By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics, 2/2/25

U.S. President Donald Trump is apparently intent on achieving peace at a rapid pace, having set a 100 day window for accomplishing this exceedingly complex political task. Aside from such a time table’s lack of realism, there are other factors that will render it soon out of date. Primary is the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian army’s capacity to hold back the powerful Russian armed forces now arrayed against it. The front may suffer a catastrophic collapse before Trump’s presumed deadline, giving Russia an even greater upper hand in talks.

The collapse of Ukraine’s defense fronts along all or nearly the entire line of combat – which stretches from Kherson just north of Crimea to the east, then north through Donetsk to Kharkiv and Sumy – appears imminent. Some fronts may hold longer but are unlikely to survive 2025. All last year, Russian territorial gains and, for the most part of the year, Ukrainian casualties have increased with each passing month, as I predicted would be the case over a year ago (https://youtu.be/P_MJi5H6HKU?si=rxRiaE0EglSgbclw at the 1:00:45 mark). The territorial advance now is accelerating at an ever more rapid pace and could lead to major breakthroughs to the Dnepr (Dnieper) River at any time now.

At the same time, the state of the Ukrainian military is disastrous. The military mobilization passed and being carried out this year with such a debilitating effect on the economy and society is failing to replace current losses at the front with completely inexperienced recruits with low to no morale (www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8yMTGKURYU). There are reportedly no more volunteers, and by spring some Ukrainian officials report the situation will be irretrievable. Moreover, almost all new recruits are old or unmotivated, The Economist reports (https://ctrana.one/news/475629-nekhvatka-soldat-v-vsu-stanet-kritichnoj-vesnoj-the-economist.html).

Commanders at the front, such as commander of the drone battalion of Ukraine’s 30th mechanized brigade, confirm that the 2024 mobilization has been an absolute failure, and there are now too few men to replace battle losses (https://ria.ru/20250113/mobilizatsiya-1993456847.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fstory%2F1af5d353-85ec-5374-a9d8-e07753fbda13). The mobilization that does occur is carried out by harsh, frequently violent measures. Verkhovna Rada deputy Aleksandr Bakumov from Zelenskiy’s own ‘Servants of the People’ party declared in session that mobilisation in Kharkiv Region is coerced, resembling filtration of Ukrainian population (referring to practice of detaining, beating, and torturing citizens of occupied areas in an ostensible search for fighters and collaborators), with exits from the city blockaded by ‘recruitment’ press gangs and lawyers of mobilized men get beaten. Small businesses are undergoing mass closures because of lack of workers willing to go outside for fear of being pressed into the army. Others have reported falsification of data to justify recruitment (https://ctrana.one/news/478468-v-verkhovnoj-rade-zajavili-o-bespredele-ttsk-v-kharkove-video-vystuplenija.html and https://x.com/leonidragozin/status/1881280945644605814). There are numerous reports and videos of violence being used by recruitment gangs. In addition, many men are fleeing the country in greater numbers in order to avoid Ukraine’s desperate and draconian  forced mobilization measures, sometimes at great risk to their lives and to sociopolitical stability. Most recently, Western governments have reportedly been pressuring Kiev to extend the mobilization to the age cohort of 18-25, which would bring a near catastrophic demographic collapse to a population already depleted by some 30 percent because of war deaths and emigration (https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-biden-draft-08e3bad195585b7c3d9662819cc5618f). Even the recrutiment centers themselves are attempting to avoid the draft. When Rada deputies proposed closing the personnel shortage by creating a brigade from among the mobilization gangs, the chairman of the mobilization centers claimed there were not enough of them to form a full brigade (https://ctrana.one/news/475129-v-ttsk-objasnili-pochemu-nelzja-vsekh-ikh-rabotnikov-poslat-na-front.html). Low numbers of volunteers and failed mobilization are creating distortions in force structure. ‘Zombi-brigades’ or ‘paper brigades’ are partially-manned units merely called brigades in order to impress Western donors and facilitate corruption for commanders who seize the salaries designated for non-existing personnel (https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html).

The large number of desertions from the Ukrainian military, a phenomenon wholly ignored in the Western media for three years, were revealed finally in November to have exceeded 100,000 since the war began (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This would amount to perhaps more than 10 precent of the Ukrainian army at its present size, given Zelenskiy’s recent claim it numbers 800,000 (https://t.me/stranaua/183652). Moreover, more than half those desertions occurred in the first ten months of 2024 alone (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This is already desertion on a massive scale and includes mass desertions (https://www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f; https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Military blogger Yurii Butusov, Servants of the People deputy Maryana Bezuglaya, and others reported late last year on the desertion of an entire 1,000-man brigade trained in France immediately upon their arrival at the front. This may have been a case of a commander’s unsuccessful attempt to form what are called ‘zombi-brigades’ (https://ctrana.one/news/476748-jurij-butusov-zajavil-o-massovom-dezertirstve-v-brihade-vsu-anna-kievskaja.html and https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html). Indeed, military personnel have questioned the recent practice of creating new brigades when existing ones are woefully undermanned, apparently suspecting the corruption scheme lurking behind this practice (https://ctrana.one/news/474755-v-vsu-objasnili-zachem-sozdavat-novye-brihady-vmesto-popolnenija-sushchestvujushchikh.html). One Ukrainian commander told a Polish newspaper that sometimes in battle there are more deserters than killed and wounded (https://t.me/stranaua/180095).

