These units, while ultimately effective, suffered up to 60% casualties. Between 30-50,000 convicts were eventually recruited by Wagner, of whom 10-15,000 are believed to have been killed in the subsequent fighting for the cities of Soledar and Bakhmut.

The battles for the twin cities of Soledar and Bakhmut began on August 1, 2022. Wagner Group and its inmate “shock” units played a central role in the intense combat that followed. By this time, the world was starting to take notice of the fighters of this private military company. Labeled as mercenaries by the Western media and governments, and patriotic heroes by the pro-Russian citizens of the Donbas whose homes, villages, towns, and cities were being liberated, Wagner began emerging from the shadows. Whereas previously the Russian government and media were reticent to even acknowledge its existence, by the end of September 2022 Prigozhin, who had famously sued journalists who (accurately) reported that he was the owner of Wagner Group, wrote a posting on his Telegram channel admitting that he was, indeed, the owner.

While many observers took Prigozhin’s unexpected step into the spotlight as a sign of Wagner’s increasing public profile, the reality behind Prigozhin’s decision was simple business. From September 25-27, 2022, the citizens of the Donbas undertook a referendum on whether they wanted to be incorporated as part of the Russian Federation. By the end of the first day, it was clear that the result would be an overwhelming “yes.”

Prigozhin went public with his role as the owner of Wagner Group on September 26, 2022. This was the first salvo of what would become a massive public relations campaign designed to create the impression that Wagner was an essential part of the Russian war effort, whose fighters were singularly capable of defeating the Ukrainians. Prigozhin’s public relations campaign was further enhanced by the fact that the Russian public had been shocked by the retreat of the Russian army during the Ukrainian Kharkov Offensive, which began on September 6, 2022. While the regular army was in retreat, the forces of Wagner continued to advance along the Soledar-Bakhmut front, providing the Russian people with the only example of battlefield success during these dark times.

For Prigozhin, it became essential that he separate Wagner from the Russian Army in the eyes of the Russian people. The reason why was simple—with the Donbas now part of the Russian Federation, Wagner Group was in technical violation of Russian laws which prohibited the operation of private military contractors on Russian soil. Already there was talk about the need to change the contractual status of Wagner’s relationship with the Russian Ministry of Defense as soon as Wagner’s contract expired on May 1, 2023.

But Prigozhin had a money-making system in place, especially when it came to the use of convicts. Prigozhin could pay them less than a regular Wagner recruit, and the cost of their training was miniscule compared to that given more specialized fighters. The money saved by this process was estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars, all of which flowed back into the pockets of Prigozhin and his fellow owners and investors. Desperate to keep this enterprise intact, Prigozhin went on the offensive, publicly condemning senior Russian generals and officials, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

In November Wagner unveiled a shiny new center in Saint Petersburg designed to propel the company into the psyche of the Russian public as a major player in Russian national security affairs. All the while, the fighters of Wagner pressed forward their attacks on Soledar and Bakhmut, driven by Prigozhin’s desire to be seen as the only effective fighting force fighting the Ukrainians. And, increasingly, the fighters leading the charge were units composed on former Russian inmates.

But Prigozhin was running into a problem. He was forced to stop recruiting from prisons for the simple fact that he lacked a contract vehicle to pay the inmates after May 1,2023, meaning the last inmate recruit was processed by Wagner by December 1, 2022. Prisoners were still allowed to volunteer as frontline fighters, but they would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense going forward. Since the prisoner contracts were linked to specific periods of service that had to be fulfilled before their records could be expunged, Wagner could not commit inmates to anything less than a full-six-month term of enlistment. Wagner could still recruit non-inmate persons, since there would be no legal headaches created if Wagner did not renew its contract with the Ministry of Defense.

While Prigozhin’s PR campaign was a tremendous success (Wagner even released a feature-length film, Best in Hell, in February 2023 that brought the horrors of urban warfare—and the individual heroism of the Wagner fighters—to the screen), he was failing to win over the Minster of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin turned what should have been a professional disagreement about legalities into a personal matter filled with allegations of corruption and incompetence. Prigozhin also began accusing the Russian Ministry of Defense of deliberately holding back on the provision of ammunition to Wagner forces, a phenomenon he described as “shell hunger,” which resulted in Wagner forces suffering disproportionally high casualties.

