By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 10/16/25

The number of young Ukrainians fleeing the war and seeking asylum in Germany has surged, following Kyiv’s decision to partially lift its travel ban for men aged 18 to 22, according to figures from the German Interior Ministry, reported by Die Welt.

Ukrainian asylum applications in Germany have ballooned tenfold, from around 100 per week before the policy change to approximately 1,000 per week in recent months, according to local data.

The regulation, which Kyiv implemented earlier this year, allows men under 22 who were already abroad or studying abroad to extend their stay or travel more freely — a move officials framed as a minor adjustment aimed at mitigating growing criticism of Bankova’s increasingly aggressive conscription tactics.

Ukrainian politicians have denied that the change has prompted a large-scale departure of draft-age men. However, the German data suggests otherwise.

The sharp increase in asylum applications, overwhelmingly from young men, has raised concerns in both Berlin and Brussels about the potential impact on Ukraine’s mobilisation efforts and broader EU migration policy, which could give Russia the edge on numbers.

Ukraine introduced a blanket travel ban for men aged 18 to 60 shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, in an effort to maintain sufficient manpower for its armed forces. Exceptions have since been made for humanitarian, educational and professional reasons, but Kyiv has faced growing pressure over the social and political implications of conscription.

The Interior Ministry did not provide a detailed age breakdown of the new asylum seekers but confirmed to Die Welt that most are young and male, consistent with Ukraine’s revised policy.

Ukrainian authorities have defended the decision, arguing it affects a relatively small group and does not undermine military readiness. “There is no mass exodus,” senior officials have said, insisting that enlistment and mobilisation measures remain in place.

Still, the sharp increase in asylum claims in Germany — which already hosts over 1.1mn Ukrainian refugees — may complicate EU coordination on migration policy and military assistance. With Ukraine preparing for a third year of full-scale war, Western governments are watching closely for any signs of mobilisation fatigue or domestic instability.

German officials have not indicated plans to alter their asylum policy in response but have acknowledged the numbers are “notable and being monitored.” The development comes as EU capitals continue to debate burden-sharing mechanisms and support packages for Ukraine in 2025.

Desertions swell

The exodus of young men, thanks to the easing of travel restrictions, comes on top of reports of the number of desertions from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) swelling.

Over the past year, twice as many military personnel have left their units without authorisation in Ukraine as during the first two and a half years of the conflict, according to the Ukrainian publication Strana, citing the Prosecutor General’s Office.

According to the agency, a total of nearly 290,000 criminal cases for unauthorized abandonment and desertion were opened during the conflict. Between January 2022 and September 2024, 90,000 cases were opened, and another 200,000 in the last year. Experts says that the true number of those who went AWOL is almost certainly significantly higher than the official figures.

In August, Ukrainska Pravda, citing the Prosecutor General’s Office, reported that 110,511 cases of unauthorised absence from service in the Ukrainian army had been registered since the beginning of 2025 – more than all the cases brought in the previous three years of the conflict with Russia combined.

The lack of manpower and falling number of fresh recruits is having a catastrophic effect on the AFU’s ability to defend the frontline in Donbas, where kilometre-long unmanned holes are opening up, Ukrainska Pravda reported earlier this month.

By Kyle Anzalone, The Libertarian Institute, 10/14/25

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is considering easing its rules on the use of force against Russia. Russia is accused of violating Estonian, Polish, and Romanian airspace in September. 

Sky TG24, an Italian news outlet, said NATO leaders are seeking “more flexibility” in engaging Russia on the bloc’s Eastern flank. “NATO Commander-in-Chief, US General Alexus Grynkewich, has asked allies for ‘more flexibility’ in the rules of engagement to better manage the defense of the eastern flank,” the report explains. “Especially in light of the launch of Operation Sentry East, which is seen as a ‘test bed’ for the development of an integrated air defense operation.”

Some members of NATO are seeking to ease or remove “national limitations” that countries impose on the military equipment under NATO command. 

