A Storied Russian Muckraker On Oil, Iran, Ukraine, and More – Interview with Leonid Krutakov

By Matt Taibbi, Racket News, 4/2/26

In Moscow in July 1997, reporter Leonid Krutakov had a scoop. Anatoly Chubais, the Harvard-educated privatization boss and right hand of Boris Yeltsin, had been given a $3 million loan from Stolichny Bank just before that same bank — controlled by an intimidating “businessman” named Alexander Smolensky — won an auction for a state-owned agricultural property, Agroprombank.

It was a great story, but Krutakov had to make an epic journey to print it. First fired from Chubais-friendly Komsomolskaya Pravda, he was rejected by Moskovsky Komsomolets, then appealed to the legendary editor of Top Secret, Artem Borovik, before that magazine, too, turned him down. Finally Krutakov struck a deal to publish a piece called “Credit… Or Lose” — a play on the USAID-inspired “Vote or Lose” commercials crucial to Yeltsin’s recent re-election — in Izvestia. Immediately after, Izvestia editor Igor Golombiyevsky was fired, and in a town full of hotshot muckrakers, Krutakov was feted for turning four newsrooms upside down in pursuit of a single political bribery story.

I was eventually fortunate to get a chance to work under Leonid at his paper Stringer, and watched in admiration as he and a handful of colleagues took big risks at a time when Russian reporters were routinely shot, beaten, blown up, stuffed in drainpipes, or worse. Decades later, the writer I remembered for short-form breaking news has published a massive, meticulously researched history of the oil business called “Oil and Peace,” analogous in scope to books like Daniel Yergin’s The PrizeThe book argues human history has become intertwined with oil to the point where there’s virtually no line between petroleum and politics itself, while underscoring the lunatic inefficiency of the oil-dominated world.

American analyses of these questions tend to focus obsessively on global warming, but Krutakov’s book spends more time focusing on the doomed math of tying so much of our lives — everything from light to food to antihistamines to dentures to transportation — to the production of one hydrocarbon. The high-energy lifestyles enjoyed by residents of the West are dependent on low extraction costs in developing nations, and the political unsustainability calculus is more troubling than the ecological one:

The energy density of oil is incredible… 159 liters of oil is equivalent to about 100 liters of gasoline. A month of driving equals a thousand kilometers, with an average consumption of 10 liters per kilometer. This means that the average driver burns as much energy in a month as it would take 12 people to build a three-story mansion in a year… It’s hard to even imagine how many people would have to work, and for how long, to provide the energy equivalent of one voyage of a supertanker from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam.

Krutakov started working on this book, his first, two decades ago. Having never visited the U.S., he nonetheless spends a significant portion of the book tracing the rise of John D. Rockefeller, who’s described in enormous detail as a brilliant, morally dubious visionary. “Rockefeller built the world in which we live,” Krutakov says. “He laid the foundations of the oil industry as vertically integrated with an internal pricing system that allows controlling the cost of the final product.”

There are parts of the book that will cause an American reader to raise an eyebrow, like the assertion that the American Civil War “wasn’t fought over human rights or a struggle over slavery” but over two warring models of economics, between muscle and machine, “biological” and “mineral” energy. The bulk of America’s oil-producing regions were located in the South, which presented a considerable problem for the Union, which was heavily invested in the nascent new business empire led by Rockefeller.

It’s not news that a long list of subsequent wars were fought with control over the oil supply as either a central motivation or a significant subtext, with Hitler’s invasion of Russia in search of the Caspian petroleum fields a classic example. Krutakov he writes in detail about this key role oil played in triggering two world wars and misadventures in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. Still, the subject has never been more relevant than now. I asked him about oil’s role in the Iran war and what the future of a world rapidly burning through its energy reserves looks like:

MT: You say you’ve been working on this book for twenty years. What prompted you to start on this subject?

Leonid Krutakov: The topic seized me right after September 11, 2001. Then I realized that the world had entered a new phase of development, where energy resources became key to solving economic questions. The collapse of Enron, as the most “advanced” energy company in the world, showed that the ratio of real flows of physical oil to futures volumes of “paper oil” didn’t stand up to risk-hedging market tools. The market had been pushed too far into the future. The lever of financial engineering had exceeded the horizon of risk insurance. Regulatory political factors came to the forefront. It became clear that the energy component would lead the world to a global clash over energy sources, which we are witnessing today: Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Russia, Iran…

MT: You write that the world cannot exist without oil. Will that always be the case? Is there an analog in history to our current oil dependence?

