The Lever Daily, 10/16/25

Forever wars, forever profits. The White House has authorized covert CIA intervention in Venezuela as the military reportedly prepares a number of actions in the country, including land strikes. Blaming drugs and other crime, President Donald Trump announced an additional 25 percent tariff on countries that buy Venezuelan oil earlier this year. The president also allowed permits enabling Big Oil companies to operate in Venezuela to expire — before giving Chevron a restricted license this summer following months of lobbying from the firm. Nonetheless, Trump’s policies so far have halved Chevron’s exports of Venezuelan oil in a matter of months, meaning U.S. intervention in the region could be a welcome development for Big Oil. 

• “We’re a commercial player, not a political player,” Chevron Chief Executive Mike Wirth told investors last year, even as the company spent more than $9 million on lobbying and $1 million in campaign expenditures in 2024.

War crimes subsidized. As displaced Palestinians return to a leveled Gaza amid the Trump administration’s precarious Israel-Hamas “ceasefire,” senators quietly worked through a government shutdown to deliver $914 billion in 2026 military spending. The budget fulfills a number of expensive surveillance and weapons funding requests from the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Through its donor-funded war chest, AIPAC has secured more than $38 billion in U.S. taxpayer-funded contributions toward Israel since Oct. 7.

A weapons bonanza. In a 77-20 vote last week, Senators passed their version of the National Defense Authorization Act, which expands the Pentagon’s already outsized annual budget by more than $100 billion — including lucrative subsidies for the Israeli military. That includes $75 million in funding for counter-drone technology, $80 million for anti-tunnel engineering, and $50 million towards “emerging technologies in warfare” like artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and automation.

• Research shows that the Israeli military’s use of automated technologies has accelerated the country’s mass killings and surveillance operations — while shirking the moral and legal burden of war to an algorithm.

Secret stockpiles. Also buried deep in the defense budget is a two-year extension of an opaque and unlimited weapons stockpile reserved for Israel — one that the Israeli military can call upon without approval from Congress. The War Reserve Stock for Allies-Israel is “the least transparent mechanism of providing arms to Israel,” a State Department official told Responsible Statescraft, as transfers require a simple sign-off from the Secretary of Defense.

• Congress previously capped how much funding the stockpile received per year at $200 million, but a 2024 law temporarily waived that limit.

Bought and paid for. Last election cycle, AIPAC dished out a record $126 million in campaign cash. Recipients on the Senate Armed Services Committee, which helps oversee the annual defense budget, include a top beneficiary of the Israel lobby: Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) accepted $1.8 million in AIPAC funds last election while standing with the minority of Democrats who’ve backed continued arms sales to Israel.

• Meanwhile, since 2019, the committee’s leadership, Chairman Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-R.I.), have accepted more than $1 million in combined campaign cash from the defense industry, which has reaped millions in Pentagon contracts backing Israel since Oct. 7.

