By Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone, 8/4/25

August 4 marks the 30th anniversary of Operation Storm. Little known outside the former Yugoslavia, the military campaign unleashed a genocidal cataclysm that violently expelled Croatia’s entire Serb population. Dubbed “the most efficient ethnic cleansing we’ve seen in the Balkans” by Swedish politician Carl Bildt, Croat forces rampaged UN-protected areas of the self-declared Serb Republic of Krajina, looting, burning, raping and murdering their way across the province. Up to 350,000 locals fled, many on foot, never to return. Meanwhile, thousands were summarily executed.

As these hideous scenes unfolded, UN peacekeepers charged with protecting Krajina watched without intervening. Meanwhile, US officials strenuously denied the horrifying massacres and mass displacement amounted to ethnic cleansing, let alone war crimes. NATO member state governments were far more interested in the “sophistication” of Zagreb’s military tactics. One British colonel heading a UN observer mission in the area gushed, “whoever wrote that plan of attack could have gone to any NATO staff college in North America or Western Europe and scored an A-plus.”

Widely overlooked documents reviewed by The Grayzone help explain why Croatian forces were graded so highly: Operation Storm was for all intents and purposes a NATO attack, carried out by soldiers armed and trained by the US and directly coordinated with other Western powers. Despite publicly endorsing a negotiated peace, Washington privately encouraged Zagreb to employ maximum belligerence, even as their ultranationalist Croat proxies plotted to strike with such ferocity that the country’s entire Serb population would “to all practical purposes disappear.”

In the midst of talks on a political settlement in Geneva, high-ranking Croat officials privately discussed methods to justify their coming blitzkrieg, including false flag attacks. Assured of their Western patrons’ continued backing amid the bloodshed, Croat leaders boasted that they merely needed to inform their NATO backers in advance of their plans. Once the dust settled and Croatia’s Serb population was entirely cleansed, Croat officials met in secret with US officials to celebrate their “triumph.”

Richard Holbrooke, a veteran US diplomat then serving as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bill Clinton administration, told the president of Croatia that while the US “said publicly… that we were concerned” about the situation, “privately, you knew what we wanted.” As one of Holbrooke’s aides wrote in a note the diplomat later reproduced, Croatian forces had been “hired” as Washington’s “junkyard dogs” to destroy Yugoslavia.

After expelling the newly-independent country’s Serb population, the newly-formed Croat regime could be counted on to exert US dominance not only over the Balkans, but Europe more widely. The ethnic tensions fomented by NATO in the region still simmer, and have been exploited to justify perpetual occupation.

The former Yugoslavia remains horribly scarred by Operation Storm. From NATO’s perspective, however, the military campaign provided a blueprint for subsequent proxy conflicts and military strikes. Washington has recreated the strategy of weaponizing extremist foreign fighters as shock troops in an array of theaters, from Syria to Ukraine.

Western-backed fascists seek ethnically pure Croatia

Throughout the 1980s, Western powers – in particular Britain, Germany, and the US – covertly sponsored the growth of nationalism in Yugoslavia, hoping to encourage the multiethnic federation’s breakup. Their chosen proxy in Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, was a fanatical ethnonationalist, outspoken Holocaust denier, Catholic fundamentalist, and alumni of secessionist extremist groups. These factions embarked on a terrorist rampage throughout the early 1970’s, hijacking and blowing up airliners, attacking Yugoslav diplomatic sites abroad, and in 1971 assassinating Vladimir Rolovic, Belgrade’s ambassador to Sweden.

Following an upsurge of Croatian separatist violence in Yugoslavia, Tudjman was jailed in March 1972 along with his close confederate Stepjan Mesic due to their ultranationalist views. When Zagreb held its first multi-party elections since World War II 18 years later, the pair’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won a plurality of votes, and a majority of parliamentary seats. In the process, Tudjman became President, and Mesic Prime Minister. As Croatian nationalism soared, Serbs were purged en masse from state agencies.

On the campaign trail, Tudjman eagerly venerated the “Independent State of Croatia,” a Nazi-created puppet entity savagely run by local collaborators from April 1941 to May 1945, describing the fascistic construct as “an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people.” Elsewhere, he openly remarked, “thank God, my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew.”

These utterances reflected a monstrous strategy Tudjman laid out in February 1990 at a public meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, for when HDZ took power:

“[Our] basic goal… is to separate Croatia from Yugoslavia,” Tudjman explained. “If we come to power, then in the first 48 hours, while there is still euphoria, it is indispensable that we settle scores with all those who are against Croatia.”

“Lists of such persons have already been drawn up,” he continued. “Serbs in Croatia should be declared citizens of Croatia and called Orthodox Croats. The name ‘Orthodox Serb’ will be banned. The Serbian Orthodox Church will be abolished… it will be declared Croatian for those who do not move to Serbia.”

Many of Tudjman’s adherents adulated the Ustase, hardcore fascists who ruled the “Independent State of Croatia” during World War II. Their crimes ranged from executing women and the elderly by the hundred through methods including beheading, drowning. Meanwhile, the Ustase managed a network of death camps across Axis-occupied Yugoslavia, with dedicated units for children. Their ruthless barbarity towards Jews, Roma, and Serbs repulsed even their Nazi patrons. Hundreds of thousands were murdered by the Ustase, whose officer corps included the brother and father of Tudjman’s Defense Minister, Gojko Šušak.

These horrific events remained visceral for residents of the historic Serbian territory of Krajina, which was administratively assigned to the Yugoslav socialist republic of Croatia following World War II. HDZ received funding from Ustase exiles in Western countries, and immediately upon taking office renamed Zagreb’s iconic Square of the Victims of Fascism as Croatian Nobles Square, while Croat paramilitary units proudly touted Ustase chants and symbols. As the Tudjman-led government openly fanned the flames of ethnic hatred, Serbs in the fledgling country began preparing for civil war.