Desertions are one symptom of lax discipline and especially low morale increasingly plaguing the Ukrainian army. Commanders are reporting that 90 percent of their troops on the frontlines are new, coercively mobilized men (https://ctrana.news/news/475190-v-vsu-sejchas-vojujut-v-osnovnom-zhiteli-sel-horodskim-lehche-sprjatatsja-ot-ttsk.html; https://t.me/rezident_ua/25314 (video); and https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Sources in the Ukrainian General Staff report similarly (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Thus, desertions are accompanied by unauthorized retreats, which are increasing in frequency. For example, hundreds ran from battle at one point last autumn in Vugledar (Ugledar) before it fell (www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f). Vugledar was once a solid stronghold, which in 2023 Russian forces stormed tens of times with no results. Ukrainians soldiers are refusing to carry out operational orders because they amount to suicide operations and are beginning to surrender as whole units, in one case nearly a full battalion (e.g., 92nd Combat). Indeed, refusals to follow orders or undertake counteroffensive measures are increasing. In one recent case, the Azov Brigade’s chief of staff, Bogdan Koretich, accused a Ukrainian general of such poor command that he was described as being responsible for more Ukrainian war dead than the Russians, forcing his removal (www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/24/7462293/). At lower levels, commanders are being fired in large numbers (https://strana.news/news/467266-itohi-852-dnja-vojny-v-ukraine.html). One reason for the disintegrating discipline and morale is that there is no relief for troops, as there is no long term‚ demobilization or time away from the front other than that coming from episodic brief rotations of troops—a consequence of insufficient troop numbers. Soldiers and their relatives have been lobbying for well over year for a law on demobilization that would routinize long rotations for troops to visit home, but no such law is visible on the horizon. Such would likely lead to a fatal troop shortage and the Ukrainian army’s full rout on the battlefield.

However, perhaps the main problem in the Ukrainian army, as in the rest of Ukrainian state and society, is corruption. It is endemic and omnipresent in arms production and procurement, mobilization (draft evasion by bribe), purchasing of leave and absence from the front, and manning brigades. One Ukrainian Defense Minister told a journalist that the problem is catastrophic“ (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Independent Rada deputy Anna Skorokhod claims that only 15 percent (!) of servicemen on the personnel roles are serving at the front, with large numbers either non-existent (dead souls) in service or having bribed their way into hiding somewhere in the rear (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). 

This is how Ukrainian officers describe the mass-scale of corruption in the army. Ukrainian army captain: “Due to false reports about the presence of personnel, the commanders of the directions receive false information. And they operate with ‚dead souls‘, developing combat plans. For example, somewhere the Russians have broken through a section of the front, the commander gives an order to a certain brigade to send a battalion with an attached group to reinforce. In fact, the battalion has been gone for a long time, its number is no more than a company — some have bought off their way to the rear or deserted. As a result, there is nothing to close the breakthrough, because of the threat, the flanks of neighboring brigades begin to crumble.”

Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff source: “If we take how many Russian troops we have at the front on paper, then if the Russians have an advantage in numbers, it is less than twofold. But that is on paper. In practice, the situation is different. Let’s imagine a separate section of the front. According to the papers, there are 100 people on our side, and 150 on the Russian side. That is, the enemy’s advantage is insignificant. With such numbers, it is quite possible to keep the defense. But during a real battle, the situation is radically different. At most 40 of our 100 people participate in it. And often even less. The rest are deserters, who simply refuse to fight, and the like. And Russians have 140-145 out of 150 people going into battle. In total, the advantage has already more than tripled. Why does this situation exist? Our army was initially based on a core of volunteers, ATO veterans, and highly motivated soldiers who went into battle without coercion and took the initiative. Russians had a big problem with motivation from the very beginning. But they worked on this issue and gradually created their own military-repressive system of coercion. And it works by sending soldiers into battle and stopping cases of insubordination and desertion. We did not create anything like this. And I doubt that we are even capable of creating such a system. Our state system is too weak and too corrupt for this. And now that the volunteers have died, died of injury, or simply burned out, and the army is being replenished with fake conscripts who have close to zero motivation, there are no ways to force them to fight. A separate problem is the quality of the command staff and the combat management system. There are also very big failures here, because many experienced commanders died and worthy replacements do not always come after them.” (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html).