The discussions follow Russian alleged violations of NATO airspace last month. Tallinn claimed three Russian jets flew just inside Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland. NATO says the jets remained in Estonian territory for about 12 minutes, and the bloc scrambled F-35s operated by Italy to escort the Russian warplanes. 

The Kremlin denied the accusations. 

In a separate incident, about two dozen Russian decoy drones entered Polish airspace. The bloc scrambled multiple fighter jets and shot down some of the UAVs. The operation cost the bloc about half a billion dollars. 

Russia has denied that it targeted Poland, and Belarus claimed that the drones flew into Polish airspace after they were impacted by Ukrainian electronic interference.

In a third event, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace before turning around and striking Ukraine. 

Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte have called for shooting down Russian aircraft in allied airspace.

By Chris Weafer, Intellinews, 10/12/25

Chris Weafer is the CEO of Macro-Advisory.

Since 2014, Western nations have hit Russia with a total of 26,655 sanctions (to mid-September 2025), with 23,960 coming after February 2022. The largest target group, with 13,611 sanctions, is state officials, business owners, and well-known public figures. The declared intention of sanctions was to force the Kremlin to alter its geopolitical course, i.e. to quickly withdraw from Ukraine, by causing a shock crisis in the economy and creating a backlash by prominent businesspersons and the public against the Kremlin.

The economy did suffer from disruption in 2022 (-1.2%), but growth returned in 2023 (+4.1%) and in 2024 (+4.3%). The economy also received a huge boost to income in 2022-23, as the EU was not ready for sanctions and was forced to stockpile Russian oil and other materials. The external trade and current accounts have remained comfortably in surplus since 2022.

Today, there is again speculation in many parts of the western media that because headline growth in Russia dropped to just over 1.0% in the first half of this year; the rate of VAT is planned to rise to 22%, (from 20% currently); and the budget deficit is higher than had been planned; that the economy is heading for recession and that the government is facing a financial crisis. President Trump recently fuelled that narrative with his reference to Russia as a “paper tiger”. But none of this speculation or the assumption of imminent crisis holds up to scrutiny. The motivation for the reports is again, or is mostly, political optics.

As mentioned, over 13,000 of the sanctions have been directed at individuals, especially Russian billionaires and business owners. The assumption being that these individuals would increase pressure on the Kremlin to withdraw from Ukraine to alleviate pressure on their businesses and to recover their wealth from sanctions orders. But here is where there is a lack of understanding about how Russia has changed since 2000. billionaires do not have political influence in Putin’s Russia and, as such, cannot be properly referred to as Oligarchs, i.e. as originally defined in ancient Greece. So, while these individuals were targeted by sanctions intended to pressure the government, they hold little to no political influence, and the measures have therefore failed to bring about any meaningful change in state policy – and nor will they. 

Moreover, while some assets – modest volume – belonging to the business elite have been frozen under Western sanctions, the bulk of their wealth remains in Russia or in so-called friendly jurisdictions. This is largely because, in the face of an increasingly unpredictable external environment – where sanctions were often imposed based solely on high net worth – many saw no viable option other than to redomicile their wealth and business interests to Russia or allied countries. And they had plenty of notice to do so since sanctions against Russia started quite meekly from spring 2014.

The 2025 Forbes billionaire Report showed that there are now 146 billionaires in Russia, up 21 from 2024 and with 15 new names appearing. The combined wealth of the billionaires is assessed at $625.6bn, a record high for Russia. Most of that wealth is now in Russia or in so-called friendly jurisdictions and has helped create a strong financial base in the country. This is one of the reasons why the government is now able to switch from financing the federal budget deficit from the National Welfare Fund, Russia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, to tapping into the local debt market. With state debt at only 16% of GDP, the Finance Ministry has considerable scope to borrow and still keep Russia as a low indebted country.

