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By Scott Horton, Antiwar.com, 8/5/25

“The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.” —Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower

“In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. … The Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’ The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude.” —Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower

“The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul.” —Herbert Hoover

“[T]he Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945 … up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; … [I]f such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the bombs.” —Herber Hoover

“I told [Gen. Douglas] MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.” —Herbert Hoover

“MacArthur’s views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed. When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.” —Norman Cousins

“General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. He wants time to think the thing out, so he has postponed the trip to some future date to be decided later.” —Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades

“[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants…MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off…” —Richard Nixon

“The Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and the Swiss. And that suggestion of giving a warning of the atomic bomb was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted. In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb.” —Under Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bird

“The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air.” —General “Hap” Arnold

“The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.” — Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

“The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war.” Adm. Nimitz

“The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons … The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.” —Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman

“Truman told me it was agreed they would use it, after military men’s statements that it would save many, many American lives, by shortening the war, only to hit military objectives. Of course, then they went ahead and killed as many women and children as they could, which was just what they wanted all the time.” —Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman

“The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. … The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.” — Major General Curtis LeMay, XXI Bomber Command

“[LeMay said] if we’d lost the war, we’d all have been prosecuted as war criminals. And I think he’s right. He, and I’d say I, were behaving as war criminals. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?” —Robert MacNamara

“The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment … It was a mistake to ever drop it … [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it.” — Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr.

“I concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945. Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands scheduled for 1 November 1945 would have been necessary.” —Paul Nitze, director and then Vice Chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey

“[E]ven without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion. Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” —U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946

“Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia. Washington decided it was time to use the A-bomb. I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds.” —Ellis Zacharias Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence

“When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. Many other high-level military officers concurred.” —Brigadier General Carter Clarke, the Military Intelligence officer in charge of preparing summaries of intercepted Japanese cables for President Truman and his advisors

“The commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated that the naval blockade and prior bombing of Japan in March of 1945, had rendered the Japanese helpless and that the use of the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and immoral. —Brigadier General Carter Clarke

“I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used… the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate… My proposal… was that the weapon should be demonstrated over… a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo… Would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will… Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation… It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world.” —Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss

“In the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the retention of the dynasty had been issued in May 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the Japanese government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clear cut decision. If surrender could have been brought about in May 1945, or even in June, or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the Pacific war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer.” —Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew

And for what it’s worth, then-Army Chief George Marshall wanted only to hit military facilities with it, not cities.

Scott Horton is editorial director of Antiwar.com, director of the Libertarian Institute, host of Antiwar Radio on Pacifica, 90.7 FM KPFK in Los Angeles, California and podcasts the Scott Horton Show from ScottHorton.org. He’s the author of the 2017 book, Fool’s Errand: Time to End the War in Afghanistan and editor of The Great Ron Paul: The Scott Horton Show Interviews 2004–2019. He’s conducted more than 5,000 interviews since 2003. Scott lives in Austin, Texas with his wife, investigative reporter Larisa Alexandrovna Horton. He is a fan of, but no relation to the lawyer from Harper’s. Scott’s Twitter, YouTube, Patreon.

Chart courtesy of The Daily Lever, July 24, 2025

Sanctions can be just as deadly as armed conflict. (Source: The Lancet)

RT, 7/31/25

US President Donald Trump has said he is considering tariffs on BRICS nations, accusing the group of adopting anti-US policies. Earlier, Trump warned that any attempt by the group to challenge the US dollar would be met with harsh economic measures. BRICS members targeted by his latest sanctions, such as India and Brazil, said they would protect their domestic interests.

Speaking at the White House on Wednesday, he claimed the group is working to weaken the dollar and strip it of its role as the world’s reserve currency.

“They have BRICS, which is basically a group of countries which are anti the United States, and India is a member of that if you can believe it,” Trump said. “It’s an attack on the dollar, and we’re not going to let anybody attack the dollar.”

The same day, Trump announced that India will face 25% tariffs and additional penalties starting on Friday over its continued trade with Russia. He said the tariffs were imposed partly because of India’s membership in BRICS, and partly because of what he called a “tremendous” trade deficit with New Delhi.

Trump also imposed a 50% tariff on all goods from Brazil effective August 1, claiming the country poses a threat to “the national security, foreign policy, and economy” of the US.

BRICS was established in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining in 2010. Over the past year, it has extended membership to Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. BRICS partner countries include Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said BRICS countries are seeking alternatives to the dollar to shield themselves from Washington’s “arbitrariness,” calling the shift irreversible.

Last year, Russia’s Finance Ministry said national currencies made up 65% of BRICS trade, with the dollar and euro falling below 30%. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said BRICS is not a rival to the US, but warned that “the language of threats and manipulation… is not the way to speak to members of this group.”

