By Tom O’Connor, Newsweek, 10/31/24

Russia is being considered as a potential player in a deal to halt the conflict raging between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, leveraging its unique position to prevent an even larger-scale war from erupting across a region consumed by crisis for more than a year.

As a ceasefire agreement is drafted with the backing of U.S. presidential advisers Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk, international outlets such as Israel’s Ynet News and the Saudi-owned, United Kingdom-based Asharq Al-Awsat have cited sources in recent days saying that Russia has been asked by Israel to take part in the arrangement.

Uncertainties surround Moscow’s capacity to play an effective role as it contends with a war of its own in Ukraine, but the buy-in of a world power with ties to nearly every major stakeholder could provide crucial support to the initiative at a time when Washington’s leadership in the Middle East has been increasingly called into question.

“We always prefer the Americans,” Orna Mizrahi, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser now serving as senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, told Newsweek. “But we understand that, because of [the Russians’] really good relations nowadays with the Iranians, maybe they can provide something that will contribute to this for the stability of any arrangement in the future.

“Another point is the fact that they are part of the United Nations Security Council five and if we get to the point that we have some kind of a new resolution about the ceasefire in the United Nations Security Council, we would like that the Russians will approve it.”

Moreover, Mizrahi said the latest developments came at a time when Russia “wants to be involved, they want to be relevant to what’s going on in the region.”

A Dual Approach

Moscow has a long history of power plays in the Middle East dating back to the days of the Soviet Union, as the already ideologically fractured region emerging from its colonial era was thrust into the crosshairs of the Cold War. For decades, the USSR was a key supporter of a number of Arab states that clashed with U.S.-backed Israel in support of Palestinian statehood.

Just months before its ultimate collapse, however, the Soviet Union reestablished ties with Israel in 1991 and the newly formed Russian Federation doubled down on this path, particularly after President Vladimir Putin first came to power in 2000. Putin would go on to reassert Russia’s influence across the Middle East and take it a step further by conducting an unprecedented intervention on behalf of longtime partner Syria in the midst of its civil war in 2015.

The conflict set the stage for a substantial boost in Russia’s relationship with Iran, which also backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and jihadis, including the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). Moscow and Tehran have since further bolstered their partnership, with Russian forces even utilizing Iranian drones in the ongoing war in Ukraine launched by Putin in February 2022.

The Russian leader has also forged a close, personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These bonds have been complicated by Moscow’s increasingly harsh criticism of Israeli wartime actions in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, yet Netanyahu has rarely responded in kind and the two sides have managed to keep their channels open.

Having dealt with Russian officials directly in her past roles in government, Mizrahi testified to an “astonishing” level of “their appreciation of Israeli military capabilities,” something she said has helped drive a pragmatic approach on issues such as Syria, where advanced Russian air defenses have been silent in the face of hundreds of Israeli strikes against positions tied to Iran and its militia allies.

She said: “I think that this plays a very significant role in their policy towards Israel and this is one of the reasons that they are not doing anything against the Israeli attacks in Syria, although they could do a lot, of course.”

The region’s focus has since shifted from Syria to Gaza, however, where war erupted in October of last year following an attack led by the Palestinian Hamas movement against Israel. Even more recently, the spotlight has been on Lebanon, where the Israeli military is now waging a combined air and land campaign against Hezbollah, a close ally of Iran, over its continuous cross-border strikes in solidarity with Hamas.

Hezbollah has been dealt severe blows as a result of the conflict, including the loss of large amounts of equipment and the deaths of senior commanders, including longtime Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. But as the powerful paramilitary organization regroups and Israel and Iran reel from their recent exchange of direct strikes, the latest ceasefire talks have emerged as a potential off-ramp.

Among the discussed components of the deal, an apparent U.S. draft of which was leaked earlier this week by Israeli broadcaster Kan and confirmed by two sources cited by Reuters, is a plan to hamper the flow of weapons to Hezbollah via the presence of foreign troops at the Syria-Lebanon border.

Yeghia Tashjian, regional and international affairs cluster coordinator at the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, pointed out that Russia was in the best position to aid in this effort given the presence of its forces in Syria.

“Here, we should ask, is it in Russia’s interest to see Hezbollah dismantled?” Tashjian, who recently participated in a conference held by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies discussing Moscow’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean, asked.