After interethnic fighting broke out in Croatia in March 1991, Yugoslav People’s Army units were deployed to guard Krajina, where residents declared the establishment of an autonomous Serb Republic until an international peacekeeping deal could be brokered. Yugoslavia’s then-President Borislav Jovic testified before his death the objective was “to protect the Serb territories, until a political solution [could be] found.”

Croats covertly scheme to make Serbs ‘disappear’

In August 1995, that “political solution” appeared on the brink of fruition. A dedicated UN Contact Group was conducting peace negotiations in Geneva between Krajina authorities and Zagreb. A proposal intended to bring the Croatian conflict to an end, known as Zagreb 4 or Z-4, was drafted by the EU, Russia, and the US. Washington’s ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, played a key role in negotiating terms with Krajina-Serb leaders.

Accepted on August 3rd 1995, Z-4 envisioned Serb-majority areas in Croatia remaining part of the country, albeit with a degree of autonomy. That same day, Galbraith confirmed on local TV that “reintegration of the Serb-held areas in Croatia” had been agreed upon. Meanwhile, US mediators in Geneva declared that due to major Serb concessions, there was “no reason for Croatia to go to war.” At long last, the stage was finally set for a negotiated peace.

Upbeat Krajina-Serb officials announced they’d received assurances from Washington that it would intervene to prevent Croatian military action against Krajina if they complied with Z-4’s terms. Yet, before the day was over, Croatian officials rejected Z-4, walking out of negotiations. Operation Storm began the next morning.

Now, documents reviewed by The Grayzone reveal that Tudjman never had any intention of securing peace at the conference.

Instead, the files shows that Croatia’s participation in Geneva was a ruse intended to create the illusion Zagreb was seeking a diplomatic settlement, while it secretly crafted plans for “completely [vanquishing] the enemy.” The scheme was revealed in the minutes from a July 31, 1995 meeting between Tudjman and his top military brass at the presidential palace on the Brionian Islands. During the conversation, Tudjman informed those assembled: “We have to inflict such blows that the Serbs will to all practical purposes disappear.”

“I am going to Geneva to hide this and not to talk… I want to hide what we are preparing for the day after. And we can rebut any argument in the world about how we didn’t want to talk.”

Such statements, which constitute clear and unambiguous evidence of genocidal intent, were not limited to the President. The inevitability of ethnic cleansing was admitted by Ante Gotovina, a senior general who returned to Yugoslavia to lead operation Storm after he fleeing in the early 1970s. a decisive and sustained attack on Krajina would mean that afterwards, “there won’t be so many civilians, just those who have to stay, who have no possibility of leaving,” said Gotovina. The former French foreign legion commander, who was once employed as security for France’s far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen and worked as a strikebreaker cracking down on CGT union workers, would later be acquitted for his leading role in Operation Storm by a Western-dominated international tribunal.

For those Serbs who were now trapped in a hostile ethnic enclave, Tudjman suggested a mass propaganda campaign targeting them with leaflets declaring “the victory of the Croatian Army supported by the international community,” and calling on Serbs not to flee – in an apparent attempt to lend an inclusive veneer to their proposal to forcibly displace the civilian population. “This means giving them a way out, while pretending [emphasis added] to guarantee civil rights… Use radio and television, but leaflets as well.”

The generals discussed other propaganda efforts to justify the impending attack, including false flags. Given that “every military operation must have its political justification,” Tudjman said the Serbs “should provide us with a pretext and provoke us” before the strike began. One official proposed, “we accuse them of having launched a sabotage attack against us… that’s why we were forced to intervene.” Another general suggested carrying out “an explosion as if they had struck with their airforce.”

Bill Clinton provided ‘all clearance’ for mass murder

In late 1990, Yugoslav intelligence secretly filmed Croatia’s Defense Minister Martin Spegelj covertly plotting to purge the republic’s Serb population. In one tape, he told a fellow official that anyone opposed to Zagreb’s independence should be murdered “on the spot, in the street, in the compound, in barracks, anywhere” via “[a] pistol…into the stomach.” He forecast “a civil war in which there is no mercy towards anyone, women or children,” and Serb “family homes” were dealt with using “quite simply grenades.”

Spegelj went on to openly advocate “slaughter” to “resolve” the issue of Knin, Krajina’s capital, making the city “disappear.” He boasted, “we have international recognition for that.” The US had already “offered us all possible assistance,” including “thousands of combat vehicles” and “complete arming” of 100,000 Croat soldiers “free of charge.” The desired end result? “Serbs in Croatia will never be there again.” Spegelj concluded, “we are going to create a state at all costs, if necessary, at the cost of shedding blood.”

Western support for the horrors planned and perpetrated during Operation Storm was also writ large during the meeting on July 31, 1995. There, Tudjman told his generals, “we have a friend, Germany, which consistently supports us.” The Croats just had to “inform them ahead of time” of their objectives. “In NATO as well there is also understanding of our views,” he explained, adding, “we enjoy the sympathy of the US.” In 2006, German outlet Der Spiegel confirmed that the massacres bore Washington’s fingerprints, citing Croatian military sources who claimed they’d enjoyed “direct though secret support from both the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency in planning and carrying out the ‘Storm’ offensive.”

“In preparing for the offensive, Croatian soldiers were trained at Fort Irwin in California and the Pentagon aided in planning the operation,” the outlet reported. US support went far beyond what it publicly acknowledged, which was that Croatian forces merely underwent training exercises carried out by US private military contractor MPRI, Spiegel revealed. “Immediately prior to the offensive, then-Deputy CIA Director George Tenet met with Gotovina and Tudjman’s son – then in charge of Croatian intelligence – for last minute consultations. During the operation, US aircraft destroyed Serbian communication and anti-aircraft centers and the Pentagon passed on information gathered by satellite to [Croatian forces].”

At an August 7 1995 cabinet meeting, Tudjman bragged of how Washington “must have been pleased” with how Croatia’s military executed Operation Storm. His premier, Ivo Sanader, then discussed coordinating the effort with US officials, who “worked in the name of” Vice President Al Gore. He assured those gathered that “all clearance… was approved straight” by US President Bill Clinton, and that Croatia could therefore “expect continuous support” from Washington as the massacres unfolded.

