By Tarik Cyril Amar, Website, 3/9/25

This is a text from my informal series trying to convey better information about Russian politics than can be found in Western mainstream media. I pay particular attention to statements, policies, or events that the latter either distort, neglect, or entirely ignore – that is, a lot. While I cannot possibly fill that gap, I hope my efforts help Western readers in search of better and more serious coverage.

Here, I address a recent meeting (on 6 March) between the president of Russia Vladimir Putin and about twenty representatives of the Defenders of the Fatherland Fund, all of them women. The Russian presidency’s website has posted a long (over two hours) recording and a full transcript of the meeting, which are the basis for this text. [http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76418]

The fund is an important institution that emerged from the war between Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and the West, on the other. It was founded by presidential degree in 2023 and has branches in all of Russia’s 89 regions. Its “principle task,” to quote the website of the Russian government, “is individual social assistance and support [сопровождение] of veterans of the Special Military Operation [that is, the war in Ukraine] and of the families of fallen soldiers.”

I had to select aspects that appeared most interesting to me. But those who know Russian will see that it is very well worth listening to the whole meeting.

Some of the meeting consisted of questions, requests, and answers that concerned the details of the assistance and services offered by the fund and Russian public authorities, at the general, that is, federal as well as the regional level, to veterans of the war in Ukraine – or, in the official parlance that was used here, the “special military operation” – and their families. Such issues included, for instance, the standardization of these measures, requests to routinely extend them to further categories of family members, and the status of former prisoners who have volunteered for military service.

Here, incidentally, Putin made clear that this policy – often distorted in the West – makes distinctions: Certain categories of crime, such as treason and terrorism, disqualify prisoners. In essence, only those who have committed more or less ordinary crimes can volunteer.

Another thread running through the meeting may surprise those in the West who rely on Western mainstream media for their (dis)information about Russia: With many of the women present either the widows or mothers of fallen soldiers, the losses and sacrifices of war were by no means avoided in this recorded discussion with the president that is now posted on the presidency’s website. That is a notable fact worth paying attention to.

If anything, the death of Russian servicemen was a central, recurring topic of the meeting, coming up time and again and at length. In a generally patriotic register, unsurprisingly – as, by the way, it would be on any similar occasion in, for instance, the US, the UK, or France. Yet the key point to note is that Putin and his government do not rely on silencing the memory of loss. It is true that Russia keeps its total casualties secret, as does Ukraine. That is what states at war often do. But anyone who things that the Russian public is not permitted to think about the fact that Russians die in this war, needs to watch this discussion: the opposite is true.

Putin also repeatedly took the opportunity to acknowledge the military service, heroism, and sacrifice of the soldiers fighting at the front. Addressing the case of a soldier who had sacrificed himself to protect his unit, the president sent a warning to those in the West, clearly especially French president Emmanuel Macron, who “want to return to the times of Napoleon and forget how that ended.” “Indeed,” he then generalized, “all mistakes of our enemies [yes, that’s the term he used], [our] opponents have begun with just that – with underestimating” Russia and, in particular, its unity.

Putin praised the contribution of, by implication, all civilians in the rear and especially women, to the war effort in terms that may, at first sight, appear rhetorical. But, as he underlined, he meant it: “Your work also brings victory closer […] It’s not hyperbole […] your work facilitates the unity of [our society] around our boys, who are fighting, around our motherland. That is the aim of your work and it accomplished this task. And that is a most important condition for achieving success, I say [that] entirely deliberately.”

What made this explanation particularly interesting was the reference point Putin chose, namely World War I. Not, let’s note, World War II or the Great Fatherland War, that is, the specific struggle against Nazi Germany between 1941 and 1945. So much, again, for those in the West who cannot grasp that Putin is not obsessed with the Soviet Union. His horizon is Russia’s history as a whole and hence much wider.