This is a state of corruption, low morale, and incapacity reminiscent of the late, recently collpased Syrian army of Bashir al-Assad.

This sort of Ukrainian army along with its collapse comprises multiple threats to both the Maidan regime and the Ukrainian state beyond that posed by the advancing Russian army. I wrote some time back: “With the front collapsing and the army on the verge of dissolving, Zelenskiy’s post-Maidan regime is deeply divided and in danger of dissolution, which could bring state collapse, internecine warfare, and widespread chaos” (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/12/10/the-second-great-ukrainian-ruin-revisited/). The troops of a collapsed Ukrainian army will become a force that can sow chaos and/or be marshalled by a military or civilian leader towards the execution of a coup and perhaps a neofascist revolution or by peripheral and local figures to establish separate fiefdoms. Recall that during the Maidan demonstrations, leaders in Lvov and elsewhere first broached the idea of separating from then Yanukovych-controlled Ukraine. After the Maidan revolt and Yanukovych’s overthrow, it was Crimea and Donbas that moved towards separatism. Trump and his counterparts in Moscow, Kiev, and Brussels will need to make peace expeditiously in order to achieve a peace that avoids the long standoff and prospects for a new war in Ukraine that will be inherent in any unilateral, Russian imposed peace and Ukrainian capitulation and/or conquest as well as the danger of state collapse that could precede a Russian all-out victory. Indeed, it appears only Trump’s rapid peace can preempt the Ukrainian army’s full rout and collapse and save what remains of the Ukrainian state.

Two points to make. First, if you receive funding from a foreign government, you are not independent and those in alternative media need to stop referring to these outlets and organizations as independent. Second, as detailed by Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, a writer who has been living in Russia for decades, the majority of civil society in Russia is domestically funded and only a small percentage – the percentage that the west constantly focuses on – is foreign funded. So hysterical claims that “independent” Russian civil society will be gutted by the lack of US funding is nonsense. – Natylie

By Mark Tubridy, The Moscow Times, 1/30/25

The Trump administration’s abrupt freeze on foreign aid has plunged exiled Russian NGOs and media outlets into uncertainty, jeopardizing their funding and posing what some describe as the greatest challenge to Russian civil society since the Kremlin enacted its “undesirable” organization law a decade ago.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a sweeping directive last Friday, pausing all foreign aid for 90 days. The move aims to give the Trump administration time to review which programs align with the president’s “America First” agenda and determine which should continue receiving U.S. funding. Organizations have been issued stop-work notices on existing projects, along with a suspension of further disbursements.

The freeze has affected a broad range of initiatives, from landmine removal efforts in Iraq and HIV/AIDS treatment programs in Zimbabwe to typhoon emergency relief in the Philippines and wartime civilian programs in Ukraine. While Rubio later granted a waiver for “life-saving humanitarian assistance,” the vague wording has only deepened confusion, leaving organizations scrambling to determine whether their work qualifies.

For Russian NGOs and independent media operating in exile, many of which cannot generate revenue from donations or advertising inside Russia due to their designation as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations,” the sudden cutoff of U.S. funding is potentially devastating.

“This is the biggest funding crisis for Russian civil society since 2015, when Russia’s law on ‘undesirable foreign organizations’ forced several Western private foundations to shut down their Russia programs,” a Washington, D.C.-based source familiar with U.S. government funding for Russian organizations told The Moscow Times.

The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, estimated that as many as 90 organizations could be affected. While some receive funding from private donors and European governments, many are losing a significant share of their budgets due to the Trump administration’s freeze.

“The consequences will vary by organization, depending on their financial situation and alternative funding sources,” the source said. “But most will at minimum have to scale back operations and lay off staff. Some of the largest and most prominent independent Russian media outlets and civil society groups could be forced to shut down entirely.”

Kovcheg (The Ark), an exiled nonprofit that provides support to anti-war Russians both abroad and inside Russia, said it was notified earlier this week by U.S. donors that some of its funding had been paused due to the State Department directive.

“We’re still in a better situation than most NGOs because we cover half of our budget through crowdfunding, but still, I need to cut a team and [some of] our activities,” Anastasia Burakova, who heads Kovcheg, told The Moscow Times.

Burakova added that donor organizations she had spoken with seemed uncertain about what would happen next. “They don’t have a clear idea of whether the programs will continue after the audit or which areas the new administration will support,” she said.

Almut Rochowanski, a nonprofit consultant with years of experience working with Russian human rights activists, recalled the “existential panic” that followed Russia’s 2012 “foreign agent” law in the context of both the current foreign aid freeze and suspension of U.S. federal domestic funding, which was temporarily blocked.