Leonid Krutakov: The world can exist without oil, but not in the same quantity and not in the same configuration as today. Oil is an accumulation of biological energy, concentrating enormous volumes of solar energy dispersed over time and space. One gallon of the gasoline we use today contains 90 metric tons of ancient plant substances. In one year, humanity burns a volume of fossil fuel equivalent to all the animal and plant life that inhabited the Earth over 400 years. We are eating through the lives and well-being of future generations.

Oil, of course, is not the only energy source. Today it is actively being replaced by LNG and coal, but these are also finite natural resources. Moreover, today’s agriculture is built on petrochemistry. Without nitrates and “targeted” pesticides, industrialized farms cannot exist, just as huge cattle farms cannot. As the Iran crisis shows, a shortage of oil and gas immediately drives up fertilizer prices, which means developing countries with growing populations will not be able to feed themselves.

So the world can exist without oil only in a limited format, which would lead to a decline in medical care and life expectancy (even ordinary aspirin is a petrochemical product). A drop in yields would lead to more hunger and epidemics in poorly developed countries. We would see a world of shrinking possibilities.

As for an analog to today’s dependence on oil, such dependence has always existed. Even in the era of Standard Oil, about 400 different products were produced from oil. Today this assortment has grown by orders of magnitude, including diapers and baby bottles. So the dependence has been growing all this time. And whenever energy-deficient countries faced questions of shortage, a global crisis followed. The analog of today is the 1973 crisis.

MT: Prior to the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Europe was largely dependent on Russian oil, as you wrote. Now the United States is in a war led by a president who wants to “take oil” from Iran. Are all wars now about energy (and oil in particular)?

Leonid Krutakov: It has always been so, for at least the last 150 years, since oil became the first (if you don’t count gold and silver) global commodity requiring unification of trading rules on a world scale. Oil became the first global commodity traded in only one currency. Oil lies at the core of the rules of the global market.

I show that the First and Second World Wars (Churchill regarded them as a single 30-year war) were also about energy resources, about the right to establish norms, standards, and regulations for the global market. The oil underpinning (more precisely, the kerosene underpinning) even ties to the Civil War of the North and South, the “oil triangle” war among three Eastern Seaboard states and agricultural states of America.

Iran, as I noted above, is only one link in the new Great War for the planet’s global market. The Libyan story began with a project to construct an oil pipeline to Italy along the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea, which would make Europe, together with Russian pipelines, energy-independent from sea deliveries of oil and gas. Syria should have become part of the oil pipeline from Iran through Iraq, along the bottom of the Mediterranean to Europe. Literally on the eve of Syrian events, a tripartite memorandum Iran-Iraq-Syria was signed about the pipeline. Ukraine, before Maidan and the start of the Special Military Operation, was the main oil-and-gas hub between Europe and Russia.

In the same line is the explosion of the gas “Nord Stream” pipelines, which established a direct link between Germany and Russia, bypassing Ukraine. One can recall Biden’s statement on the eve of the explosion that the U.S. would stop gas deliveries via Nord Stream. When asked how, he said he couldn’t say at that moment. As for Venezuela, perhaps no need to remind—everything happened right before our eyes. So Iran is not a precedent.

MT: Thirty years ago American and European oil titans dominated the market and Western advisers considered Russia a minor power, unable to realize the potential of its natural resources. Have the roles changed at all?

Leonid Krutakov: Russia remains fundamentally a rentier country. Over the past 30 years Russia has failed to convert its energy opportunities into cognitive capital. We did not convert oil revenues into education and science, we did not recreate an autonomous technological and industrial contour, as Rockefeller and America managed to do from scratch. Russia remains a critically important factor on the global energy map. Its military potential is significant, the foundations of which were laid under the USSR. In this sense, Russia remains a politically significant subject of world relations, but there hasn’t yet been a fundamental reorientation of the country’s development strategy at a deep level. I say this with pain for my homeland, because genuine supremacy is formed not in raw materials or the military sphere, but in education. Knowledge and science make a country truly great and significant for the whole of world civilization.

MT: You write about the “red line” around the Arabian Peninsula. There a hot war has erupted. What do you think are its causes?