Regarding his view of World War I, Putin revealed two intriguing facets of his thinking. He believes that, first, the Russian Empire of the day was merely months away from winning instead of losing (as it did in 1917, the year of two revolutions) and, secondly, that the decisive factor in its defeat was social disunity. In his own words, “in Russia [social unity] was not achieved during World War I, [instead, our] society began to break down, fall apart […] The fact that our country did not make it through to victory by merely a few months was linked to [that] disintegration of [our] society.”

Unsurprisingly, in that area, Putin sees a decisive difference with the, that is, his Russia of today: “And you,” he assured his audience, but surely also speaking about himself, “your position – that is the most important [thing]: that it unites the country. That is one of the elementary conditions of achieving success.”

Regarding the current search for a way to end the war by Russia and the US (under new management) – despite the Zelensky regime’s delusions and the NATO-EU Europeans’ best efforts to keep the bloodbath going – there were no surprises at this meeting. But there was a particularly and – most likely deliberate – signal that Moscow is not ready to make concessions on what it sees as its vital national interests and therefore indispensable war aims: It was the bereaved mother of a fallen (and highly decorated) 21-one year old elite soldier (from the legendary 810th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade) who stressed that everyone was waiting for “victory” and that “we have to go through with this to the end; we must not make concessions to anyone.”

Unsurprisingly, the president agreed, confirming that concessions are not part of the plan. And that, to quote in full an important passage, “we [Russia] must select for ourselves […] a […] peace which will satisfy us and which will secure tranquility for our country in a long historical perspective. We need nothing from others, but we won’t hand over what is ours. And we need such a kind [of peace], precisely such a kind, which will secure the stable development of our country in conditions of peace and security.”

The phrase “We need nothing from others, but we won’t hand over what is ours” deserves special attention. Not only because it was widely reported in the Russian media. But also because it is important to be clear about what it implies: As Moscow now claims that both Crimea and four eastern oblast administrative regions in Ukraine now belong to Russia, it is crucial not to misunderstand its president here: For Russia – like or not – these regions are now formerly Ukrainian and currently part of “ours.” Putin’s statement was emphatically not about Russia’s border with Ukraine as of 2013.

Western observers and politicians would do very well to note at least three points from this meeting: 1) The above: Russia may be ready for a compromise but it will not compromise its key war aims, and that concerns, of course, not only territory but also Ukraine’s real neutrality. 2) Putin is confident – and probably with good reason – that Russia is united in pursuing these aims. If negotiations should lead nowhere, Moscow will not be afraid of continuing the war. 3) The Russian government sincerely believes – and I guess, so do many Russians – that this is a fight that is fundamentally defensive and that Russia must win it to secure a prosperous and independent future. That again means that Moscow will not agree to a peace – or truce – that does not reflect its de facto victory.

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 2/4/25

Russia’s Investigative Committee has announced the initiation of a criminal investigation into the killing of civilians in a small village in Kursk Region.

The region on the border with Ukraine is, of course, the site of the worse than pyrrhic incursion which Kiev launched into Russian territory last August. Since initially being overrun, the territory under the control of Ukrainian forces has unsurprisingly been shrinking under a Russian counterattack, while Kiev has been wasting its soldiers’ lives on yet another strategically absurd and tactically mulish to-the-last-man stand in classic Zelensky style.

Against this grim backdrop, the village in question, Russkoye Porechnoye, was under temporary Ukrainian occupation before being liberated by Russian forces. Entering the settlement, those forces reported finding evidence of the crimes that are now under investigation.

Specifically, Russian prosecutors charge Ukrainian forces with severely abusing and killing 22 civilians (11 men and 11 women) in Russkoye Porechnoye. They have also identified five individual Ukrainian servicemen as perpetrators: they go by the field pseudonyms of “Kum” (godfather), a platoon commander, “Motyl” (moth), “Provodnik” (conductor), and “Khudozhnik” (artist) and belong to Ukraine’s 92nd assault brigade. A fifth man, Evgenii Fabrisenko, is of special importance as he is the only one – at least until now – who has been apprehended by Russian forces.

