By Ariel Uraujo, InfoBrics, 5/30/25

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

The Baltic Sea, a historically contested region, has once again become a flashpoint for geopolitical tensions, with recent incidents raising the specter of broader conflict. The escalating tensions is being described by some analysis—amid the war of narratives—as a reaction to Moscow’s actions but it would be more accurate to describe it as a reflection of deeper systemic pressures driven by Western policies. One may recall that NATO’s expanding presence and provocative maneuvers in the region have significantly contributed to the current unease.

In May 2025, for example, Poland reportedly intervened after detecting a Russian “shadow fleet” ship near a Baltic Sea cable. This incident followed reports of Russia conducting major naval drills in the region, interpreted by some as a show of force. Additionally, the Russia-Estonia standoff over maritime boundaries has further inflamed tensions, with both sides accusing each other of provocative actions

These incidents, framed by Western media as Russian aggression, are seen in Moscow as defensive responses to encirclement by NATO and its allies. As Gerald Walker notes (an expert writing for Modern Diplomacy), “the Baltic Sea’s strategic importance has grown since Sweden and Finland joined NATO, transforming the region into a near-NATO-controlled waterway. This shift has prompted Russia to assert its presence more forcefully, as evidenced by its Baltic Fleet’s ‘Safety of Navigation’ exercise in early May, which focused on protecting civilian maritime traffic from interception.”

To put it simply, Moscow views the Baltic Sea as a critical strategic space, vital for its economic and security interests. The region hosts key energy infrastructure, including pipelines like Nord Stream, which have been targets of Western sabotage in the past. Russia’s naval exercises, far from being unprovoked, are a response to NATO’s increased military presence, including joint exercises and deployments near Russian borders.

There is an energy angle, as well, one just needs to consider the recent EU memorandum to bolster energy cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, signed by energy ministers of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) High-Level Group. It signals a strategic intent to reduce dependence on Russian energy, thereby isolating Moscow economically.

From Moscow’s perspective the overall context has a history. One may recall that the Baltic Sea has long been a contested space, with Russia’s access to its ports being a cornerstone of its maritime strategy since the days of Peter the Great. The expansion of NATO to include Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—has placed the alliance directly on Russia’s doorstep, a development Russia views as a direct threat. The recent incidents, including the alleged shadow fleet activities, can be framed as Russia protecting its legitimate interests against the reality of encirclement. Moscow in any case argues that its naval drills are routine and necessary to maintain readiness, especially in light of NATO’s aggressive posturing.

Energy dynamics, as mentioned, further complicate the situation. The Baltic Sea is a critical corridor for energy infrastructure, and recent Western efforts to diversify energy sources are seen as a direct challenge to Russia’s economic leverage. The memorandum signed by Baltic states to enhance energy cooperation is a case in point, aiming to integrate renewable energy and reduce reliance on Russian gas. From Russia’s vantage point, these initiatives are less about energy security and more about geoeconomic/geopolitical maneuvering to marginalize Moscow. Suffice it to say, such actions risk escalating frictions by framing Russia as an economic adversary amid military tensions .

As I noted in October 2024, the Baltic region’s strategic importance cannot be overstated, with Russia seeking to uphold its position   amid growing Western pressure. Finland and Estonia, NATO members, have signed a Baltic Sea security agreement and announced plans to potentially blockade the Gulf of Finland, a vital route for Russian shipping. The Gulf is crucial for Russia, hosting key ports like Primorsk for oil exports and the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.

Moscow deems this a violation of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, warning of serious consequences. The Atlantic Alliance’s growing presence, including exercises in Lithuania and a new headquarters in Mikkeli, further fuels Russian concerns about encirclement. As NATO’s expansion continues, the risk of escalation increases in this strategically critical region, thus threatening global stability.

Last month, I further highlighted how NATO’s rhetoric often ignores Russia’s legitimate security concerns, painting it as the sole aggressor in a complex geopolitical landscape. These observations remain relevant, as the current incidents reflect a continuation of this ongoing dynamic. Russia’s actions, while assertive, are not escalatory in isolation; they are responses to a broader pattern of Western containment, which goes beyond the matter of Ukraine as seen in the Arctic as well. In fact, with Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, the Alliance’s territorial reach now extends as far out as Russia’s eastern Arctic flank, thus making Russia the sole non-NATO Arctic nation.

To sum it up, the Baltic Sea’s rising tensions are a symptom of deeper mistrust between Russia and the West, deeply rooted in post-Soviet NATO’s expansion. Moscow’s perspective is one of defensive pragmatism: it seeks to protect its strategic interests in a region increasingly dominated by NATO’s presence and Western economic initiatives. The danger lies in miscalculation—where even a minor incident could spiral into a larger confrontation.

Moscow, for one thing, has consistently called for dialogue to de-escalate, while setting red lines, yet these calls are often drowned out by accusations of aggression. A sober approach requires working toward mutual de-escalation in an increasingly volatile environment.