Instead of staging a revolt, some of the sanctioned businesspersons have adapted to the new environment and have refocused their repatriated wealth on bolstering Russia’s domestic economy. Others have pursued investments or private activities outside the West, particularly in countries “friendly” to Russia. In essence, rather than weakening the Russian state, the sanctions inadvertently reinforced it by redirecting wealth and investment into the domestic market, while also simultaneously pushing away many of the pro-Western businesspeople who were essentially punished because of their nationality. Had policymakers heeded the advice of several prominent voices in the west to not sanction Russian billionaires but to make it easier for them to settle in the west and to bring the bulk of their wealth with them, it would probably be a different story in Russia today.

Also, in terms of foreign businesses in Russia, while some left, many chose to stay, either directly or indirectly by selling their operations to local investors or changing their business models. Around 46% of the largest foreign companies operating in Russia in early 2022, sold their businesses to local investors, ensuring operations continued, providing goods and services, employment and taxes and bolstering overall GDP. Ironically, many foreign companies still operating in Russia are often finding themselves in a favorable position. With many Russian founded companies now sanctioned, foreign firms, or those which have evolved from a formerly foreign owned business, are emerging as key players in several sectors, often enjoying a competitive advantage. This has created another unintended consequence in that, according to a recent calculation published by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) foreign companies are now contributing significantly to the Russian federal budget, paying taxes in excess of $20bn last year, but remain outside of Western sanctions lists. 

A survey by the Association of European Businesses showed in May that most of such companies operating in Russia saw opportunities for growth. While barriers like sanctions, geopolitical risks and payment restrictions persist, these companies are continuing with their long-term strategies. The reputation risks are real, but for many businesses the long-term financial rewards provide adequate compensation for the medium-term costs.

The sanctions on Russia have also had ripple effects and unintended consequences far beyond its borders. Many countries in the so-called Global South, especially China, India and others in the BRICS bloc, have deepened their economic ties with each other and with Moscow. As a result, the shift toward a multipolar world has accelerated, with new economic power centers emerging outside of the traditional Western dominated structures.

In addition, sanctions have exposed vulnerabilities within the global financial system, particularly in terms of reliance on the US dollar and the SWIFT payment system. Russia’s, and China’s, ability to create alternative financial networks and build stronger connections with non-Western financial institutions has opened the door for other countries to re-evaluate their overdependence on Western-controlled financial systems. While this shift may not be immediate, it has started and could have long-lasting implications for global trade and finance.

Apart from the unintended consequences, of course there are damaging and direct consequences from sanctions in Russia. While the economy is now stable, albeit in a much lower but sustainable growth range, the legacy of sanctions will likely remain visible in the long run. The penalties and negative effects won’t dissolve quickly even when the sanctions start to ease. High military spending will remain for several years after a peace deal. As stated by President Trump and his senior officials, sanctions will only be removed in stages over many years and some, such as access to Western technologies in dual-use areas, may stay indefinitely. Moscow also faces even greater challenges dealing with demographic challenges.

Russia has for sure been impacted by the weight of sanctions, and previous plans for economic development have been disrupted. But the country, big businesses, and people proved a lot more resilient and adaptable than those applying sanctions had expected. Trade has shifted from a previous Western dominance to the East and South. Innovation has accelerated, and localization has moved from being an ambition to a reality. Assumptions made about the nature of political power and influence in Russia was very wide of the mark.

It can also be argued that sanctions have had many unintended consequences and, in some instances, the opposite effect of what was originally hoped for by those who demanded them. Rather than fracturing Russia, the restrictions have inadvertently helped reinforce the country’s economic, social and political stability. Rather than isolating Russia within the global community, there is now a more visible fracture between the West and the Global South, and it is growing. This realization is at least one reason why The White House is now opposed to additional sanctions against Moscow (despite the frequent threats) even as Brussels prepares yet another, the nineteenth, package of sanctions.