Prigozhin began to behave erratically. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Wagner contract was not going to be renewed, meaning that Wagner forces would have to be incorporated into the very Russian Ministry of Defense Prigozhin was publicly denigrating, a move widely rejected by the rank and file of Wagner as well as its leadership. It also was becoming clear that Prigozhin’s lucrative food contract with the Ministry of Defense was likewise not going to be renewed, an action most probably related to Prigozhin’s attacks on the Defense Ministry’s two most senior officials, Shoigu and Gerasimov.

It was around this time that Prigozhin first discussed the issue of what would become of Wagner’s 50,000-strong force if the Russian Ministry of Defense continued to insist on their formal incorporation. In an interview in February 2023 with Semyon Pegov (“War Gonzo”), a pro-Russian combat correspondent and blogger, the topic of a potential Wagner attack on Moscow was raised in the context of why the Ministry of Defense was restricting ammunition. While Prigozhin noted that the idea did not originate with him, he indicated that it was interesting—not something one wants to hear from who owns a large, combat-hardened, well-equipped private army.

It was also in February 2023 that, according to US intelligence, Prigozhin and the Ukrainian intelligence service began communicating directly. Perhaps picking up on Prigozhin’s frustration and paranoia, the Ukrainian intelligence service notified the Wagner owner of a plot involving former Wagner personnel to orchestrate a coup in Moldova. Prigozhin and Wagner had, by this time, been conducting secret talks with Ukrainian intelligence. Concerned that Russian intelligence had gotten wind of these discussions, Ukraine raised the possibility of Prigozhin’s arrest and subsequent labeling as a traitor. 

The impact of Prigozhin losing nearly $2 billion in contacts, combined with an increasing level of paranoia on his part that he was caught up in a life-or-death struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov, led the Wagner owner to double down on his vitriolic attacks on Russia’s military leadership, and thereby create the impression that he and Wagner alone could guarantee military victory for Russia over Ukraine. These attacks reached their culmination in the final fights for Bakhmut, which concluded on May 20, 2023, when Prigozhin announced that his fighters had captured the city. Prigozhin spoke of the “meatgrinder” aspect of this battle, and how Wagner—at great sacrifice—“broke the back” of the Ukrainian army, killing between 55-70,000 Ukrainian soldiers for a loss of between 20-30,000 of its fighters.

As Russia celebrated the accomplishments of Wagner in Bakhmut—elevating even further the near-mythological status Wagner and its fighters enjoyed in the eyes of an adoring Russian public—Prigozhin had more pressing matters to deal with. His contract with the Ministry of Defense had expired. He had been given a two-month extension—through July 1, 2023—given the fact that Wagner was heavily engaged in the fighting in Bakhmut. After that time, however, the Wagner forces operating in the Donbas would have to enter a contractual relationship with the Ministry of Defense or else be disbanded. Prigozhin withdrew his fighters from Bakhmut to camps in eastern Lugansk, where he lobbied his combat-hardened commanders to reject the terms of the Ministry of Defense, and instead join him to create a common front of opposition to the leadership of the Russian military.

Prigozhin’s opposition to Shoigu and Gerasimov, and his plotting to supplant them, did not escape the attention of either the Russian government or Russia’s enemies in Ukraine, the US, and Great Britain. Vladimir Putin, in a speech delivered to Russian security officials on June 27, indicated that Russian officials were in constant contact with the commanders of Wagner to warn them not to help Prigozhin use Wagner for his own personal ambition. Days before Prigozhin sent Wagner forces to Rostov and Moscow, the CIA briefed US Congress and President Biden on the existence of Prigozhin’s plot. The British MI-6 did the same, briefing the British Prime Minister as well as Ukrainian President Zelensky.

According to Ukrainian sources, the British also lobbied the Ukrainians to pause offensive operations during the window of time Prigozhin was expected to move on Moscow in the hopes that a civil war would break out that would cause Russia to withdraw combat troops from the frontline, providing the Ukrainian army with increased opportunities for success. MI-6 also used its connectivity with the Ukrainian intelligence services, in coordination with MI-6-controlled Russian oligarchs operating out of London, to reinforce Prigozhin’s belief that he had the support of the Russian military, politicians, and business elite, all of whom Prigozhin was led to believe would rally to his side once Wagner began marching on Moscow.