By Alexander Libman, NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, 5/13/25

The last three years demonstrated the astonishing resilience of the Russian economy. Not only did it not collapse after major foreign sanctions were imposed in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine; it even demonstrated high growth rates in 2023-2024. It is this economy that allows Putin to replenish his army and, most crucially, to find new soldiers without resorting to what would be an extremely unpopular mass mobilization—simply by offering very high payments to new recruits.

Two sets of factors have allowed the Russian economy to survive and even to grow during the last years. The first is associated with the limits of sanctions—here, internal contradictions in the sanctions regime reduced its effectiveness. The second is associated with the nature of the Russian economy itself.

Sanctions certainly would have worked better if they were joined not only by the Western states, but also by non-Western countries, especially China and India. They would also have been more effective had they more resolutely targeted Russia’s main sources of revenue, oil and gas, at a much earlier stage. Throughout 2022, Russia benefitted from skyrocketing prices for its resource exports, which simplified its process of economic adaptation to the new reality.

An alternative course of sanctions from the point of view of these two issues was, however, likely not feasible. Most of the Global South perceived the war in Ukraine as a regional European conflict and the West as hypocritical and self-interested. As a result, it saw absolutely no reason to sacrifice its own economic interests to shore up Western ones. Similarly, from China’s point of view, given the unavoidable reality of economic and political confrontation with the US, there was little to be gained from supporting a West that would not offer anything in return.

Immediately sanctioning Russian oil and gas would likely have significantly damaged European economies, especially Germany’s—which is even now struggling with stagnation and decline of its industrial base. This effect, in turn, would make Germany less able to support Ukraine, and its electorate less willing to accept further costs of conflict. Even now, after the EU undertook substantial efforts to decouple its economy from Russian energy, it is simply buying resources from other, more expensive sources—and sometimes, as in the case of LNG (liquefied natural gas), from Russia itself. Meanwhile, Russia is selling oil and gas to customers it had originally found less attractive than Europe. In short, Russia is simply too big to be completely cut off from global energy markets.

Beyond its relative imperviousness to Western sanctions, the most important reason for Russia’s economic performance over the last two years was a specific economic model that it managed to create. In somewhat simplified form, the mechanism of Russian economic growth boils down to the following five elements.

1. Since the start of the war, Russia massively increased its military spending. The Russian government notably did not use coercive tools— requisitions, reallocation of workforces, or mandatory industrial plans—to strengthen the military sector. Instead, it continued to rely on market mechanisms, which means that, even now, the Russian economy can be described as a “war economy” only with an asterisk.

2. To ensure that it is able to maintain the output necessary to continue fighting, the Russian military-industrial complex had to increase employment. This increase happened in a country that already before the full-scale invasion suffered from major workforce deficits that were only exacerbated after 2022 due to emigration and the recruitment of soldiers. As a result, military companies had to substantially increase salaries for their employees.

3. These larger salaries led to increasing consumption spending. And here another key feature becomes highly relevant: unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is a market economy, where private business has enormous experience in adapting to various challenges. Private companies responded to the growing demand by providing consumer goods and services. The decision of many Western firms to leave Russia was seen as a unique chance for expansion. Russian business showed enormous creativity in finding ways around sanctions. Still, private firms also required more workers—a fact that contributed to the labor shortage and the increasing salaries, which then, in turn, strengthened the consumption boom.

4. The Russian Central Bank is also an important element of Russia’s recent economic success. Run by a highly professional management team, it managed to act quickly to avoid bank runs and the collapse of the banking sector in the early days of the full-scale invasion. This strategy also supported the economic adaptation discussed above.

5. From the point of view of this model, sanctions play an ambiguous role. They make import of consumer goods and technologies more expensive, which is a problem for Russia. However, paradoxically, they strengthen Russian economic performance by preventing capital flight from the country. Under other conditions, Russian companies, concerned about the risky and unstable environment in Russia, might move their consumption-boom profits to safe locations abroad. Now, these locations are not safe anymore—and as a result, money stays inside Russia and is further invested in production and infrastructure.

While this model worked reasonably well in the last couple of years, the high growth rates of 2023 and 2024 will most likely not be sustained in the future. In a nutshell, Russia has reached a state of full employment—there are no more workers available to expand production. As long as the war continues, there is no solution to this problem because of limited access to new technologies and constant demand for soldiers for the frontlines. Even worse, in 2024, as a reaction to the terrorist attack in Moscow, the Russian government introduced numerous restrictive measures against labor migrants from Central Asia, who, in the past partially solved the Russian workforce problem.

Without new workers, more demand does not lead to more growth, but only to more inflation, which in 2025 is expected to reach10%. The Central Bank reacts to increasing inflation by increasing its interest rate, which is now at the extremely high level of 21%. So far, however, the effects of this policy have been limited, primarily because large parts of the Russian economy have access to money “outside” the standard banking lending mechanism, e.g., through governmental subsidies and procurement. The Russian government is also increasing tariffs and taxes, which will only strengthen inflation.