Leonid Krutakov: Since the discovery of the first oil on the Arabian Peninsula, the U.S. has made the kingdom its oil dominion. After World War II, when Churchill tried to strike a deal with Roosevelt to divide the Middle East resource base between the two nations, the U.S. president answered him unequivocally that “the oil of Saudi Arabia belongs to America.” In the second book, which is being prepared for publication now, I explain this in more detail, with references to primary sources. The strikes on Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar by Iran mean that Tehran understands very well what bets are being placed in today’s game. It understands where the Western world’s most vulnerable spot lies. It understands why Trump came with the war against Iran.

MT: You write that you hope to avoid a conventional history, and instead create a book that captures the “underground currents” of this time period, as might be visible to future generations. What prompted that approach?

Leonid Krutakov: There has been a lot of research written about oil. I was seeking a new approach, aiming to rise above market conjuncture. To assess oil not just as an energy resource, but as a foundation for the entire social order and the system of international relations. I set the task of explaining historical patterns not through the will and personal characteristics of political leaders (such as Trump, for example, or Putin), but through the material resources that allow history itself to materialize. To turn the future from unpredictable into predictable. To find a basis for a global agreement among key world players.

I believed that if you expose the real global problem and publicize it, the question of future world parity could be solved not on the basis of power resources, but on a rational approach to our possibilities and the resources of planet Earth.

MT: Switching topics: what don’t Americans understand about the war in Ukraine? What was your reaction when the West cut off access to Russian television and tried to arrest people like Dmitry Simes? In the 2000s you had a reputation as a fearless reporter — what memories do you have of those times?

Leonid Krutakov: I think the American government understands the reasons for the war in Ukraine very well. The fact that these reasons are unclear to the American people only shows that these reasons have not been made public, as in the cases of Venezuela and Iran. For Russia, the situation of Ukraine potentially joining NATO was an existential threat. It’s somewhat like placing Chinese or Russian military contingents in Mexico or Venezuela.

Everyone remembers how the Cuban Missile Crisis began, almost leading the world to nuclear war: the deployment of American medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Turkey. The USSR, in response, began placing its missiles in Cuba. In this sense, the Ukrainian situation is a replica of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thank God, so far there has been no direct confrontation between the United States and Russia.

As for cutting off access to Russian television, I can only say that this is how it always happens when you lose in direct information confrontation. When your arguments yield to your opponent’s arguments. This happened in the Soviet Union. And, unfortunately, today in Russia with cutting off access to Telegram. You cannot retreat into your own shell. In a war of meanings, victory can be achieved only through meaning, content, arguments, ideas. Retreat from discussion does not mean victory; it means admission of defeat.

The attempt to arrest Dmitry Simes, like the killings of journalists, is a symptom of a deeper disease affecting the whole world discourse. The revolver has always been and remains the last argument in a debate when you have nothing left to respond with. Look at the film industry. Where is “Rain Man”? Where is “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest”? Only lines and comics. We in the cultural sphere have similar trends…

I haven’t felt like a journalist for a long time. It all ended with the death of the Stringer, in the issue you also participated in. The last issue was, ironically, the one devoted to the events of September 11, 2001. How do I see that time? A time of global catastrophes and enormous possibilities. A time of adventurers and unscrupulous brokers. A huge country dying in bloody convulsions, while someone was making enormous fortunes from it. In the second book (a continuation of the first), I want to devote attention to this period—the period of the Great Privatization or the selling-off of the country at retail.

MT: Thanks, Leonid, and good luck.

Professor Pape: IRAN WAR NOT OVER, Trump TRAPPED | Trump Pre-WARNED On Israel LIES Before Iran War

Professor Pape: Iran War Not Over, Trump Trapped YouTube link here.

Trump Warned About Israeli Lies Before Iran War YouTube link here.

Gordon Hahn: Russian Security Culture and the Democracy Perception Index 2025

By Gordon Hahn, Website, 3/16/26

We often here that Russians are imperialistic, militaristic, aggressive, expansionist, paranoid in relation to foreigners and foreign states, especially the West; that Russian President Vladimir Putin carried out an ‘unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine,’ and is engaged in a massive military buildup in preparation for an invasion of Europe: ‘If he wins in Ukraine, he will not stop.’ Commentators refer to Putin’s ‘fortress Russia.’ This is a reference to an intentional government propaganda effort to convince Russians that they are being surrounded by NATO and so the country must hunker down, crush opposition, and maximize its military production and prowess, making the coubntry extremely militaristic and exceptionally aggressive. At the same time, the universal Western meme is that Ukraine is a democracy and a passive victim of that ‘bad Russia.’ Putting aside Kiev’s initiation of a civil war in Donbass in April 2014, Ukraine’s powerful and now well-armed neofascist movement, and its NATO-backed military buildup prior to the February 2022 Russian effort at coercive diplomacy, a global opinion survey shows that Russia is no outlier, even with compared to the ‘alliance of democracies’ with regard to its national secuerity culture, and where it is it is it deviates in a direction counteropposite to expansionism, militarism, and aggressiveness. Ukraine and Ukrainians turn out to be more militaristic and aggressive than Russia and Russians, refuting what the media-academia misinformation complex so tirelessly exclaims.

