By Pietro Shakarian, ACURA, 3/21/23

The ongoing war in Ukraine has been framed in multiple ways by multiple commentators of international affairs.  Depending on one’s point of view, it could be characterized as a war between Russia and Ukraine, a proxy war between Russia and NATO, or a proxy war between Russia and a US-backed West.  The latter two perspectives anchor the war in the larger context of the gradual deterioration of US-Russia relations since the high point at the end of the Cold War.  In this framework, most scholars who adhere to this position perceive the expansion of NATO as a key reason for the deterioration and eventual break-down of ties between Moscow and Washington.

Although this position is amply supported by a substantial body of evidence, there are those who question it on the basis of excluding the agency of Ukraine.  By framing the war and its origins entirely within the larger context of US-Russia relations, these individuals contend, “does it not erase or mitigate the independent agency of Ukraine?”  Similarly, those who adhere to this argument contend that Ukraine should be able to join NATO if it so freely chooses.  The argument is applicable beyond Ukraine and, in different contexts, has been applied to various other former Soviet republics – Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, etc.

The response given to such arguments is usually that, yes, Ukraine (for example) has independent agency, but NATO membership is not, as the historian Stephen F. Cohen used to say, a fraternity or sorority, let alone the American Association of Retired People.  Not anyone can join.  The membership of the country must enhance the security of the other member states, not imperil it.  A similar response, employed by John Mearsheimer, contends that while these countries do have agency, their interests have to take a back seat to the larger aim of averting a cataclysmic nuclear clash between the superpowers.  Such was the case with Fidel Castro’s Cuba when it had to relinquish the Soviet missiles from its island as a necessary part of defusing of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

While such arguments are fully valid, an equally compelling response to the agency question, and one that speaks much more directly to the people of the post-Soviet space, is the fact that former Soviet republics like Ukraine are usually compelled into such a difficult geopolitical position by external forces that do not have the interests of the people at heart.  Again, this argument applies beyond Ukraine and, in different contexts, extends variously to Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and other ex-Soviet states.

The external forces in these cases are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based out of numerous Western countries, especially the United States.  This is not to say that all Western-based NGOs exert some sort of nefarious influence in the region.  However, certain NGOs have clearly used (or abused) the goodwill of several post-Soviet governments in order to advance larger geopolitical aims.  These include the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Open Society Foundation, the Eurasia Foundation, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republic Institute (IRI), among many others.  In the 30-year period since the dissolution of the USSR, such organizations have taken full advantage of the acute socioeconomic conditions that emerged in these countries, with little or no regard for their independent agency, their national histories, or the longstanding economic, cultural, and personal ties that bind them together.

As a result of the loss of jobs, inter-republican economic ties, and the significant disruptions that occurred from haphazard market “reforms,” many citizens of these societies have gravitated toward these NGOs as sources of economic opportunity.  Still others have fallen under the sway of the messaging of these organizations, which have a clear geopolitical imperative – to diminish Russia’s political and cultural presence in the post-Soviet space, with the objective of preventing any sort of restoration of economic, political, or person-to-person connections.  Another, much more sinister aim, made all too painfully evident by the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine, is the effort on the part of these NGOs, in collusion with the Washington war party, to use these republics as geopolitical bludgeons against Russia, at the terrible expense of their own citizens.

Equipped with substantial budgets and a savvy understanding of soft power and social media, these same NGOs also know the value of marketing.  If large majorities of Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and others might have opposed taking an overtly anti-Russian, pro-NATO stance in 1992 or 1998, then these NGOs work constantly to change public opinion, manipulating attitudes and manufacturing consent until the desired results are achieved.  These newfound “desires” for NATO are then represented as being just as natural as the Caucasus mountains or the wheat fields of the Ukrainian steppe.  To deny NATO, the NGOniks declare, would be to deny the long-awaited wish of the narod of the post-Soviet space to join the Western military alliance and purchase expensive military weaponry.