This means, however, that the Russian economy is facing a dilemma. Sectors without privileged access to state money—which is, of course, distributed not based on economic merit but on political and lobbying considerations—will have no choice but to reduce their output due to the high interest rate and expensive credit. However, even this high interest rate, for which the Central Bank is heavily criticized in Russia, does not solve the inflation problem.

Russia’s immediate economic outlook is thus far less optimistic than the last two years would suggest. Most likely, Russia is sliding into a form of stagflation, characterized by zero growth, high inflation, and—unlike most other stagflation episodes in world history—low unemployment. In the short run, this state of affairs will make economic sentiment in the country more pessimistic. In the long run, it will lead to an increasing gap between Russia and leading world economies. In 2025, the Russian GDP is expected to grow by 1-2%, which is a substantial decline compared to over 4% in 2024. In particular, the non-defense industry is likely to slide into economic slowdown. Declining oil prices, which could be driven by the new US trade tariffs, are likely to weaken the Russian economy even further.

None of this means, however, that Russia is approaching economic collapse, which some observers have been so eager to predict. For now, the Russian economy remains a functioning one, allowing Putin to continue his war.

Russian Memorandum

Published by RT on 6/2/25:

The Russian delegation presented its peace proposal to the Ukrainian side during the talks in Istanbul on Monday.

Among the main points, Moscow’s memorandum calls on Kiev to withdraw its troops from the former Ukrainian territories that have joined Russia and confirm its neutral and non-nuclear status.

Draft as of June 1, 2025

Proposals of the Russian Federation (Memorandum) on the Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis

Section I

Key Parameters for a Definitive Settlement

1. International legal recognition of the incorporation into the Russian Federation of Crimea, the LPR, the DPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions; full withdrawal from these territories of Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) units and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations;

2. Neutrality of Ukraine, implying its refusal to join military alliances and coalitions, as well as a ban on any military activity by third-party states on Ukrainian territory and the deployment of foreign armed formations, military bases and military infrastructure there;

3. Termination of all existing international treaties and agreements inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Section, and refusal to conclude any such agreements in the future;

4. Confirmation of Ukraine’s status as a state without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with a direct ban on their receipt, transit and deployment on Ukrainian territory;

5. Establishment of maximum limits for the size of the AFU and other Ukrainian military formations, the quantity of armaments and military equipment, and their permissible specifications; dissolution of Ukrainian nationalist formations within the AFU and National Guard;

6. Guarantees of the full rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population; granting the Russian language official status;

7. Legislative prohibition of the glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties;

8. Lifting of all current economic sanctions, bans and restrictive measures between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and refusal to impose new ones;

9. Resolution of issues related to family reunification and displaced persons;

10. Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities;

11. Removal of restrictions imposed on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;

12. Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other connections, including with third-party states.

Section II

Ceasefire Conditions

Option 1.

Commencement of complete withdrawal of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations from the territory of the Russian Federation, including the DPR, LPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, and their pullback from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties, in accordance with Provisions to be approved.

Option 2. “Package Proposal”:

1. Prohibition on redeployment of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations, except for movements aimed at withdrawal from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties;

2. Cessation of mobilization and commencement of demobilization;

3. Cessation of foreign supplies of military products and foreign military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of satellite communication services and intelligence data;

4. Elimination of military presence of third countries on Ukrainian territory, cessation of participation of foreign specialists in military operations on Ukraine’s side;

5. Guarantees of Ukraine’s renunciation of sabotage and subversive activities against the Russian Federation and its citizens;

6. Establishment of a bilateral Center for Monitoring and Control of the Ceasefire Regime;

7. Mutual amnesty for “political prisoners” and release of detained civilians;

8. Lifting of martial law in Ukraine;

9. Announcement of the date for elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;

10. Signing of an Agreement on the implementation of provisions contained in Section I.

Section III

Sequence of Steps and Timeline for Implementation

1. Work commences on drafting the Treaty text;

2. A 2-3 day ceasefire is declared for collection of bodies of the fallen in the “gray zone”;

3, Six thousand bodies of AFU servicemen are unilaterally transferred to the AFU;

4. A Ceasefire Memorandum is signed with specific dates for fulfillment of all provisions, determining the date for signing the future Treaty on Final Settlement (hereinafter, the Treaty);

5. A 30-day ceasefire regime takes effect from the moment the AFU withdrawal begins. Complete withdrawal of AFU units from the territory of the Russian Federation and full implementation of the “package agreement” must be completed within these 30 days;

6. Elections are conducted and government bodies are formed on the territory of Ukraine;

7. The Treaty is signed;

8. The signed Treaty is endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;

9. The Treaty is ratified, enforced, and implemented.

***

Ukrainian Memorandum

Published by Reuters on 6/1/25:

KYIV, June 1 (Reuters) – Reuters has seen the text of the peace proposals that Ukrainian negotiators plan to present to the Russian side at peace talks scheduled to take place on June 2 in Istanbul.