“It was revealing. It showed that access to foreign money was seen as the single most decisive factor for their continued work and existence,” Rochowanski told The Moscow Times.

A journalist who founded an independent Russian news outlet now operating in exile described the “emotional rollercoaster” he and his team experienced upon learning that a “significant portion” of their funding had been frozen.

“It’s not like we were entirely dependent on American grants… It just so happened that at this moment, we were more reliant on U.S. funding, and everything hit at once,” the journalist said on condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters. “Almost overnight, the [money] was frozen.”

Despite the setback, he said his team would “keep fighting” and look for alternative funding sources. “If not, we’ll have to close, because, at this point, there’s simply nothing left to pay people with,” he added.

Some Russian organizations noted that while they do not rely directly on U.S. funding, they receive grants through intermediaries that do — causing the freeze’s effects to spill over to them.

“Some of the donors where you didn’t know who their source was… turned out to be one way or another linked to the same basket,” the head of a Russian nonprofit operating in exile said, requesting anonymity.

“Our donors told us to wait. They say they don’t know how long the pause will be,” the nonprofit head added. “So everything is on hold.”

Given the sweeping nature of the State Department directive, Russian independent media and NGOs are far from the only ones in the region to be impacted.

Ukrainian newspapers receiving funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have also said they were forced to suspend ongoing projects as a result.

And in an opinion column this week, The Kyiv Independent’s Chief Editor Olga Rudenko described how the U.S. funding freeze had left programs — including humanitarian relief, mental health support, media initiatives and community development projects — without critical financial backing.

Most Russian organizations contacted by The Moscow Times declined to comment on the freeze’s impact, with some stating they were still assessing how it would affect their operations.

“Russian media outfits probably understand that openly flaunting the fact that they are funded by Western governments might alienate their audiences,” Rochowanski said, pointing out that even anti-Kremlin Russians do not always view the West as a benign actor.

“They may also want to be careful because drawing unwanted attention from the Russian authorities could lead to threats against their reporters and sources,” she added. “For those same reasons, Ukrainian media can be quite open about how they are funded by Western governments.”

With U.S. funding on hold, some organizations are turning to European institutions for support, with discussions of potential emergency funding underway, according to the Washington, D.C.-based source.

The European Federation of Journalists urged potential European donors to step in and fill the gap left by the withdrawal of U.S. funding. While it did not specifically mention Russian organizations, the federation emphasized the reliance of Ukrainian news publications and exiled Belarusian media on U.S. financial assistance.

Still, even if civil society organizations manage to secure stopgap funding during the three-month freeze, there is growing concern that if the Trump administration’s review leads to long-term cuts, many will not survive.

“In the long term, if U.S. government funding isn’t restored, Russia’s independent civil society as a whole will be greatly diminished,” the Washington, D.C.-based source warned.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 1/19/25

The Russian and Iranian presidents met in Moscow last Friday to sign an updated strategic partnership pact that can be read in full here and was reviewed here. The run-up to this development was marked by predictable hype about it being a game-changer, which hasn’t subsided in the days since, but this is an inaccurate description of what they agreed to. The only way in which this might ring true is with regards to gas, not geopolitics, for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

To begin with, Russia and Iran already had close military-technical cooperation before they updated their strategic partnership last week as proven by the rumors of Russia relying on Iranian drones in Ukraine. They also agreed to revive the previously stillborn North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) shortly after the special operation began and the West imposed unprecedented sanctions against Moscow. Therefore, these parts of their updated strategic partnership aren’t anything new, they just aim to strengthen them.

About that, this agreement is fundamentally different from last summer’s Russian-North Korean one in that there aren’t any mutual defense obligations as clarified in Article 3. They only committed to not aid any aggression against the other, including assistance to the aggressor, and to help settle the subsequent conflict at the UN. That was already the case in their relations so explicitly clarifying it is redundant. Under no circumstances will Russia go to war against Israel and/or the US in support of Iran.

After all, “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis” over the past 15 months as Israel single-handedly destroyed that Iranian-led regional network, so it naturally follows that it won’t risk World War III in defense of an even weaker Iran. Moreover, Russia didn’t risk war with either of them amidst last December’s American- and Turkish-backed regime change in Syria, not to mention the ongoing special operation where it has direct national security interests.

Putin is therefore very unlikely to break from this precedent, which observers can confidently conclude by dint of him declining to include any North Korean-like mutual defense obligations in Russia’s updated strategic partnership pact with Iran, which should hopefully put to rest some folks’ wishful thinking. It should also be said that the timing of this document’s signing is important too since it took place after Israel defeated the Resistance Axis and as the region correspondingly enters a new geopolitical era.