The historical periods of Khrushchev’s Thaw and Gorbachev’s glasnost underscore the indisputable historical fact that the countries of the former Soviet Union have a rich history of endogenous democratization efforts.  Yet, the post-Soviet NGO class represents democratization as only being possible through the “enlightened” influence of the United States and other Western societies.  To allow these countries to find their way to democracy independently is considered an anathema, a rejection of “European values,” and indicative of “democratic backsliding,” to use a very demeaning term all too common in the neocolonial lexicon of post-Soviet NGO-speak.  This line of thinking is horribly Hobbesian, assuming that without the “civilizing influence” of Washington, these “poor people” would revert to a “natural state” of “barbarism” and “Cyrillic autocracy” (as if use of the Latin alphabet indicates “civilization” and “democracy”).

With the discreet charm of used car salesmen, the representatives of these NGOs also extol markets and hyper-individualistic neoliberal values, while ignoring genuine social concerns like poverty and joblessness.  In terms of the historical memory of the Soviet experience, those affiliated with NGOs in former Soviet republics often emphasize the “totalitarian model,” asserting that there were virtually no differences between the various Soviet leaders and their contexts (e.g., that there was “no difference” between Lenin and Stalin, or even Stalin and Gorbachev).

Likewise, the NGO emissaries often represent the October Revolution of 1917 not as a genuine revolution (which it was, as the research of Alexander Rabinowitch and others highlight), but as a “Bolshevik coup.”  In this context, they also often downplay the major Soviet-era achievements of these republics, be they artistic, scientific, or economic. Furthermore, these NGOs emphasize the (incorrect) narrative (adopted as truth by the US foreign policy establishment) that the Washington “won” the Cold War and single-handedly defeated the Soviet Union, the dissolution of which they framed as “inevitable.”  Yet, as former US ambassador Jack Matlock regularly reminds us, this was simply not the case.  However, if one questions these narratives, they are attacked for peddling “Russian disinformation.”

Rather than reflecting the desires of the societies of the post-Soviet space, these Western-based NGOs usually subordinate wishes for genuine independence to the geopolitical objectives of Washington’s war class.  In this respect, they only succeed in acting as disruptors, upsetting the ability of countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia from developing genuinely democratic societies and truly independent agency on the international stage.  The recent controversy in Georgia over the “foreign agent” bill is vividly illustrative of the roles of these NGOs as “disruptors” preventing these countries from achieving actual independence and democracy.  Rather than indicating a “roll-back of democracy” or a “contradiction of European aspirations,” the aim of Tbilisi was to move toward a genuinely independent and transparent democratic society.  After all, there is a reason why the “foreign agent” bill was based on the example of FARA in the United States.

Above all, by forcing the post-Soviet states to make a hard geopolitical “civilizational choice” between Russia and the West, these NGOs are being incredibly unfair to the peoples of these societies.  In this regard, they deny them the true agency and independence that they genuinely desire, barring them from the right to imbibe in the fruits of both sides as independent actors.  Moreover, the professed NGO aspiration of “democratization” has resulted in the opposite intended effect.  Across the former Soviet space today, from Russia to Ukraine, one encounters far more illiberal governments than liberal, democratic ones.  Indeed, the interference of external organizations into the endogenous political development of these states has led to a greater de-democratization throughout the region.

Perhaps most ironically and tragically, the professed zeal for “democratic enlightenment” has also led to a de-democratization of the United States itself.  In the drive to “contain Russia,” the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower once eloquently warned against has now joined forces with corporate interests and a pervasive political culture of righteous conformity to erode the basic liberties upon which the country was founded.  The results bode poorly for America’s image abroad and only succeed in setting a bad example for the rest of the world, including the post-Soviet space.  Even more alarmingly, they also have the potential to bring humanity perilously close to nuclear catastrophe.  If the deafening silence on the journalism of Sy Hersh is any indication of the state of American democracy, then it becomes clear that the chief priority of Washington lawmakers should be fixing democracy at home rather than searching for monsters abroad.