The Alliance of the Democracies sponsored a global opinion survey this year, the results of which were published in a report called the ‘Democracy Perception Index’ (DPI) It asked numerous questions regarding national security among the populations of almost all countries (https://allianceofdemocracies.org/democracy-perception-index and https://146165116.fs1.hubspotusercontent-eu1.net/hubfs/146165116/DPI 2025.pdf). The survey’s results demonstrate this ‘counter-intuitive’ conclusion, made counter-intuitive by decades of Western propaganda. For example, the survey asked respondents how concerned they were that their country might be invaded. Slightly more than a quarter of Russians answered they were very or extremely concerned about this (DPI, p. 31). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alleged efforts to create a ‘fortress Russia’ mentality in the Russian populace apparently is not going well. One explanation for the relative lack of concern among Russians is confidence in the Russian leadership and military to handle any foreign challenges that may arise.

On the other hand, Russians are not prone to rely on military power as the key instrument in guaranteeing their country’s national security, according to the DPI. Respondents were given a choice between: (1) military buildup; (2) maintaining or developing nuclear weapons; (3) strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships; and (4) implementing or expanding mandatory military service. The option most often chosen by Russians strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships—the only non-military response available. By contrast, Ukrainians most often chose ‘maintaining or developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent’; Ukraine was the only country in the world to choose this answer the most. Poland, Turkey, and China were the only countries on the Greater Eurasian landmass to choose military buildup most often. The rest of Europe and all of the Americas, except for Cuba, chose to rely on alliances as the Russians did (DPI, p. 32).

Respondents aged 18-55 were also asked about whether they personaly would be willing to fight if their country were attacked. A little over half in Russia responded positively, while in the US slightly less than half did so. In Ukraine, only a third responded positively. In Europe, the figure falls to 41%, with higher percentages willing to fight found in Norway, Greece, and Sweden. Globally, some of the weakest willingness to fight were France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where less than a third responded positively. Middle Eastern and North African countries responded positively on an average of 69% — “the highest regional average in the world.” (DPI, p. 33). In sum, Russian society does not register as extremely militaristic or aggressive, and its government propaganda is not yeilding one, regardless of whether it is attmepting to do so or not.

Some might retort that I myself have written that Russia has a security vigilance culture, suspicious of external and internal national security threats emanating from the West [Gordon M. Hahn, The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (Jefferson: McFarland, 2021)]. This is true, but security vigilance has little to do with militarism and agressiveness, and might devolve into them only in response to a deep, existential crisis to the Russian nation or state. To the extent Russians seems ‘aggressive’ and its government ‘militaristic’, this is a misperception of Russia’s historically learned defensiveness. Moreover, the security vigilance culture is situational, born by historical experience and heightened by concrete contemporary circumstances impacting the level of national security and Russian perceptions thereof. It waxes and wanes, becomes dominant or recessive within Russia’s security and political cultures to the extent threats emerge from the West.

The DPI’s results reflect all of this. Russians are moderately conscious of the threat environment and do not uniformly fear invasion no less exhibit some irrational paranoia. Russians prefer building alliances to massing arms. They are willing to fight for their country but not inordinately so. This is because they perceive the security environment as a result of centuries of Western lessons on invasion, intervention, domestic interference, and manipulative, ontologically threatening cultural influence. If Russians see their government takes the required measures to address potential and kinetic threats, they are less inclined to succumb to militarism and aggressiveness and more inclined to hold to a more or less healthy patriotism and security vigilance.

Sylvia Demarest: An Easter Sunday Situation Report on the War on Iran

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 4/5/26

PLEASE NOTE: The effects of this war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are already being felt in Asia and parts of Europe with shortages and rationing. When the war started tankers were in route from the Middle East to Asia, the EU, and the US. The last of these tankers will unload in the next 10 days.