US diplomat cheers a genocidal ‘triumph’

On August 18, a high-level summit with senior US diplomat Richard Holbrooke was convened in Zagreb’s Presidential palace. A fixture of the intervention-obsessed Beltway foreign policy establishment, Holbrooke had his eyes on plum appointments under Bill Clinton and beyond – perhaps under a future Hillary Clinton administration. The successful dismantling of Yugoslavia would provide fuel for his ambitions.

In a transcript reviewed by The Grayzone, Holbrooke fawningly described Tudjman as the “father of modern Croatia” and its “liberator” and “creator.” Noting with approval that the strongman had “regained 98 percent of your territory” – without mentioning that it had been purged of Serbs – the American diplomat described himself as “a friend” of the newly-independent state, whose violent conduct he framed as legitimate.

“You had justification for your military action in Eastern Slavonia,” Holbrooke informed Tudjman, “and I defended it, always, in Washington.” When some in the US suggested reining in Zagreb, Holbrooke argued Croats should “continue” anyway, he declared.

Regarding Operation Storm, Holbrooke admitted, “we said publicly, as you know, that we were concerned, but privately, you knew what we wanted.” He dubbed the horrifying blitzkrieg a “triumph” from “a political and military point of view,” which left refugees as “the only problem” from Zagreb’s perspective. Effectively stage-managing the Croatian president, Holbrooke advised Tudjman to “give a speech stating that the war has finished and that [Serbs] should return.” While forecasting “the majority would not return,” Holbrooke apparently felt it important to at least leave the offer open publicly.

Croatian authorities dealt with this “problem” by passing discriminatory laws making it virtually impossible for displaced Serbs to return, while seizing their property. Despite possessing overwhelming evidence of grave war crimes, the NATO-funded International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did not indict anyone responsible for Operation Storm until 2008. Many culpable officials, including Tudjman, died in the intervening time. Three surviving military commanders were eventually prosecuted in 2011. One was acquitted and two convicted, although this was overturned on appeal in 2012.

That ruling reached several other extraordinary conclusions. While accepting “discriminatory and restrictive measures” were employed by Zagreb to prevent displaced Serbs from returning, this did not mean their departure was forced. Although civilians had been murdered in large numbers, including the elderly and infirm who couldn’t flee, Operation Storm somehow didn’t deliberately target non-combatants. And despite the explicitly stated desire of Spegelj and Tudjman to make Serbs “disappear,” neither government nor military officials were found to have specifically intended to expel Croatia’s entire Serb minority.

The anniversary of Operation Storm is now celebrated as ‘Victory Day’ in Croatia. The attack’s success is venerated in Western military circles today, and the effort may have influenced similar operations in other theaters of proxy conflict. In September 2022, the Kyiv Post cheered Ukraine’s unexpectedly successful counteroffensive in Kharkov as “Operation Storm 2.0,” suggesting it was a harbinger of Russia’s impending “capitulation.”

Almost three years later, Kiev’s forces are collapsing throughout the Donbass. Unlike in Croatia, the latest crop of ultranationalist US proxies appear unlikely to prevail.

​Trump’s security guarantees: key to a Ukraine settlement?

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 8/18/25

Are we in for something like a repeat of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles?

US President Donald Trump has offered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky security guarantees that Trump describes as “like Article V” of the NATO Treaty. Zelensky has apparently signed onto the Trump offer and potentially has agreed that some “territorial swaps” will be needed to make a deal with Russia.

Trump has reported to his European interlocutors who came to the White House to back up Zelensky. He told them more or less the same thing, according to reports, and told German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who pushed for an immediate ceasefire, that a ceasefire ahead of a deal was off the table.

We don’t know what security guarantees mean or how they would be implemented. The Russians will be asking a lot of questions about the idea, if they have not already done so. Trump said he would be calling Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as today, [August] 18, 2025, where it is already after midnight as this is written.

Here are the likely questions about security guarantees.

(1) Will the US send troops to Ukraine (as the European so-called “coalition of the willing” wants to do) or will the assurances to Kyiv be political in nature?

(2) Will the US set up any kind of infrastructure in Ukraine as part of the assurances to Ukraine?

(3) While Trump has ruled out any NATO membership for Ukraine, will the Europeans, or some of then, be part of the Trump guarantee?

(4) Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which is the effective collective security provision of the Treaty, requires consensus of all NATO members. Is Trump thinking of a quasi-NATO-like arrangement that also will require consensus for activation? One should note that not all European countries plan to support any troop presence in Ukraine even for security assurances. Specifically, Germany, Italy and Poland have said “no” to proposals from the UK and France.

(5) NATO is a treaty organization that was formally approved by its members, meaning the Treaty was signed and ratified by each country’s legislative authority. If Trump’s security guarantees are not under a treaty format, the deal might not be supported by a future President. If Trump wants to sign a treaty with Ukraine, he will need to convince Congress it is in the US national interest. This may not be as easy as it would seem because many will start to question exactly what would oblige the US to take military action if there is a violation of the final deal on Ukraine. It is obvious these are tricky waters, and the Trump administration will have to skip a lot of rope to sell the idea of an actual guarantee that involves the US military in a war with Russia, which is, as I am sure some have noticed, a nuclear-armed power.

In the United States a treaty, for ratification, needs a two thirds vote in the US Senate. There may well be enough isolationists in Congress to block ratification, if Trump goes for a treaty. Down the road, one is reminded of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles.

There are more recent examples of treaties that ran into trouble. These include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Elimination of All Forces of Discrimination Against Women and the Law of the Sea Convention.

(6) The Russians have demanded a smaller Ukrainian military and a neutral Ukraine. Will this demand be honored in any way?

(7) We don’t yet have any idea on the territories Ukraine will yield, or the actual borders (since the Russians do not control all of Donbas). This will be a tough negotiation, and Putin will be under heavy pressure from his army, which, for the most part, is gaining ground in Donbas and elsewhere.