Dr. Pietro A. Shakarian is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Historical Research, National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia. He previously worked as a lecturer in history at the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.

Intellinews, 3/20/23

Eight out of ten (82%) of Russians consider themselves happy, according to a recent survey conducted by state-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM).

The poll surveyed 1,600 respondents over the age of 18 on March 10. Of those who claim to be happy, 35% say so with conviction.

The happiness index of Russians was 68 points, the same as last March. In October 2022, it was slightly lower – 66 points, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre experts pointed out.

When asked about the main pillars of happiness, those who say they are happy most often list their family (24%), their own and their family’s health (21%), satisfaction with life in general (20%) and a good job (19%). Children make another 16% happy, and a good financial situation and prosperity, 13%. Living conditions and lack of loneliness were each cited by 8% of respondents, and 6% felt happy because of a healthy personal life.

Among those who feel unhappy, 20% cited the unsatisfactory situation in the country as the reason, and 19% the lack of material resources.

More than 40% of Russians believe that the majority of people around them are happy. One in three (36%) believes that there are about the same number of happy and unhappy people, and 14% notice more unhappy people.

The Social Happiness Index, which shows whether there are mostly happy or unhappy people around respondents, was 57 points in the March measurement. In March 2022, it was 60 points.

The pollsters noted that among those who definitely feel happy, 55% say they are surrounded by happy people, 9% see more unhappy people around them. In contrast, in the group of Russians who definitely feel unhappy, only 7% see more happy people around them, and 58% see more unhappy people around them.

Overall, the poll results indicate a relatively high level of happiness among Russians, with family, health and job satisfaction being the primary sources of happiness for most people. However, there are still a significant number of people who feel unhappy, with unsatisfactory situations in the country and lack of resources being the main reasons cited.

By Edward Slavsquat, Substack, 3/21/23

“We have increased our economic sovereignty many times over. After all, what did our enemy count on? That we would collapse in 2-3 weeks or in a month,” Russian president Vladimir Putin said during his visit to the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant last week.

Is Putin’s gloating justified? Yes … and no.

“Yes and No? No and Yes? But [callous ideologue on the internet] told me [meaningless word salad used to prop up a hopelessly warped view of Russia],” you might be screaming at your screen.

We blame both Anne Applebaum and the 5D Checkmate Wizards for shrouding Russia’s economic realities in an impenetrable fog of vapid slogans and lazy one-liners. Together they have created a mind-melting false binary in which there are apparently only two possibilities for Russia:

1. Total economic collapse as starving Russians hunt feral cats for sustenance.
2. A Golden Age of profitable, sanctions-bypassing commerce and comfortable self-sufficiency.

Maybe it’s time to expand our horizons? Yes, probably. We will need at least five blog posts to do this, though.

Where to begin?

Putin said on March 19 that Russia had made great strides towards reducing dependency on foreign imports, so let’s start with import substitution.

Import substitution: Is it urgent now?

On February 15, 2022—nine days before Russian tanks poured into Ukraine—your correspondent asked if Russia was adequately prepared for an inevitable barrage of US-imposed sanctions (which, as historians will confirm, arrived about two weeks later).

We concluded that in vital sectors such as agriculture and energy, Russia had little to worry about (to the point where it was the world’s leading exporter of wheat). In other key areas—particularly electronics and manufacturing—there was definitely room for improvement.

Just to be very clear: Import substitution is different from autarky. There was never a plan to make Russia 100% self-sufficient.

But if Russia’s “trusted western partners” were willing to knee-cap trade agreements at the behest of Washington—like they did in 2014—who knows what else they were capable of? It became a national security issue; a way to safeguard against any future monkey business.

The topic of self-sufficiency predictably took center stage in Russia after the start of the “special military operation,” and the resulting tsunami of sanctions.