The parties had been negotiating their updated pact for several years already, and while work had finally ended last fall, Putin specifically requested during the Kazan Summit that Pezeshkian “pay a separate visit to our country to sign this document and other important documents in a ceremonial atmosphere.” Some at the time casually dismissed this as some form of protocol, but in retrospect, it’s arguably the case that Russia didn’t want to sign such a partnership pact until regional hostilities finally abated.

That’s understandable too since he foresaw that the West and some in Israel would interpret that development as supposedly being aimed against them, with the resultant spin complicating any potential peace talks over Ukraine and risking a crisis in relations with Israel. Putin remains committed to resolving the NATO-Russian security dilemma over Ukraine through diplomatic means and spent the past quarter-century expanding ties with Israel so he wasn’t going to jeopardize either in this way.

From the Iran side, Pezeshkian represents the “reformist”/“moderate” faction of the Iranian policymaking elite, and they too might have been concerned that this development would be interpreted by the West and some in Israel as being aimed against them. Such perceptions could spoil any chance of reviving nuclear talks with the US, and it was still uncertain who the next American President would be, so he and his ilk might have also calculated that it’s better to wait until regional hostilities finally abated.

Observers will note that Pezeshkian gave his first interview to foreign media since the US presidential election just days before traveling to Moscow, during which time he reaffirmed his intent to resume talks with the US. The timing strongly suggests that he wanted to preemptively counteract whatever spin hawkish elements in the new administration might try to put on his country’s updated strategic partnership pact with Russia. This might have even been coordinated with Russia to a degree too.

Moving along to the NSTC component of their updated strategic partnership pact, it’s much more substantive since the aim is to increase their measly $4 billion mutual trade, which will help Russia more easily reach other Global South markets while providing relief for Iran’s sanctions-beleaguered economy. If successful, and it’ll take some time to see either way, then the NSTC can serve as a new geo-economic axis connecting the Eurasian Heartland to West Asia, South Asia, and eventually ASEAN and East Africa.

Once again, these plans were already underway for almost three years before they finally signed their long-negotiated updated strategic partnership pact so none of this is exactly new, it just bears mentioning in the larger context considering that part of this newly signed document concerns the NSTC. Much more important than the military and connectivity parts by far is their ambitious gas plans since Russia and Iran have some of the world’s largest reserves, with the latter’s largely remaining untapped.

It was explained in late August why “Russia Might Soon Redirect Its Gas Pipeline Plans From China To Iran & India”, namely due to the continued pricing dispute with the People’s Republic over Power of Siberia 2 and the latest gas MoUs at the time with Iran and then Azerbaijan. These combined to create the credible possibility of Russia replacing its hitherto eastward export focus with a southward one instead. Their updated strategic partnership pact confirms that the southern direction is now Russia’s priority.

Putin said during his press conference with Pezeshkian that he envisages beginning exports at just 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, presumably due to the lack of infrastructure in northern Iran, before eventually scaling it to 55 bcm. That’s the same capacity as the now-defunct Nord Stream 1 to the EU. His Energy Minister later told reporters that the route will run through Azerbaijan and that negotiations are in their final stages over pricing. Their successful conclusion would revolutionize the industry.

Russian investment and technology could unlock Iran’s enormous gas reserves, thus leading to those two creating a “gas OPEC” for managing global prices amidst the Islamic Republic’s entrance to the market. While they have a self-interested incentive to keep them high, plunging the price could deal a powerful blow to America’s fracking industry and its associated LNG exports, thus imperiling its newfound European market dominance brought about by sanctions, the Nord Stream terrorist attack, and Ukraine.

Additionally, Russian gas projects on Iran’s side of the Gulf could supply nearby India, and/or a swap arrangement could be agreed to whereby Iran provides gas to it on Russia’s behalf even sooner. For that to happen, however, India would have to defy existing US sanctions on Iran or secure a waiver. Trump 2.0 might be convinced to respectively turn a blind eye or extend such in order for India to purchase this gas instead of China, the latter of which is already defying such sanctions on the import of Iranian oil.

Part of Trump 2.0’s expected “Pivot (back) to Asia” is to obtain predominant influence over China’s energy imports, which includes cutting off its supply through a carrot-and-stick approach of incentivizing exporters to sell to other clients instead and creating obstacles for those that don’t. Some possibilities for how this could look with regards to Russia were explained here in early January, while the Iranian dimension could work as described above, albeit in exchange for US-Iranian talks making progress.

Even if India decides not to risk the US’ wrath by unilaterally importing Russian-produced Iranian gas in the event that Trump 2.0 isn’t convinced about the merits of having it replace China as Iran’s top energy client and thus threatens harsh sanctions, then China can just buy it all instead. Either way, Russia’s help in unlocking Iran’s largely untapped and enormous reserves will have a seismic effect on this industry, with the only questions being what prices they agree to and who’ll purchase most of it.