By Luis de Vega, El Pais (Spain), 10/5/25

“The instructors constantly remind us to be aware that every day in our position could be our last,” says 18-year-old Ulan during a training session, already wearing the uniform of the Ukrainian army alongside a dozen comrades. They were children when Russia occupied Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014. They were teenagers when, in 2022, Moscow unleashed its full-scale invasion. Now, in 2025, having come of age, they are the latest and youngest group to voluntarily join an army decimated by three and a half years of bloody, high-intensity conflict.

Until this year, profiles like Ulan’s weren’t accepted at recruitment centers, where the mandatory age ranges from 25 to 60. That was until February, when the Ministry of Defense approved the so-called “18-24 Contract” project, which ensures training under NATO standards. “At the beginning of the current war, I decided I would join the army as soon as possible,” admits this young man with big blue eyes from the northern region of Sumy.

All members of the group visited by EL PAÍS are between 18 and 24 years old. They are completing their two-month training in an area of the country that their superiors do not allow to be revealed in this report. They are doing so after signing a one-year contract for which they will pocket around €52,000 ($61,000). In exchange, they will be deployed to an area where, although the government does not provide figures, reports indicate that there have been a significant number of casualties.

Although they will receive a considerable amount of money (the average salary in Ukraine is around $645 per month), Ulan doesn’t list remuneration as the primary reason for donning the uniform. “Not all of us can join the army. The economy is also important for the country’s survival,” he says, while gunfire from target practice can be heard in the background.

Serhii (no one provides their last name), a 39-year-old officer who works in an army unit that strives to maintain the mental health of soldiers, explains that they encounter two types of young people who are volunteering to join up. On the one hand, and predominantly, those who belong to a nationalist family and place great importance on the defense of the country; and on the other, those who come from troubled families who may see the salary offer as a way out of their situation.

In any case, he believes that caution is needed with regard to the impulse that may lead these young soldiers to minimize the dangers they face due to their lack of life experience and, at the same time, the fact that they almost never have wives or children.

“Defend the homeland”

Alexander, 21, has no doubt that the main reason for joining the army as a volunteer is to “defend the homeland.” He has just jumped out of a BMP 2 infantry fighting vehicle, rifle in hand, which is used for training exercises. When he was 17, Russia invaded and he fled to Poland with his family. His father returned and enlisted, but he was unable to do so after several attempts because he was told he was too young. With the government sponsored 18-24 campaign, he has found his opportunity. “Quick, quick, quick!” the instructor shouts, while asking the others to lie down on the ground in firing positions.

Alexander’s mother, the young man explains, didn’t want another soldier in the house. Several relatives have ended up in the army over the years. Nor did the young soldier’s wife support him at first. The reality is that, as the country’s military leaders acknowledge, the army cannot stop recruiting because it must maintain a high level of personnel, even once the Russian invasion is over. In contrast to positions such as those held by Alexander and others who volunteer out of a sense of patriotism, there are hundreds of thousands of men — up to 1.5 million, according to authorities’ estimates — of military age who refuse to be drafted and live outside the law.

The shortage of personnel has led the authorities in Kyiv to seek new ways to partially address the problem. Therefore, in addition to young people aged between 18 and 24, the army has now also opened the door to those over 60 who wish to enlist, although these will not be assigned to combat positions. Far from being an obligation, the 18-24 contract “is rather an opportunity for people to make a conscious decision, gain combat experience, and achieve financial stability in just one year. It is the volunteer’s decision to extend their service or return to civilian life,” Defense Minister Rustem Umerov emphasized at the beginning of 2025.

The contract entails receiving, up front, one million hryvnias (approximately $24,265). Of this money, 200,000 hryvnias is paid immediately and the remainder during the volunteer’s service. In addition, recruits receive a monthly salary of up to 120,000 hryvnias (approximately $2,930) as well as other benefits: an interest-free mortgage, state-funded training, access to free medical care, the right to travel abroad after completing a year of service, and exemption from being drafted for 12 months after the end of the contract.