“Russia does not want to see Hezbollah weakened to a degree that would increase the U.S. influence in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah and Iran have been useful in containing the American influence,” he said. “However, instability is not in the interest of Russia if it extends to Syria.”

Allies and Competitors

Today, Tashjian said, Moscow’s attention has been diverted to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where Putin is overseeing a massive war effort against Kyiv, which is receiving increasingly advanced aid from Washington and its NATO allies.

Tashjian said this shift was most notably demonstrated by Russia’s lack of intervention in support of ally Armenia when Azerbaijan seized control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region last year. The large-scale offensive came just three years after the establishment of a ceasefire agreement meant to be enforced by Russian peacekeeping units.

Russia and Iran, which also borders the volatile South Caucasus region, have since diverged on their positions in the strategically located area as the former backs the opening of a corridor through Armenian territory to Azerbaijani lands and Iran opposes it.

In Syria, too, the two powers have differed in their long-term approaches, with Moscow looking to bring the war-torn nation back into the Arab fold while Tehran views it as a key component of the Axis of Resistance coalition that also includes Hezbollah and an array of other non-state actors in the region. Critical for both players is access to the Mediterranean.

“Within this context, there seems to be an agreement between Tel Aviv and Moscow that the former would not sell weapons to Kyiv and in return, Russia would close an eye for Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah assets in Syria,” Tashjian said. “The weakening of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria would also provide additional flexibility for President Bashar al-Assad to open to the Gulf countries.”

The Syrian conflict has also had a profound impact in Lebanon because of refugee flows, security concerns and the often-polarizing history between the neighboring nations, among other factors. Since the end of the civil war in 1991 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, Lebanon’s sectarian politics have largely been divided into two blocs, one supportive of Assad and the other opposed to him.

Iran’s influence in the country has traditionally been rooted in its close ties to fellow Shiite Muslims, predominantly Hezbollah, the dominant military force in the country and also a powerful political entity.

Russia, too, has established a rapport with Hezbollah. Moscow has also fostered support among different segments of society, including the Orthodox Christian community and other key figures such as Maronite Christian Marada Movement leader Suleiman Frangieh, who has been considered a potential candidate to assume the vacant Lebanese presidency, thus breaking a two-year deadlock.

“Its soft power over the years has built bridges with many actors both in the Christian and Muslim communities, something that Iran lacks,” Tashjian said. “Hence, the Israeli media outlets hinting on the issue that Russia is being asked and has expressed willingness to play a role in a ceasefire in Lebanon means we may see greater Russian involvement in Lebanon, at the expense of Iran.”

“I am not sure if the U.S. will agree on such an idea,” he added. “This depends on the future administration in Washington and its willingness to compartmentalize its relations with Moscow.”

Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department told Newsweek that “we don’t have comment on Russian diplomatic efforts” and spoke instead to the U.S. approach to the ongoing talks.

“The United States is committed to regional stability,” the State Department spokesperson said. “We continue to support a diplomatic solution to current hostilities between Israel and Hizballah—one that restores lasting calm and allows residents in both countries to return safely to their homes.”

Newsweek has also reached out to the Lebanese Embassy to the U.S., the Israeli Consulate General in New York, the Iranian Mission to the United Nations and the Russian Foreign Ministry for comment.

A Precarious Pivot

Mona Yacoubian, a former U.S. State Department analyst now serving as vice president of the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East and North Africa center, expressed doubts regarding Russia’s potential to play a major role in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon.

“Russia’s strategy in Lebanon has largely been opportunistic, seeking to exploit opportunities wherever they arise without investing significant resources,” Yacoubian told Newsweek. “As such, Moscow’s influence in Lebanon is fairly limited and certainly pales in comparison to the role it plays in Syria.”

Unlike in Syria, where Russia capitalized on a Cold War-era relationship with the central government to great effect, Lebanon’s complex constellation of sectarian factions would demand a more comprehensive campaign of maneuvering.

“Under the current circumstances, it’s difficult to imagine Russia exploiting the current crisis to play a bigger role in Lebanon,” Yacoubian said. “It does not have the requisite influence across Lebanon’s political spectrum, leverage among key regional players or leading influence in the United Nations to take on ceasefire diplomacy in Lebanon.”

