By Tony Kevin, Facebook, 8/5/24

Tony Kevin is a former Australian Foreign Affairs officer 1968-98 at Australian Government. Writer of ‘Return to Moscow’ (UWA Publishing, Perth 2017) and ‘Russia and the West, 2017-19’ (2019)

Here is my latest update on the Ukraine war situation as of 5 August 2024, drawn from multiple independent and Russian sources:

Russia has absolute military supremacy on the Ukrainian frontline. There is active fighting now in 3 particular localities: Pokrovsk/Progress, Toretsk, and near Kharkov . Ukraine is taking casualties, dead or disabled, of 1000-2000 men per day or up to 14,000 per week. These casualties cannot be replaced despite extreme and cruel measures of forced mobilisation that are now increasingly being resisted by Ukrainian civil populations from all regions. There has been massive male flight out of Ukraine and the birthrate has collapsed . Foreign mercenaries have largely fled the country too. Quite large numbers of untrained forces sent to the front and left without weapons or leadership, are simply surrendering to Russian forces when surrounded , or retreating without orders to do so.

Unable to make progress on the battlefront, but with a temporary surplus of long range drones, Kiev is carrying out militarily meaningless terrorist drone attacks that are damaging a few apartment buildings and killing a few civilians in weakly defended towns and cities in frontline regions of Russia adjacent to Ukraine like Belgorod, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov. Russia regards these acts as war crimes and promises retribution when the war is over. Ukrainian security chief Kirill Budanov will be high on the Russian prosecution list.

There will come a point – and it may come soon – at which enough Ukrainian soldiers will just stop fighting at the front that no amount of bullying by Kiev war enforcers can change the outcome .

It is still bipartisan US policy to fight Russia in Ukraine to the last Ukrainian but the Ukrainian soldiers are not superhuman. Their will to fight and die is close to cracking.

Russians are calibrating the rate of their advances and destruction of Ukr military units just fast enough to keep steadily demoralising and neutralising Ukr soldiers, while not panicking NATO elites too much into desperate decisions to expand the war. NATO elites have got the message and are going quiet.

On The Duran, Alexander Mercouris was convincing this week in reporting on this: see The Duran conversation, “Ukraine front line slow motion collapse” (copied also to YouTube and to my social media- and recommended viewing) .

Here also are extracts from the latest Russian Defence Ministry weekly report. Note the huge Ukr casualties this week. Russian casualties would by most expert estimates be between 5 and 10%% of these, which are sustainable given Russia’s massive mobilised manpower advantage:

“August 2️⃣. [2024]

▪️ 11 group strikes were carried out during the week against Ukrainian armoured enterprises, UAV workshops, ammunition depots and temporary staging areas of the Ukrainian armed forces and mercenaries.

▪️ The Central Group of the Russian Armed Forces liberated five settlements during the week, the Defence Ministry said.

▪️ Kiev lost 13570 soldiers, 14 tanks, 42 armoured vehicles, 189 field artillery guns during the week, according to the summary” (extracts end).

It’s only a matter of time now. The NATO armaments cupboard is bare. The trickle of F-16 aircraft now getting into Ukraine from US are militarily meaningless. NATO is afraid overtly to expand the war with their own declared regular forces. NATO covert special force units in Ukraine have taken significant personnel hits in recent weeks. Russia has superb intel on where they are and hits them now without compunction, when they are located in legitimate military rear-area targets alongside NATO weapons and ammunition storages and depots.

Finally, on the diplomatic front, Russia is rejecting phony peace signals by Kiev that do not reflect military and political reality as it has evolved on the ground since February 2022. Russia has made clear it is open to genuine peace signals through possible intermediaries China, Hungary or Turkey.

Until there is real policy and/or regime change in Kiev, such efforts will not bear fruit and the war will continue its slow and bloody path.

By James Davis, Asia Times, 8/7/24

Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a personal letter to Iran’s leaders asking them to refrain from military action against Israel while he attempts to mediate between the two countries, according to sources with knowledge of the matter.

The letter was hand-delivered by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who arrived in Tehran on Monday.

Shoigu is slated to meet the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri.

He also will meet new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the news agency Interfax reported.

Iran has declared that it will retaliate against Israel for the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, widely attributed to the intelligence services of the Jewish State. Israel has made no official comment on the killing.

Haniyeh and one of his bodyguards died in an explosion at a secure guesthouse for foreign dignitaries, under circumstances that remain unexplained. Haniyeh was attending the inauguration of President Pezeshkian.

Hours earlier, an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, a close Iranian ally. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps declared that it would inflict a “severe punishment” on Israel “at the appropriate time, place and manner.”