Ulan, Alexander, and the others have been at the training camp for five weeks. They’ve practiced with weapons, learned how to move and coordinate, and how to protect themselves. Alexander already knows where he’ll be assigned as a member of the infantry, but he’s not authorized to give details. The instructor shouts orders and advice. He positions their rifles correctly, tells them how to move in groups and individually. The recruits will soon complete two months of training and the kids will be assigned to their different brigades. The war continues in Ukraine, and the outlook is not encouraging.

By Kit Klarenberg, Substack, 10/12/25

September 22nd marked “Resistance Fighting Day”. It was on this date in 1944 anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Estonia declared war on the Soviet Union’s local ‘occupation’. Parallel paramilitary factions rapidly formed in neighbouring Latvia and Lithuania. For over a decade, these violent factions – popularly known as the Forest Brothers – waged a brutal, ill-fated insurgency against Soviet authorities. They remain venerated in the region and beyond today as courageous freedom fighters, immortalised by commemorative monuments, street names and statues throughout the Baltic states.

In reality, the vast majority of the tens of thousands of Forest Brothers were Holocaust perpetrators and Nazi collaborators. In many cases, militants joined the movement due to fear of prosecution and punishment for their activities during World War II. While waging their anti-Soviet crusade, the Brothers also murdered thousands of innocent civilians, including many children. However, critical scrutiny of the Forest Brothers’ genocidal legacy is criminalised throughout the Baltics. Academics, journalists and lawyers have been jailed for exposing the truth.

The same legislation moreover prohibits any public discussion of how the Jewish populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were slaughtered in their virtual totality, largely before the Wehrmacht arrived in June 1941 under Operation Barbarossa. Western powers are aggressively complicit in this historical coverup. In July 2017, NATO produced a slick propaganda film heroising the Forest Brothers. Meanwhile, mainstream pundits routinely whitewash Baltic Nazi collaboration, on the risible basis local populations simply sought to resist Communist rule.

There is another core component of the Forest Brothers’ history their advocates at home and abroad are keen to conceal. Namely, the Baltic Nazi guerrilla war was covertly supported financially, materially and practically by MI6. Britain’s foreign spying agency assisted their attempted insurrection by supplying explosives and weapons, infiltrating and exfiltrating agents, and sponsoring assassinations and sabotage attacks. Yet, MI6 records documenting this dark alliance are unforthcoming. Evidence of London’s cloak-and-dagger assistance to the Forest Brothers is provided largely by declassified CIA files.

The documents indicate Langley glommed onto MI6’s secret bond with the Baltic insurgents some time after British intelligence first struck up a relationship with the Forest Brothers, in the precise manner London recruited Nazi-created ‘stay-behind’ units in Ukraine before World War II was even over. It was the CIA’s first covert action targeting the Soviet Union, and the Agency was extremely concerned about its exposure. “Any breaches of security” revealing US involvement would lead “to an immediate cessation of financial support” for the Brothers.

‘Offensive Tasks’

An April 1952 CIA file indicates Langley was willing to pump in excess of $110,000 – close to $1.5 million today – into “clandestine support” for resistance groups in Riga. The Agency’s mission was “contacting, organizing and developing agent and underground facilities” for “black” operations against the Soviet Union, courtesy of the Forest Brothers. However, MI6 took umbrage at the CIA’s proposed drop zones in Kurzeme, Latvia, as this would “endanger” British assets in the area.

MI6 argued it was already “in contact with partisans in Kurzeme and had adequate intelligence and operational coverage of this part of Latvia.” British intelligence thus requested the CIA postpone its plans until autumn 1952. Then, London would “arrange for the reception and further movement” of the CIA’s Latvian assets. “As a result of the British protest,” Langley’s “conflicting interests” with MI6, and the agency’s offer of “providing aid and reception to our personnel…it was reluctantly decided to postpone” the mission.

