By MK Bhadrakumar, Consortium News, 10/6/25

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov came out of a meeting in New York on Sept. 24 with the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio showing a thumbs-up sign as he passed journalists.

It was a confusing signal so soon after U.S. President Donald Trump publicly shamed the Russian military as a “paper tiger” and stunned European capitals by saying that Ukraine could still “fight and win” all its land.

A charitable explanation could be that Trump was building the off ramp to hand the responsibility for Ukraine’s defence to the Europeans. He made a strong point that Europeans can and should do more.

That said, it is also noticeable that Trump’s initial sympathy for Russia has given way steadily to a more neutral position — a shift that accelerated last month.

British columnist Gerard Baker wrote in The Times that “Trump is signaling to Russia that he no longer has its back. But he has also made clear that Europeans can’t rely on U.S. support.” Moscow played cool initially, but realism dawned within the week.

While reduced U.S. involvement in Ukraine is a good thing to happen for Russia, it is far from an open and shut case that Trump won’t reassume NATO leadership.

The matrix is getting complicated, as NATO is not in step with the U.S. and Trump does not control NATO anymore, although NATO doesn’t amount to much without America. And neither NATO nor Trump controls the war.  

Clearly, the U.S. appears to be growing more distant. This is an epic inflection point: in the American global order Europe flourishes and has the opportunity to become a geopolitical force in its own right but also risks becoming an afterthought in a fragmenting world.

Scott Bessent, U.S. treasury secretary who is close to Trump’s thinking, highlighted this paradox in an interview with Fox Business when he said, “As I told my European counterparts about two weeks ago, ‘All I can hear from you is that Putin wants to march into Warsaw. The one thing I’m sure of is that Putin isn’t marching into Boston.’”

U.S. President Donald Trump with Ukraine’s President Volodymy Zelensky in Paris on Dec. 7, 2024. (President of Ukraine/Flickr/Public Domain)

Trump’s remarks about the Ukraine war and his invitation to the E.U. to be the ‘counterweight’ to Russia were by no means a spontaneous, emotional outburst. They came from long multi-layered strategy sessions over several weeks.

Indeed, by last Sunday, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance was already revealing that Washington is considering a Ukrainian request to obtain Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine — a long-range, nuclear capable, all-weather cruise missile of technological sophistication and precision whose land-based version is in production.

Tomahawks, if inducted into the war, will give Kiev the capability to strike deep inside Russia. Moscow sharply reacted overnight to Vance’s remark, saying it would carefully analyse whether any Tomahawk missiles that might be supplied to Ukraine would be fired using targeting data supplied by the U.S.

A new dangerous phase of the war is beginning, which holds the risk of a direct Russia-NATO confrontation. Asked about Vance’s comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia was analysing them carefully. President Putin has previously stated that Western countries will make themselves direct parties to the war if they supply targeting and intelligence to enable Ukraine to fire missiles deep inside Russia.

Peskov said,

“The question, as before, is this: who can launch these missiles…? Can only Ukrainians launch them, or do American soldiers have to do that? Who is determining the targeting of these missiles? The American side or the Ukrainians themselves?”

Peskov added that “a very in-depth analysis” is required. 

U.S. guided-missile destroyer targets Libya’s Mediterranean Coast, March 19, 2011. (U.S. Navy, Wikimedia Commons)

This is a moment of truth, since with Tomahawks arrival in the war zone, Trump will be climbing the escalation ladder at a juncture when indications are that Ukraine has strengthened its capability lately, launching a series of successful drone strikes against Russian refineries.

They triggered fuel shortages, driving gasoline prices to record highs and prompted Moscow to restrict exports to stabilise its domestic market.

The locus of the proxy war in Ukraine may altogether change going forward. Germany is willing to pay for the procurement of the Tomahawks. Russian expert opinion is that there is no magic weapon capable of changing the dynamic of the war. But beneath that high threshold, there are other compelling realities.

The West’s last throw of the dice may well be to stoke up social discontent within Russia, as parliamentary elections are to be held not later than Sept. 10, 2026. The West’s assessment, rightly or wrongly, is that the majority opinion in Russia favours an early end to the war. 

The discords within the transatlantic alliance worked well for Russia so far. Also, Trump exhibited little appetite for military adventurism [except perhaps in Venezuela] or foreign entanglements. American foreign policy, once dominated by containment and the domino theory, had gone into reverse.

However, now it seems that although the White House ceased to be hostile, the U.S. will still continue to supply intelligence to Kiev and allow Ukraine to buy its advanced weaponry with the Europeans footing the bill. 