The text of the Ukrainian document is published in full with no changes.

Ukraine-Russia Negotiations Framework

I. Key Principles of the Agreement and the Negotiation Process

• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.

• Confidence-building measures – addressing humanitarian issues: unconditionally return all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners (the “all for all”

principle). Release by Russia of all civilian hostages.

• Non-repetition of aggression: The aim of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not occur again.

• Security guarantees and engagement of the international community: Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.

• Sovereignty: Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.

• Territorial issues: Territorial gains made by Russia since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territory issues are discussed only after a full and unconditional ceasefire.

• Sanctions: Some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.

• Implementation: Agree on a clear, balanced and achievable roadmap for implementation and enforcement of the agreements.

II. Next step – agreeing ceasefire and agenda of the leaders’ meeting

• After the meeting in Istanbul, the parties continue the talks which shall focus on: (1) full and unconditional ceasefire: its modalities and monitoring; (2) confidence building measures; (3) preparation, agreeing agenda and structure of future leaders’ negotiations on key topics.

• Negotiations to be held with the U.S. and Europe participating.

III. Ceasefire

• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea at least for 30 days (with the possibility of rolling extensions every 30 days) as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.

• Ceasefire monitoring, led by the US and supported by third countries.

IV. Confidence-building measures

• After successful exchange of PoWs after Istanbul talks, the parties continue the exchange process for all prisoners of war (“all for all” principle).

• Agreement on unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, and release by Russia of all civilian prisoners. These measures should include all categories of persons listed, starting from February 2014.

V. Leaders’ meeting

• The leaders of Ukraine and Russia meet to agree on key aspects of final peace settlement.

• Key topics of peace agreement to be agreed by the leaders:

1) Permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations

2) Security guarantees and non-repetition of aggression

3) Territorial issues

4) Economy, compensation, reconstruction

5) Penalties for breach of agreements

6) Conclusion of a final peace agreement

***

Fresh Ukraine, Russia demands show no interest for actual peace

By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 6/3/25

The memos presented by Ukraine and Russia at their direct talks in Istanbul on Monday make it absolutely clear that, absent a strong U.S. intervention based on a detailed U.S. peace plan, there will be no peace settlement in Ukraine.

It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.

The Ukrainian memo, presented before the talks, sets a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” Russia has already rejected this and will continue to do so — naturally, because it would mean giving up its main point of leverage for nothing in return. Nor indeed is a fragile and unstable ceasefire in the interests of Ukraine or the West. If Ukraine is to begin the extremely challenging process of economic reconstruction and democratic reform, it needs a stable and permanent peace.

The Ukrainian memo also states that “no restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.” Russia has already stated that it will not under any circumstances accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine since it sees this as NATO membership in all but name. European leaders have also stated that a European force could only be deployed with a U.S. guarantee of support, a condition which the Trump administration has rejected.

The Ukrainian memo continues, “some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.” Moscow will obviously not agree to a final peace without the lifting of sanctions or firm assurances that they will be lifted.

On one key point, the Ukrainian memo does leave room for compromise: “Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance.” Russia has in fact already publicly stated that Ukraine has the sovereign right to seek EU membership. And on NATO membership, the memo is correct that this does not depend on Ukraine but on unanimous agreement (not merely “consensus”) among existing members.

The Trump administration (or any European government) is therefore in a position to block Ukrainian NATO membership without reference to Kyiv. The problem for Moscow however is that Poland and other European members of NATO continue to declare their support for Ukraine’s membership; and, if the Democrats win the U.S. elections in 2028, they could overturn Trump’s veto. The Russians therefore are insisting on a Ukrainian constitutional commitment to neutrality and/or a U.S.-Russian treaty to that effect — which Kyiv is refusing.

Meanwhile, accounts of the Russian memo presented in Istanbul, as reported by the Russian media, include reported conditions for a ceasefire that Moscow must know are totally unacceptable to the Ukrainians — though this does not in itself rule out the possibility of Russia being willing to compromise on some of them in a final settlement if it meets its goals in other areas — especially bilateral relations with Washington.

They include “complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The second option for the ceasefire is a ban on major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the abolition of mobilization and martial law, and the cessation of supplies of foreign weapons.”

This is not going to happen, absent Russian victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will never agree to surrender territory that it still holds, nor will European countries agree to end all weapons supplies.

In return for a ceasefire, the Russian memo as reported calls for “international recognition of these regions and Crimea as part of Russia.” This is utterly pointless. It is not just that neither Ukraine nor Western countries will legally recognize the Russian annexations; China, India and South Africa have also refused this, and will continue to do so. The best that Russia can hope for (as was indeed provisionally agreed at the Istanbul talks in March 2022) is to defer the legal status of these territories for future negotiation.