Newsworthy Items

On Easter morning, our President delivered this threat to Iran:

“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day and, and Bridge Day, all wrapped into one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open up the Fuckin’ Strait you crazy bastards or you will be living in hell—JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah. President DONALD J. TRUMP”

Did you get that? Tuesday will be a day when US war crimes against Iran will expand from bombing schools, hospitals, police stations, civilian homes and neighborhoods, the Pasteur Institute, and universities, to the destruction of Iran’s civilian infrastructure.

Pope Leo delivered his Easter message:

“Brothers and Sisters, this is our God, Jesus -King of Peace who rejects war who no one can use to justify war. He does not listen to the prayers of those who wage war but rejects them saying ‘even though you make many prayers, I will not listen. Your hands are full of blood.’”

Earlier this week, the president’s spiritual advisor Paula White-Cain. “advised” that American Christians should tithe their gross incomes and give 10% of their money to Israel to avoid “disobeying God.” At a lunch at the White House later in the week she also compared Jesus Christ with Donald J Trump.”

On Good Friday, it has been alleged, that the “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth, ordered a “Protestant only” mass at the Pentagon and instructed the organizers to prohibit the attendance by Catholics. Signs were posted to that effect outside the gathering. According to a Friday report from HuffPost, Defense Secretary PeteHegseth’s Pentagon held a Protestant-only Good Friday service at its in-house chapel, with no Catholic Mass scheduled for one of Christianity’s holiest days.

“WE GOT HIM!” President Trump Announces Rescue of 2nd Airman

The president reported that a US special forces raid and aerial operation had recovered the second crew member from the F-15E jet, shot down in Iran on Saturday. US officials have also confirmed that the downed pilot has been “recovered” in Iran following a “heavy firefight” – according to Al Jazeera, Axios, and others.

The good news—President Trump says we rescued the A-15 officer. The bad news we lost several aviation assets in the process. US losses: 1) The initial downed F-15 Strike Eagle. The F15 was downed by what Western sources say was s Sayyad-4B missile, fired from the Bavar-373 air defense system; 2) an A-0 Thunderbolt II. The A10 was apparently hit over the Strait probably by a Project 358 loitering missile; 3) 2 HC-130J Combat King II. The Iranians say they knocked them down—the US says the US destroyed them. 4) 2 MQ-9 Reapers We have now lost at least 14; 5) A Hermes 900; 6) 2 UH-60 Black Hawks; 7) 2 MH-6 Little Birds.

The operation cost at least $1 billion. The Americans say there were no US casualties but 100s of Iranians were killed. The Iranians disagree saying there were US casualities. Bottom line—it does not appear that we have air supremacy over Iran.

Brief Status Report on Standoff Weapons

Given how many JASSM-ER missiles were used in the first four weeks of the war, only about 425 are estimated to remain available globally, with roughly another 75 considered unserviceable. The Pentagon has issued orders to move missiles from other regional stockpiles, including the Pacific, to US Central Command bases and the UK’s Fairford base to sustain the fight.

Lockheed Martin’s scheduled production rate for 2026 is 396 units, although it can be scaled up to 860. Replacing the expended inventory will take several years.

The situation is much the same for the balance of US standoff weapons and for interceptors. Once the supply of these weapons is exhausted the US will have to use B-2’s, B-26’s and other bombers who will have to fly over Iran to deliver “dumb bombs”. This is when we will find out if the US and Israel has achieved “air supremacy” over Iran’s skies.

The Two-Week Window That Could Break Global Commodity Markets

From Oil Price

Below is the entire article–time is running out.

  • Markets appear stable on the surface, but underlying stress is building across interconnected commodity chains—oil, gas, petrochemicals, fertilizers, helium, and logistics—raising the risk of a systemic breakdown.
  • The key shift is from pricing risk to deliverability and access risk, with supply chains losing flexibility and physical shortages beginning to emerge beneath still-functioning paper markets.
  • The next two weeks are critical: if disruptions persist, cascading failures could trigger inflation, supply shortages, and a broader global economic shock.

The familiar assumption used by markets remains in place, at least according to financial analysts: what has been priced is what matters. Oil is still elevated but not yet showing a disorderly pattern. LNG is tightening but still trading within a recognizable or conventional range. Freight rates are rising, insurers are repricing risk, and policymakers continue to signal control. On the surface, all these signs are showing a stressed but functioning system.

The coming weeks will reveal which systemic risks-such as chain desynchronization or supply chain coupling-policymakers must prioritize to prevent cascading failures, guiding targeted proactive measures.