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz wrote in the Financial Times two weeks ago urging the E.U. to transfer Russia’s frozen reserves (roughly $300 billion) to Ukraine exclusively for procurement of weapons. It effectively means Ukraine should be able to hold the line.

The crunch time comes when or if NATO toughens its rules of engagement on its eastern flank to make it easier to shoot down intruding [alleged] Russian aircraft. No doubt, the alliance has become firmer in its messaging towards the Kremlin over past week.

President Donald Trump on a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the White House on Aug. 18, 2025, before the U.S. president met with with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders in the Oval Office. (White House/Daniel Torok)

But there are indications also that Washington and Moscow are communicating. Neither side is looking for confrontation. As things stand, it is very much possible that Trump may not agree ultimately to the supply of Tomahawks to Ukraine. 

On the other hand, in the changed circumstances and growing uncertainties about a negotiated settlement, Russia may be left with no option but to go all out for a military solution. After all, even if there is going to be a negotiated settlement on paper, it may not add up to much. 

The so-called Helsinki Accords (1975) were painstakingly negotiated through a two-year period in Geneva and every European country, and the U.S. and Canada signed it, but exactly one year later, this was what Henry Kissinger told President Gerard Ford:

“We (U.S.) never wanted it but went along with the Europeans … It is meaningless — it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.” 

In the final analysis, all that the Helsinki Final Act achieved was to draw international attention to the human rights situation in the Soviet bloc and open ties between the East European countries and Western Europe, which of course led to the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland and an overall loosening of the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, which culminated in the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 

M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat. He was India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey. Views are personal.

This article originally appeared on Indian Punchline.

The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not reflect those of Consortium News.

Tags: Aircraft 

By Connor Echols, Responsible Statecraft, 10/10/25

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel sparked controversy in Europe this week when she appeared to blame eastern European states for helping to instigate the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Merkel claimed in an interview with Hungarian media that, in June of 2021, she began to feel that Russian President Vladimir Putin “was no longer taking the Minsk Agreement seriously,” referencing a series of treaties that aimed to end the war between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas. “That’s why I wanted a new format where we could speak directly with Putin as the European Union,” she said.

But that proposal stalled due to opposition from the Baltic states and Poland, who “feared we would not be able to develop a common policy towards Russia,” according to Merkel. “Then I left office and Putin’s war began,” she said.

The comments provide rare, new insights into the deterioration in Western relations with Russia that reached a crescendo in February 2022, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Merkel’s account adds credence to arguments that the West failed to pursue all diplomatic avenues to prevent the war, which has now turned into a protracted conflict.

Eastern European leaders responded to the interview with indignation, arguing that efforts to negotiate with Putin were in fact to blame for the war. “I consistently told her that you cannot deal with Putin ‘in good faith,’ but she believed that the Baltic states were wrong,” said former Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins, who served in that role from 2019 to 2023. “Putin acts the way he acts, and the only options for the West are either to submit or to resist.”

“Russia’s war against Ukraine is driven by one thing and one thing only: its refusal to accept the Soviet Union’s collapse and its unrelenting imperialist ambitions,” said Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna. “Russia alone is to blame for this aggression.”

Notably, Merkel didn’t place all of the blame on eastern Europe. The former chancellor also cited the pandemic as an aggravating factor in the deterioration of Western ties with Russia. “If you cannot meet, if you cannot discuss differences face to face, you won’t find new compromises,” she said.

Merkel appeared less hopeful about the possibility of diplomacy with Russia today, after more than three years of war in Ukraine. “Times have changed now, and we need to think about what position will best help us achieve peace,” she said. In Merkel’s view, that means that Europe will have to act “as a real deterrent” to Russia by strengthening its military position and supporting Ukraine.

ACURA, 10/7/25

It is with deep sadness that we inform you that our stalwart Board Member, David C. Speedie, passed away on Thursday, October 2nd, at the University of Virginia Hospital. David was being treated for prostate cancer, and was scheduled to begin chemotherapy shortly. However, in spite of the accurate diagnosis, the cancer had become metastatic and difficult to control.

David was Senior  Fellow and Director of the Program on US Global Engagement at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Policy in New York from 2007 to 2017.  Prior to that he chaired the Program on International Peace and Security at the Carnegie Corporation in New York from 1992 to 2007. David had also served as Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government.

He was a thoughtful and tireless advocate for global peace who had a keen interest in improving US Russia Relations.  A prolific writer and lecturer on the need for diplomacy and cross-cultural understanding, David traveled to Russia frequently.  He was a close associate of our founder, Stephen F. Cohen.