The failure of Prigozhin’s gambit has already become cemented in history. However, there remains an element of Russian society which, having been swayed by Prigozhin’s intensive PR campaign, continue to believe that Prigozhin’s complaints against Shoigu and Gerasimov were legitimate and, as such, so too was his march of Moscow. The facts speak otherwise. At the time of Prigozhin’s precipitous move on Moscow, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov were overseeing a Russian military campaign that was eviscerating Ukraine’s NATO-trained army, inflicting casualties at a 10-to-1 ration. During the first three weeks of the current Ukrainian counteroffensive, more than 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, along with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles—many of which were just recently supplied to Ukraine—destroyed. The Russian military was well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. Morale was high. Any notion that Shoigu and Gerasimov were professionally incompetent was belied by the facts.

Prigozhin has bragged about the superiority of the Wagner forces when compared to those of the Russian Army. But the real reason the Wagner forces halted their march on Moscow and returned to their barracks was the fact that they had encountered the Russian military outside Serpukhov, south of Moscow. There, some 2,500 Russian special forces backed by Russian air power were waiting. At the same time, some 10,000 Chechen “Akhmat” special forces had closed in on Rostov-on-Don, where Prigozhin had taken up headquarters, and were preparing to assault the city with the intent to destroy the Wagner forces deployed there, along with their leader. Wagner’s combat experience could not make up for the fact that they were not prepared to carry out sustained ground combat against Russian ground and air forces.

Prigozhin was not only confronted with the reality of his imminent demise and of the men who had accompanied him, but, contrary to the expectations created by the British and Ukrainian intelligence services before the Wagner mutiny, the fact that not a single military unit or officer, not a single politician, and not a single businessman—no one—rallied to Prigozhin’s cause; Russia had sided with its President, Vladimir Putin. While Prigozhin’s extensive PR campaign had succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of Russian people, it had failed to convince people that they should betray their president.

In the interest of avoiding Russian-on-Russian bloodshed, Prigozhin accepted a compromise, brokered by Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, that had he, Dmitry Utkin (the only senior Wagner commander to join him) and the 8,000 Wagner fighters who participated in the failed coup return to their camps in eastern Lugansk. There they would disarm, turning over their heavy weapons to the Russian military, before being sent off into exile in Belarus. For those Wagner fighters—some 17,000—who refused to participate in Prigozhin’s act of treachery, they, along with their commanders, were given the option to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense or go home. Prigozhin’s contracts were cancelled, and Wagner disbanded. Moreover, there would be no changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense—Shoigu and Gerasimov would remain in their respective positions.

Even had Prigozhin not betrayed Russia, the Wagner Group would have ceased to exist as Prigozhin’s private army. However, the Wagner Group’s honor would have remained intact. Prigozhin’s treachery guaranteed that Wagner will be forever tainted by the greed and naked ambition of its owner, a man who sought to exploit the goodwill of the Russian public that the fighters of Wagner had earned with their blood and sacrifice on battlefields in the Donbas, Syria, and Africa, all in a misguided effort to usurp a constitutionally-mandated government the people had themselves put in power.

Farewell, Wagner—I hardly knew ye.

By Ted Snider, The Libertarian Institute, 6/22/23

On June 13, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with war correspondents and military bloggers for a question and answer session at the Kremlin. One war correspondent asked Putin “a question about the notorious red lines.” Addressing Putin, he said, “Clearly…we are at war not just with the Kiev regime, but with the so-called collective West as well. NATO countries are constantly moving and crossing our red lines. We express our concern and keep saying that this is unacceptable, but never come up with actual answers. Are we going to keep moving our red lines?”

That is a question top officials in the Biden administration have been asking as well. Less than two weeks earlier, The Washington Post reported that the risk calculation has begun to factor in that Putin “has not followed through on promises to punish the West for providing weapons to Ukraine.” The White House has concluded that Putin is “bluffing.”

A senior State Department official says, “Russia’s reluctance to retaliate has influenced the risk calculus of Secretary of State Antony Blinken,” who has pushed the Biden administration “to do more to support Ukraine.” A White House official told the Post that “national security adviser Jake Sullivan also has viewed the benefits of supplying more lethal weaponry to Ukraine as outweighing the risks of escalation,” leading him to work “extensively with European allies on providing F-16s to Ukraine.”