The real situation in the market has clearly shifted from disruption to early-stage system strain. Recognizing how oil, gas, naphtha, fertilizer, and helium are interconnected will help policymakers and analysts feel the system’s fragility and the risk of a widespread shock.

This coupling of commodity chains could lead to widespread economic impacts, including inflationary pressures and supply shortages, emphasizing the urgency for stakeholders to prepare for systemic disruptions.

For media and most analysts, oil and gas are the visible front line. Physical flows have not recovered to pre-crisis levels, while, much more importantly, confidence in their stability has eroded and will continue to do so. Even where volumes are partially moving, the market is treating them as unreliable. That distinction matters, as it will shift behavior from trading to securing.

Until now, an illusion has been in place, holding markets together over the past weeks: cargoes in transit, delayed physical impact, and the expectation of rapid stabilization. This will be fading as refiners begin to adjust intake assumptions. LNG buyers are moving from portfolio optimization to a clear new strategy: outright procurement urgency. Strategic reserves are being discussed not only as precautionary tools but also, given the facts on the ground, as potential necessities.

The divergence between paper and physical markets is widening. Benchmarks still reflect liquidity and sentiment. When looking at physical cargoes, there is clearly scarcity and risk. This gap is a precursor to dislocation and should already be recognized.

Shipping is accelerating this transition. War-risk insurance constraints are tightening further. It has also been changing as behavioral risk is rising. Owners are not only reacting to premiums; they are also slowly but steadily reassessing their exposure entirely. The result of this change is that there is a reduction of available tonnage in practice, even where fleets exist on paper. For all, deliverability, not production anymore, is the central constraint.

Oil and gas, however, are only the entry point.

The second chain, showing early signs of stress, is naphtha. Petrochemical margins have become increasingly compressed due to feedstock uncertainty and rising costs. It is not yet a full disruption, but the shift is visible: reduced operating rates, cautious procurement, and early signs of pricing pass-through.

The naphtha situation is critical as it sits at the core of industrial transformation. Plastics, chemicals, packaging, and solvents all depend on the availability of stable feedstocks. While there will not be an immediate shock, it will create a broad, creeping constraint across manufacturing systems.

And it is beginning.

The third chain, fertilizer, has already entered its critical window as gas-linked production economics deteriorate. At the same time, producers have begun adjusting output expectations. At present, the market is not yet recognizing all of it, as it is still treating fertilizer as a secondary risk because physical shortages have not yet materialized.

That is the mistake.

The fertilizer risk is already delayed and will remain that way for weeks or months. It needs to be recognized that production decisions made now will determine availability weeks and months ahead. All signs are already on red, with tightening margins, cautious production, and early signs of reduced forward supply becoming visible by the day. Once this translates into agricultural input shortages, the system will have very limited ability to respond.

Food inflation will not start today. But the conditions for it are being set now.

Helium, the fourth chain, has already made some headlines. It is moving quietly but decisively into risk territory. Gas processing disruptions are beginning to ripple through helium availability, with early signs of supply tightening in specialized markets.

Policymakers and analysts should understand that the industries that are exposed to this development, such as healthcare, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing, are not marginal economic sectors; they are critical. And they do not have easy substitutes.

The fifth chain, logistics, has moved to the forefront; it is no longer a background variable. Its role as a primary driver of system stress should make industry leaders and policymakers aware of the urgent need for action to maintain supply flexibility and prevent disruptions.

This is the shift markets are still underestimating.

The system is not only losing supply. It is losing flexibility.

Multiple risks are now moving to reality, no longer a theoretical background noise. As oil and gas constraints increase energy costs and uncertainty, it directly feeds into naphtha and fertilizer production. Due to this system stress, petrochemical and agricultural systems begin to tighten. The total at the same time is amplified by logistics constraints, which limit response capacity.

Each chain does not fail independently. Each one accelerates the stress in the others. The result is not a series of shocks, but a system that loses its ability to absorb them.

At present, markets are still anchored in linear thinking, so no pricing for this situation is evident. Recognizing the coupling of these chains and their thresholds is crucial; delays could lead to rapid, uncontrollable shifts, urging policymakers and analysts to act now rather than wait for confirmation.

Markets and policymakers should understand that waiting for confirmation is the most expensive strategy. When all five chains show clear signs of disruption, an adjustment will already be underway, as prices will have moved, availability will be constrained, and decision-making will shift from optimization to allocation.