According to the New York Times, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, directed Iran’s armed forces to attack Israel in retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh.

There is widespread speculation about possible Iranian actions as well as Israel’s potential response. On April 13, Iran launched over 300 projectiles at Israel. Almost all were shot down by a combination of Israeli and American air defenses.

Russia’s possible role in an Israel-Iran conflict remains an open question. Reuters reported August 6 that Putin asked Iran to avoid civilian casualties in any prospective military action on Israel.

The news agency said that Shoigu delivered this message in Tehran. It also reported that Iran asked Russia to sell it Su-35 fighters, one of Russia’s most advanced airframes. There are no reports of a Russian response to the request.

The New York Times reported August 5 that Russia was sending air defense systems to Iran, without specifying the systems in question. Russia does not have weaponry to spare from its ongoing operation in Ukraine, according to Russian sources, and is unlikely to provide its best air defense hardware to Iran.

According to sources familiar with Shoigu’s discussions in Tehran, Iran took Putin’s proposal under consideration but asked for high-tech Russian weaponry as part of the bargain – specifically, Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which has a range of up to 400 kilometers and capacity to track multiple targets.

Iran has had an older Russian system, the S-300, since 2016, although it is not known whether it has the newest version.

Some analysts believe that the S-400 can track American stealth aircraft like the F-22 and F-35. This is unlikely, given that Russia has delayed shipments of previously contracted S-400 systems to India – its best arms customer – due to the demands of the Ukraine conflict.

Israel has maintained close communications with Russia, advising Russian forces in Syria on thousands of strikes against Iranian-allied militias. Russia has stood down its air defense and allowed Israel to operate unimpeded.

The Ukraine war has put Israel in a bind: It does not want to get on Russia’s wrong side by providing military support to Ukraine.

The US has asked Israel to sell up to eight Patriot missile systems to Ukraine, and the matter reportedly remains under negotiation.

The Patriot is particularly important for Ukraine, as the only defense available against Russian aircraft launching glide bombs at a reported range of about 60 kilometers.

If Putin helps Israel by defusing a possible exchange of fire with Iran, he will want some favors in return.

Lenta.ru, 8/6/24 (Machine translated)

Ukrainian special services planned an attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov at a parade in St. Petersburg on Navy Day. This was stated by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on the Rossiya-1 TV channel.

He noted that several days before the parade, Belousov had a telephone conversation with Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin, in which he urged his American counterpart to persuade Kiev to abandon its intentions. According to Ryabkov, Austin was “extremely surprised” by the information, but took it seriously.

“Moscow and Washington avoided an escalatory spiral,” Ryabkov emphasized.

Earlier, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry , Maria Zakharova, pointed out the role of Great Britain in the Ukrainian assassination attempt on Putin. “There is no doubt that the assassination attempt on Putin, which [the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Kirill] Budanov (included in the list of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring ) spoke about, was planned with the participation of the Anglo-Saxon masters of Kiev,” she said.

The conversation between Belousov and Austin took place on July 12. As the American newspaper The New York Times (NYT) later wrote, citing sources, Belousov called Pentagon chief Austin about a secret Ukrainian operation.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/2/24

Russia and the West exchanged 24 prisoners [last] Thursday in the largest such swap since the Old Cold War. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and CNN published detailed reports about the diplomacy that led up to this deal, which included the WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich and Russia’s Vadim Krasikov as the highest-profile exchanges. The New York Times also shared brief bios about the others who were swapped. Here are the top five takeaways from this historic deal that most observers might have missed:

———-

1. Germany Was Responsible For Holding Everything Up

Russia conveyed that it won’t agree to any swap without the release of Vadim Krasikov, who was jailed in Germany for assassinating a Chechen terrorist that President Putin told Tucker Carlson had driven his car over the heads of Russian prisoners, among his other crimes. Germany balked for a while though due to the “morality” of releasing a convicted killer that’s serving a life sentence, but the US convinced it to go along with this, especially since Russia and Belarus agreed to release jailed Germans as part of the deal.

2. Poland, Slovenia, and Norway Chipped In But Got Nothing In Return

A total of four Russians who were imprisoned in the aforementioned countries were also released even though their governments didn’t get anything in return. This suggests a concession on the West’s part, albeit one that enabled Russia to make its own such concession that’ll be touched upon in the next point for turning this deal into the largest one in decades. Those three Western countries are presenting this as an “act of solidarity”, but it’s really proof of the US’ hegemonic power over them.

