By Leon Vermeulen, Substack, 4/26/26
Recent statements in Russian strategic discourse should not be dismissed lightly. In a widely viewed interview on Russia-24, Sergey Karaganov articulated a view that is gaining traction within segments of Russia’s policy and intellectual elite: that Europe is no longer merely supporting Ukraine, but is becoming a direct participant in a broader war against Russia.
For many in the West, such statements are reflexively categorised as propaganda or escalation rhetoric. For many in Russia, they are increasingly seen as plain descriptions of reality.
This divergence is no longer just rhetorical. It is becoming structural—and it is dangerous.
Two Realities, One Escalation Path
From a European perspective, recent developments are framed as necessary responses to Russian actions in Ukraine:
increased defence spending
expanded military cooperation
support for Ukrainian military capabilitiesThese are seen as deterrence measures, intended to prevent further escalation.
From a Russian perspective, the same developments are interpreted cumulatively:
European defence industries producing weapons used against Russian territory
military planning scenarios involving Russian regions such as Kaliningrad
increasingly explicit discussions of nuclear deterrence within Europe
Taken together, these are not seen as defensive. They are read as preparations for sustained confrontation.
Neither interpretation is entirely irrational. But together, they form a mutually reinforcing escalation dynamic.
The Shift Inside Russia
The significance of voices like Sergey Karaganov lies not in their extremity, but in their growing resonance.
Several elements stand out:
1. Expansion of the Conflict Frame
The war is no longer described as limited to Ukraine. It is increasingly framed as: a broader conflict between Russia and the West, with Europe as an active participant.
2. Historical Reframing
References to Europe as a recurrent source of conflict—particularly invoking the legacy of the World War II—are becoming more frequent. These are not casual analogies. They:
elevate the perceived stakes
justify long-term mobilisation
normalise the idea of existential confrontation
3. Nuclear Threshold Reconsideration
Perhaps most concerning is the re-emergence of arguments that:
Russia may need to lower its nuclear threshold
limited or demonstrative use could be considered to “stop escalation”
Even when framed conditionally, such discussions shift the boundaries of what is thinkable.
Pressure on Leadership
In this environment, Vladimir Putin faces a complex internal dynamic:
On one side: the need to avoid uncontrolled escalation
On the other: increasing pressure not to appear weak or indecisive
As elite discourse hardens, the political space for restraint narrows—not only in Europe, but in Russia as well.
This is a critical point often missed in Western analysis:
Escalation risk is not only a function of capability—it is a function of perceived credibility under pressure.
Europe’s Parallel Constraint
Europe faces its own version of this narrowing:
Political systems reward firmness over flexibility
Media narratives increasingly moralise the conflict
Strategic planning assumes long-term confrontation
The result is a system in which:
de-escalation becomes politically costly
signalling becomes more explicit
and deterrence begins to resemble preparation for war
The Convergence Risk
What emerges is not a deliberate march toward war, but something more insidious:
a convergence of perceptions in which both sides believe they are acting defensively, while preparing for escalation.
This is the classic security dilemma—intensified by:
historical memory
media amplification
and the erosion of direct communication channels
The absence of meaningful diplomatic engagement between European Union states and Russia compounds the problem. Signals are increasingly transmitted through:
military posture
public rhetoric
and indirect interpretation
This is an unstable way to manage great-power tension.
A Warning, Not an Endorsement
The views expressed by figures like Sergey Karaganov should not be accepted at face value. But neither should they be ignored.
They are indicators:
of shifting elite sentiment
of widening perception gaps
of increasing tolerance for escalation
Dismissing them outright risks underestimating the trajectory. Embracing them uncritically risks legitimising escalation.
The Responsibility of Leadership
The current trajectory does not make large-scale war inevitable. But it does make it increasingly thinkable.
Avoiding that outcome requires deliberate action:
re-establishing channels of communication
restoring space for strategic ambiguity rather than constant signalling
resisting the political incentives that reward maximalist positions
Above all, it requires recognition of a simple but uncomfortable truth:
Deterrence without understanding can become indistinguishable from provocation.
Conclusion: Stepping Back from the Edge
The danger today is not that Europe seeks war, or that Russia seeks immediate escalation. It is that both are constructing systems in which:
mistrust is embedded
restraint is penalised
and worst-case assumptions become default
In such a system, disaster does not require intent. It requires only continuation.
If there is still time to step back, it lies not in winning the argument—but in slowing the trajectory.
Because once deterrence becomes destiny,
the path to catastrophe may no longer feel like a choice.