While Russia’s soft power moves have gained a degree of foothold in Lebanon, Moscow’s more ambitious projects have had mixed results.

In 2018, Russia offered a $5 billion military assistance deal to Lebanon only for the agreement to later be turned down amid U.S. and European pressure. That same year, Russian energy giants Novatek and Rosneft signed contracts for the exploration of Lebanese maritime gas fields but the former ultimately ceded the contract to QatarEnergy last year amid Western sanctions over the war in Ukraine.

Karim Emile Bitar, a professor of international relations at Saint Joseph University of Beirut, also felt the major players in Lebanon at this stage remained the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia, which continues to hold the greatest influence among the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanon amid competition with another regional player, Turkey.

He told Newsweek that Moscow and Ankara do exert degrees of influence in Lebanon “but they cannot be considered as key stakeholders, unless the solution to the Israeli-Lebanese war is part of a wider package deal that would involve a detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between the United States and Iran, and if it includes the Syrian dossier, if Bashar al-Assad can be forced to make certain concessions.”

“In that case, Putin could be a broker, a middleman between the Sunni Arab states and Bashar al-Assad,” he said.

Still, as Russian International Affairs Council expert Kirill Semenov told Newsweek: “Russia does not cease to conduct dialogue with Lebanese political forces.” He said the current discussions come as “Moscow is trying to understand Israel’s motives in order to find common ground between them in order to develop a formula for a possible ceasefire.”

Others, too, would need to be convinced of the final initiative.

“Moscow’s efforts alone on this track will not be enough and informal consultations with Western countries are necessary, as well as close coordination with Moscow’s Arab partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” Semenov said.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have called for a ceasefire since the regional crisis first erupted more than a year ago, but they have so far been hesitant to play a larger role. Moscow has had success in the past on this front, however, notably playing a significant part in mending their ties with Damascus, which returned to the Arab League last year after being shut out at the onset of the civil war in 2011.

Assad’s comeback on the battlefield and diplomatic arena with help from Moscow was widely viewed as a victory against Washington’s waning influence in the region. But replicating this win in Lebanon may prove an even bigger challenge for the Kremlin, even with the many inroads it has sought to foster.

“Moscow and Beirut maintain close relations and contacts, just as Russia maintains relations with various political forces in the country, both with Hezbollah’s allies and opponents, so Russia still has certain levers of influence in Lebanon,” Semenov said. “But they are limited.

“Nevertheless, many political forces in Lebanon are ready to listen to Moscow’s advice but this does not mean that they will follow this advice.”

YouTube link here.