Blackpills came from unexpected places.

Anastasia Tatulova, public ombudsman for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Russia, accused officials of presenting a “distorted picture” of Russia’s self-sufficiency. The country’s real sector was almost entirely dependent on imported equipment and components, the business leader said.

Read full article here.

Link here.

By Matt Kennard, Declassified UK, 3/15/23

• Yeltsin said privately in 1993 Russia had “no objection” to Poland and Czech Republic joining NATO
• The comments, which had not been agreed beforehand, “disconcerted” the Russian delegation 
• The following year, Yeltsin told prime minister John Major he was “not against” NATO expansion provided it was done gradually
• Yeltsin was even keen to attend the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid when the first post-Soviet expansion was announced
• But Yeltsin’s prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin gave Major a different view in 1996, saying NATO expansion “would create a fragile situation which could explode” across Europe
• “Russia was not an enemy now but could become one,” Chernomyrdin warned

Boris Yeltsin privately stated he was not against NATO expansion in the 1990s while publicly opposing the military alliance, declassified files show. 

This posture went back as far as 1993, two years into his presidency, which would last until 2000 when he appointed Vladimir Putin his successor.  

Declassified notes from a meeting of the British cabinet in September 1993 include a statement from defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind on the “Russian attitude to the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. 

Rifkind said that on a visit to Poland the previous month, President Yeltsin had told his Polish counterpart Lech Wałęsa “that the Russian Government had no objection to Poland and the Czech Republic joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. 

Rifkind added that this statement “had not been agreed beforehand in Moscow” and “had surprised his Polish hosts and had disconcerted the rest of the Russian delegation”. 

Rifkind concluded that “it was not to be assumed that the Russian authorities as a whole would be so relaxed about the extension eastwards of a Western, albeit defensive, military alliance.”

Yeltsin’s acquiescence in NATO’s expansion was not something shared by his prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. In a private conversation with prime minister John Major in 1996, Chernomyrdin said NATO expansion “could explode” across Europe, declassified files also show.

The proposed NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a hugely controversial policy in Russia. The Western military alliance had originally been set up in 1949 ostensibly as a “defensive” bloc against the “threat” posed by the Soviet Union.

‘Not against the process of enlargement’

But as NATO’s first post-Soviet expansion was being negotiated through the 1990s, Yeltsin’s private support continued. 

In December 1994, John Major and President Yeltsin had a bilateral meeting in Budapest. “This record should be handled discreetly, and is not suitable for passing on to the Americans,” the summary of the meeting read. 

“Yeltsin said he had felt that he and the Prime Minister had come to an agreement…over NATO enlargement,” it added. 

Yeltsin “was not against the process of enlargement, so long as it was well balanced and gradual”, it continued. 

“It would be all right if, after a time, one country joined NATO, and then perhaps a year later another. But he could not agree to enlargement if it was a matter of taking in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe (comment: by implication as a block). This would affect all of Russia’s interests.”

Major said “he understood Yeltsin’s concerns”, adding, “we believe that enlargement had to be handled cautiously and without deadlines…After the division of Europe for so many years into two blocs, everyone needed to approach this subject with great caution.”

Yeltsin “said he understood the Prime Minister’s position and was satisfied with it”. 

In December 1996, Major and Yeltsin talked on the phone as plans for the announcement of the first NATO expansion got closer. “On NATO enlargement, the message was…all sorts of voiced opposition, but in the end tacit acceptance that it would happen,” a summary of Yeltsin’s position read.

Madrid Declaration

These sentiments continued after Tony Blair’s Labour won the general election in May 1997. “The noises made by Yeltsin [on NATO expansion] were all positive,” read the summary of a call between new prime minister Blair and Yeltsin.

A British telegram from Washington, also from May 1997, recounted that a meeting between President Clinton and Yeltsin had “excellent atmospherics”. It added: “Yeltsin [is] in good shape. Clinton encourages him to come to Madrid, sketching out possible arrangements to ease the Russia domestic angle.”