3. A Russian “Government-In-Exile” Will Likely Soon Take Shape

Eight members of Russia’s non-systemic “opposition” were also sent to the West as part of this deal. They’ll predictably soon set up a “government-in-exile”, which might generate lots of media attention but fail to have any influence inside of Russia. Their inclusion in this swap made it appear more “moral” in Germany’s eyes and thus helped convince it to agree. It can also be understood as a reciprocal concession for freeing the four Russians mentioned above from Poland, Slovenia, and Norway.

4. Turkiye’s Role In Facilitating This Swap Positions It To Host The Next Round Of Peace Talks

For as noble as China, India, and Hungary’s efforts are in trying to mediate a resolution to the Ukrainian Conflict, Turkiye has a much better chance of doing so than they do. Its role in facilitating this latest swap builds upon the earlier ones that it facilitated, which show that Russia and the West still regard it as a neutral middleman. This suggests that they’d agree to it hosting the next round peace talks along the lines of spring 2022’s ultimately sabotaged ones once all parties are ready instead of looking elsewhere.

5. Kamala Will Try Politicizing This Swap To Discredit Trump

Trump claimed earlier this spring that only he could secure Gershkovich’s release and that he’d get Putin to agree to this as a favor without receiving anything in return, yet the this week’s historic swap proved him wrong. In response, Trump suggested that the deal was lopsided despite the West getting twice as many people as Russia did, and he also speculated that cash was paid for them too. Kamala will certainly try politicizing this swap to discredit Trump, but it’s unclear whether voters will care all that much.

———-

Altogether, each side in this swap got what they wanted, and it represents a rare example of successful New Cold War diplomacy. Reflecting on the top five takeaways, the last two are the most significant, but neither can be taken for granted with respect to Turkiye hosting the next round of peace talks (let alone anytime soon) and Kamala’s politicization of this swap having any effect on the presidential race. Even so, they’re what observers should monitor to see whether anything meaningful comes of them.

By Amwaj Media, 8/5/24

The story: Russian security chief Sergei Shoigu has visited Tehran for talks with top officials, raising eyebrows given the growing tensions between Iran and Israel. Already, reports charge that Moscow has begun delivering air defense equipment and advanced radars allegedly requested by the Islamic Republic.

The visit comes as Iran and its regional allies weigh the scale of their response to Israel’s suspected assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh. Iran has pledged to avenge the July 31 killing of Haniyeh in Tehran as the region braces for escalation.

The Russian visit: 

Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, landed in Tehran on Aug. 5 on what Russian media described as a “planned working visit.”

• Shoigu met his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Ahmadian, though details of their meeting have been kept under wraps.
  
• The Russian security chief also sat down with President Masoud Pezeshkian and separately met Mohammad Baqeri, the chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.
  
• Iranian media quoted Shoigu as saying in his meeting with Baqeri that Russia “is ready for comprehensive cooperation with Iran in the region.” On his part, the top Iranian military commander described ties as “strategic,” indicating a systemic decision to expand the partnership.

Russia was one of the first countries to condemn the killing of Haniyeh and warn of its consequences.

• In connection with a UN Security Council session on the assassination, Moscow also drafted a statement to condemn Israel, but the statement was blocked by Washington.

Given Russia’s growing defense cooperation with Iran, there has been speculation about the timing of Shoigu’s visit.

• Some commentators have pointed out that Ahmadian invited his Russian counterpart to visit Tehran during a phone call in May, but no date was announced.
  
• However, observers have also noted that the timing of the trip may have been influenced by developments in the region, such as Haniyeh’s assassination and the impending Iranian response.

Notably, Shoigu’s visit came on the same day that the head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Michael Kurilla, arrived in Israel for talks with military figures. Washington has been rushing additional forces to the region, and played a key role in helping defend Israel when Iran last attacked Israeli military bases in Apr. 2024.

• Amid the dispatch of US reinforcements, rumors have been circulating on social media about an alleged uptick in Russian cargo flights landing in Iran in the past three days. However, flight trackers have only confirmed one such arrival.
  
• Reports emerged on Aug. 7 which claimed that Iran has requested advanced military gear, including air defenses and radar equipment, and that Russia has initiated deliveries.

The Iranian posturing: 

Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on July 31, just hours after attending the inauguration of President Pezeshkian.

• The IRGC, which was hosting Haniyeh at a complex in northern Tehran, has said a “short-range projectile” carrying a 7 kg (15.4 lbs) warhead struck the room where the Hamas political bureau chief was staying in.

Iranian authorities continue to insist that Iran has a right to respond to Israel over the killing. Israel has not claimed the July 31 assassination.

• In a meeting with foreign ambassadors to Tehran on Aug. 5, Acting Foreign Minister Ali Baqeri-Kani said Iran has a “legitimate right to take deterrent action.”
  