As part of an eventual peace settlement, Russia is also apparently demanding that:

-Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and Rada elections, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;

-The size of the Ukrainian military be limited;

-A legal ban on Nazi & neo-Nazi propaganda. Dissolution of “nationalist” parties & organizations;

-Restoration of rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;

-A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council;

-It is necessary to ensure the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;

-Renouncing mutual claims with Ukraine in connection with damage from military operations.

Formal endorsement of the peace treaty by the UNSC makes very good sense. The other Russian conditions however will be exceptionally difficult for Kyiv to meet under Russian pressure — not least because in several cases they would need the legal approval of the Ukrainian parliament, which is very unlikely to give it.

Only Washington can offer Russia compromises in other areas (for example on U.S. force deployments in Europe) that could persuade Moscow to reduce these conditions to reasonable levels; and only Washington could then pressure Kyiv and European capitals into accepting them. Some of the Russian conditions (including minority rights) are not only legitimate, but essential if postwar Ukraine is to progress towards eventual EU membership, but a formula has to be found whereby Ukraine can agree to them as a starting point of the EU accession process, and not as surrender to Moscow.

The Trump administration can be forgiven its exasperation with the state of the peace process. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake — from the point of view of America’s own interests — for the U.S. to walk away from it. Apart from the fact that sooner or later Washington would inevitably be dragged back in, three recent developments have highlighted how a prolonged continuation of the war will involve serious risks for the U.S.

Thus the weekend’s devastating Ukrainian attack on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet undermines nuclear security between the U.S. and Russia.

The bipartisan bill to go before the U.S. Senate next week (with the encouragement of the EU presidency) proposes 500% tariffs on imports from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. Presumably the senators are thinking of China. They appear to have forgotten that it also means India (and other U.S. partners). India has no intention of bowing to a U.S. diktat that would radically increase its energy costs and undermine its economy; and the imposition of 500% tariffs on India would ruin a vital U.S. relationship in Asia.

Finally, the EU has passed a new package of sanctions against Russia including measures to target the so-called “shadow fleet” of internationally-flagged tankers transporting Russian energy exports. This is also an affront to countries like India that buy this energy — and consider that they have a perfect right to do so under international law, since Western sanctions against Russia have not been approved by the United Nations, or agreed by themselves.

Last month, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to board a tanker bound for Russia in international waters, and Moscow sent a fighter jet to warn the Estonians off. Finland and Sweden have also threatened to detain such ships. Russia in response briefly detained a Liberian-flagged Greek tanker exiting Estonia through Russian waters. Russian politicians have threatened retaliatory seizures: “Any attack on our carriers can be regarded as an attack on our territory, even if the ship is under a foreign flag,” warned Alexei Zhuravlev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee.

If both sides stick to their positions, then naval clashes will be not only possible, but certain. It is also obvious that these NATO members would never engage in such wildly reckless behavior unless they believed that in the event of such clashes, the U.S. military would come to their aid. The Trump administration needs to rein them in very firmly indeed. It also however needs to continue trying to bring an end to the Ukraine War, for as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.

By Kevin Batcho, Website, 5/19/25

“Victory has a hundred fathers,” John F. Kennedy observed days after the Bay of Pigs invasion imploded, “but defeat is an orphan.” He spoke not as a triumphant statesman, but as a coroner delivering an autopsy—cool, clinical, already stepping back from the still-smouldering wreckage. The disaster in question: a CIA-trained exile force, dead or captured on Playa Girón’s sands, their promised anti-Castro uprising evaporated like morning mist under Cuban gunfire.

There it was—the bitter truth, suspended like breath in winter: victory is always a crowded christening—everyone jostling to be godfather, to claim a hand in the miracle. Defeat gets no such ceremony. It is left at the threshold in the dead of night, unblessed and unnamed.

In the Ukraine war’s defiant early months, they dressed their gamble in sacred vestments—casting Zelensky as a paladin of modern virtue, arming him with weapons, myths, and standing ovations. They saw themselves as midwives to liberal democracy reborn in the black mud of Kherson. But the dream could not survive the discipline of Russian attrition. As the frontlines stalled and counteroffensives dissolved into mire, the self-declared fathers of victory grew queasy, slipping into shadow as their creation began to rot.

Today, the pathology returns as tragic farce. European leaders and American hawks cling to the illusion of victory—not secured on the battlefield, but performed through ultimatums, pageant diplomacy, and the hollow theatre of sanctions. This is no longer strategy, but reflex: a compulsive shedding of responsibility, a disavowal of a war no longer convenient to claim—masked by ever-louder cries for justice that barely muffle the silence of inner defeat.

As the outcome sours, a new adversary emerges—not in Moscow, but in the White House. The temptation grows to pin failure on the man who refuses to follow their script, to recast their miscalculation as his betrayal. Like Roman patriarchs exposing an unwanted child to the elements, they abandon their geopolitical offspring, hoping the cold wind of history will carry off both the body and the blame.