Trump faces an uphill battle selling US guarantees for Ukraine, notwithstanding whether they require US boots on the ground and if others will join the US, such as the UK and France. In one sense, with a smaller group, the Russians will regard the future risk as greater than the NATO risk because the UK and French are aggressively promoting their participation in armed conflict against Russia. A so-called coalition of some-willing looks like a non-starter for Russia.

All of this means that what looks like a success at the White House may devolve into another casualty of the Ukraine war. The offer of guarantees may fail under scrutiny, either by Russia or by the US Congress.

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Doubts Grow on Ukraine Security Package as Russia Demands a Role (Excerpt)

By Natalia Drozdiak, Bloomberg, 8/21/25

Efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a US-led push to end Russia’s war are running into difficulties almost immediately.

US, Ukrainian and European officials have started hashing out proposals for a post-war plan to protect Ukraine, after White House officials said Russian President Vladimir Putin was open to “Article 5-style” security guarantees for Kyiv, a reference to NATO’s collective defense commitment.

The Kremlin hasn’t confirmed publicly that Putin made such a commitment at his summit with US President Donald Trump in Alaska last week. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Wednesday that Russia should have a say in security arrangements for Ukraine, which could also involve China. Hours later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy ruled out Beijing as a potential guarantor of peace.

Lavrov reiterated the demand on Thursday, saying Moscow had supported a Ukrainian proposal at negotiations in Istanbul shortly after the 2022 invasion began that would have involved the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the US, Russia, China, the UK and France, in security guarantees.

Russia supports guarantees based “on the principle of collective security, on the principles of indivisible security,” Lavrov said. “Anything else, anything unilateral is, of course, an absolutely hopeless undertaking.”

Several senior European officials and diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they viewed Lavrov’s comments as an attempt to stall the process, and expressed doubt that Putin is willing to make a deal. Trump is pressing for Putin and Zelenskiy to meet for direct talks as the next stage of US efforts to reach an end to the war that’s in its fourth year.

Zelenskiy and a delegation of European leaders rushed to the White House on Monday for talks with Trump after the US president rolled out the red carpet for Putin at their summit and appeared to swing toward Russia’s positions on the war. He abandoned demands for Putin to agree to a ceasefire ahead of negotiations and said Ukraine would have to concede territories to Russia as part of a settlement.

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US will play minimum role in Ukraine’s security guarantees – Politico

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/21/25

The Pentagon’s top policy official Elbridge Colby says the US will play a minimal role in any Ukraine security guarantees, Politico reported on August 21.

US President Donald Trump has shifted position in the last month, promising to contribute to the security guarantees being worked out by Ukraine’s European allies ahead of a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but has also made it clear that the US role will be limited.

Trump has revealed few details of what the US role will be but has said Washington will not contribute troops to any peacekeeping force Europe appears to be planning. Colby comments add some clarity and underscore the fact that the lion’s share of the security arrangements will fall to Europe.

There also seems to be some dissent amongst EU leaders on what the best sort of security guarantee would be. While the UK and France are tending towards reviving the idea of sending peacekeepers, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been a lone voice arguing for a true “Nato Article 5-like” guarantee where EU members sign genuine security guarantees and commit to sending troops to Ukraine within 24 hours if Russia were to re-invade Ukraine, Bloomberg reports. The plan does not include Ukraine’s membership in Nato, but does tally with the bilateral security deals that Zelenskiy was hoping for as part of the 2022 Istanbul peace deal.

Meloni first brought up the idea of “Nato-lite” Article 5-like protections for Kyiv in March 2025, but has not been backed by other Nato members. She brought the idea up again in public comments during the White House summit on August 18.

The Article 5-like proposal is one of many options currently being weighed by European leaders ahead of a mooted meeting between Putin and Zelenskiy that also includes peacekeepers, more sanctions, increased weapons supplies, security agreements, long-term economic aid, and land swaps.

Peacekeepers

A decision to send peacekeepers to Ukraine is controversial. The Kremlin has said repeatedly that it will not accept any Nato-backed troops on Ukrainian soil.

The idea of peacekeepers was first floated by French President Emmanuel Macron earlier this year and backed by the UK, two of the leading members of the coalition of the willing. Germany, however, the third leading member of the coalition, has made it clear that it will not participate. Bloomberg previously reported that about ten European countries are willing to commit troops to Ukraine.

The Kremlin has dismissed the peacekeeping security proposals. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on August 20 that Russia should be one of the countries that provides Ukraine security guarantees.

“As for reports that the UK, France, and Germany want to develop collective security guarantees, we support making these guarantees truly reliable,” Lavrov said on August 20 and repeated earlier calls that any deal should be based on the terms agreed in Istanbul in 2022.

“Our delegation then agreed to work out security guarantees involving all permanent members of the UN Security Council — Russia, China, the US, France, and the UK,” he said. “Germany and Turkey were mentioned, as well as others that may be interested in joining this group.”

Zelenskiy has demanded that Russia provide Ukraine with “ironclad” security guarantees and Putin signalled during the Alaska summit on August 15 that he was agreeable to the idea.

EU leaders have flip flopped on the idea of peacekeepers, but it appeared the plan was abandoned in March, deemed to be unworkable thanks to Russia’s objections. Now the idea appears to have been revived in lieu of giving Ukraine true security guarantees.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said on August 20 that the UK was willing to send up to 30,000 soldiers to Ukraine as part of the peacekeeper force.

Europe in the driving seat

Colby’s comments came in response to questions from European military leaders in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Dan Caine on August 20. Defence chiefs from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Finland pushed the US side to disclose what it would provide in troops and air defences to help Ukraine maintain a peace deal with Russia should an agreement be reached, according to a European official cited by Politico.

“There’s the dawning reality that this will be Europe making this happen on the ground,” a Nato diplomat who was briefed on the talks told Politico. “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

Trump on Monday said he was ready to send US troops to Ukraine. But he backtracked next day, suggesting instead that he was open to providing air support for European troops there.