• On the same day, Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani vowed that Iran would “definitely and decisively” take action—but added that Tehran does not want to escalate tensions.

An article published on Aug. 4 in the weekly magazine Sobh-e Sadeq sought to make the case for a “severe response” against Tel Aviv, which it said would be a “wise” move.

• The magazine, which is published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described Haniyeh’s killing as an attack on Iranian territory and insisted that the Iranian public supports action against Israel.
  
• The conservative-dominated state broadcaster on Aug. 4 and Aug. 5 aired vox pops in which ordinary Iranians almost unanimously said Israel should be struck. However, many argued that any action should be aimed at restoring deterrence rather than starting a war.

The context/analysis: 

Long plagued by mutual distrust, relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in Feb. 2022.

• The bilateral partnership has especially grown in the military sphere, with Iran delivering drones which are reportedly being used in the Ukraine war. Tehran is also supporting Russian efforts to localize drone production.
  
• Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is additionally focused on connectivity, with the two sides pursuing development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The initiative seeks to connect India and Russia via Iran.
  
• The growing Iranian-Russian cooperation has been a cause for concern in the west, leading European diplomats to call on the Islamic Republic to reverse course.

While cooperation has generally grown, many obstacles remain. For instance, Iran has so far avoided exporting ballistic missiles to Russia amid warnings from Washington. Moreover, collaboration in the energy sector has been lackluster.

• In Feb. 2024, reports emerged that Iran had allegedly supplied Russia with around 400 missiles, including short-range Fateh-110 projectiles. However, those reports have reportedly been dismissed by Iran, Russia, and Ukraine.
  
• Speculations that Russia may deliver up to two dozen Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) fighter jets and Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters to Iran have not materialized. This is even though reports emerged in Sept. 2023 that Yak-130 combat trainers were transferred to Iran amid rumors that an air base may have been prepared for the arrival of Su-35s.
  
• The finalization of a comprehensive 20-year cooperation agreement has also been lagging, with Moscow pointing the finger at Tehran. The accord would succeed the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has since been extended for five-year terms—most recently in 2021.
  
• While bilateral ties blossomed under late conservative president Ebrahim Raisi (2021-24), incumbent Reformist President Pezeshkian has signaled a willingness to engage with the west. Such a shift by Tehran, if it were to be reciprocated by western capitals, may be problematic for Moscow and could play a part in Shoigu’s engagement.

It remains unclear whether the precise date of Shoigu’s trip to Iran was set prior to Haniyeh’s killing. However, such a trip in the current climate may be seen as either Russian support for Iran vis-à-vis Israel, or an attempt to manage tensions between the two regional arch-foes.

• What will likely fuel the view of Russia siding with Iran is what analysts see as the cooling of relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv over the past year, in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war on Gaza.
  
• Shoigu, a former defense minister who has a good working relationship with Baqeri, notably oversees Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation which handles arms exports. Against this backdrop, it remains to be seen whether the bilateral engagement will produce dividends for Tehran in the military field.
  
• Despite a possible shift by Moscow, the broader disparities at play are significant. Should a direct conflict between Iran and Israel emerge, observers argue that potential Russian support for Tehran is unlikely to match US backing for Tel Aviv.

The future: 

The vox pops on Iranian television may be an attempt by the authorities to gauge the public’s views, and scale the response to Israel accordingly. The Islamic Republic most recently struck Israel in Apr. 2024, when the IRGC launched an unprecedented attack over the suspected Israeli bombing of Iranian diplomatic premises in Syria.

• Operation ‘True Promise’, which involved the firing of hundreds of drones and missiles, marked the first attack on Israel launched from Iranian territory.
  
• Should Iran press on with a strike on Israel, it could be bigger than ‘True Promise’. Moreover, it may well include coordinated action by the Islamic Republic’s regional allies.

While military relations between Iran and Russia are growing, Russia will think twice before overtly backing Tehran against Tel Aviv. If cooperation is to expand, it will in all likelihood be limited to defensive capabilities, including air defenses.

• Israel and Russia have seen their ties dwindle in the shadow of the Ukraine war. However, they have a so-called deconfliction mechanism in Syria to protect.
  
• The deconfliction mechanism has prevented Israeli and Russian forces from clashing in Syria. If Moscow were to aid Tehran, it could impact Russian arrangements with Tel Aviv.
  
• Even if Russia rushes air defense systems to Iran, their reliability and capabilities are questionable. Moreover, Moscow could very well be supplying spare parts. Notably, in Apr. 2024, Israel reportedly took out a radar site associated with a Russian-built S-300 missile defense battery covering a key nuclear site. Iran denied the incident.

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