The NATO Summit in 1997 was when the organisation put forward the “Madrid Declaration” which formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance. They became members in 1999. 

“Yeltsin asked Clinton’s advice on whether he should come [to Madrid],” the telegram noted. “He was worried about the domestic downside (ie being accused of blessing NATO expansion). His advisors…were cautioning against attendance.”

Clinton said it would be good if Yeltsin could come. “He recognised the Russian arguments for and against. But there was scope for Yeltsin to make this another personal and political success. Madrid would not focus only on NATO expansion. The Alliance would also be adapting itself, which should be congenial to Russia.” 

Yelstin listened carefully and said “he would reflect”. The UK National Security Council concluded: “Yeltsin is personally keen to go to Madrid, provided he can devise the right presentational strategy.”

Founding Act

Also in 1997, the NATO/Russia Founding Act was signed, ostensibly to build up trust and habits of consultation and cooperation. 

But the declassified files show that the Act, which NATO refused to make legally binding, was a public relations exercise requested by Yeltsin to help him dampen domestic opposition to NATO expansion. 

One UK document noted that NATO expansion was “the catalyst for the NATO/Russia agreement, although we have been careful not to link the two issues.”

UK foreign secretary Robin Cook commented that Yeltsin continued to publicly oppose NATO expansion. However, the Russian leader was privately focusing efforts “on negotiating a joint document with NATO that would enable him to claim that NATO had taken Russian security concerns fully into account before proceeding with enlargement.”

Cook revealed that the Russians had wanted the document to be legally binding and allow for Russia to “enjoy wide-ranging joint decision-making with NATO”. The Russians also requested that the agreement state that the Baltic states and Ukraine should be ruled off-limits for future NATO expansion. 

NATO refused all these requests, but the Russians signed anyway. 

Cook concluded: “I judge that the NATO/Russia agreement has considerable net political benefits to UK and NATO interests. Russian opposition to NATO’s decision, at its Madrid Summit, to invite some countries to begin accession negotiations, is likely to be considerably more muted than it might otherwise have been.”

He added: “Russia’s leaders will have a vested interest in presenting the NATO/Russia deal in a positive light, and in portraying NATO not as a threat or adversary, but as a partner, sensitive to Russian security concerns.”

‘Develop his domestic defence’

The declassified documents also show the US was concerned with helping Yeltsin defend himself against domestic Russian attacks on NATO expansion. 

A January 1997 message from Washington to London noted that the US government “would like to help Yeltsin develop his domestic defence of NATO enlargement”. 

It added: “The underlying American objective was to reinforce Russian leaders (and particularly the younger generation) whose aim was to ‘normalise’ Russia.”

The US was focused on “finding ways to help Yeltsin minimise the domestic damage which NATO enlargement would cause by letting him claim victory on the basis of what could be negotiated with NATO in 1997”. 

It added: “Yeltsin would want to be able to tell the Russian people that Russian interests had been secured”. The newly appointed US ambassador to Russia, James F. Collins “believed the West should help Yeltsin find the right formula to use domestically.”

Collins thought this “was one reason why Yeltsin liked the idea of a Five Power meeting”, which would include France, Germany, Russia, the US and the UK. “It could”, he said, “provide a good platform for Yeltsin to explain the NATO/Russia deal to his domestic constituency.”

Warnings of NATO expansion

But Yeltsin’s position was not official Russian policy. Dire warnings about the dangers of NATO expansion were being communicated to the British at the time by other senior figures in the Russian government. 

A private 1996 conversation between the Major and Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin gives a window into the risks NATO knew they were taking to move forward with post-Soviet expansion. 

Russia’s prime minister told his British counterpart that NATO expansion “could explode” across Europe in a passionate diatribe against the policy. 