The war now marches forward—increasingly disowned by its patrons, sustained only by the one power that never recoiled. For Moscow, there is no shame in the scars of this conflict, no urge to rewrite its origins. Even its most disfigured chapters are embraced as providence—grim, perhaps, but righteous. And so, in the ceremonial hush of the Kremlin’s vaulted halls, they wait for the hundred fathers of victory to one day claim their seats.

Istanbul 2.0

In a last-ditch effort to blunt the trajectory of Ukraine’s defeat, Western leaders issued an ultimatum on May 10. The United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Poland demanded that Russia submit to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire by May 12—or face expanded sanctions on its financial and energy sectors, along with a renewed surge in arms deliveries to Ukraine.

The Kremlin swiftly rejected the Western diktat. At a 2 a.m. press briefing on May 11, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that “the language of ultimatums is unacceptable for Russia,” and insisted on addressing the “root causes” of the war. Rather than comply, Russian President Vladimir Putin tore up the Western script and imposed his own: direct talks with Ukraine in Istanbul on May 15. President Trump, determined to force an end to the conflict, compelled Kiev to accept Russia’s terms.

For Moscow, the aim is not to open a new chapter but to resume the one left unfinished in 2022—when peace talks were first derailed by Western intervention. The symbolism is clear: once again, negotiations take place in Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe Palace; once again, Russia’s delegation mirrors its earlier form, now reinforced with senior military officials to underscore both resolve and leverage.

Back in the early days of the war, Ukraine appeared ready to accept sweeping concessions: permanent neutrality, strict limits on its military capabilities, a ban on foreign troops, cultural protections for Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and a 15-year timeline to negotiate Crimea’s status. But these terms unravelled shortly after Russia’s retreat from Kiev, when Western leaders—especially Joe Biden and Boris Johnson—urged Zelensky to reject the deal. Instead, they unleashed a flood of arms and promises of victory. For these leaders, it was not enough merely to avoid defeat; they sought to sire triumph—to be remembered as the proud fathers of a decisive strategic victory over Russia.

For a brief period, this strategy created the illusion of success. Ukraine reclaimed territory through mid-to-late 2022, but by the failed summer offensive of 2023, momentum had decisively shifted. Ukrainian forces crashed against an impenetrable Russian defensive wall. Since then, Russia has seized the initiative—both on the battlefield and at international diplomatic forums.

Russia has survived the Western sanction onslaught, outpaced the G7 in growth, and now unquestionably commands the battlefield. The perceived balance of power has changed—and so has the language of diplomacy. Western leverage has dwindled to a theatre of gestures: sanctions that failed, stockpiles that thinned, and declarations no longer matched by capacity.

What remains is a vanishing space for illusion. Wars do not end through moral appeals or maximalist demands from the losing side. They end through negotiation—or collapse—depending on the foresight of those facing defeat. Caught between these fates, Ukraine and its patrons oscillate in confusion—unable to accept the war is lost, yet desperate to end it on terms that feign dominance. They speak in the language of resolution not to claim authorship, but to obscure it—nudging the burden of paternity toward more convenient shoulders, hoping history forgets who first blessed the cause. Yet the window for meaningful dialogue narrows with every uncompromising demand.

Kellogg’s Ceasefire Plan

The Western call for an “unconditional ceasefire”—echoed by Kiev and increasingly framed as the moral minimum for peace—rests largely on a blueprint attributed to retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg. His proposal has come to define the broad contours of Washington and its allies’ expectations: an internationally monitored armistice, with the United States and European powers acting as “neutral guarantors,” tasked with enforcing compliance through the solemn theatre of impartiality.

At its core is the demand that both Russian and Ukrainian forces withdraw 15 kilometres from the current line of contact, creating a demilitarized buffer zone—a frozen strip of contested land intended to suspend hostilities and cool tensions along the front.

But what are the odds this plan will play out as advertised? Imagine Ukrainian artillery shelling European monitors in the buffer zone, blaming it on Moscow and then executing a swift punitive advance into the vacated zone towards the new Russian lines? Would British or French officers then solemnly indict Kiev for violating the terms? Or would Moscow once again be the predictable scapegoat? The answer is as damning as it is obvious.

For Vladimir Putin, accepting such a plan would be political self-immolation. Signing away strategic ground under the watchful eyes of adversarial “arbiters” would not only weaken Russia’s military posture—it would be seen as capitulation dressed in legalese. The penalty for such betrayal would not be diplomatic embarrassment but a bullet in a Kremlin courtyard.

For Moscow, the Kellogg Plan is a non-starter. The ancient axiom endures: the weak do not dictate terms; they suffer what they must.

Premature Peace Negotiations

Following Putin’s call for renewed peace talks in Istanbul, the world watched a tense choreography unfold. Ukrainian delegates stalled, detouring to Ankara while their Russian counterparts sat in cold silence at the Dolmabahçe Palace table. After a day of low-stakes manoeuvring and diplomatic squirming, the two sides finally met face-to-face on Friday, May 16—their first direct negotiation since the collapse of peace talks in March 2022.