His confessions, partly shown on Russian primetime news and on widely watched talk shows, seem to be a key source for information on the other perpetrators. Apart from providing details about the cruel abuses – including rape – and killings in Russkoye Porechnoye, Fabrisenko also claims that the perpetrators received an order from their battalion commander to “cleanse” the settlement. That is an important detail since it implicates the commander in the crimes even if he was not personally present.

At this point, the Russian authorities have launched an investigation, named suspects, and made specific accusations. It is true that, at the same time, Russian media and politicians treat the crimes already as fact: Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Russian President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has underlined that the atrocities of Russkoye Porechnoye must be acknowledged and widely publicized, even if the West and Ukraine pretend to be deaf to this kind of news. Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, has denounced the crimes as typical of the “terrorist and Neo-Nazi” Kiev regime, which, she stressed, is supported by the West.

But the investigations have not been completed, and trials have not yet taken place. At least until then, conclusive assessments of what exactly happened in Russkoye Porechnoye and who precisely took part in it are out of reach. It should be noted, however, that things can get even worse: Russian prosecutors speak of five identified perpetrators at least. Others might still become targets of investigation. The battalion commander, in any case, seems liable to be charged under the command responsibility principle.

Even without speculating, we do know a few things already: very serious, detailed allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity have been made. Russian prosecutors and media are showing us pieces of evidence and of the confessions of one of the accused. Leading Russian politicians have invested their credibility into supporting these allegations.

Even if some of the rhetoric around the case in the Russian media is, unsurprisingly, intense (it would be everywhere), there is no good reason to simply dismiss all of the above as “fake.” Yet that is what Ukraine and the West have done. Intriguingly, with few exceptions that seem to almost fulfill an “alibi” function, this wholesale dismissal has mostly taken the form of keeping quiet about the case: try googling for “News” about “Russkoye Porechnoye” in Russian and in, for instance, English, and the pattern is clear. That may still change in the future, but it is already a fact that the initial Western and Kiev response has been what the Germans call “totschweigen,” that is, hushing something up until it is – or at least seems – dead.

In that regard, as a minimum, both Peskov and Zakharova have an important point: even if Western and Ukrainian observers and politicians want to contradict Russia’s version of events, their silence is entirely inadequate, in three regards:

First, despite endless Western mainstream media brainwashing there is no a priori reason to simply dismiss the Russian accusations because they also carry an inevitable political charge: In general, facts can do so and still be facts. In the case of Russia, specifically, its record of telling or not telling the truth is, actually, no worse than that of the West or Ukraine (witness the ludicrous Western and Ukrainian lying about the Nord Stream sabotage or Western denialism about Israeli genocide), to say the very least.

It is true that Amnesty International has criticized prior Russian judicial procedures against Ukrainian POWs as unfair. In 2023, a UN commission of enquiry found that “Russian authorities have used torture in a widespread and systematic way in various types of detention facilities.” Yet even if you believe all of the above, it is reasonable – and not “whataboutism,” that last refuge of the special pleader – to apply the same standards to every state: The Ukrainian army, for instance, has an extensive and well-documented record of horrendous and pervasive illegality, including kidnapping, assassinations, “renditions,” and torture. And yet no one in the Western mainstream media would simply dismiss without further ado allegations that its officials make about others’ crimes.   

Thus, if you take allegations out of Kiev, Washington, or, say, London seriously enough to give them at least a hearing, you’ll have to do the same for Moscow. You won’t have to – and should not – believe anyone without evidence, but you cannot quickly decide to disbelieve anyone just because you feel you are “on the other team” either.

Second, there is no reason to consider Ukrainian soldiers immune to committing crimes. The West may have turned a blind eye to plenty of very questionable behavior – to put it mildly – by its proxy’s forces, from shelling civilians in Donbass to mistreating Russian POWs. And the Kiev regime has invested heavily in a deliberate attempt to “sell” its war effort as unrealistically kind and innocent.