“I don’t know where that leaves us,” a European official told Politico. “Pretty much back to where we were in the spring with the coalition of the willing.”

Trump has tried to withdraw from supporting Ukraine since taking office. He has cancelled all monetary and military support at least twice since taking office but has been pressured into resuming some level of support by the Ukraine supporters in his entourage.

But what support remains, will be minimal. US Secretary for Defence Pete Hegseth announced in July that the Pentagon had stopped all support for Ukraine, although the White House walked the total halt back a week later. As bne IntelliNews reported, Europe has taken on almost the entire burden of supporting Ukraine since the start of the year.

EU officials are sceptical of Colby, who was the force behind Hegseth’s decision to stop supplying Ukraine, arguing that US stockpiles of weapons had fallen to only 25% of what Pentagon’s strategic planning targets demanded for the US’ own defensive needs. Coby has long lobbied for European allies to do more to defend the continent against Russia.

A poll from The Economist/YouGov found that US citizens are deeply divided on the question of US support for Ukraine. A third (32%) of Americans favour increasing military aid, and a fifth (21%) favour maintaining the current amount. Just over half (54%) of those polled said that Europe should be involved in the talks with Russia while just under half (46%) think the US should also be involved.

The poll also found that the results show that 42% would blame Putin for the failure of the talks, while only one in ten would blame Zelenskiy. An additional 11% would blame President Donald Trump, and 17% would blame all of the leaders equally.

The poll also shows strong opposition to Ukrainian territorial concessions: 68% of Americans said Russia should get “none of it,” although the same poll found that 38% of Americans believe Russia will ultimately control “some of” Ukraine’s territory and 30% of Americans believe Russia is more likely to win the conflict, while only 15% believe Ukraine is more likely to win.

Zelenskiy reports that Ukraine now produces between 40% and 50% of all the weapons it needs, but the progress has been largely in the simpler weapons raising the question: can Ukraine go it alone? For now, Kyiv remains entirely dependent on the West for the sophisticated and long-range offensive and defensive items like Patriot, HIMARS and ATACMS missile systems.

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Can Putin Legally Stop The Conflict Without First Controlling All The Disputed Territory?

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/19/25

The Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on this hypothetical scenario due to 2020’s constitutional amendment prohibiting the cession of Russian territory except in certain cases.

RT’s report on Steve Witkoff’s claim that Russia has made “some concessions” on territorial issues, which signal a “significant” shift towards “moderation”, prompted talk about whether Putin can legally stop the special operation without first controlling all the disputed territory that Moscow claims as its own. He himself demanded in June 2024 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces “must be withdrawn from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders at the time of their being part of Ukraine.”

Moreover, the agreements under which Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson joined Russia all describe their administrative boundaries as those that existed “on the day of [their] formation”, thus suggesting that the entirety of their regions are indeed legally considered by Russia to be its own. Putin also famously declared during the signing of those treaties in late September 2022 that “the people living [there] have become our citizens, forever” and that “Russia will not betray [their choice to join it]”.

Nevertheless, Putin could still hypothetically “moderate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution, which entered into force after 2020’s constitutional referendum, stipulates that “Actions (except delimitation, demarcation, and re-demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with adjacent states) aimed at alienating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as calls for such actions, are not permitted.” “Moderation” could thus hypothetically be an “exception”.

To be absolutely clear, no call is being made within this analysis for Russia to “cede” any territory that it considers to be its own, nor have any Russian officials lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim. That said, if Putin concludes for whatever reason that Russia’s national interests are now best served by “moderating” its territorial claims after all that happened since September 2022’s referenda, then any proposed “re-demarcation of the state border” would likely require the Constitutional Court’s approval.

He’s a lawyer by training so it would make sense for him to proactively ask them to rule on the legality of this hypothetical solution to the Ukrainian Conflict. Even if he instead hypothetically proposes retaining his country’s territorial claims but freezing the military phase of the conflict and only advancing those claims through political means, he’d still likely seek their judgement too. They’re the final authority on constitutional issues and these scenarios require their expertise per their connection to Article 67.2.1.

If they hypothetically rule in his favor, the question would then arise about the fate of those living in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of those regions who Putin said “have become our citizens, forever.” They might rule that those who didn’t take part in the referenda, such as the residents of Zaporozhye city, aren’t Russian citizens. Those that did but then fell under Ukrainian control, such as the residents of Kherson city, might be deemed citizens who could move to Russia if Ukraine lets them as part of a deal.

To remind the reader, no Russian officials at the time of this analysis’ publication have lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim that Russia made “some concessions” on territorial issues, so it remains solely a hypothetical scenario for now. Even so, Putin might hypothetically conclude that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a grand compromise), in which case the Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on its legality.

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Declassified notes from Putin’s first presidential summit show parallels with Alaska meeting last week

National Security Archive, 8/21/25

Washington, D.C., August 21, 2025 – Newly declassified notes from Vladimir Putin’s first presidential summit with an American leader reveal some of the constants in the Russian leader’s approach: flattery, banter about sports, appearing to agree while saying nyet, and history lectures, according to documents obtained through a Freedom of Information lawsuit and published today by the National Security Archive.

The notes written by Strobe Talbott show Putin in his most cooperative and pro-Western period, hoping for full integration of Russia into the European security system and even NATO. Putin emphasizes cooperation on every point, strategic and economic, even when he intends to disagree. Putin is still inexperienced, yet confident and in full command of his brief, freely moving from subject to subject and trying to impress the American president.

The declassified notes published today include extensive color commentary about Putin’s style, psychological assessments of Putin and his rhetorical flourishes, dramatic quotes from Putin about preferring force to negotiations (“giving them what they deserved”), descriptions of Russian motivations and red lines—all the product of close first-hand observation by Strobe Talbott, then deputy secretary of state and fluent in Russian, during the June 2000 summit between Putin and President Bill Clinton at the Kremlin. Talbott was the U.S. notetaker during the three “one-on-ones” (actually 3-on-3 including translators and notetakers) at the 2000 summit, as he had been for most of Clinton’s previous meetings with Yeltsin.