And yet, despite the high stakes, these talks remain premature. Russia’s battlefield momentum is undeniable, but not yet decisive enough to dictate terms outright. It is as if, in early 1864, a battered yet unbroken Confederacy had demanded a ceasefire from a rising Union—not in surrender, but as a calculated gambit to freeze the war and preserve the means to fight another day.

From Moscow’s perspective, any ceasefire must represent an unambiguous admission of defeat: a full Ukrainian withdrawal from the four annexed oblasts—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Even this concession, Russian officials warn, is a closing window of opportunity.

When asked if he had threatened, “Next time there will be five regions,” Russia’s chief negotiator corrected him: “No. I said, next time it will be eight.” In Moscow’s view, time is firmly on its side—both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The terms offered now are already harsher than those of 2022; what comes next promises to be even more severe.

What most shocks American observers is Russia’s insistence that Ukraine vacate these oblasts even where Moscow lacks full military control. Beneath this surprise lies a common delusion: that territorial gains must mirror battlefield occupation. History suggests otherwise.

In the 1846–48 Mexican-American War, the United States annexed over half a million square miles—including California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and beyond—without ever fully occupying them. Japan, too, surrendered all of its territory, despite the U.S. never invading the Japanese home islands, let alone coming anywhere close to capturing Tokyo. Europe offers further precedent: Alsace-Lorraine changed hands between Germany and France twice with only partial occupation, and Finland ceded 11% of its territory to the Soviet Union in 1940 despite fiercely resisting Stalin’s invasion.

Art of the U-Turn

By compelling Ukraine back to the negotiating table on Russian terms, President Trump reveals that he holds more leverage over Zelensky than over Putin. He has already shown he’s both willing and able to halt military aid and suspend intelligence cooperation—pressure points Kiev cannot afford to ignore. Reports from the Ukrainian capital suggest the country’s defenses could hold out for only four more months under such conditions.

With Russia, however, Trump’s options are narrower—and politically perilous. His only potential instruments of leverage—reviving sanctions or resuming large-scale arms transfers—would require him to embrace the very policies he denounced on the campaign trail. Doing so would lend retroactive legitimacy to Joe Biden’s Ukraine strategy while undermining Trump’s own populist credentials. Such a pivot risks alienating his base. Meanwhile, Senator Lindsey Graham boasts of 70 senators ready to back “bone-crushing sanctions.” That number carries weight: it exceeds the threshold needed to override a presidential veto—and, ever so faintly, gestures toward the spectre of impeachment should Trump impose peace on terms deemed too harsh for Ukraine.

As the delegations departed Istanbul for the airport, having only achieved a 1,000 for 1,000 prisoner exchange deal, the Trump team’s new message was unequivocal: the path to peace must pass through a personal summit between Trump and Putin. But Moscow has held firm since the start of Trump’s second term—summits are ceremonial endpoints, not negotiation venues. They occur only after every clause of an agreement has been finalized and signed off by the Kremlin. There is no room in Russian protocol for impromptu theatre or improvisational statesmanship. If Trump wants a handshake for the cameras, he must first deliver terms that Moscow has already endorsed—final, binding, and on paper.

In America’s Five-Front Trap, I argued that the U.S. had dangerously overextended itself by engaging in multiple simultaneous conflicts, when prudence demanded a sequential strategy. Since then, Trump has done a great job pivoting: reversing course in Yemen after Houthi air defenses exposed the F-35’s vulnerabilities; easing trade tensions with China; and extending diplomatic overtures to Iran, even at the cost of a public “breach” with Israel. North Korea remains a dormant front, likely to be activated only if others spiral out of control. On paper, these reversals free up military bandwidth to focus U.S. pressure on Russia.

But these de-escalations are tenuous at best. Yemen and China are quiet, not resolved. Iran is a tinderbox. After U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff allegedly promised Hamas that in exchange for the release of prisoner Edan Alexander, the Gaza food blockade would be lifted—a promise still unfulfilled—American credibility has been wounded. In this context, why would Putin take U.S. assurances at face value now?

In many ways, Trump has stumbled into a trap laid not by Moscow, but by the very neoconservatives and European elites who oppose him so viscerally. Just as Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive broke against an immovable Russian wall, Trump now finds himself caught between two planks of intransigence—Moscow’s cold resolve on one side, and the unyielding demands of Western hawks on the other. The walls are closing in. His attempt to wrench a frozen peace from the jaws of Western defeat has become a solitary campaign of theatrical will. For his adversaries in London, Paris, Berlin, and the think tanks and Senate chambers of Washington, the war that truly matters isn’t in Ukraine—it’s against Trump himself.

And yet, whatever the outcome, Trump has a knack for declaring it a triumph. If defeat is an orphan, then Trump is the self-declared father of a hundred victories—sometimes christened in defiance of the facts, but always a declared monument to his own legacy. The battle may seem unwinnable, but the genius of Trump is that any seeming orphan of defeat can be rebranded, dressed in glory, and proudly claimed as rightful victorious progeny.

By Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 5/30/25

Ian Proud was a member of His Britannic Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He served as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019. Prior to Moscow, he organized the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, working out of 10 Downing Street. He recently published his memoir, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British diplomacy in Russia failed, 2014-2019.”

Ukraine is already asking for more money to continue fighting into 2026, a sure sign that President Volodmyr Zelensky has no plans to end the war.

With the battlefield continuing to favor Russia, European leaders have their collective heads in the sand on who will pay. How long before President Trump walks away?

At the G7 Finance and Central Bank governors’ meeting in Banff on May 21, Ukraine’s Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko sought financial support for 2026, “including the provision of support to the Ukrainian army through its integration into the European security system,” according to reports.

I have said before that Ukraine cannot keep fighting into 2026 without a significant injection of European money. Even if the war were to stop tomorrow, Ukraine would still face a huge funding black hole. And that prolonging the war simply extends Ukraine’s indebtedness and delinquency, nudging it every closer towards the status of a failed state.

Making light of the price tag, German-based Kiel Institute has suggested extra EU support to Ukraine’s army would only need to cost an extra 0.2% of GDP or $43.3 billion per year. This assumes no additional U.S. funding under President Trump and is a figure practically identical to the $41.5 billion figure I forecast two months ago.

The Ukrainian side pointed out two assumptions that underpin their request — first, that funding Ukraine’s military supports macro-financial stability in that country. That is untrue. By far the leading cause of the increased financial distress of Ukraine is its vast and unsustainable prosecution of a war that it cannot win. As I have said before, ending the war would allow for immediate reductions to be made to military spending, which accounts for 65% of total government expenditure.

Second, that paying for Ukraine’s military is keeping Europe safer. It isn’t. The best route to European security would be to end the war tomorrow. The risk of escalation only grows for the longer the war continues and President Zelensky resorts to increasingly desperate tactics as the battlefield realities turn against him.

This latest request for money is a clear signal that Zelensky is not serious about U.S. demands for peace, and would prefer to continue the fight, drawing directly upon European funds. It has long been clear to me that Zelensky is evading peace because it would bring his presidency to a close, not to mention elevate risks to his personal safety.

He has therefore been piling on more pressure for Western leaders to impose more sanctions and other measures, which will only serve to prolong the war. Senator Lindsey Graham’s recent brain wave that the U.S. impose 500% secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Russia is a classic example. No doubt other countries, China in particular, would respond negatively to this, as it has already to the launch of Trump’s tariff war. It would kill President Trump’s efforts at engagement with Russia, by boxing him in to Beltway demands in an identical rerun of his first presidency, making him appear toothless in the eyes of Putin.

But these are not the real points. Having suffered over 20,000 sanctions already since 2014 yet maintaining a stable, growing economy, what makes people believe that Russia will back down to even more sanctions now?

The war continues to favor Russia on the battlefield. In recent days, in addition to expanding territory in the south of Donetsk, the Russian army has made major gains in the pocket around now-occupied Toretsk. Progress, as always, is slow and grinding as it has been since the start of 2024. Ukraine has undoubtedly mounted a formidable defence of its territory, for which its fighters deserve great credit.

But Russia has never fully mobilized the country for the fight in Ukraine, for various domestic political reasons. Putin also wants to maintain relations with developing country partners and a more devastating military offensive against Ukraine would make that harder.

Pumping more billions into Ukraine’s army will merely slow the speed of defeat. Even the Ukrainians now accept that they cannot reclaim lost territory by force. Ending the war would at least draw a line in the sand for future negotiations.

For their part, Europe simply can’t afford to pump another $40 billion per year into Ukraine’s army, at a time when member states are trying to boost their own militaries, revive their flagging economies and deal with an upsurge in nationalist political parties that want to end the war.

An April pledge for extra military donations in 2025 elicited just $2.5 billion per year from Germany, and reconfirmed the £6 billion from the UK already committed, without pledging new funds. Keir Starmer’s government is in the process of making an embarrassing U-turn on previously agreed cuts to winter fuel payments for pensioners.

I seriously doubt that British people would consider another big increase in funds for Ukraine’s war would be a sensible investment if peace was on the table. That this isn’t actively discussed in Britain, in a way that it is in the United States, is driven by the complete lockdown of debate in the UK and European mainstream media.

Right from the beginning, the war in Ukraine has been an attritional battle of who can sustain the fight for the longest period of time. A longer war will always favor Russia because the economic liability Europe faces will ratchet up to the point where it becomes politically unsustainable. We make the assumption that Russia’s aims in Ukraine are to prevent NATO expansion and to protect the rights of native Russian speakers in that country, and of course, on the surface, they are.

But on the current track, Putin gets the added benefit of watching the European Union project slowly implode, without the need to go all in on Ukraine.

President Trump for his part continues to walk a fine line that involves criticizing both Putin and Zelensky for the continuance of the war. In the face of intransigence on all sides, I wonder how long it will be before he washes his hands of the mess and walks away.