Russia Matters, 10/24/25

1. The White House canceled the planned Trump-Putin summit and imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies after an Oct. 20 call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov revealed that the Kremlin is clinging to its long-held positions, namely that Ukraine hand over control of the entire Donbas region as part of any settlement, U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal.¹ According to CNN, it was not only Vladimir Putin’s maximalist demands on Kyiv, but also his refusal to agree to an immediate ceasefire and Russia’s continued strikes on civilians in Ukraine that “all added up, in Donald Trump’s mind, to a clear signal that nothing really had changed.” “I just felt it was time,” Trump himself said moments after the new sanctions were announced on the pair of Russia’s oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil.² Commenting on the sanctions, Putin said they will have “serious implications for us, but they will not significantly affect our economic well-being,”³ while his deputy at Russia’ Security Council Dmitry Medvedev wrote that the U.S. has now “fully embarked on the warpath against Russia,” according to Kremlin.ru and WSJ, respectively. With Rosneft and Lukoil penalized, three-quarters of Russian oil exports will come from companies under new U.S. sanctions, according to Kommersant’s calculations.⁴ Analysts say the impact of blacklisting Rosneft and Lukoil will hinge on three things: how well they are enforced, the reaction of major markets in India and China and whether Moscow can circumvent the measures, according to WSJ.⁵ The U.S. announcement was coordinated with the EU, which adopted its own new package of sanctions targeting Russian energy, banks, crypto exchanges and entities in China, according to the European Council, Financial Times and Bloomberg.
2. Putin threatens an overwhelming response to use of Western long-range missiles by Ukraine for deep strikes into Russia even as Trump denies authorizing use of such missiles for long-range strikes. On Oct. 22, WSJ wrote, citing U.S. officials, that “the Trump administration has lifted a key restriction on Ukraine’s use of some long-range missiles provided by Western allies.” “U.S. officials said they expect Ukraine to conduct more cross-border attacks using the Storm Shadow, which is launched from Ukrainian aircraft and can travel more than 180 miles. The U.S. can restrict Ukraine’s use of Storm Shadow because the missiles use American targeting data,” according to WSJ. Speaking on the same day,  however, Trump rejected the WSJ report. “The Wall Street Journal story on the U.S.A.’s approval of Ukraine being allowed to use long range missiles deep into Russia is FAKE NEWS!” Trump wrote on Truth Social, according to The Hill. Despite this denial and Trump’s earlier decision not to allow supplies of Tomahawks to Ukraine, the Kremlin still felt it necessary to issue another warning. In a choreographed Q&A on Oct. 23, Putin was asked by Russian media: “Regarding the use of Western long-range weapons, how do you personally assess the evidently contradictory signals coming from Washington? Recently, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. has lifted a key restriction on the use of such weapons. … In your view, is this still an escalation?” Putin’s answer was: “This is an attempt at escalation. However, if such weapons are used to strike Russian territory, the response will be very serious, if not overwhelming. Let them think about that.”
3. Putin oversees test-launches of long-range missiles operated by all three elements of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad. On Oct. 22, Putin oversaw a strategic nuclear forces exercise involving launches of a Yars ICBM from Plesetsk, of a Sineva SLBM from the Bryansk submarine in the Barents Sea and “a volley of air-launched cruise missile” fired by Tu-95MS bombers. The exercise “evaluated the readiness of military command bodies and the operational staff’s proficiency in organizing and managing the troops (forces) under their command,” according to the Kremlin. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov “was a bit more specific”: the goal of the exercise was to “practice the procedures for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons,” according to renowned Russian nuclear forces expert Pavel Podvig.
4. In the week of Oct. 14–21, 2025, Russia gained 33 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, down from the previous week’s gain of 48 square miles, according to the Oct. 22, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In the past four weeks (Sept. 23–Oct. 21, 2025), Russian forces gained 128 square miles of Ukrainian territory, a decrease from the 206 square miles these forces gained during the previous four-week period (Aug. 26–Sept. 23, 2025), according to the card, which analyzes ISW data for measuring changes in territorial control in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Since Jan. 1, 2025, average Russian monthly gains have been 168 square miles and, as of Oct. 21, 2025, Russia controlled 19% of Ukraine’s territory, according to the card.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 10/16/25

The number of young Ukrainians fleeing the war and seeking asylum in Germany has surged, following Kyiv’s decision to partially lift its travel ban for men aged 18 to 22, according to figures from the German Interior Ministry, reported by Die Welt.

Ukrainian asylum applications in Germany have ballooned tenfold, from around 100 per week before the policy change to approximately 1,000 per week in recent months, according to local data.

The regulation, which Kyiv implemented earlier this year, allows men under 22 who were already abroad or studying abroad to extend their stay or travel more freely — a move officials framed as a minor adjustment aimed at mitigating growing criticism of Bankova’s increasingly aggressive conscription tactics.

Ukrainian politicians have denied that the change has prompted a large-scale departure of draft-age men. However, the German data suggests otherwise.

The sharp increase in asylum applications, overwhelmingly from young men, has raised concerns in both Berlin and Brussels about the potential impact on Ukraine’s mobilisation efforts and broader EU migration policy, which could give Russia the edge on numbers.

Ukraine introduced a blanket travel ban for men aged 18 to 60 shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, in an effort to maintain sufficient manpower for its armed forces. Exceptions have since been made for humanitarian, educational and professional reasons, but Kyiv has faced growing pressure over the social and political implications of conscription.

The Interior Ministry did not provide a detailed age breakdown of the new asylum seekers but confirmed to Die Welt that most are young and male, consistent with Ukraine’s revised policy.

Ukrainian authorities have defended the decision, arguing it affects a relatively small group and does not undermine military readiness. “There is no mass exodus,” senior officials have said, insisting that enlistment and mobilisation measures remain in place.

Still, the sharp increase in asylum claims in Germany — which already hosts over 1.1mn Ukrainian refugees — may complicate EU coordination on migration policy and military assistance. With Ukraine preparing for a third year of full-scale war, Western governments are watching closely for any signs of mobilisation fatigue or domestic instability.

German officials have not indicated plans to alter their asylum policy in response but have acknowledged the numbers are “notable and being monitored.” The development comes as EU capitals continue to debate burden-sharing mechanisms and support packages for Ukraine in 2025.

Desertions swell

The exodus of young men, thanks to the easing of travel restrictions, comes on top of reports of the number of desertions from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) swelling.