The following is an interview with Nicolai N. Petro about his book, The Tragedy of Ukraine (De Gruyter, 2023). It was conducted by István Szabó of the Hungarian daily newspaper Magyar Nemzez on July 12, 2025.

What inspired you to approach the Russia–Ukraine conflict through the lens of classical Greek tragedy? Why did you choose this particular cultural reference?

I had been thinking about writing a book about Ukraine ever since our first visit there in 2008. When I won a Fulbright Grant to spend the 2013-2014 academic year in Odessa, I thought of writing about the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukrainian society. This topic, however, was quickly overtaken by the events that were unfolding around us—the Maidan uprising.

I subsequently spent several more years thinking about how such a seemingly stable society could shatter in just a few short months. I found no suitable approach, until I stumbled upon Professor Richard Ned Lebow’s book The Tragic Vision of Politics.

In it, he looks at modern conflicts through the lens of political realism inspired by Thucydides’ classic history of the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BC). Thucydides traced the roots of this conflict among the Greeks to the collapse of the traditions and practices that had sustained their civilization for so long. Simply put, war erupted because the leaders of Athens and Sparta decided that they no longer shared ideas, identity, and values, and so were no longer bound to each other.

I felt that this was a good description of what had taken place in relations between Russians and Ukrainians since the Orange Revolution of 2004.

In your book, the concept of catharsis plays a central role. How do you interpret catharsis in the context of the current geopolitical situation, particularly with regard to Ukraine?

Recurring conflict is a problem of the heart, as much as it is of political institutions. This is as true of nations as it is of individuals. The enduring value of classical Greek tragedy is that it seeks to induce a change of heart—which the Greeks called catharsis—a purging of emotions so powerful that it allowed emotions such as pity and compassion to enter the soul, and to take the place of rage.

By showing the horrors that result from the unyielding pursuit of vengeance, Greek playwrights tried to lead citizens away from anger and vengeance, and toward compassion. By replacing rage with reason, they believed catharsis could liberate both individuals and societies from the tragic cycle of vengeance.

Catharsis is based on the ability to see the enemy, the Other, as a co-sufferer, so that endless conflict can give way to dialogue, and eventually forgiveness. Put another way, no conflict can ever be resolved without a catharsis.

What could such a form of catharsis mean for the future of the Ukrainian state and society? Is it even possible in the midst of an ongoing war?

I believe that Sophocles, Euripides, and Aeschylus would prescribe for Ukrainian society what they prescribed for themselves– a profound shift in social attitudes that would allow people who hate each other to engage in dialogue. Without such a catharsis there can be no dialogue about the future, because there is no shared future.

In my book I suggest that Ukraine would benefit from a Truth and Reconciliation process, which has helped scores of countries to heal conflicts, both domestic and international. This would be an important step in reconciling the antagonistic segments of Ukrainian society, and in restoring trust in government institutions.

In your book, you highlight that many people in eastern and southern Ukraine identify with Russian cultural identity. What are the consequences if this identity is not recognized at the political level?

The persistent divisions within Ukrainian society derive from its history of being a focus of contention between rival empires, including Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottomans. When these empires collapsed in the early 20^th century, their frictions were often inherited by the countries that emerged from them.

The largest community within modern Ukraine are those seeking to preserve a cultural, religious, and linguistic tie with Russia. In my book I refer to them not as “Russian speakers,” which oversimplifies their identity, but as Maloross Ukrainians. This older term was commonly used before the Bolshevik Revolution because it highlights that this identity goes far beyond language and religious affiliation, even though these are the most widely discussed points of contention today.

These two Ukrainian identities, which can be thought of as two nations living in one state, have not yet learned how to live together, and this has led to the bloody war that the country is enduring today.

Do you think it is possible for Ukraine to develop an inclusive national narrative in the long term—one that provides a legitimate place for its Russian-speaking population? If so, how?

It is certainly possible. Other countries have done it—Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, India, Indonesia, to name a few. The main obstacle that needs to be overcome is atavistic nationalism, which says that a nation must consist of only one monolithic identity, and which therefore sees all other identities as threats. Such nationalism seeks to redefine and restrict ethnicity, language, religion, and historical memory. Eventually, however, the list expands to include almost any characteristic, which is why nationalism is often seen as a precursor to Fascism and Nazism.

What role has the international community—especially the West—played in either reinforcing or exacerbating Ukraine’s internal tensions?

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently stated (Fox News, 5 March 2025) that the West is involved in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. This makes it a continuation of what 19^th century British rulers commonly referred to as “The Great Game”—a global chess match between rival powers aimed at shifting the overall balance of power in their favor.

The impact on any nation caught up in the “game” has always been devastating, as the competing powers each promote their indigenous supporters. This inflames existing social tensions, and turns every political debate into a choice of good versus evil. That is why Ukrainian nationalists referred to their Maidan coup d’etat against president Viktor Yanukovych, as a “civilizational choice” in favor of the West. This in turn led to the rebellions of Crimea and Donbass, which were supported by Russia.