The publication today also includes the formal memorandum of conversation for one of the two plenary sessions during the summit, declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library as the result of a Mandatory Review request by the National Security Archive. Detailed in this memcon is an extraordinary back-and-forth between Putin and Clinton about the possibility of Russia actually joining NATO, a prospect about which Putin says, “I am pleased.”

While the parallels between last week’s Alaska summit and the Moscow summit 25 years ago are not exact, many of the same issues resonate today, although similar detailed notes are unlikely ever to appear from the meeting last week between Putin and President Trump. Putin’s aggressive approach to the Chechen war back then and his endorsement of force over negotiation no doubt rhymes with his current stance on Ukraine, since he was the invader and could stop the war tomorrow if he wanted. The other major subject of the Putin-Clinton conversations—missile defense—remains a front-burner issue today, with President Trump’s newfound interest in building a “Golden Dome” over the U.S.

Read documents here.

By Greg Mitchell, Antiwar.com, 7/31/25

Reprinted on Antiwar with permission from Greg Mitchell’s newsletter Between Rock and a Hard Place.

Just to start briefly: As some know, this is a subject that I have explored in hundreds of articles, and in four books, since 1984, and now in an award-winning film “The Atomic Bowl” that started streaming on PBS.org and PBS apps this week (you can easily watch it via links here), plus: a companion e-book.

Having closely followed and studied American responses to the atomic bomb attacks on Japan (even co-authored a book with Robert Jay Lifton titled “Hiroshima in America”), I have to say that polling on this subject has always been very spotty. What has emerged has generally attested to very strong support in the months and first years after, then a slow decline but still fairly strong or clear majority backing last time I checked.

This week, however, , the venerable Pew Research operation has released a new survey taken in June with what I’d call somewhat encouraging results. In a rare step, they did not just ask yes or no but broke results down by gender and age.

Still, I wish they had asked the question of support for Hiroshima bombing and Nagasaki bombing separately instead of the usual “Hiroshima and Nagasaki” together.

In any event here are a few highlights, directly from Pew:

In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, also conducted on the phone, 56% of Americans said the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified, while 34% said it was not. Unlike in the new survey, the 2015 survey question did not include an explicit “Not sure” response option.

Of course, I would argue that if the question about the Nagasaki bombing was asked separately the results would be interesting. Perhaps more opposition but more likely much more “not sure” (given low awareness among Americans going back, well, almost 80 years). Perhaps my new PBS film will change that, a bit, and you can watch now.

A breakdown of the new poll, again directly from Pew:

»Gender

Men are more likely than women to say the bombings were justified (51% vs. 20%). Women are more likely than men to say the bombings were not justified (36% vs. 25%). Women are also about twice as likely as men to say they aren’t sure (43% vs. 22%).

»Age

Americans ages 65 and older (48%) are more likely than adults in younger age groups to say the bombings were justified. Adults under 30, meanwhile, are considerably more likely to say the bombings were not justified than to say they were justified (44% vs. 27%).

»Party and ideology

About half of Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party (51%) say the bombings were justified, but views differ considerably by ideology. Around six-in-ten conservative Republicans (61%) say the bombings were justified, while a much smaller share (14%) say they were not. Moderate and liberal Republicans, by contrast, are about equally likely to say the use of the bombs was justified as to say it was not justified (35% vs. 31%).

Democrats and Democratic leaners are more likely to say the bombings were not justified than to say they were justified (42% vs. 23%). Liberal Democrats are particularly likely to see the use of the atomic bomb as unjustified – 50% say this.

And ultimately:

Today, most Americans (69%) say the development of nuclear weapons has made the world less safe. Far fewer (10%) say this has made the world safer, according to the Center’s new survey, which was fielded prior to U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June.

Greg Mitchell is the author of a dozen books, including “Hiroshima in America,” and the recent award-winning The Beginning or the End: How Hollywood – and America – Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, and has directed three documentary films since 2021, including two for PBS (plus award-winning “Atomic Cover-up”). He has written widely about the atomic bomb and atomic bombings, and their aftermath, for over forty years. He writes often at Oppenheimer: From Hiroshima to Hollywood.

By Paul Robinson, Russia Post, 7/25/25

Ever since the collapse of communism, Russians have struggled to define their national identity, their country’s place in the world, and the values that should underpin their society. In the early 1990s, the idea that Russia was a European country that should rest on liberal democratic values briefly held centre stage, but this vision was soon abandoned due to disillusionment with the realities of shock therapy and Westernization.

In the mid-1990s, President Boris Yeltsin called for the definition of the ‘Russian Idea’ only to abandon the project once it became clear that nobody could agree what it was. The 1993 constitution forbade the country from having an official ideology (a rule designed to prevent a situation of ideological conformity such as existed under communism), and so efforts to define the ideological foundations of post-Soviet society came largely to a halt.

Cover of the report “A Living Idea – Russia’s Dream. The Russian’s Code in the 21st Century. The Ideological Foundation of the Russian State-Civilization”.

From Ideological Flexibility to a Vision of Russia as a Distinct Civilization

For the most part, Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, has been happy to keep things that way, preferring ideological flexibility over the constraints of a formal state doctrine. Many conservative intellectuals, however, have long been unhappy with this state of affairs, pointing out that any society, if it is to be stable, has to have a commonly agreed understanding of itself and its core values.

As political tensions with the West have grown, the Russian state has increasingly defined Russia in terms of opposition to the West, and in the last few years as an entirely distinct civilization. But that has raised the questions of what defines Russian civilization and makes it distinct, questions to which the state has no easy answers, due to its lack of clear ideological foundations. The process of defining Russian civilization has therefore acquired a new political importance.

Into this political context, there now steps a new report titled ‘A Living Idea – Russia’s Dream. The Russian’s Code in the 21^st Century. The Ideological Foundation of the Russian State-Civilization.’