Over the past year, twice as many military personnel have left their units without authorisation in Ukraine as during the first two and a half years of the conflict, according to the Ukrainian publication Strana, citing the Prosecutor General’s Office.

According to the agency, a total of nearly 290,000 criminal cases for unauthorized abandonment and desertion were opened during the conflict. Between January 2022 and September 2024, 90,000 cases were opened, and another 200,000 in the last year. Experts says that the true number of those who went AWOL is almost certainly significantly higher than the official figures.

In August, Ukrainska Pravda, citing the Prosecutor General’s Office, reported that 110,511 cases of unauthorised absence from service in the Ukrainian army had been registered since the beginning of 2025 – more than all the cases brought in the previous three years of the conflict with Russia combined.

The lack of manpower and falling number of fresh recruits is having a catastrophic effect on the AFU’s ability to defend the frontline in Donbas, where kilometre-long unmanned holes are opening up, Ukrainska Pravda reported earlier this month.

By Kyle Anzalone, The Libertarian Institute, 10/14/25

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is considering easing its rules on the use of force against Russia. Russia is accused of violating Estonian, Polish, and Romanian airspace in September. 

Sky TG24, an Italian news outlet, said NATO leaders are seeking “more flexibility” in engaging Russia on the bloc’s Eastern flank. “NATO Commander-in-Chief, US General Alexus Grynkewich, has asked allies for ‘more flexibility’ in the rules of engagement to better manage the defense of the eastern flank,” the report explains. “Especially in light of the launch of Operation Sentry East, which is seen as a ‘test bed’ for the development of an integrated air defense operation.”

Some members of NATO are seeking to ease or remove “national limitations” that countries impose on the military equipment under NATO command. 

The discussions follow Russian alleged violations of NATO airspace last month. Tallinn claimed three Russian jets flew just inside Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland. NATO says the jets remained in Estonian territory for about 12 minutes, and the bloc scrambled F-35s operated by Italy to escort the Russian warplanes. 

The Kremlin denied the accusations. 

In a separate incident, about two dozen Russian decoy drones entered Polish airspace. The bloc scrambled multiple fighter jets and shot down some of the UAVs. The operation cost the bloc about half a billion dollars. 

Russia has denied that it targeted Poland, and Belarus claimed that the drones flew into Polish airspace after they were impacted by Ukrainian electronic interference.

In a third event, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace before turning around and striking Ukraine. 

Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte have called for shooting down Russian aircraft in allied airspace.

By Chris Weafer, Intellinews, 10/12/25

Chris Weafer is the CEO of Macro-Advisory.

Since 2014, Western nations have hit Russia with a total of 26,655 sanctions (to mid-September 2025), with 23,960 coming after February 2022. The largest target group, with 13,611 sanctions, is state officials, business owners, and well-known public figures. The declared intention of sanctions was to force the Kremlin to alter its geopolitical course, i.e. to quickly withdraw from Ukraine, by causing a shock crisis in the economy and creating a backlash by prominent businesspersons and the public against the Kremlin.

The economy did suffer from disruption in 2022 (-1.2%), but growth returned in 2023 (+4.1%) and in 2024 (+4.3%). The economy also received a huge boost to income in 2022-23, as the EU was not ready for sanctions and was forced to stockpile Russian oil and other materials. The external trade and current accounts have remained comfortably in surplus since 2022.

Today, there is again speculation in many parts of the western media that because headline growth in Russia dropped to just over 1.0% in the first half of this year; the rate of VAT is planned to rise to 22%, (from 20% currently); and the budget deficit is higher than had been planned; that the economy is heading for recession and that the government is facing a financial crisis. President Trump recently fuelled that narrative with his reference to Russia as a “paper tiger”. But none of this speculation or the assumption of imminent crisis holds up to scrutiny. The motivation for the reports is again, or is mostly, political optics.

As mentioned, over 13,000 of the sanctions have been directed at individuals, especially Russian billionaires and business owners. The assumption being that these individuals would increase pressure on the Kremlin to withdraw from Ukraine to alleviate pressure on their businesses and to recover their wealth from sanctions orders. But here is where there is a lack of understanding about how Russia has changed since 2000. billionaires do not have political influence in Putin’s Russia and, as such, cannot be properly referred to as Oligarchs, i.e. as originally defined in ancient Greece. So, while these individuals were targeted by sanctions intended to pressure the government, they hold little to no political influence, and the measures have therefore failed to bring about any meaningful change in state policy – and nor will they. 

Moreover, while some assets – modest volume – belonging to the business elite have been frozen under Western sanctions, the bulk of their wealth remains in Russia or in so-called friendly jurisdictions. This is largely because, in the face of an increasingly unpredictable external environment – where sanctions were often imposed based solely on high net worth – many saw no viable option other than to redomicile their wealth and business interests to Russia or allied countries. And they had plenty of notice to do so since sanctions against Russia started quite meekly from spring 2014.