In your view, would the West ever be willing to accept a Ukrainian national vision that is not exclusively Western-oriented but also culturally multipolar? Are there any historical or international precedents for this?

The West contains many diverse elites, with many diverse agendas. While it is hard to imagine the current political leadership of the EU accepting a neutral Ukraine that had good relations with both Russia and the EU (this was already an obstacle during the EU Association talks in 2013), the political climate in Europe and the United States seems to be shifting away from this group, and toward elites that place their own national interest first. This is causing the once monolithic West to fracture.

It is therefore possible that, when current political leaders are replaced by their national electorates, their successors will seek better relations with Russia, even at the expense of Ukraine, since Russia is a far more important neighbor for Europe.

What do you see as the biggest challenge in conveying your book’s message to the direct actors in the conflict? How might this kind of discourse gain wider societal resonance?

The biggest challenge in the resolution of any conflict, large or small, is getting the parties now immersed in the conflict to recognize the extent to which they themselves helped to bring about this conflict. That is why the Greeks said that true object of dialogue was self-transformation. Classical Greek tragedy is, quintessentially, a series of dialogues in which we are all encouraged to reflect on our own tragic flaws. Only when the participants can grasp how their own actions have stoked the hatred of others, can they choose a different path.

Welsh social critic Raymond Williams captured this perfectly when he said that, “Tragedy rests not in the individual destiny. . . but in the general condition, of a people reducing or destroying itself because it is not conscious of its true condition” (Modern Tragedy, p. 196).

Greek playwrights could convey this message through plays that were mandatory for the entire polis. Today we cannot gather all citizens in one place, but governments could use social media to spread a message of tolerance, dialogue, and forgiveness of our enemies, if they wanted to.

Of course, in a world of rival nation-states it would be naïve to expect political leaders to do so, unless it could be shown to benefit their own political careers, and as being the supreme national interest. Over the past few decades several senior diplomats have tried to steer American foreign policy in this direction, including such luminaries as George F. Kennan, Amb. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., and Amb. Chas W. Freeman, Jr..

On a personal level, how has your perspective on the Ukraine–Russia relationship changed during the course of your research? Was there any insight that particularly surprised you?

I was struck by the consensus that once existed among scholars regarding the totalitarian aspirations of nationalism. Reinhold Niebuhr once commented that nationalism is when “the nation pretends to be God.” The danger of this seems to have been almost entirely forgotten today.

I was impressed by the successes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in healing social wounds that have festered for many decades. In my book I look at what they were able to accomplish in South Africa, to prevent violence after the end of the apartheid regime; in Guatemala, to support reconciliation after nearly four decades of civil war and American intervention; and in Spain, to assist the peaceful transition to federalism and democracy after 36 years of dictatorship.

In a similar vein, inside Ukraine we can point to the remarkable peacemaking efforts of Sergei Sivokho, a close friend of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who, with the president’s support, set up a National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity. Unfortunately, he was hounded out of his position by Ukrainian nationalists, and died soon afterwards.

On a personal note, I find it amusing that I am sometimes accused of being too naïve about politics. I would counter that if a policy fails to achieve the results it promises (like sanctions on Russia, which were supposed to lead to the rapid collapse of the Russian economy), then expecting success from more of the same is both naïve and irresponsible.

Policies should be judged by their results, and when a policy has persistently failed, governments should consider other approaches. In the case of Ukraine, Western efforts to promote security through escalation have patently failed. Why not, then, see if better results can be achieved by reducing military involvement, rather than expanding it?

There is historical precedent for this—the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. After a series of contentious negotiations, a ceasefire was finally achieved not through increasing arms and support for South Korea, but through a total embargo on any new weapons being introduced onto the peninsula. This embargo was monitored by the United Nations. The parties also agreed to hold later talks on a permanent peace treaty, but by 1954 the United States had already moved on to the conflict in Vietnam. As a result, the ceasefire that was meant to be temporary became permanent. While this is certainly not an optimal solution, it has resulted in more than seventy years of peace.

Another criticism that I sometimes hear is that I minimize the role of Russian aggression. Again, I disagree. I have always pointed out that the invasion of Ukraine is a violation of international law, but my study of Ukrainian history leads me to conclude that, while Russia initiated the current level of hostilities, their roots go much, much deeper. Understanding this complex history does not in any way minimize, mitigate, or justify Russia’s attack on Ukraine. It is however, vital for the healing of Ukrainian society, and for achieving a lasting peace after the war.

About Nicolai Petro:

Nicolai N. Petro is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, where he previously held the Silvia-Chandley Professorship of Peace Studies and Nonviolence. His scholarly awards include two Fulbright awards (one to Russia and one to Ukraine), a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship, and research awards from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in Washington, D.C., and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. In 2021 he was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies at the University of Bologna, Italy.