Those who knew David will remember him not only as a brilliant man but as a decent and empathetic one.  We will miss David greatly.

-Krishen Mehta for the Board

Russia Matters, 10/10/25

1. Russian strikes in recent days have wiped out more than half of Ukraine’s domestic natural gas production, according to Bloomberg.Oct. 5 saw Russia launch its largest air attack in weeks on Ukraine, firing 53 missiles—including two Kinzhals—and nearly 500 attack drones across nine regions, killing five and damaging energy facilities nationwide. Five days later, Russia unleashed one of its largest attacks on Ukraine, launching around 465 drones and 32 missiles, according to Ukrainian officials.¹ The Oct. 10 attack caused temporary power outages for over one million people nationwide in Ukraine. Also this week, Russia reported a growing number of Ukrainian drone attacks deep inside its territory, with some reaching nearly 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) from the Ukrainian border, in the Ural Mountains and the oil-rich region of Tyumen.
2. In the past week, Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 2025, Russia gained 34 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, up from the previous week’s gain of 13 square miles, which constitutes an increase of 162%. In the past four weeks (Sept. 9–Oct. 7, 2025), Russian forces gained 166 square miles of Ukrainian territory, a slight increase from the 160 square miles they gained during the previous four-week period (Aug. 12–Sept. 9, 2025), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week has also seen Vladimir Putin claim that Russian forces had captured almost 1,930 square miles (5,000 square kilometers) of land in Ukraine in 2025. According to data from DeepState, which is associated with Ukraine’s MoD, however, from Jan. 1, 2025, to Oct. 5, 2025, Russia gained approximately 1,217 square miles (3,152 square kilometers) of Ukrainian land.
3. Donald Trump said Oct. 6 that he has “sort of made a decision” about selling long-range Tomahawk missiles to NATO countries in order for them to be supplied to Ukraine, Axios reported. Trump also said he wants to know what the Ukrainians plan to do with the missiles before he supplies them. Following Trump’s comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that supplying Tomahawks, which he stressed could carry nuclear warheads, would constitute a “serious escalation.” Senior Russian lawmakers broadened the warnings: Andrei Kartapolov promised a “tough, ambiguous, measured and asymmetrical” response. Andrei Zhuravlyov suggested Russia should strike Poland’s Rzeszow air base, a key Western transit hub for arms, if deliveries proceed, while Leonid Slutsky claimed Trump risked a third world war. In his comments on Tomahawks, another senior Russian MP Alexei Zhuravlev referenced Russia’s recent military cooperation agreement with Cuba and implied that Russia can deploy missiles to Cuba close to the United States. Putin weighed in, too, asserting on Oct. 9 that Russia will strengthen air defense.
4. Trump on Oct. 5 praised Putin’s proposal to extend New START’s limits for one additional year after its planned February 2026 expiration, describing the Russian offer as a “good idea.” Trump did not indicate if the U.S. would attach new conditions or whether it has formally responded to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Kremlin welcomed Trump’s positive remarks, with Putin’s spokesman Peskov calling them grounds for optimism and possible new talks that could sidestep the Ukraine conflict. Speaking on Oct. 10, Putin himself said it would be a shame if the United States declined to extend the warhead limits, but that such a refusal would not be critical for Moscow. Putin has not indicated whether he is open to restoring inspections or data sharing under the treaty, while his Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov emphasized that Moscow’s proposal is not to renew the treaty, but to maintain its quantitative limits for one year post-expiry, provided the U.S. does not take destabilizing actions in offensive or strategic air defense fields.²

By Dr. F. Andrew Wolf, Jr., Global Research, 9/30/25

F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organization of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (Wales), MA-theology (Univ. S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (TCU-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

The past several weeks has witnessed tensions between EU political elites and the Kremlin escalating, needlessly. A contrived drone incident in Poland, Estonian airspace allegedly being violated by Russian planes, and East European politicians urging NATO to shoot down Russian aircraft — it all points to a deliberate attempt to provoke Moscow and garner Washington’s attention.

But this sudden propensity toward provocation says less about Moscow and more about EU insecurity. With US security guarantees steadily declining, the bloc’s governments are grasping at an old but favorite retreat: the myth of the “Russian threat.”

It is a conjured story that has lingered in European consciousness for more than five centuries, and it speaks clearly to Western Europe’s insecurity – rather than any Russian territorial ambitions.

There are reasons why the EU’s desperate posturing is laced with deceit. Washington’s inclination towards underwriting European security is diminishing. Western media suggests that US officials have told their European counterparts that direct military aid to Eastern Europe may soon be scaled back. Political elites in the Baltics and some former Soviet republics view this as an untenable situation. Hence, the group’s foreign policy initiatives are routinely directed towards provoking a response from Russia, hoping to extract security guarantees and military resources from the US.