The Cassandra-like warning offers a remarkable account of the dangers and risk for European security and domestic reform in Russia if NATO expansion was pursued. 

Russian president Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that NATO’s eastward expansion is one of the reasons for his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has been condemned as illegal and has involved extensive war crimes. 

Chernomyrdin was Russian prime minister from 1992-98, and was seen as a force for moving Moscow closer to the West and forging a friendship with the US. The Yeltsin administration was highly regarded by the British. 

The conversation with Major took place in the margins of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit on 2 December 1996. At the time Yeltsin was recovering from illness, but Chernomyrdin said he had been talking to him “almost every day”. 

When Major asked Chernomyrdin what he thought of the OSCE summit, the Russian prime minister said the organisation’s “importance should be increased” as it could “lay the foundations for the new architecture of European security”. 

He added: “It should be the pivotal organisation, rather than NATO, which had too obvious a military component to it.”

Nuclear ramp up

On NATO expansion Chernomyrdin conceded that Russia could not stop it but made clear “this would create a fragile situation which could explode”. 

He added that “even those countries which wanted to join NATO could not explain why, and where the danger to them came from. Russia might have been seen as a danger in the past. This was no longer appropriate.” 

But it was clear that NATO expansion was perceived as a significant threat to Russian security even by those in the Yeltsin administration prepared to acquiesce in that expansion. This meant that the scale down of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War would also be adversely affected by expanding NATO, Chernomyrdin said. 

“If Russia had to face a unified Europe alone, she would need full nuclear protection, and nuclear reductions would no longer be appropriate,” he told Major. 

Chernomyrdin warned that the proposed expansion would damage European security, which had been improving in the post-Soviet period. 

“What would Europe and the new members gain in practice from NATO enlargement?” he asked Major. “Russia did not have a veto, but Russia was in danger of being vetoed by the rest of Europe. This would recreate volatility in Europe, just when peace and stability had been reestablished. Russia was not an enemy now but could become one.”

Damage to Russian reform

Major told Chernomyrdin: “We did not wish to do anything to unsettle Russia. The Russian leadership’s achievements of recent years were huge.”

But the Russian prime minister outlined the risks to the stability of the Yeltsin administration if new NATO members were invited in.

“The situation in Russia in those circumstances would not be controllable,” he said. “There would be a very negative reaction, as the public hostility – unifying Communists and fascists (Zhirinovksky) – to the latest decree on withdrawal from Chechnya had shown.”

Yeltsin had the previous month ordered the withdrawal of virtually all Russian forces in Chechnya. Vladimir Zhirinovsky was a Russian ultra-nationalist politician and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

The withdrawal from Chechnya “had produced calls for the impeachment of Yeltsin, so the reaction to NATO enlargement could easily be imagined,” Chernomyrdin added. “Russian patience should not be tested again.”

He concluded: “An extreme reaction to NATO enlargement would also damage democracy and economic reform in Russia.”

New cooperation

NATO was at the time trying to create a new cooperation framework to soften the impact of its expansion on Russian opinion. But Chernomyrdin said Russia “was not clear about the path of cooperation, unless the functional core of NATO was changed. Russia could not rush into a partnership with NATO unless the ways of working together had been properly defined.”

At the time, NATO was pushing a new Charter with Russia.

“Russia could not be bought by a Charter – that would not convince the Russian people that NATO enlargement was not dangerous,” Chernomyrdin said. 

For his part, John Major “repeated that sincere Russian fears were well understood” and conceded that “enlargement was obviously a sensitive issue, on which discussions would need to continue. Russian fears were well understood. He certainly did not brush them aside.”  

But, he added, “enlargement would be an evolutionary and transparent process, moving in parallel with a better and broader security relationship with Russia.”

The final note in the document notes that “Chernomyrdin’s comments on NATO enlargement were both longer and more emotional than the above account would suggest. He was beginning to work himself up into quite a lather when lunch finally intervened.”