Looking at the system at present, there are clear signs that this shift is already in place in parts of it.

Looking at the impact of this total shift, the regional implications are becoming clearer as this transition unfolds.

When looking at Europe, it is clear that the continent is entering a renewed phase of exposure. It is directly placed in the path of a multi-chain stress situation due to its reliance on global LNG markets and its industrial sensitivity to petrochemicals and fertilizers. At present, the ARA hub remains a critical buffer, but it is increasingly functioning as a balancing mechanism rather than a stabilizing one.

While the media will focus on immediate shortages, the real risk for Europe is progressive constraint. Europe’s industrial users will have to face rising input costs and potential supply uncertainty. Southern Europe, however, is particularly exposed due to its greater import dependence and limited flexibility. Taking the option of tightening multiple chains simultaneously, the continent will face a scenario in which inflation returns alongside an industrial slowdown.

Asia’s behavior is already shifting, as seen in more aggressive procurement strategies, especially among major importers. In Asia, the transition from price sensitivity to security-driven buying is underway. It not only increases competition for available cargoes but also pushes the system toward fragmentation. The real risk for emerging Asian economies is sharper, as these countries are not only exposed to higher prices but to reduced access. Demand destruction, power shortages, and industrial curtailment are no longer hypothetical but emerging risks.

At the same time, and largely forgotten, North Africa is being pulled into the system from both sides. Import-dependent countries are facing rising costs and growing exposure to fertilizer and energy constraints. Egypt, already dealing with reduced Suez Canal flows, is under increasing economic pressure. Regional producers, however, are also seeing increased demand from Europe, which creates an opportunity. Still, most of this is, however, constrained by infrastructure, domestic needs, and geopolitical risk. North Africa is not insulated; it is being integrated into the stress.

Overall, what should be recognized without delay is a persistent mismatch between system dynamics and policy framing. Responses are still focused on price, on reserves, on diplomatic signaling. These are tools designed for cyclical disruptions.

This is not a cyclical disruption.

When using strategic reserves, it should be understood that they can only alleviate short-term oil shortages. They will never address LNG competition, petrochemical feedstock constraints, fertilizer production risks, or helium supply. SPRs are also not solving logistics. They do not restore flexibility.

The next fourteen days are therefore not just another period of volatility, but a first and dangerous compression phase.

If nothing fundamental changes, such as stabilizing flows, easing logistics, and the return of confidence, the total system will move from stress into breach conditions. Not everywhere at once, but across enough chains to alter overall behavior. In such scenarios or realities, markets will soon stop clearing through price alone; they will clear through access. It is a fundamentally different system.

For companies, these implications will be immediate. Exposure to Hormuz-linked flows is no longer a scenario but an operational risk. Supply chains need to be reassessed, logistics secured, and contingencies activated. Waiting for clarity on all is no longer a neutral choice but will be a cost.

The warning is now sharper than it was even days ago.

Five chains are moving, not in isolation, but together. Buffers are eroded. The system still appears stable because those buffers have not yet fully run out. In the coming days, they will be running out.

When this happens, the adjustment will not be gradual, but abrupt, non-linear, and difficult to reverse. It should be understood that, in systemic risk, the most expensive moment is the one just before recognition. This is when signals are clearly visible, but no action is taken.

That is where the market stands now. In the next two weeks, it will be determined whether this remains a severe disruption or, if the signals are there, a systemic break.

How long can Iran hold out

Iran did not start this war. The Iranian people are being bombarded daily by the full force of the US and Israel. Iran’s cities and heritage are under attack. The US has gone from claiming to want to “rescue the Iranian people from a brutal regime” to threatening to bomb the country back to the stone age. Putting aside the illegality and complete immorality of this war and the US/Israel “leadership” behind it, it is time to ask: how are Iranians doing?

The example of Ali Larijani a PhD scholar, philosopher, military officer and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council assassinated by Israel on March 17th as he visited his daughter. He did not try to hide–but neither did the Ayatollah. The Israel’s wiped out an entire neighborhood to kill him, including women and children.

Larijani’s estate has been settled. He had a small house, an old car, and virtually no savings. Contrast this to the US/Israeli elite, most of whom use their office to enrich themselves–do I need to give examples?

One of the objections to war in the west is that our leaders and our elite never suffer from war. The US and Israel have killed dozens of Iranian leaders often wiping out entire neighborhoods to kill them. The Iranian leadership elite have suffered along with Iranian citizens.