The answer to both is of immense importance for American interests since constantly low prices could kill its fracking industry and inevitably lead to the loss of its newly captured European market while China’s large-scale import of this resource (let alone on the cheap) could further fuel its superpower rise. It’s therefore in the US’ interests to boldly consider coordinating with the potentially forthcoming Russian-Iranian “gas OPEC” as well as allowing India to replace China as Iran’s top energy client.

Circling back to the headline, it’s indeed the case that the updated Russian-Iranian strategic partnership pact is poised to be much more of a game-changer in the global gas industry than for geopolitics, though its revolutionary impact on the aforesaid could have some geopolitical consequences in time. Even so, the point is that the pact isn’t geopolitically driven like some enthusiasts imagined before its signing and others still counterfactually insist afterwards since Russia won’t defend Iran from Israel or the US.

Russia and Iran “reject unipolarity and hegemony in world affairs” as agreed upon in their newly signed pact, but they’re not going to directly oppose it via joint military means, only indirectly via energy-related ones and by strengthening their economies’ resilience. The future of their strategic partnership is bright, but in order to fully appreciate its prospects, observers must acknowledge its non-military nature instead of continuing to fantasize about a joint war against Israel and/or the US like some are doing.

I discuss Suzanne Massie in my book and made major use of her excellent book “Land of the Firebird” as a source on the tsarist Russian period. Last summer, I finally got around to reading her memoir about her time as an advisor to Reagan on Russian/Soviet issues and how she’d developed her interest in Russia. I’d wanted to interview her about her books and reached out to the two different email addresses on her website, but never got a response. It had occurred to me that she must be in her 90’s and maybe wasn’t in any condition to give an interview. I’m sad that I wasn’t able to talk to her. She sounds like she was a wonderfully interesting woman who played an important role at a crucial time in getting a US president to see “the enemy” as human (as opposed to an ideological blob thousands of miles away) and having legitimate interests that had to be considered. – Natylie

Meduza, 1/27/25

Suzanne Massie, an American writer and scholar of Russian history who served as an adviser to U.S. President Ronald Reagan during the final years of the Cold War, died on January 26. She was 94 years old.

Massie was the author of books including Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia, which Reagan used to prepare for his meeting with Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit of 1985, and The Living Mirror: Five Young Poets from Leningrad, in which she profiled future Nobel Prize winner Joseph Brodsky. She also made significant contributions to the book Nicholas and Alexandra, by her then-husband, Robert K. Massie.

During Reagan’s presidency, Massie met with him over 20 times, telling him stories of her personal experiences with Soviet citizens and advocating for more communication between Washington and Moscow. She also shared Russian jokes and phrases with Reagan, including the phrase “Trust, but verify,” and made multiple back-channel trips to the Soviet Union to deliver messages for his administration. A 1993 article in The Atlantic referred to her as “The Woman Who Ended the Cold War.”

Massie continued to travel to Russia throughout the last decades of her life. In 2021, she asked Vladimir Putin for Russian citizenship in a TV interview on the state media network NTV. She was granted Russian citizenship later that year.

By Pietro Shakarian, ACURA, 1/20/25

At the end of 1829, the social scene in St. Petersburg was abuzz about a charming young Persian prince, who had traveled from Tabriz to the Russian Imperial capital with gifts for Tsar Nicholas I and the Romanov family.  The journey of Iran’s Khosrow Mirza, the seventh son of Crown Prince `Abbas Mirza, was intended to repair relations between Tehran and Petersburg, following the murder of the diplomat and writer, Aleksandr Griboedov. The mission was major diplomatic success and set the stage for a long-term rapprochement between Russia and Persia, following two major wars over control of the Caucasus in the early 19th century.

Almost 200 years later, Russia and Iran have never been closer.  On January 17, 2025, Iran’s affable reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, arrived in Moscow to a red-carpet reception.  After a warm meeting and over three hours of talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between their respective countries.  The signed pact envisions an intensification of ties between Moscow and Tehran to a degree unprecedented in the history of Russo-Iranian relations.  The document was the result of months of intensive diplomatic work by both the Russian and Iranian sides.  It also reflected a significant deepening of relations that had been occurring steadily over the past decade, augmented by Russo-Iranian cooperation within BRICS and coordination on several major flashpoints—Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), Gaza/Palestine, and Lebanon.

Prior to this groundbreaking event, Western—especially British—media outlets made persistent attempts to dismiss the obvious deepening of ties between Moscow and Tehran. Publications such as The Guardian sought to play-up the supposed points of disagreement between the sides on issues such as the rising tensions over the southern Armenian province of Syunik (Zangezur).  Still others have speculated, without any understanding of the internal dynamics of the Iranian Islamic Republic, that Pezeshkian was on course to lead a rapprochement with the West, especially the US.  Yet, to any serious observer of Russo-Iranian relations, it was abundantly clear that such speculation was completely divorced from reality.  The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty between Putin and Pezeshkian ran this point home, amplified by the obvious warmth between the two leaders.