The report’s primary author is prominent public intellectual Sergei Karaganov, but it is not his work alone. Rather, it is the collective product of numerous individuals from the Council of Foreign and Defence Policy, the Higher School of Economics and its Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy, as well as the journal Russia in Global Affairs.

As such it is perhaps a good reflection of thinking among elements of that part of Russia’s intellectual class that devotes itself to studying foreign and defence policy. Karaganov himself is especially well-known and last year was granted the honour of moderating Putin’s speech to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. Thus, even if this report does not reflect the views of the entire foreign and defence policy community, it certainly represents those of a well-connected segment of it, and as such is worth paying attention to.

The report’s starting point is that Russia is ‘a unique civilizational formation’ and that like any human society it needs a unifying idea. This cannot be Western liberalism, a philosophy spread ‘by liberal-globalistic elites, striving to strengthen their privileged position and to facilitate their control over the masses.’

Russia, according to the report, needs to develop an alternative, something that it has not yet done. Due to the constitutional prohibition, this cannot be a formal state ideology, but it could instead be designated as ‘Russia’s dream’ and as such play much the same role as an official ideology. This dream is necessary in order ‘to save the human in humans, to protect the Russian civilizational code, and to save the world from global thermonuclear war.

“Russia, claim the authors, is a ‘God-bearing country’ with ‘a mission before God and humanity’.”

Sergei Karaganov (center) moderates Vladimir Putin’s address at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. June 2024. Source: Kremlin.ru

The Ideological Roots of Sergey Karaganov’s Report

The report is largely a modernized version of mid-nineteenth century Slavophilism, with hints of Cosmism and Eurasianism, and occasional lines that could have been written by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Ivan Ilyin, or other twentieth century conservative Russian philosophers (see my earlier article in Russia.Post here). There is very little about it that could be said to be intellectually original. One can, for instance, find much the same logic in the writings of Alexander Panarin in the 1990s, such as his book The Russian Alternative. The report is very much part of a Russian tradition.

The Slavophile elements come out strongly in the depiction of the Western world as decadent, materialistic, individualistic, and overly rationalistic, compared to which Russia is portrayed as spiritually oriented, collectivistic, and founded on faith as well as reason. Modern Western civilization, the report says, ‘while making the person’s life more comfortable, destroys many of the functions that make him a person,’ leading to ‘an ever more evident degradation of the person himself.’

Russian philosophy has long been concerned with the issue of what constitutes ‘personhood’ and what makes someone a ‘person’ (the word for which in such philosophical debates was traditionally ‘lichnost’ but in this report for some reason is ‘chelovek’).

The report notes that ‘We are for Personhood (‘Chelovechnost’), true humanism, for preserving the Person in the person, the godly principle in him.’ True personhood relies on connections to God and to the rest of society – ‘a person cannot develop outside the family, society, nature, and country’. With its assaults on religion, the family, patriotism, and so on, Western civilization is thus portrayed as destroying personhood, in contrast to which, Russia, as the defender of religion, family, nation, and so on, is defending what it means to be truly human.

The report is thus in many respects profoundly conservative, although it denies this, saying that the values it promotes are not conservative values but universal human ones. Russia, by promoting these values, is thus defending humanity as a whole, giving Russia a holy global mission, albeit one that is more spiritual than political. Again, this is not exactly novel, but an updated version of the original Slavophilism.

“Russia, in the eyes of the report’s authors, is blessed by God, a fact proven by its recovery from the traumas of the 1990s, a true ‘miracle’ that has ‘only one “scientific” explanation – that God took pity on Russia and forgave her sins’.”

Russia is for Justice Rather than Freedom 

In true Slavophile fashion, the authors portray Russia as resting on different spiritual roots than the West, although they differ from the Slavophiles in viewing Russia as a largely Eastern country, thus showing the influence of later Eurasianist ideas.

‘The main external sources of our identity lie in Byzantium and the Great Mongol empire and not in the West’, claims the report. Russia, it says, has a ‘tradition of sobornost’ and obschinnost’, using a couple of rather untranslatable words to indicate a tradition of collectivism in contrast to individualism.

Russians, says the report, are also distinguished from Westerners by their concern for justice rather than freedom, for their concern for peace, and for their use of force only ‘to defeat endless aggressions’ rather than for ‘looting and enrichment.’ Russia is noted also for the importance it assigns to sovereignty and to a strong state, to the principle of statehood [‘gosudarstvennichestvo’]. And finally, Russians are distinguished by their ‘sense of unity with nature’ and their understanding of the ‘active unity of man and nature.’

As previously stated, none of these claims are in any way novel. They are the long standing core of Slavophile, Cosmist, and Eurasianist mythology. They also lack firm evidential basis – the idea that Russians are more collectivist, more at one with nature, and more concerned with justice than their Western counterparts is, for instance, hard to empirically justify.

Nevertheless, the report uses them to derive the essence of the ‘Russian dream’: service of God manifested in service of fellow humans through society, the family, and the state. This has political ramifications, above all the strengthening of the state, something that is necessary not only for Russia, but also for the world as a whole, since the collective problems of humanity, such as climate change, hunger, and poverty, can only be solved by strong states.

‘Оnly a strong state, resting on the support of a strong society’, the report says, can save humanity from the degrading influence of the negative trends of modern civilization, that deprive the person of many of the functions that make him a person. … The state is needed to counteract the previously mentioned tendencies and the efforts of contemporary globalists liberal elites to destroy the person … [and also] to counteract the efforts of liberal imperialist globalist elites to weaken it in order to seize it and impose its dominance.’

Aleksey Khomyakov, 1804-1860, philosopher and co-founder of the Slavophile movement. Source: Wiki Commons

Western liberal democracy in incompatible with this kind of strong state, claims the report. Liberal democracy can function only in conditions of relative peace and stability and is incompatible with Russia’s particular conditions and the increasingly unstable state of the world.