Russia Matters, 11/1/24

1. Russia gained more territory in October, including 160+ square miles in the Donetsk region, than in any month since July 2022, according to NYT’s analysis of ISW maps. According to estimates, which ISW itself shared with RM, the Russian armed forces have made a net gain of 206 square miles between Sept. 30, 2024, and Oct. 31, 2024. Just this week, Russian gains acknowledged by Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT project included the seizures of Levadne, Hirnyk, Bohoyavlenka, Novoukrainka, Selydove, Vyshneve, and Zoryane. Capture of Selydove can give the Russian army a tactical exit to Pokrovsk, which is a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, according to Ukrainian Gen. Dmytro Marchenko. “This is very bad for us,” he said, according to the Daily Telegraph. “I won’t be revealing a military secret if I say that our front has crumbled,” said the general. While Ukrainian forces have so far managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defenses elsewhere, according to an Oct. 29 story in the Economist. Russia cannot fight forever, but the worry is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first, according to this U.K. newspaper. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say the narrow focus is on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” a person involved in that planning told the Economist. Interestingly, the headline on this story, which The Economist ran on Oct. 29 and which RM staff accessed on that day and wrote about in a post on X, said “Ukraine is now struggling to survive, not to win.”¹ On Oct. 31, however, that story’s headline already read “Ukraine is now struggling to cling on, not to win.”*   
2. Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists this week that the Ukrainian forces have received only 10% of a $61 billion U.S. aid package pledged in April, blaming delays on bureaucracy and logistics. He has repeatedly asked the U.S., so far without success, to provide long-range weapons so that Ukraine can strike military targets in Russia, per his victory plan, according to Bloomberg. In one part of his victory plan, Zelenskyy proposed a “nonnuclear deterrence package,” in which Ukraine would get Tomahawk missiles, a totally unfeasible request, a senior U.S. official told NYT.Ukrainian Gen. Dmytro Marchenko said that Zelenskyy’s victory plan was too heavily focused on pleading with Western allies for more support. “This plan lacks any points addressing Ukraine or our needs,” Marchenko said of Zelenskyy’s plan, according to the Daily Telegraph. Referring to Western supplies of arms to Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin wrote in FA, “There is no silver bullet. No single capability will turn the tide. No one system will end Putin’s assault. What matters is the combined effects of Ukraine’s military capabilities—and staying focused on what works.”   
3. More than two-thirds of Ukrainians believe it’s time to start peace talks with Russia, according to a recent survey by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center cited by Bloomberg. This represents an increase of 14 percentage points on the same period last year. As for Russians’ attitudes toward peace, a majority of them support ending hostilities and launching peace negotiations, according to the results of a recent poll by the Levada Center. However, when asked by Levada if Russia should make concessions in such negotiations, a vast majority answered in the negative.
4. In a recent interview, Zelenskyy reiterated that he was still against ceding territory, but he also talked about diplomatic steps on the protection of energy infrastructure and safe shipping in the Black Sea. He also hinted at one approach that might allow Ukraine to save face if it does not reclaim all the land Russia has captured, NYT reported. “No one will legally recognize the occupied territories as belonging to other states,” he said. Zelenskyy may also strive to show Ukrainians that he has done all he can, prepare them for the possibility that Ukraine might have to make a deal and give Ukrainians a convenient scapegoat: the West, according to NYT. Meanwhile, some in Moscow hope Vladimir Putin will be ready to open peace talks once Russian troops reach the administrative border of the Donetsk region, Sergei Markov, a political consultant close to the Kremlin, told Bloomberg. So far, however, Putin would not even discuss the mutual non-targeting of energy infrastructure with Ukraine, to say less of a peace deal, until the Ukrainian army loses control of over 600 square kilometers of Russian land in the Kursk region, according to a Kremlin insider. Ukraine needs a deal on non-targeting of energy infrastructure more than Russia does, given Russia’s vast energy resources and that some 60% of Ukraine’s power generation has been knocked out by Russian attacks.

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 10/17/24

The just-released results from Gallup’s Trust in Media Survey leave no doubt that members of my profession are officially America’s lowest life form. Gallup asked:

In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the mass media — such as newspapers, T.V. and radio — when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately, and fairly — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

• A great deal 7
• Fair amount 25
• Not very much 29
• None at all 39

The Great Deal/Fair Amount number of 32% merely ties Gallup’s lowest-ever number, first recorded in 2016. The more shocking result is the combined Not much (29%) and None at all (39!) number of 68%. That is one point lower than the 67% figure posted by the usual standard-setter for mistrust: “The legislative branch, consisting of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.” It’s really not that close, as most distrust of Congress is of the softer, “Not very much” variety (44%), while the press laps elected counterparts by 15 points (39%-24%) in the far more hardcore None at all category.

It’s impossible to overstate this embarrassment. There are necrophiliacs who wouldn’t touch a congressional corpse. You may not hesitate to sacrifice a congressman in a lifeboat, but you think twice about eating him, even starving. Record fines for misconduct, and more informational access to behaviors like legal insider trading mean the elected officials Twain called America’s only “distinctly native criminal class” are hated more than ever. Yet expectations for journalists are now lower than those for Congress. Asked about trust in a politician, “None at all” is what people say when they expect nothing to get done. With media, it’s what you say if you don’t even trust a reporter to tell the time. It’s an extraordinary indictment…

The full article (behind a paywall) is available here. I highly recommend subscribing to Taibbi’s journalism at Substack for $5.00 a month.

By Glenn Diesen, Substack, 10/30/24

[Links to references available at link above]

The Economist reports that “Russia is slicing through Ukrainian defences” and Ukraine is subsequently “struggling to survive”.[1] Across the Western media, the public is prepared for defeat and painful concessions in future negotiations. The media is changing the narrative as reality can no longer be ignored. Russia’s coming victory has been obvious since at least the summer of 2023, yet this was ignored to keep the proxy war going.