The 2025 Forbes billionaire Report showed that there are now 146 billionaires in Russia, up 21 from 2024 and with 15 new names appearing. The combined wealth of the billionaires is assessed at $625.6bn, a record high for Russia. Most of that wealth is now in Russia or in so-called friendly jurisdictions and has helped create a strong financial base in the country. This is one of the reasons why the government is now able to switch from financing the federal budget deficit from the National Welfare Fund, Russia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, to tapping into the local debt market. With state debt at only 16% of GDP, the Finance Ministry has considerable scope to borrow and still keep Russia as a low indebted country.

Instead of staging a revolt, some of the sanctioned businesspersons have adapted to the new environment and have refocused their repatriated wealth on bolstering Russia’s domestic economy. Others have pursued investments or private activities outside the West, particularly in countries “friendly” to Russia. In essence, rather than weakening the Russian state, the sanctions inadvertently reinforced it by redirecting wealth and investment into the domestic market, while also simultaneously pushing away many of the pro-Western businesspeople who were essentially punished because of their nationality. Had policymakers heeded the advice of several prominent voices in the west to not sanction Russian billionaires but to make it easier for them to settle in the west and to bring the bulk of their wealth with them, it would probably be a different story in Russia today.

Also, in terms of foreign businesses in Russia, while some left, many chose to stay, either directly or indirectly by selling their operations to local investors or changing their business models. Around 46% of the largest foreign companies operating in Russia in early 2022, sold their businesses to local investors, ensuring operations continued, providing goods and services, employment and taxes and bolstering overall GDP. Ironically, many foreign companies still operating in Russia are often finding themselves in a favorable position. With many Russian founded companies now sanctioned, foreign firms, or those which have evolved from a formerly foreign owned business, are emerging as key players in several sectors, often enjoying a competitive advantage. This has created another unintended consequence in that, according to a recent calculation published by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) foreign companies are now contributing significantly to the Russian federal budget, paying taxes in excess of $20bn last year, but remain outside of Western sanctions lists. 

A survey by the Association of European Businesses showed in May that most of such companies operating in Russia saw opportunities for growth. While barriers like sanctions, geopolitical risks and payment restrictions persist, these companies are continuing with their long-term strategies. The reputation risks are real, but for many businesses the long-term financial rewards provide adequate compensation for the medium-term costs.

The sanctions on Russia have also had ripple effects and unintended consequences far beyond its borders. Many countries in the so-called Global South, especially China, India and others in the BRICS bloc, have deepened their economic ties with each other and with Moscow. As a result, the shift toward a multipolar world has accelerated, with new economic power centers emerging outside of the traditional Western dominated structures.

In addition, sanctions have exposed vulnerabilities within the global financial system, particularly in terms of reliance on the US dollar and the SWIFT payment system. Russia’s, and China’s, ability to create alternative financial networks and build stronger connections with non-Western financial institutions has opened the door for other countries to re-evaluate their overdependence on Western-controlled financial systems. While this shift may not be immediate, it has started and could have long-lasting implications for global trade and finance.

Apart from the unintended consequences, of course there are damaging and direct consequences from sanctions in Russia. While the economy is now stable, albeit in a much lower but sustainable growth range, the legacy of sanctions will likely remain visible in the long run. The penalties and negative effects won’t dissolve quickly even when the sanctions start to ease. High military spending will remain for several years after a peace deal. As stated by President Trump and his senior officials, sanctions will only be removed in stages over many years and some, such as access to Western technologies in dual-use areas, may stay indefinitely. Moscow also faces even greater challenges dealing with demographic challenges.

Russia has for sure been impacted by the weight of sanctions, and previous plans for economic development have been disrupted. But the country, big businesses, and people proved a lot more resilient and adaptable than those applying sanctions had expected. Trade has shifted from a previous Western dominance to the East and South. Innovation has accelerated, and localization has moved from being an ambition to a reality. Assumptions made about the nature of political power and influence in Russia was very wide of the mark.

It can also be argued that sanctions have had many unintended consequences and, in some instances, the opposite effect of what was originally hoped for by those who demanded them. Rather than fracturing Russia, the restrictions have inadvertently helped reinforce the country’s economic, social and political stability. Rather than isolating Russia within the global community, there is now a more visible fracture between the West and the Global South, and it is growing. This realization is at least one reason why The White House is now opposed to additional sanctions against Moscow (despite the frequent threats) even as Brussels prepares yet another, the nineteenth, package of sanctions.