The next month, a CIA memo lamented, “there has been no significant activity in this project…as a result of the postponement of the operation into Latvia.” Resultantly, its agents were “being reassessed to determine their willingness and fitness” for clandestine activities later in the year. The note went on to record, “the British have informed us” how in recent weeks, MI6 had successfully airdropped supplementary agents into Riga, while exfiltrating one of its chaos agents.

In June 1952, a CIA document detailed the minutes of successive recent talks in London between MI6 and its US counterpart on “operations in the Baltic states.” On May 29th, an “exploratory discussion” on CIA skullduggery later that year and “possible assistance which might be provided” from MI6 agents “already in the country” was convened. British intelligence “defined their interest in maintaining contact with the resistance movement in Latvia”:

“[MI6] found from experience that single agents, living semi-legal lives in the Baltic States, were not able to develop intelligence gathering networks. They felt that the best way to cover the limited intelligence requirements in Latvia was by encouraging the resistance organisation to brief its contacts among the legally living population to obtain the intelligence and pass it back through the illegal groups with whom [MI6] was in contact.”

London had reportedly “briefed their recently infiltrated Latvians to this effect.” MI6 was “further interested in building up” the Forest Brothers , so they could assume “more offensive tasks”, such as penetrating the local Soviet administration. “It was also hoped that this resistance organisation would provide the jumping off point for agents to more important targets in the East,” the document noted. “It was however clear that only Baltic personnel could be dispatched by this means,” the CIA added:

“[MI6] felt that for the present its interests in Latvia were adequately covered by the agents whom they had already infiltrated. Their plans therefore were directed to maintaining these agents. This did not mean the introduction of an independent party by the CIA could not provide a valuable contribution.”

‘Intelligence Targets’

Both agencies had significant concerns about the state of operations in Lithuania. The CIA was worried about Soviet penetration of the Forest Brothers. While MI6 had “recently exfiltrated a Lithuanian…whose bona fides” weren’t in doubt, the “general situation was becoming ever more difficult.” Younger generations in the Baltics increasingly accepted “Sovietisation”, the Red Army and KGB were successfully countering armed resistance, and “the apparent hopelessness of the cause of independence” was becoming ever-clearer to those who rejected Communism, including the Forest Brothers themselves.

Undeterred, “it was agreed to discuss the establishment of a mechanism for guaranteeing the effective running” of CIA and MI6 missions in the Baltics over the next year. The pair “would consider mounting a test joint operation possibly in Lithuania in the spring of 1953.” Clandestine efforts in the intervening time would be “fully co-ordinated”. While the Baltic states themselves didn’t offer a particularly useful intelligence yield, their geographic position was ideal for striking further into the Soviet Union.

MI6 was reportedly “exploring the dispatch of Lithuanians to targets further east,” and considered it “advantageous to establish contact” with other local resistance groups, beyond its main proxy, the BPDS – Lithuania’s United Democratic Resistance Movement, a key Forest Brothers cell. The British were also “anxious” to expand their “coverage” in Estonia, which “was more favourably situated geographically for intelligence targets further afield.” The CIA concurred, and “hoped to send a party in, possibly in the spring of 1953.”

Over subsequent years, MI6’s involvement with the Forest Brothers waned, while the CIA’s grew, with Agency funding for the assorted resistance groups increasing significantly, and operations expanding to include psychological warfare, such as the funding of underground anti-Communist publications locally. The Agency also bankrolled the travel of Baltic émigrés to the US, and Stateside conferences on the region’s future liberation. However, due to a combination of successful KGB infiltration and intensified counterinsurgency operations, the Forest Brothers were fully neutralised by 1959.

While the Forest Brothers’ struggle ultimately ended in failure, the CIA and MI6 continued to support fascist and Nazi elements within and without the Eastern Bloc – most significantly in Ukraine – in service of precipitating the Soviet Union’s collapse. Moreover, the experience provided a clear blueprint for covert Anglo-American sponsorship of separatist militias, which has been deployed to devastating effect over and over again in every corner of the world in the decades since.

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