The preamble of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty defines relations between the Iranian and Russian peoples as being “deeply historical,” stressing the “closeness of cultures and spiritual-moral values.”  It emphasizes the need to elevate Russo-Iranian relations to a “new level” (“novy uroven’”) and to give them a “comprehensive, long-term, and strategic character.”  The treaty itself is valid for 20 years but is automatically extended every five years, ensuring that it remains more or less perpetually effective, unless one of the signatories withdraws from it.  In the run-up to the signing of this landmark accord, analysts in both the East and West widely speculated on its potential nature. Some believed that the treaty would only be of an economic or cooperative nature.  Others speculated that it would be purely focused on defense—to such a degree that the treaty itself could even be called a “defense pact.” In fact, the treaty, being comprehensive, includes elements of both.  Its 47 articles cover everything from cooperation in the defense and energy spheres, to mutual support against sanctions, to the promotion of Persian literature and language in Russia and Russian literature and language in Iran.

Defense Cooperation

As Iran’s top diplomat Abbas Araghchi stressed, the treaty itself does not represent a “military alliance.”  Nevertheless, mutual defensive cooperation stands front and center in the text, with the first several articles being devoted entirely to that issue. The centrality of defense is undoubtedly informed by the recent challenges faced by Moscow and Tehran in their common geographic neighborhood.  Iran’s area largely corresponds to the vast Iranian plateau of Eurasia, touching many areas of mutual concern with Russia.  Shaped like an elegant Persian ewer, the country stretches from the Caucasus in the north, to the Persian Gulf in the south, and to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent in the east.  The fact that Iran sits adjacent to the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia makes it an ideal partner for Russia, as the Kremlin aims to bolster security along its Eurasian perimeter amid increased pressure from the West. Moscow and Tehran likewise share significant common interests in the Middle East and the Levant, enhanced by the recent fall of the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

These common areas of interest are reflected in the relevant articles on defense cooperation in the treaty.  Section 1 of Article 3 obliges the parties to strengthen relations on the basis of “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, independence,” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of both sides.”  Section 3—a cornerstone of the treaty—prohibits the parties from supporting potential aggressors who might attack one of the two signatories. This section is especially significant in light of recent Israeli threats against Iran. Section 4 of Article 3 further obliges the parties against supporting separatist movements on each of the other’s territory. Given that Russia and Iran are large, multiethnic “civilizational” states, this section is certainly applicable to both sides.  However, it is especially relevant for Iran, given post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s irredentist designs on Iranian Azerbaijan (the historical Atropatene of antiquity).  As an Iranian Azerbaijani himself, Pezeshkian is particularly sensitive to Baku’s efforts to stir up separatism in his native province.  In recent years, Ilham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan has been actively encouraged in these aggressive irredentist endeavors by the Israeli and American governments.  Supported by copious amounts of “caviar diplomacy,” dubious “academics” like the Atlantic Council’s Brenda Shaffer have been particularly vocal about the cause of “Southern Azerbaijan” (Baku’s official irredentist name for Iran’s northern provinces).

Section 4 of Article 3 thus represents a strong refutation of these efforts to “balkanize” Iran.  In Persian eyes, it is also perceived as a significant symbolic gesture on the part of Moscow, due to the historical legacy of Russian and Soviet interventions in Iran’s internal affairs. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the Iranian memory of Stalin’s support for the breakaway Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics in northern Iran after World War II.  The latter history still resonates among many Iranians and was even represented by Marjane Satrapi in her graphic novel (later film) Persepolis. Significantly, Pezeshkian’s hometown, Mahabad, once served as the center for the short-lived Kurdish Republic, backed by Stalin. Nevertheless, it must be stressed again that Section 4 is arguably just as relevant to Russia as it is to Iran, given recent calls by certain Western politicians and pundits for the dissolution or “breakup” of the Russian Federation.

Article 4 of the treaty focuses on deepening cooperation in the intelligence sphere, while Article 5 is entirely devoted to military cooperation.  The latter envisions a deep and all-encompassing collaboration between Tehran and Moscow in all military spheres, stopping just short of an outright military alliance.  It obliges both parties to conduct joint military exercises on their respective territories as well as “beyond their borders” in accordance with international law.  Section 4 calls for cooperation against common military and security threats, as well as larger threats to regional security.  In a similar vein, Section 2 of Article 6 envisions annual meetings on bilateral military-technical cooperation.  Article 7 focuses on joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism, human trafficking, illegal migration, and more, while Articles 10 and 11 focus on cooperation in the spheres of arms control and information security respectively.