I recently saw a tweet of a sign on the door of a supermarket–the sign said, “take what you need, you can repay me after the war.”

When the time comes–and it will come, how will we act?

Sociologist Mohammad Ali Senobari’s account of the war days 20 March 2026, 02:01 Tehran time. “For years we have spoken of the “social resilience” of the Iranian people, a concept which, until recently, remained abstract for many, confined to sociological theories. But these days, on the streets of Tehran, this concept is no longer theoretical; it is alive and visible in everyday life.”

“When I leave the house in the morning, the first thing that catches my attention is not the distant sound of explosions, but the queues for bread: people standing there as always, exchanging jokes and everyday conversation. It almost seems as though life itself has decided not to give up. Even amidst reports of air strikes and the pressures of war, a large part of the population remains in the capital, striving to preserve a sense of normality and rushing, almost enthusiastically, to do their shopping for Nowruz (the New Year festival, according to the Persian calendar, ed.).”

“On the streets, taxis are full, shops are half-open and cafés still serve tea and coffee until late at night. Perhaps there are fewer customers, but even this minimal presence carries a profound meaning: “life goes on”. In sociological terms, this is what we call “everyday resistance”.”

“At night, the atmosphere in the streets and squares becomes even more evocative. From early afternoon until almost dawn, the city’s main avenues and iconic squares fill with private cars. Families, waving the tricolour flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran, form long convoys of cars.”

“When they reach the central squares, people get out of their cars, forming massive gatherings – tens of thousands in every square – waving flags and singing epic hymns in unison. I am now 43 years old and I remember the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1981–1988), yet I have never witnessed scenes like these. From 28th February 2026, when, in an unprecedented and criminal act of terrorism, my country’s Supreme Leader was assassinated, until tonight, 19th March 2026, millions of people across the country have supported this movement of passion and unity every single night.”

“What strikes me most, however, as an observer, is how people react to the “sound of war”.”

“A few evenings ago, around sunset, an explosion rang out in the southern part of the city. There was a brief pause – not the silence of fear, but a momentary pause, like a comma in a sentence. Then life resumed. No one ran away, no one screamed. People turned their heads, perhaps muttered something under their breath, and then carried on with what they were doing.”

“In my writings I have always maintained: “Fear is a social phenomenon, not merely a psychological one”. Now I see how a society can learn to manage fear. In Tehran today, fear exists, but panic does not. Anxiety is present, but there is no collective psychological breakdown.”

The charge of the light brigade

In 1854 during the Crimean War Lord Cardigan led a calvary charge, “the Light Brigade” against Russian cannons in the Battle of Balaclava. I visited “the valley of Death” when I went to Crimea in 2017. This battle marked the end of one form of war and the beginning of war marked by cannons, repeating rifles, tanks, artillery, and ultimately by aircraft, aircraft carriers, and missiles. Horses and mounted units became obsolete. Are we witnessing another shift in how war is conducted today?

The Ukraine war has been characterized by the use of drones making any concentration of troops and equipment suicidal. Drones were also used to destroy tanks, personnel carriers and even aircraft. This is one reason the Ukraine war has lasted so long. Has the US adapted to these changes? It has been said that the U.S. is fighting a 19th Century war, with 20th Century weapons, against 21st Century Powers. True or false? If this war does not end soon, we will find out. Below is a poem written by Lord Alfred Tennyson about the Battle of Balaclava and the Charge of the 600.

The Charge of the Light Brigade

BY ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON

Half a league, half a league,

Half a league onward,

All in the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

“Forward the Light Brigade!

Charge for the guns!” he said.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

“Forward, the Light Brigade!”

Was there a man dismayed?

Not though the soldier knew

Someone had blundered.

Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon in front of them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

Boldly they rode and well,

Into the jaws of Death,

Into the mouth of hell

Rode the six hundred.

Flashed all their sabers bare,

Flashed as they turned in air

Sab’ring the gunners there,

Charging an army, while

All the world wondered.

Plunged in the battery smoke

Right through the line they broke;

Cossack and Russian

Reeled from the saber stroke

Shattered and sundered.

Then they rode back, but not,

Not the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon behind them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

While horse and hero fell,

They that had fought so well

Came through the jaws of Death,

Back from the mouth of hell,

All that was left of them,

Left of six hundred.

When can their glory fade?

O the wild charge they made!

All the world wondered.

Honor the charge they made!

Honor the Light Brigade,

Noble six hundred!

Happy Easter- -pray for peace


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