Yet we still have some evidence independent of any Russian claims: Early in the war, Western media and Amnesty International, for instance, still dared to report Ukrainian crimes. In addition – and again despite the West’s massive efforts at obfuscating and “normalizing” this fact – Ukrainian troops do include substantial numbers of men with extremely violent, far-right ideologies.

In addition, the Ukrainian public sphere has been subjected to a systematic dehumanization campaign, in which all Russians have been depicted not merely as enemies but as monstrous and inferior (often using slurs, such as “vatnik,” a demeaning term implying backwardness; “rashist,” a contraction of “Russian” and “fascist”; or “Orc,” borrowed from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings). The systematic adoption of this language by the political elite and the mass media has had real effects. As Al Jazeera reported as early as May 2022, even a humble sales clerk in Kiev knew and shared its message: “They’re orcs because we don’t consider them human.”

Indeed, many Western “friends” of Ukraine had nothing better to do than to excuse, encourage, and even adopt this foul rhetoric. Those who may wish to justify such talk as a virtually inevitable consequence of war will still have to admit that it can have severe consequences beyond words: soldiers – that is men with arms who can end up in positions where they have the upper hand over civilians without arms – taking this dehumanizing language seriously will feel free, even encouraged to commit atrocities.

And, finally, the third reason why we cannot simply dismiss the Russian accusations is that crimes have victims. If the Russian accusations are borne out, then it will be principally unjust to pretend that the crimes against these victims do not exist or do not matter simply because they are “on the other side.” Because that would imply that these victims do not matter. Yes, there is a fundamental ethical issue here.

It bears repeating that, if we think in large numbers – and this has become a war of very large numbers indeed – then it is still likely that the preponderant majority of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are not criminals. They are now at war, and they live and die violently. I know Russian and Ukrainian and I have met many Russians as well as Ukrainians. Call me naïve if you wish, but I will hope until the opposite is proven that, on both sides, most of those fighting are not rapists or murderers. And when this war will be over, everyone will need to remember this, if they want a better future. Yet everyone will also have to be honest about not only the crimes they accuse others of but also those that some on their own side will have committed.

And as far as the West is concerned, those honest enough to face reality will find that no one has remained innocent. The West – its politicians, intellectuals, and media representative – in particular, will have to admit its abysmal, essential contribution to making this war happen and keeping it going. The psychological shock delivered by this predictable, late (as always), and inevitable (in the long run) discovery will produce ongoing denial, but also, hopefully, at least some soul-searching. Because a West that always claims the moral high ground must finally understand itself: it is no better than others, and, given its extremely aggressive conduct since the end of the Cold War – not to adopt a longer, also plausible perspective – it may well be worse.

By Seymour Hersh, Substack, 3/10/25

Much narrower talks are now under way [between the US and Russia]. What follows is a report from inside a series on-and-off talks between some Americans and Russians that have been going on since it became clear in 2023 there would be no victors in the war.

One American knowledgeable of the current talks told me that they now have the attention of senior Trump Administration officials. It is understood that any settlement that emerges will not include a post-settlement role for Zelensky. His term as Ukraine’s president expired last spring, but the Ukrainian constitution bars elections while the country is under martial law. Zelensky has long been long known by American intelligence to be among a group of political officials and military leaders siphoning millions of dollars from American and European war aid. At one point, I was told that Zelensky was warned by William Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Biden, that the corrupt generals and political figures involved in skimming funds were angry because Zelensky himself was taking too big a cut.

As to the specifics of the discussions now under way, the current objective “is short-term and pragmatic—stop the shooting. Putin is in. He sees the domestic political benefit of winning back the ‘Russian’ provinces and giving the arrogant Ukrainians a bloody nose as well as an economic solution to Russia’s inflation driven-economy.” The Russian delegation to the talks seeks “no long-term solution to the historic hatred and mistrust” between the two countries. Vice President Vance, who has been involved in some of the discussions, believes implicit deterrence of any future Russian military action against Ukraine will come through American “corporate interests and US involvement in redevelopment across the board.”