We are witnessing an impressive demonstration of narrative control: For more than two years, the political-media elites have been chanting “Ukraine is winning” and denounced any dissent to their narrative as “Kremlin talking points” that aim to reduce support for the war. What was “Russian propaganda” yesterday is now suddenly the consensus of the collective media. Critical self-reflection is as absent as it was after the Russiagate reporting.

Similar narrative control was displayed when the media reassured the public for two decades that NATO was winning [in Afghanistan], before fleeing in a great rush with dramatic images of people falling off an airplane.

The media deceived the public by presenting the stagnant frontlines as evidence that Russia was not winning. However, in a war of attrition, the direction of the war is measured by attrition rates – the losses on each side. Territorial control comes after the adversary has been exhausted as territorial expansion is very costly in such high-intensity warfare with powerful defensive lines. The attrition rates have throughout the war been extremely unfavourable to Ukraine, and they continuously get worse. The current collapse of the Ukrainian frontlines was very predictable as the manpower and weaponry have been exhausted.

Why has the former narrative expired? The public could be misled by fake attrition rates, yet it is not possible to cover up territorial changes after the eventual breaking point. Furthermore, the proxy war was beneficial to NATO when the Russians and Ukrainians were bleeding each other without any significant territorial changes. Once the Ukrainians are exhausted and begin to lose strategic territory, it is no longer in the interest of NATO to continue the war.

Narrative Control: Weaponising Empathy

The political-media elites weaponised empathy to get public support for war and disdain for diplomacy. The Western public was convinced to support the proxy war against Russia by appealing to their empathy for the suffering of Ukrainians and the injustice of their loss of sovereignty. Yet, all appeals to empathy are always translated into support for continued warfare and dismissing diplomatic solutions.

Those who disagreed with NATO’s mantra that “weapons are the way to peace” and instead suggested negotiations, were quickly dismissed as puppets of the Kremlin who did not care about Ukrainians. Support for continued fighting in a war that cannot be won has been the only acceptable expression of empathy.

For the postmodernists seeking to socially construct their own reality, great power rivalry is largely a battle of narratives. The weaponisation of empathy enabled the war narrative to become impervious to criticism. War is virtuous and diplomacy is treasonous as Ukraine was allegedly fighting Russia’s unprovoked war with the objective to subjugate the entire country. A strong moral framing convinced people to deceive and self-censor in support of the noble cause.

Even criticism of how Ukrainian civilians were dragged into cars by their government and sent to their deaths on the frontlines was portrayed as supporting “Kremlin talking points” as it undermined the NATO war narrative.

Reporting on high Ukrainian casualty rates threatened to undermine support for the war. Reporting on the failure of sanctions threatened to reduce public support for the sanctions. Reporting on the likely US destruction of Nord Stream threatened to create divisions within the military bloc. Reporting on the US and UK sabotage of the Minsk agreement and the Istanbul negotiations threatens the narrative of NATO merely attempting to “help” Ukraine. The public is offered the binary option of adhering either to the pro-Ukraine/NATO narrative or the pro-Russia narrative. Anyone challenging the narrative with inconvenient facts could thus be accused of supporting Moscow’s narrative. Reporting that Russia was winning was uncritically interpreted as taking Russia’s side.

There are ample facts and statements that demonstrate NATO has been fighting to the last Ukrainian to weaken a strategic rival. Yet, the strict narrative control entails that such evidence has not been permitted to be discussed.

The Objectives of a Proxy War: Bleeding the Adversary

The strict demand for loyalty to the narrative conceals unreported facts that US foreign policy is about restoring global primacy and not an altruistic commitment to liberal democratic values. The US considers Ukraine to be an important instrument to weaken Russia as a strategic rival.

RAND Corporation, a think tank funded by the US government and renowned for its close ties with the intelligence community, published a report in 2019 on how the US could bleed Russia by pulling it further into Ukraine. RAND recognised that the US could send more military equipment to Ukraine and threaten NATO expansion to provoke Russia to increase its involvement in Ukraine:

“Providing more U.S. military equipment and advice could lead Russia to increase its direct involvement in the conflict and the price it pays for it… While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washington pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while leading Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development”.[2]

However, the same RAND report recognised that the strategy of bleeding Russia had to be carefully “calibrated” as a full-scale war could result in Russia acquiring strategic territories, which is not in the interest of the US. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the strategy was similarly to keep the war going as long as there were not significant territorial changes.