But the United States may be misinterpreting Russian military decisions and not recognizing them as escalatory responses to the crossing of redlines.

Those who know Putin’s thinking best say he does not bluff. In his biography, Putin, Philip Short says that a formative lesson of Putin’s childhood was never bluff. Short says that the lesson Putin learned in the KGB had already been learned on the streets. In the KGB, Putin was taught not to “reach for a weapon unless you are prepared to use it.” As a child, Putin says, he had learned that “It was the same on the street. [There] relations were clarified with fists. You didn’t get involved unless you were prepared to see it through.”

“NATO countries are constantly…crossing our redlines,” the war correspondent said. “We express our concern and keep saying that this is unacceptable, but never come up with actual answers. Are we going to keep moving our red lines?” he asked.

We have responded to them crossing our redlines, Putin answered. He specifically identified three responses to the crossing of Russian redlines.

The “first and the most important,” Putin said was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

“[T]he brightest of all redlines” for Russia, as then-ambassador to Russia and now director of the CIA William Burns called it, has always been “Ukrainian entry into NATO.” On December 17, 2021, Russia, once again, highlighted that redline for Washington. The key demands of the proposals on security guarantees were no NATO expansion into Ukraine and no deployment of weapons or troops to Ukraine. On December 26, the U.S. rejected Russia’s essential demand for a written guarantee that Ukraine would not join NATO. Putin noted “that fundamental Russian concerns were ignored,” and, on February 17, the official Russian response said that the United States and NATO offered “no constructive answer” to Russia’s key demands. It then added that if the U.S. and NATO continued to refuse to provide Russia with “legally binding guarantees” regarding its security concerns, Russia would respond with “military-technical means.”

That was not a bluff. Russia drew the redline. The U.S. crossed the redline. Putin said Russia would respond with military means. One week later, they invaded Ukraine. “Is the special military operation itself not a response to them crossing these lines?” Putin responded to the war correspondent. “Is this not the answer to their crossing the red lines?”

The second Russian response to the West’s crossing of Russian redlines was the striking of Ukraine’s energy system. In the early days of the war, Russia seems not to have deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure. A senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency leaked to Newsweek that, in the first month of the war, “almost all of the long-range strikes have been aimed at military targets.”

In September, 2022, Russia witnessed “U.S. military personnel” being “directly involved…in critical line functions” in the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive. On September 10, The New York Times reported that the United States was “provid[ing] better and more relevant information about Russian weaknesses” and that they had “stepped up feeds of intelligence about the position of Russian forces, highlighting weaknesses in the Russian lines.” CNN reported that the U.S. was now engage in “war-gaming” with Ukraine.

Russia interpreted this escalated involvement in the war as indicating that the United States was now “directly participating in the military actions against our country.” And that crossed the second redline. The Russian response was the first massive air strikes on electrical systems.

That the Ukrainian offensive “directly involved U.S. military personnel in critical line functions…crossed what certainly may be seen by the Russian leadership as a red line announced at the very outset of the Russian action in Ukraine,” Asia Times reported on September 12.

“Are strikes on Ukraine’s energy system not an answer to them crossing the red lines?” Putin asked the war correspondent.

The third Russian response came after a series of Ukrainian drone strikes inside Russian territory, highlighted especially by the drones that Russia was forced to explode over the Kremlin, and a blunt admission of “plans to assassinate President Putin.” Russia responded with missile strikes that destroyed Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate just outside Kiev.

“And the destruction of the headquarters of the main intelligence directorate of the armed forces of Ukraine outside Kiev, almost within Kiev’s city limits, is it not the answer? It is,” Putin said to the question of answering the crossing of redlines.

You never know you have crossed a redline until you have already crossed it. That makes the choice of escalation over diplomacy very dangerous. But you also never know a country has answered the crossing of a redline unless you recognize their escalations as answers to the crossing of redlines. Putin publicly identified three Russian escalations as responses to the West crossing Russian redlines. He also suggested there may have been more escalations that might not have happened but for the crossing of redlines: “not everything may be covered by the media.”