The insider said that “the task for Vance now is tell Europe, ‘Don’t do it’”: don’t offer renewed arms and rebuilding funds for a Ukraine government still led by Zelensky. The insider told me that his bet is that Zelensky “will cave to reality and sign. Russia wants Zelensky gone, but the US says it is up to the Ukrainians. Vance sees that American domestic critics will blame Trump for a sellout to Russia because of his love for Putin.”

In the end, the insider said, Zelensky will stay for a while but be replaced within a year and shooting will stop.

He added, “I hope.”

YouTube link here.

Strana, 3/11/25, Translated by Geoffrey Roberts

Ukraine has agreed to the US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.

Vladimir Putin and other representatives of the Russian government have repeatedly stated they are against a ceasefire and favour a “long-term peace agreement”, conditional upon the transfer of the entire territory of four regions of Ukraine, recognition of them as Russian territory, neutral status, etc.

The prevailing opinion among commentators is the Kremlin will reject the ceasefire proposal (as we have already written, this is exactly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is counting on, who initially did not want to talk about any ceasefire).

However, there are signals in the media that Putin may agree to a ceasefire. They have not been officially confirmed by the Kremlin, but this option cannot be 100% ruled out.

The key question is what will US President Donald Trump offer Russia in exchange for this?

If he lifts sanctions along with a ceasefire plus something else, that could be a strong argument.

In addition, there are other arguments:

1. The Russian Federation has the initiative at the front, and is achieving success, but this comes at a high price. To continue the war and achieve the goals declared by Moscow, even greater sacrifices and efforts will be needed. It will be necessary to declare mobilisation and completely transfer the economy to a war footing, cutting social and other items in favour of military spending (and the budget is already overstrained). In place of mobilised citizens, Russia will import migrants in ever greater numbers. All this could have grave consequences for the internal stability of the Russian Federation. Besides, according to all polls, a majority of Russians are for a ceasefire, provided that Russia retains the territories it has already captured.

2. Refusal to agree a truce could have negative foreign policy consequences for Russia. The United States will increase sanctions pressure, increase arms supplies to Ukraine, and a split in the West along US-Europe lines will become less likely due to the return of the “common enemy” in the person of Putin. In addition, the reaction of the global South could also be negative. Above all, China, which has long been calling for a speedy ceasefire. On the other hand, the end of hostilities will create an opportunity for Russia to begin normalising relations with both the United States and Europe. Moscow would be able to play a strong game in relation to growing contradictions between the United States, Europe and China.

3. Importantly, Russian troops have almost completely regained control over the Kursk region and the withdrawal of the UAF from there is only a matter of time. This removes one of the main arguments for the Kremlin against ending the war along the front line – the presence of the UAF on the internationally recognised territory of the Russian Federation.

4. The end of the war along the front line (if Ukraine’s armed forces are completely driven out of the Kursk region) will be a military victory for Russia, since it was able to capture part of the territory of a neighbouring state without losing its own.

5. The achievement of the political goals of the Russian Federation (both in domestic policy in Ukraine and in relations with NATO) can be achieved without military action. Trump already has a clear position on Ukraine’s non-accession to the Alliance. And other countries do not want to take it, so as not to run into the threat of war with the Russian Federation. As for internal processes in Ukraine, any prospects for normalising relations between Kyiv and Moscow are tied to one key point – ending the war.

We will find out about Putin’s decision out in the coming days. Perhaps he will refuse. Perhaps he will support a truce. Or perhaps he will set conditions for a ceasefire. But that will be a matter for negotiation. The main thing is a real readiness on both sides for a truce – which is still in question for Zelensky as well as Putin. Moreover, the “war party” in the West and in the Russian Federation will probably try to do everything possible to disrupt attempts to agree a truce.

As for the fact that the truce is not permanent, but temporary, the likelihood of a new war starting in 30 days is actually not very high. The balance of power between the parties is such that if hostilities resume, they will again turn into a war for one or two settlements without much meaning or prospects for a successful breakthrough – as is now obvious to everyone.