In March 2022, Leon Panetta (former White House Chief of Staff, US Secretary of Defence, and CIA Director) acknowledged: “We are engaged in a conflict here, it’s a proxy war with Russia, whether we say so or not…. The way you get leverage is by, frankly, going in and killing Russians”.[3] Even Zelensky recognised in March 2022 that some Western states wanted to use Ukraine as a proxy against Russia: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.[4]

US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the objectives in the Ukraine proxy war as weakening its strategic adversary:

“We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine…. So it [Russia] has already lost a lot of military capability. And a lot of its troops, quite frankly. And we want to see them not have the capability to very quickly reproduce that capability”.[5]

There have also been indications of regime change and destruction of Russia as wider goals of the war. Sources in the US and UK governments confirmed in March 2022 that the objective was for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.[6] President Biden suggested that regime change was necessary in Russia: “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power”. However, the White House later walked back Biden’s dangerous remarks.

The spokesperson of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, also made an explicit reference to regime change by arguing “the measures we’re introducing, that large parts of the world are introducing, are to bring down the Putin regime”. James Heappey, the UK Minister for the Armed Forces, similarly wrote in the Daily Telegraph:

“His failure must be complete; Ukrainian sovereignty must be restored, and the Russian people empowered to see how little he cares for them. In showing them that, Putin’s days as President will surely be numbered and so too will those of the kleptocratic elite that surround him. He’ll lose power and he won’t get to choose his successor”.[7]

Fighting to the Last Ukrainian

Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department, criticised Washington’s decision to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.[8]

Republican Senator Lindsey Graham outlined the favourable arrangements the US had established with Ukraine: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.[9] The Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, cautioned against conflating idealism the hard reality of US objectives in the proxy war:

“President Zelenskyy is an inspiring leader. But the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests.… Finally, we all know that Ukraine’s fight to retake its territory is neither the beginning nor end of the West’s broader strategic competition with Putin’s Russia”.[10]

Senator Mitt Romney argued that arming Ukraine was “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money… a weakened Russia is a good thing”, and it comes at a relatively low cost as “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. Senator Richard Blumenthal similarly asserted: “we’re getting our money’s worth on our Ukraine investment” because “for less than 3 percent of our nation’s military budget, we’ve enabled Ukraine to degrade Russia’s military strength by half… All without a single American service woman or man injured or lost”.[11] Congressman Dan Crenshaw agrees that “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.[12]

Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly argued in March 2023 that “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. Kellogg further explained that using Ukrainians to fight Russia “takes a strategic adversary off the table” and thus enables the US to focus on its “primary adversary which is China”. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg also argued that defeating Russia and using Ukraine as a bulwark against Russia “will make it easier” for the US “to focus also on China… if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we’ll have a weakened Russian army, and we have also now Europe really stepping up for defense spending”.[13]

In Search of a New Narrative

A new victory narrative is required as a NATO-backed Ukraine cannot realistically defeat Russia on the battlefield. The strongest narrative is obviously to claim that Russia has failed in its objective to annex all of Ukraine to recreate the Soviet Empire and thereafter conquer Europe. This narrative enables NATO to claim victory. After Ukraine’s disastrous counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, such a new narrative was indicated by Ignatius in the Washington Post, where he argued the measurement of success is the weakening of Russia:

“Meanwhile, for the United States and its NATO allies, these 18 months of war have been a strategic windfall, at relatively low cost (other than for the Ukrainians). The West’s most reckless antagonist has been rocked. NATO has grown much stronger with the additions of Sweden and Finland. Germany has weaned itself from dependence on Russian energy and, in many ways, rediscovered its sense of values. NATO squabbles make headlines, but overall, this has been a triumphal summer for the alliance”.[14]

Sean Bell, a former Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal and Ministry of Defence staffer, argued in September 2023 that the war had significantly degraded the Russian military to the point it ‘no longer poses a credible threat to Europe’. Bell therefore concluded that “the Western objective of this conflict has been achieved” and “The harsh reality is that Ukraine’s objectives are no longer aligned with their backers”.[15]

The Ukrainian proxy has been exhausted, which ends the proxy war unless NATO is prepared to go to war against Russia. As NATO is preparing to cut its losses, a new narrative is required. As the narrative changes, it will soon be permitted to call for negotiations as a display of empathy for the Ukrainians.