What is needed instead is a ‘leader democracy’ [‘liderskaia demokratiia’], a term that remains frustratingly undefined, but seems to endorse Russia’s current political system. At the same time, though, the authors stress that this ‘leader democracy’, while authoritarian in terms of central government, should allow for local democracy (an idea that again has Slavophile roots as well as appearing in the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn), and should guarantee freedom of thought since ‘intellectual, spiritual freedom is the undoubted precondition of a country’s prosperity’.

The latter idea reflects a long-standing Russian philosophical concern with ‘inner freedom’, as found in the writings of such diverse writers as Boris Chicherin, Ivan Ilyin, Nikolai Berdiaev, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and others. The report comments that ‘Combining intellectual freedom, freedom of thought, and political authoritarianism is not simple. But Russian history gives examples.’ Unfortunately, it doesn’t say what those are.

“The question that arises from all this is to what extent these views are shared by anyone outside of the report’s authors and especially by anybody in authority.”

It is difficult to say. One should not assume that just because the authors are well-connected, their opinions reflect those of the people actually running the country. Indeed, if they did, the authors wouldn’t have felt it necessary to publish a report saying all these things.

Clearly, this is an effort to convince the authorities of the need to act in the perceived absence of action. Indeed, at one point the report contains a veiled criticism of President Putin for refusing to challenge the constitutional prohibition of an official ideology and for failing to recognize the need for a national idea.

Putin has often been seen as an ideological balancer. He permits intellectual entrepreneurs such as Karaganov to generate ideas and then co-opts the ones that he finds politically suitable, while at the same time rejecting the ones that he doesn’t and refusing to be limited by the confines of a single ideological system.

This report notes that one of the reasons for the lack of a formal state ideology is the resistance of ‘technocrats’ who still ‘dominate in the leading layer of the state’, and that the Presidential Administration has no department specifically devoted to ideological issues. This raises the possibility that Putin and other high state officials may actually be one of the prime barriers against the adoption of the kind of ideological prescripts put forward in this report. When Putin eventually leaves office (as in due course he must, if only due to death), a turn back towards liberalism might be possible, but if this report is anything to go by, a turn in an even more conservative direction might be every bit as likely.

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 8/14/25

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s office released two damning emails yesterday [August 13th], the first being a letter from former DNI James Clapper to former FBI head James Comey, former CIA head John Brennan, and then-NSA chief Michael Rogers. Dated December 22, 2016, Clapper’s letter explains how the chiefs should approach writing a new Intelligence Community Assessment, whose conclusion — that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump — had already been reported:

Mike John Jim;

Understand your concern. It is essential that we (CIA/NSA/FBI/ODNI) be on the same page. and are all supportive of the report — in the highest tradition of “that’s OUR story, and we’re stickin’ to it.” This evening, CIA has provided to the NIC the complete draft generated by the ad hoc fusion cell. We will facilitate as much mutual transparency as possible as we complete the report, but, more time is not negotiable,” We may have to compromise on our “normal” modalities, since we must do this on such a compressed schedule.

This is one project that has to be a team sport.

Jim

Clapper’s email was in response to a note about “concerns” from Rogers, the NSA chief who never upgraded his agency’s confidence level in the “Russia did it for Trump” conclusion from “moderate” to high. The Rogers letter makes it clear that the head of the Pentagon’s most powerful surveillance agency was being asked to sign off on a conclusion without seeing the most “sensitive” intelligence. From Rogers:

I asked my team if they’d had sufficient access to the underlying intelligence and sufficient time to review that intelligence. On both points my team raised concerns… I’m concerned that, given the expedited nature of this activity, my folks aren’t fully comfortable saying that they have had enough time to review all of the intelligence to be absolutely confident in their assessments… I do want to make sure that, when we are asked in the future whether we can absolutely stand behind the paper… I’m concerned we are not there yet.

This is a devastating exchange. It shows that in assembling perhaps the most high-profile group analysis since the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD program, four of America’s most powerful enforcement officials said, “To hell with evidence, let’s just put out a tale and stick with it.”

In the specific context of this scandal, it makes a joke of years of public narratives about Trump, Putin, and Russia. Along with more documents funneled from Kash Patel’s FBI to Just The News asserting that senior Justice Department officials squashed Hillary Clinton corruption investigations, and that Comey gave a middleman access to highly classified information to help plead his case to newspapers like the New York Times, the new Gabbard docs further elucidate how years of Russia mania were built on fraud.

But this cascade of revelations is bringing a more disturbing story into focus. A subtext is the unnerving casualness with which procedural rules were broken. Even before Rogers and the NSA were asked to blindly bless a domestic political probe built in part atop “evidence” from an illegal FISA warrant, the FISA court had begun investigating misuse of the surveillance program. Onetime Trump aide Carter Page is not the only American in a politically sensitive position recently monitored under this dubious legal end-around. There was FISA monitoring of campaign manager Paul Manafort, “non-compliant” use of FISA to investigate the January 6th Capitol breach, even FISA tracking of ordinary Americans overseas applying for benefits.

In the coming weeks you’ll be reading (at Racket, among other places) about wholesale abuse of other surveillance programs. It turns out an alarming number of senior Trump campaign officials from the 2024 cycle were notified about prior FBI surveillance (news about Kash Patel, Dan Scavino, and Jeff Clark receiving such notices has already broken, but more names are coming). Widespread surveillance of congressional officials in a 2017 leak probe was the underlying context of recent revelations suggesting two members, Adam Schiff and Eric Swalwell, approved leaks of classified information.

The legacy press is ignoring the releases both because they paint Donald Trump as a victim of overreach and because the press played such a prominent role in the Russiagate corruption. They’re betraying audiences who might be concerned about the larger pattern coming into relief. That story is about intelligence agencies meddling in domestic politics at all — Trump or no Trump — through a list of forbidden practices. We’re about to find out that far more people in the political world were under routine surveillance than previously thought, including mainstream and independent reporters who communicated with political sources of all stripes.

I’m technically on vacation, but there’s more coming on this front, from players now forced to come forward. Please also tune in to America This Week tomorrow for a review of all the new materials with Walter Kirn, before he appears as a guest with Bill Maher.