Furthermore, and this is the fallacy of the EU position, the latter has no alternative strategy. Without US acquiescence, it cannot conceive of a foreign policy beyond merely provoking the Russian “Bear.” Reintroducing Russia as its “existential” nemesis provides a convenient way to gain Washington’s attention – and money if possible.

The irony is glaring: Russia has no interest in the territory of its smaller neighbors, because it is not in its best interest to do so. The Baltics, Poland, and Finland engaging for decades in anti-Russian rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow seeks no revenge or a reckoning — again, because it’s not in its interest to so engage. Their relevance in world affairs is negligible. But for the political elites, clinging to the myth of Russian aggression has become the only recourse they, shortsightedly, believe is available to them. 

The Genesis of Russophobia

The roots of this myth lie in neither the Cold War nor the 19^th century “Great Game” rivalry between empires; rather, its emergence can be traced to the rather cowardly insecurity of Baltic barons and the opportunism of German knights in Livonia and Prussia.

In the late 15^th century, Polish monarchs considered sending German knights to fight the expanding Ottoman Empire. The idea was horrifying to them. For centuries, they had lived comfortably in the Baltics while merely skirmishing with Russian militias. The Ottoman Turks was altogether different. The memory of Nicopolis was still a vivid memory – Ottoman forces executed virtually all captured knights.

Unwilling to face a real threat and a formidable enemy, the Livonian and Prussian knights initiated a propaganda campaign. The goal was to persuade the balance of Europe that Russia was an enemy as dangerous, and perhaps even more so, than the Ottomans. The strategy succeeded: Rome granted indulgences and support, ensuring the knights could remain at home, while still enjoying the prestige of crusaders fighting a “holy war.”

The myth was born: a confluence of fear, opportunism, and financial gain. Eventually, Western Europe (particularly France and Britain) absorbed the deception into a broader scheme of Russophobia – a blend of contempt and anxiety over a vast empire they could neither conquer nor ignore. And in the 20^th century England’s academics, especially through its Rhodes Scholar program, indoctrinated generations of America’s best and brightest who became influential in advising presidents and secretaries of state in US foreign policy. Russophobia crossed the Atlantic.

Reflections of the Past

Today, history repeats itself. Once more, Russia’s neighbors (anxious and insecure) seek protection from an Atlantic suzerain preoccupied with larger challenges. Five centuries ago, the Ottomans consumed Europe’s attention; today, it is China – the true strategic rival of the United States.

Little has changed, however, with European elites. They cannot imagine a political identity without playing the role of “victim.” Their economies and influence are far too insignificant, so they inflate the specter of Russian aggression in a futile attempt to remain relevant to Washington and Brussels.

Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told the United Nations this week that Moscow has no intention of attacking Europe or NATO countries. Moscow has not the desire and certainly not the need to “invade” the Baltics or Poland. In the 15th century, Ivan III was concerned with issues of trade, economic relations, and Orthodox Christian Church leadership — not with conquest for the sake of territorial gain. Today, Russia’s aims are equally pragmatic: stability, sovereignty, and relations built around trade.

Poland vs the Rest of Europe

The contrast with Poland is instructive. In the 15th century, Poland agitated for war with Russia. In the 21st, it has chosen a more cautious course, focusing on steady economic growth and avoiding reckless entanglements. Unlike the Baltics, Warsaw has built a measure of gravitas in European politics. That success has made it a target of envy in Berlin, Paris, and London, who would prefer Poland to be dragged into open confrontation with Moscow.

But Poland’s refusal to adopt the euro (much like Britain and the northern countries) has made it resilient, mitigating the leverage of German and French economic dominance. And Washington is equally reluctant to risk a “European entanglement” that would distract from its priorities in the Pacific. 

What History Teaches

The myth of the Russian threat was not born of Russian ambition but of broader European insecurity and avarice. European elites in the 21st century perpetuate the deception to distract their own populations from witnessing their own weakness and irrelevance.

What began as propaganda in Cologne in the 16^th century still shapes West European discourse, today. But deceit cannot alter reality once it is recognized for what it is – a “lie.” Russia seeks not conflict — only to secure its interests. Europe and Britain understand this – it just doesn’t fit their political agendas.

It is self-defeating for the EU to cling to invented peril; it distracts attention from the real domestic challenges facing it. And in doing so, it risks repeating the same missteps that have dogged its politics for half a millennium – a reticence to deal with actual, rather than virtual, reality.