Areas of Mutual Interest

Articles 12 and 13 of the treaty refer to the need for defense and security cooperation in specific areas of the Russian and Iranian geographic neighborhood.  In particular, one of Russia’s leading scholars of the Caucasus, Sergey Markedonov, has referred to Article 12 as being “of fundamental importance.”  This particular article obliges the two signatories to “promote the strengthening of peace and security in the Caspian region, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Middle East” and unequivocally calls on the sides to “cooperate with the objective of preventing the interference” and “destabilizing presence” of “third states.”  With regard to Transcaucasia, the unnamed “third states” undoubtedly include the US, the UK, Israel, the members of the EU, and almost certainly Turkey.  This article will likely be welcomed by Georgia’s Irakli Kobakhidze but will give pause to Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev.  Pashinyan’s flirtations with the US and the EU and Aliyev’s extensive cooperation with Israel and Turkey put Yerevan and Baku at odds with Tehran and Moscow by the terms of this specific article.

Article 13 focuses exclusively on the Caspian region, an area of particular relevance to both Russia and Iran not only in terms of security, but also energy and north-south economic and transport cooperation.  This article alone contains four sections, reflecting the great importance that Moscow and Tehran attach to the Caspian as a common zone of cooperation.  It also reflects Iran’s plans to transform itself into a regional and international gas hub, a vision that Russian elites once invoked in reference to Turkey, during a period when relations between Moscow and Ankara were warmer.  Foreign interference is no less relevant in the Caspian, given the significant interest of the American and British war parties and energy industries in the region.  BP, for example, holds a 30% interest in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  These forces also share the long-term interest in developing a Trans-Caspian pipeline, by expanding the BTC across the Caspian to access the energy riches of Central Asia, especially Turkmenistan, to “contain” Russia, Iran, and China.  Yet, despite the significance that the Caspian region is accorded in the treaty, it was not mentioned at all by Putin or Pezeshkian in their press conference.  By contrast, the Middle East was mentioned six times, while the Caucasus was mentioned three times.

Article 14 of the treaty is likewise relevant to recent developments in the Caucasus, obliging the parties to facilitate the expansion of trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  Of particular significance in this regard is the common border between Iran and EAEU member Armenia, in the mountainous province of Syunik, a region of major historical, spiritual, and cultural importance for the Armenian people. Azerbaijan seeks to claim this vital link between Iran and the EAEU as the “Zangezur corridor,” a vision known by Iranians as “NATO’s Turan Corridor.”  The aim of the “Kuwait on the Caspian” would be to secure a direct link with its Nakhichevan exclave and, by extension, NATO member Turkey, granting NATO open access to the Caspian Sea. Empowered by his belief that he can get anything he wants through military aggression, Aliyev has constantly threatened to forcibly seize this territory from Armenia, thus making Syunik another major potential flashpoint in Eurasia. The issue has profound security implications for Iran and Russia and, as the seriousness of the treaty’s language attests, this point is certainly not lost on Moscow or Tehran.

From Sanctions Support to the Shahnameh

Subsequent articles call for deepening bilateral economic, trade, energy, and transportation ties.  Section 2 of Article 16 calls for establishing “direct ties” between Russian federal subjects and the provinces (ostân-hâ) of Iran.  Article 19, with four sections, details mutual cooperation against sanctions, including an obligation not to join any international sanctions against either signatory, as well as a guarantee against “unilateral coercive measures.”  Article 20 builds on these points by detailing options to bypass SWIFT.   In particular, Section 2 calls for creating a “modern payment system independent of third countries.”  Article 23 pledges mutual assistance in the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy, while Article 25 calls for simplifying customs procedures between the two countries. Several additional articles articulate extensive cooperation in the science, healthcare, and education spheres.  In terms of culture, Articles 32 and 34 call for the promotion of Russian and Persian literature and language in both countries. In the sphere of mass media, Article 33 calls for countering “disinformation and negative propaganda” aimed against the signatories.  The concluding articles call for additional cooperation in several spheres, from tourism to sports to water resource management.

On the whole, all of these articles reflect the fact that the Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty is indeed just that – an all-encompassing document providing the basis for even deeper ties between two giants of Eurasia.  Tellingly, as Markedonov also noted, the treaty itself reflects already much of what Russo-Iranian relations had become in recent years.  Now, however, everything is codified on paper.  The text is rich in significant points, but the most significant aspect of the document is what it represents and implies as a whole.  Much like the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the Russo-Iranian treaty represents yet another major indication that today’s world is fundamentally multipolar.  Any serious student of history or international relations would do well to pay attention and study this document very closely.  It is of immense importance, not only for Russia and Iran, but also for the changing landscape of global affairs more generally.

Pietro A. Shakarian, PhD is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union and a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Historical Research at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia.