By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 7/28/23

Poland’s “Ukraine Reconstruction Service”

Poland’s Plenipotentiary for Polish-Ukrainian Development Cooperation Jadwiga Emilewicz opened Warsaw’s first “Ukraine Reconstruction Service” (URS) office in Lvov on 17 July in an event that attracted scant international media attention outside of those two countries. Publicly financed Polskie Radio reported on the seminar that she held that day under the auspices of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute here as well as the next day’s one in neighboring Volyn Region’s capital of Lutsk here.

In brief, Emilewicz announced that more offices will soon open elsewhere in Ukraine and that “We are preparing insurance and credit instruments for Polish companies.” She added that “We want to be present on the ground to support Polish entrepreneurs in establishing contacts and to monitor investment needs…We are creating a dialogue platform between Polish and Ukrainian businesses, and involving development institutions, as well as national and local authorities.”

Both seminars were attended by influential figures. The one in Lvov saw the participation of regional governor Maxim Kozitsky, who shared details about the URS’ activities in that region on his Telegram channel here. Meanwhile, the seminar in Lutsk was attended by neighboring Rivne Region’s Military Administration chief Vitaly Koval, who invited Polish companies to invest there right away. It’s important to note that all three regions – Lvov, Volyn, and Rivne – used to be part of interwar Poland.

Two Interconnected Developments

URS’ activities in these parts of Western Ukraine that most Poles still consider to be an inextricable part of their millennium-old civilization are the natural outgrowth of two interconnected developments from May 2022. Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Kiev and spoke at the Rada on the 22^nd of that month, during which time he and his Ukrainian counterpart Vladimir Zelensky pledged to accelerate their countries’ comprehensive integration.

The full English-language transcripts of their speeches can be read at each of their respective official presidential websites here and here. In the context of the present analysis, the top takeaway from Duda’s speech was that he shared their plans to streamline more road, rail, and other infrastructure connectivity. Meanwhile, Zelensky said that they’ll create a joint border and customs control. He also declared that Kiev will give Poles practically the same rights in his country as Ukrainians have.

Additionally, Duda’s remarks about how “The Polish-Ukrainian border should unite, not divide” and Zelensky’s about how “there should be no borders or barriers between us” strongly suggested the intent to eventually merge into a de facto confederation as was assessed in this analysis at the time here. The next day on 23 May 2022, Zelensky virtually attended that year’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and gave a speech that can be read in full in English at his official presidential website here.  

Of relevance, he announced that “we offer a special – historically significant – model of reconstruction. When each of the partner countries or partner cities or partner companies will have the opportunity – historical one – to take patronage over a particular region of Ukraine, city, community or industry.” Basically, Kiev plans to pay its overlords back by giving them post-war privileges in their preferred regions, which in Poland’s case are the parts of Western Ukraine that it used to control.

Perfecting The De Facto Confederation’s Economic Plans

These two interconnected developments from May 2022 directly led to Poland opening its first URS office in Lvov 14 months later. Tangible progress was therefore made on their leaders’ thinly disguised plans to merge into a de facto confederation via the “special – historically significant – model” that Zelensky described during his speech at the WEF. Although Kiev granted Poland “patronage” over Western Ukraine at that time, it took till now for Warsaw to launch its associated economic mechanism.

This delay can be explained by the need to carry out topical studies and bring together all stakeholders so that everything can move at an accelerated pace after the first URS office’s opening. Kozitsky’s earlier cited Telegram post touched upon three particular infrastructure projects that advance Duda’s vision of streamlining Polish-Ukrainian connectivity. When paired with the plans to create a shared customs space, this essentially equates to the economic dimension of their de facto confederation.

Poland’s Military Aid & Security Guarantee Demands

The security aspect of these plans is also moving forward. The Polish Finance Minister announced in March of this year that Warsaw gave Ukraine around €6.2 billion worth of military aid in 2022, which made Poland the third-largest state-level financier of the NATO-Russian proxy war there. Reports about Polish mercenaries fighting for Kiev have also circulated since the start of Russia’s special operation, and the “Polish Volunteer Corps” even took credit for a raid into Russia’s Belgorod Region in May.

Poland’s repeated calls for “security guarantees” for Ukraine could serve as the tripwire for it to formally deploy its conventional forces there in the event that such are extended, whether multilaterally via Warsaw’s participation in this scheme or bilaterally with Kiev, even if the latter is reached in secret. Politico’s report last November about Poland’s unprecedented military buildup suggests that it’s planning to have the excess capacity required for a large-scale foreign deployment sometime in the future.  

Towards A Conventional Polish Intervention In Ukraine

Of pertinence, its defense spending will be raised to 5% of GDP, it’ll have 300,000 active troops by 2035, and it’s buying billions in modern equipment from the US and South Korea. Poland is a NATO member with Article 5 mutual defense guarantees from the American nuclear superpower, however, so all these steps are excessive if Warsaw only wanted to protect itself from a speculative Russian attack. This observation suggests that Poland is indeed preparing for a conventional military intervention in Ukraine.

Even though it’ll take many more years for it complete its ambitious military plans, being a NATO member means that Poland can in theory deploy abroad whatever is presently available at home without fear of Russia attacking since the US’ nuclear umbrella deters that from happening. The Russian and Belarusian leaderships are taking this scenario very seriously as proven by what their representatives said in late July just several days after Poland opened its first URS office in Lvov on the 17^th of that month.

Russia & Belarus Warn About Polish Plans For Ukraine

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service chief Sergey Naryshkin warned about Poland’s military buildup near the Ukrainian border on 21 July during a Security Council meeting whose English-language transcript can be read in full at the official Kremlin website here. “Putin Exposed Poland’s Regional Plans In An Attempt To Deter Them”, but he also said that “If [Kiev] want[s] to relinquish or sell off something (to Poland) in order to pay their bosses, as traitors usually do, that’s their business. We will not interfere.”

His only red line in this respect is for Poland not to attack Belarus since that “would mean launching an aggression against the Russian Federation. We will respond to that with all the resources available to us.” As for that member of the Union State, President Alexander Lukashenko visited St. Petersburg two days later on 23 July, which was less than a week after Poland opened its first URS office. While there, he also rang the alarm about Poland’s plans in remarks that can be read at the official Kremlin website here.

The Belarusian leader felt differently about this scenario than his Russian counterpart did, however, since he described it as “unacceptable” due to the security threat this could potentially pose to the Union State’s southern borders. Their divergent views aside, these statements confirm that the Russian and Belarusian leaderships believe that Poland soon might commence a conventional military intervention in Ukraine to complement its economic control over the western part of that country.

The pretext that Poland might exploit to implement its hegemonic plans could be a Russian breakthrough across the Line of Contact or a false flag attack against Polish projects in Western Ukraine that’s blamed on Belarusian-based Wagner, though other “trigger events” are also possible. There’s even the chance that Kiev could openly invite this intervention during or after seemingly inevitable ceasefire and/or peace talks with Russia as part of a bilateral or multilateral “security guarantee”.

Concluding Thoughts

As it presently stands, Poland has already slyly taken control of Western Ukraine without having to fire a shot. Its political power was cemented last summer after the Rada granted Poles practically the same rights as Ukrainians in accordance with the promise that Zelensky made to Duda in May 2022, while the economic aspect was advanced through mid-July’s opening of the first URA office in Lvov. That being the case, there isn’t even a need apart from prestige for Poland to formally deploy troops to Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it’s precisely for that abovementioned reason that this might still end up happening, both because it could boost the ruling party’s prospects at the polls ahead of this fall’s elections and also since it would show the world that Poland is successfully restoring its long-lost status as a Great Power. That said, Western Ukraine’s formal integration into Poland isn’t a fait accompli even if this happens since it would risk provoking intense furor from nationalist forces on both sides of the border.

With these concerns in mind, which have very serious political and even latent security implications, the scenario of one day formalizing the currently de facto Polish-Ukrainian confederation is much more realistic than Warsaw biting off the western part of that former Soviet Republic. That would accomplish the same strategic goal of expanding Poland’s “sphere of influence” across a portion of its former Commonwealth without risking any major blowback. Truth be told, this scenario might be inevitable.

The Oakland Institute, Executive Summary, 2023

The war in Ukraine has been at the center stage of foreign policy and media reports since February 2022. Little attention, however, has been given to a major issue, which is at the core of the conflict – who controls the agricultural land in the country known as the “breadbasket of Europe?”

This report addresses this gap – identifying the interests controlling Ukraine’s agricultural land and presenting an analysis of the dynamics at play around land tenure in the country. This includes the highly controversial land reform that took place in 2021 as part of the structural adjustment program initiated under the auspices of Western financial institutions, after the installation of a pro-European Union (EU) government following the Maidan Revolution in 2014.

With 33 million hectares of arable land, Ukraine has large swaths of the most fertile farmland in the world.1 Misguided privatization and corrupt governance since the early 1990s have concentrated land in the hands of a new oligarchic class. Around 4.3 million hectares are under large-scale agriculture, with the bulk, three million hectares, in the hands of just a dozen large agribusiness firms.2 In addition, according to the government, about five million hectares – the size of two Crimea – have been “stolen” by private interests from the state of Ukraine.3 The total amount of land controlled by oligarchs, corrupt individuals, and large agribusinesses is thus over nine million hectares, exceeding 28 percent of the country’s arable land. The rest is used by over eight million Ukrainian farmers.4

The largest landholders are a mix of oligarchs and a variety of foreign interests – mostly European and North American, including a US-based private equity fund and the sovereign fund of Saudi Arabia. All but one of the ten largest landholding firms are registered overseas, mainly in tax havens such as Cyprus or Luxembourg. Even when run and still largely controlled by an oligarch founder, a number of firms have gone public with Western banks and investment funds now controlling a significant amount of their shares.

The report identifies many prominent investors, including Vanguard Group, Kopernik Global Investors, BNP Asset Management Holding, Goldman Sachs-owned NN Investment Partners Holdings, and Norges Bank Investment Management, which manages Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. A number of large US pension funds, foundations, and university endowments are also invested in Ukrainian land through NCH Capital – a US-based private equity fund, which is the fifth largest landholder in the country.

Most of these firms are substantially indebted to Western financial institutions, in particular the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – the private sector arm of the World Bank. Together, these institutions have been major lenders to Ukrainian agribusinesses, with close to US$1.7 billion lent to just six of Ukraine’s largest landholding firms in recent years. Other key lenders are a mix of mainly European and North American financial institutions, both public and private. Not only does this debt gives creditors financial stakes in the operation of the agribusinesses, but also confers a significant level of leverage over them. This was evidenced by the debt restructuring of UkrLandFarming, one of Ukraine’s largest landholders, which involved creditors including the Export-Import agencies of the US, Canada, and Denmark, among others, and led to important organizational changes including layoffs of thousands of workers.

This international financing directly benefits oligarchs, several of whom face accusations of fraud and corrupt dealings, as well as the foreign funds and firms associated as shareholders or creditors. Meanwhile, Ukrainian farmers have had to operate with limited amounts of land and financing, and many are now on the verge of poverty. Data shows that these farmers receive virtually no support compared to agribusinesses and oligarchs. 5 The Partial Credit Guarantee Fund established by the World Bank to support small farmers is only US$5.4 million, a negligible amount compared to the billions channeled to large agribusinesses.6

In recent years, Western countries and institutions have provided massive military and economic assistance to Ukraine, which became the top recipient of US foreign aid – marking the first time since
the Marshall Plan that a European country holds this top spot. 7 As of December 2022, less than one year into the war, the US has allocated over US$113 billion to Ukraine, including US$65 billion of military aid, 8 which is more than the entire budget of the State Department and USAID globally (US$58 billion).9

The report details how Western aid has been conditioned to a drastic structural adjustment program, which includes austerity measures, cuts in social safety nets, and the privatization of key sectors of the economy. A central condition has been the creation of a land market, put into law in 2020 under President Zelenskyy, despite opposition from a majority of Ukrainians fearing that it will exacerbate corruption in the agricultural sector and reinforce its control by powerful interests.

The findings of the report validate this concern, showing that the creation of a land market will likely further increase the amount of agricultural land in the hands of oligarchs and large agribusiness firms. The latter have already started expanding their access to land. Kernel has announced plans to increase its land bank to 700,000 hectares – up from 506,000 hectares in 2021. 10 Similarly, MHP, which currently controls 360,000 hectares of land, seeks to expand its holdings to 550,000 hectares.11 MHP is also reportedly circumventing restrictions on the purchase of land by asking its employees to buy land and lease it to the company.12

Additionally, by supporting large agribusinesses, international financial institutions are in effect subsidizing the concentration of land and an industrial model of agriculture based on the intensive use of synthetic inputs, fossil fuels, and large-scale monocropping – long shown to be environmentally and socially destructive.13 By contrast, small scale farmers in Ukraine demonstrate resilience and a great potential for leading the expansion of a different production model based on agroecology, environmental sustainability, and the production of healthy food.14 It is Ukraine’s small and medium-sized farmers who guarantee the country’s food security whereas large agribusinesses are geared towards export markets.

In December 2022, a coalition of farmers, academics, and NGOs called on the Ukrainian government to suspend the 2020 land reform law and all market transactions of land during the war and post-war period, “in order to guarantee the national security and preservation of territorial integrity of the country in wartime and post-war reconstruction period.”15 As explained by Prof. Olena Borodina of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), “Today, thousands of rural boys and girls, farmers, are fighting and dying in the war. They have lost everything. The processes of free land sale and purchase are increasingly liberalized and advertised. This really threatens the rights of Ukrainians to their land, for which they give their lives.”16

At a time of tremendous suffering and displacement, wherein countless lives have been lost and massive financial resources spent for the control of Ukraine, this report raises major concerns about
the future of land and food production in the country, which is likely to become more consolidated and controlled by oligarchs and foreign interests.

These concerns are exacerbated by Ukraine’s staggering and growing foreign debt, contracted at the expense of the population’s living conditions as a result of the measures required under the structural adjustment program. Ukraine is now the world’s third-largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)17 and its crippling debt burden will likely result in additional pressure from its creditors, bondholders, and international financial institutions on how post-war reconstruction – estimated to cost US$750 billion – should happen. 18 These powerful actors have already been explicit that they will use their leverage to further privatize the country’s public sector and liberalize its agriculture.19

The end of the war should be the moment and opportunity for just the opposite, i.e. the redesign of an economic model no longer dominated by oligarchy and corruption, but where land and resources are controlled by and benefit all Ukrainians. This could form the basis for the transformation of the agricultural sector to make it more democratic and environmentally and socially sustainable. International policy and financial support should be geared towards this transformation, to benefit people and farmers rather than oligarchs and foreign financial interests.

Endnotes

1. UkraineInvest. “Agrifood.” https://ukraineinvest.gov.ua/industries/agrifood/; Leshchenko, R. “Ukraine can feed the world.” Atlantic Council, March 4, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-can-feed-the-world/ (all accessed February 2, 2023).

2. Data on land leases was obtained from the Land Matrix https://landmatrix.org/ (accessed February 2, 2023) and compared with companies’ own documents as well as other databases such as https://www.largescaleagriculture.com/data/. The various sources present sometimes different data, but the Land Matrix appears to be the more up to date.

3. President of Ukraine. “For almost 30 years, the Ukrainian people have been fooled about land reform, 5 million hectares have been stolen during this period – President in an interview for Ukrainian
TV channels.” October 22, 2020. 

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/majzhe-30-rokiv-ukrayinskij-narod-durili-shodo-zemel-noyi-ref-64785 (accessed January 30, 2023).

4. US Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Service. Ukraine: Households Agricultural Production. May 23, 2022. 

https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/ukraine-households-agricultural-production (accessed January 30, 2023).

5. Foote, N. “Small farmers: The unsung heroes of the Ukraine war.” Euractiv. April 20, 2022.

https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/small-farmers-the-unsung-heroes-of-the-ukraine-war/ (accessed January 30, 2023).

6. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Program document for a proposed first economic recovery development policy loan (dpl) in the amount of US$350 million to Ukraine. June 1, 2020. 

https://documents1.worldbank.org/curat-ed/en/665101593482807601/pdf/ukraine-first-economic-recovery-development-policy-loan.pdf; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Supplemental financing document for a proposed loan in the amount of EUR437.05 million (US$489.45 mil-lion equivalent) to Ukraine for the financing of recovery from economic emergency. March 4, 2022.

https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/752081647378220940/pdf/Ukraine-Financing-of-Re-covery-from-Economic-Emergency-Ukraine-Supplemental-Development-Policy-Loan-Supplemental-Financing-Document.pdf (all accessed January 30, 2023.

7. Masters, J. and W. Merrow. How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts. Council on Foreign Relations, December 16, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts (accessed January 30, 2023).

8. Four packages of aid for Ukraine were voted by the US Congress in 2022. The first was for US$13.6 bn in March, the second US$40bn in May, the third US$12.3 bn in September and the fourth
US$45 bn in December. US Congress. “Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022.” 

https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Ukraine%20Supplemental%20Summary.pdf; “Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023. Division B – Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023.” 

https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Continuing%20 Resolution_Section%20by%20Section.pdf#page=5;“Statute at Large 136 Stat. 4378 – Public Law No. 117-128 (05/21/2022).” https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7691/ text; US Committee on Appropriations; “Fiscal Year 2023 Omnibus Appropriations Bill. US Committee on Appropriations. Division M— Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023.” https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Ukraine%20Supplemental%20Summa-ry%20FY23.pdf; See for more analysis: Freeman, B. and W. Hartung. “New Ukraine aid is a go — and it’s more than most states get in a year.” Responsible Statecraft. December 23, 2022. 

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/23/new-ukraine-aid-is-a-go-and-its-more-than-most-states-get-in-a-year/ (all accessed February 10, 2023).

9. USAID. “Budget Justification, FY 2022.” https://www.usaid.gov/cj/fy-2022 (accessed January 30, 2023).

10. “Kernel to increase its leasehold farmland bank to 0.7 mln ha:Verevskiy.” Latifundist.com, October 4, 2021. 

https://latifundist.com/en/novosti/56910-kernel-nameren-narastit-zemelnyj-bank-do-700-tys-ga–verevskij (accessed January 30, 2023).

11. “MHP plans to increase the land bank to 550 thousand hectares.” Latifundist.com, September 12, 2017. 

https://latifundist.com/en/novosti/37041-mhp-planiruet-uvelichit-zemelnyj-bank-do-550-tys-ga (accessed January 30, 2023).

12. “Offering the Ukrainians to Buy Land for the MHP Agricultural Holding.” Ukraine Gate, October 17, 2021. https://www.ukrgate.com/eng/?p=22025 (accessed January 30, 2023).

13. HLPE. Agroecological and other innovative approaches for sustainable agriculture and food systems that enhance food security and nutrition. July 2019. https://www.fao.org/3/ca5602en/ca5602en.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023); Lindwall, C. Industrial Agriculture 101. NRDC, July 21, 2022. https://www.nrdc.org/stories/industrial-agricultural-pollution-101 (accessed January 31, 2023).

14. “Small farmers are the backbone of food security during the war – and must be supported after the victory.” The Center for Environmental Initiatives “Ekodiya.” May 20, 2022. https://ecoaction.org.ua/mali-fermery-opora.html (accessed January 30, 2023); Mamonova, N. “What does War in Ukraine Mean for Smallholder Farming?” ARC2020, November 24, 2022. https://www.arc2020.eu/what-does-the-war-in-ukraine-mean-for-smallholder-farming/(accessed January 31, 2023); Mamonova, N. “Food sovereignty and solidarity initiatives in rural Ukraine during the war.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 50, no. 1 (2022): 47-66.

15. Resolution of the Public Forum of peasant farms, farming households, civil society organizations, and academic community. Kyiv, December 15, 2022.

16. Direct communication, January 27, 2023.

17. International Monetary Fund. “Total IMF Credit Outstanding Movement From January 01, 2023 to January 30, 2023.” 

https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/balmov2.aspx?type=TOTAL (accessed January 30, 2023).

18. “Ukraine sees post-war reconstruction costs nearing $750 billion – PM.” Reuters, October 24, 2022. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-sees-post-war-reconstruction-costs-nearing-750-billion-pm-2022-10-24/ ; Dolan-Evans, E. “Ukraine’s debts to Western banks are destroying its social safety net.” Open Democracy, November 17, 2022. 

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-debt-freeze-western-creditors/ (all accessed January 30, 2023).

19. Ibid.; Relief, Recovery and Resilient Reconstruction: Supporting Ukraine’s Immediate and Medium-Term Economic Needs. Informal approach paper by World Bank Group staff Presented as background to Ministerial Roundtable for Support to Ukraine at IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings 2022. April 21, 2022. 

https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099608405122216371/pdf/IDU08c704e400de7a048930b8330494a329ab3ca.pdf (accessed January 30, 2023).

RT, 7/24/23

President Vladimir Putin has shared his views on how Russia and Africa should unite their efforts in pushing for global “peace, progress, and a successful future,” in an article released ahead of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg.

1. Africa has “rightful place” in deciding the world’s fate

The Russian president said that Moscow’s relations with African states have “strong, deep roots and have always been distinguished by stability, trust and goodwill.” Moscow has “consistently supported African peoples in their struggle for liberation from colonial oppression” and “provided assistance in developing statehood, strengthening their sovereignty and defense capability,” he wrote. “We are sure that a new multipolar world order, the contours of which are already visible, will be more just and democratic.”

2. West hampers Russia’s supplies of food and fertilizers to Africa

Under the Black Sea grain deal, not only were none of the promises to exempt Russian grain exports from sanctions fulfilled, European countries even blocked Russia’s attempts to send fertilizers to African countries free of charge. According to Putin, more than 200,000 tonnes of fertilizers are “still unscrupulously held by the Europeans.”

3. Moscow can substitute Ukrainian grain

Over 70% of Kiev’s exports ended up in high-income countries, while the poorest nations received less than 3% of Ukrainian grain, according to Putin. Despite Western pressure, Moscow will continue to supply grain, food products, fertilizers, and other goods to Africa, “both on a commercial and free-of-charge basis, especially as we expect another record harvest this year,” Putin said. In 2022 alone, Russia exported 11.5 million tonnes of grain to Africa, and almost 10 million more tonnes were delivered in the first half of 2023.

4. Developing full spectrum of ties with Africa

Moscow highly values and will continue to develop economic relations with Africa – both with individual states and regional organizations. Russia also wants to take humanitarian, cultural, sports, and mass media cooperation to a “whole new level to serve our common interests.” In education, Putin noted that Russia is helping African states to build their human resources capacity, noting that out of 35,000 African students in the country “more than 6,000 receive Russian government scholarships.”

5. Importance of the Russia-Africa Summit

The second Russia-Africa Summit will take place from July 27-28, alongside the Economic and Humanitarian Forum, which is expected to provide a platform for business meetings and panel sessions. Forty-nine countries have confirmed their participation, and the Russian president expects that the participants will approve the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan. “We are working to prepare an impressive package of intergovernmental and inter‑agency agreements and memoranda with individual states as well as regional associations of the continent,” Putin said.

By Connor Echols, Responsible Statecraft, 7/21/23

On July 16, 1945, the world ended. Or at least it seemed that way to residents of the Tularosa Basin in New Mexico.

Unbeknownst to local civilians, J. Robert Oppenheimer had chosen their backyard as the proving ground for the world’s first nuclear weapon. The explosion, which U.S. officials publicly claimed to be an accident at a local ammunition depot, tore through the morning sky, leaving a 40,000-foot-tall cloud of radioactive debris that would cake the surrounding area with dust for days on end.

Tina Cordova, whose hometown of Tularosa lies just 45 miles from ground zero, remembers her grandmother’s stories about wiping that infernal dust off every nook and cranny of her childhood home. No one knew what had happened quite yet, but they figured it must have been something special. After all, a local paper reported that the explosion was so bright that a blind woman had actually seen it.

When the initial shock wore off, the 40,000 locals who lived within 50 miles of ground zero returned to their daily lives. They drank from cisterns full of radioactive debris, ate beef from cattle that had grazed on the dust for weeks on end, and breathed air full of tiny plutonium particles. Only later would the real impact become clear.

Bernice Gutierrez, born just eight days before Oppenheimer’s “Trinity Test,” moved from a small town near the blast site to Albuquerque when she was 2 years old. Cancer followed her like a specter. Her great grandfather died of stomach cancer in the early 1950s. She lost cousins to leukemia and pancreatic cancer. Her oldest son died in 2020 after a bout with a “pre-leukemia” blood disorder. In total, 21 members of Gutierrez’s family have had cancer, and seven have died from it.

“We don’t ask ourselves if we’re gonna get cancer,” Gutierrez told RS. “We ask ourselves when, because it just never ends.”

“Oppenheimer” — the latest film from famed director Christopher Nolan — is a three-hour-long exploration of the “dilettante, womanizer, Communist sympathizer,” and world-historic genius behind the ultimate weapon. The movie, based on the book “American Prometheus,” delves deeply into Oppenheimer’s psyche, from his struggles as a young student at Cambridge to his profound melancholy over the world he helped create.

Yet nowhere in the film will viewers find an acknowledgement of the first victims of the nuclear era. Indeed, the movie repeats the myth that the bomb site was in a desolate area with “nothing for 40 miles in either direction.” This was not for lack of effort, according to Cordova, who leads an activist group called the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium. (“Downwinders” refers to those who live in the fallout zone of nuclear tests.)

When Nolan’s team got to New Mexico to film, Cordova and her team published an op-ed in the local newspaper that called on the Oppenheimer crew to “grapple with the consequences of confronting the truth of our stories, of our history.” When that didn’t work, she reached out to the production through Kai Bird, the journalist who co-wrote American Prometheus, in an attempt to get a meeting. She received a flat “no.”

Cordova says she was “aggravated, angry, and disappointed” that the filmmakers had come to New Mexico to shoot the movie (and rake in state-funded tax breaks) but showed little interest in engaging with locals affected by Oppenheimer’s work. “Tens of millions of people are going to flock to theaters to see this movie, and a lot of them have never been exposed to this history,” she added. A short mention at the end of the movie could have changed that, Cordova argues. (Universal Pictures, which produced the film, did not respond to a request for comment from RS.)

And her concerns are not just about recognition. In 1990, Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which gave insurance and lump-sum payments to the people affected by decades of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. RECA payouts to date total more than $2.5 billion. But New Mexican downwinders were not included in the original law or a broader version of it passed in 2000, a fact that former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson attributes to a simple lack of awareness about their plight.

Cordova and her team have lobbied for years for an expanded version of RECA that would include New Mexican downwinders and some previously ineligible uranium miners, many of whom had little knowledge of just how dangerous their work was. A bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a RECA expansion bill earlier this month.

“Imagine having radioactive waste fall down like dirty snow on your homes and communities causing cancer and disease,” said Rep. Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-N.M.), who sponsored the bill in the House, in a statement. “Then think about the despair when you learn that the U.S. government compensated other communities exposed to radiation during the nuclear testing program but not yours.”

Lawmakers have introduced similar proposals several times in recent years, but, with limited public awareness behind their efforts, the proposal has never quite gotten enough support in Congress to pass.

“It’s an inconvenient truth,” Cordova said. “People just don’t want to reflect on the fact that American citizens were bombed at Trinity.”

---

Born in 1947 in Alamogordo, New Mexico, John Greenwood grew up a short distance from the Trinity Test site. Years of radiation exposure caught up with him in 2008, when he was first diagnosed with colon cancer.

Greenwood and his family spent four years fighting for his life. Their insurance covered 80 percent of costs, but the remaining 20 percent added up quickly given that a single chemotherapy treatment could cost $100,000. Other expenses fell by the wayside. One after another, utilities companies cut off their electricity and phone lines. Their car was repossessed.

But Laura Greenwood, John’s wife, knew their only option was to keep going. “I can’t tell you how stressful it was,” she remembered. “You go to bed crying every night wondering what you’re going to do the next day.”

John passed away in 2012, just six months after learning that the cancer had metastasized to his liver. He was the thirteenth member of his family to die from cancer since the Trinity Test.

Greenwood’s story highlights the devastating economic impact that years of health problems have had on downwinders. This, in part, is why RECA expansion has struggled to get off the ground in Congress, according to Laura. Many lawmakers argue behind closed doors that it would simply be too expensive to compensate downwinders and cover future medical costs related to radiation exposure.

Advocates of RECA expansion also have limited data to back up their claims of a link between the test and later cancers, which they blame in part on government secrecy surrounding the event. “The specter of endless lawsuits haunted the military, and most of the authorities simply wanted to put the whole test and its after-effects out of sight and mind,” according to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report on the history of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

A years-long study from the National Cancer Institute found that “no firm estimates can be established” of how many cancer cases came from the test due to limited radiation data from Oppenheimer’s team and a lack of reliable information on cancer rates and daily habits in rural New Mexico at the time. Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.), who supports RECA expansion, called the NCI research “limited” when it was released.

But one impact of the test is clear. In the months after the explosion, the entire state of New Mexico saw an unprecedented spike in infant mortality, with 56 percent more New Mexican babies dying during live births in 1945 than in 1944. That number went back down in 1946 and has never reached such high levels since, a statistical anomaly with a 0.0001 percent chance of being caused by natural conditions, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

To Nolan’s credit, “Oppenheimer” includes affecting scenes in which the scientist wrestles with the pain wrought by his life’s work. While it leaves out some notable parts of the history, the film offers a powerful and largely accurate account of Oppenheimer’s quest to build — and later try to contain — the ultimate weapon, according to Stephen Schwartz, an expert on the history of nuclear weapons and a non-resident senior fellow with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

“I don’t think it glorifies nuclear weapons at all, which was the concern that some people had,” Schwartz told RS. Viewers will leave with “a better understanding of why he did what he did and all the complications that ensued,” he added. “I hope that it sparks many conversations.”

But Cordova sees the lack of engagement with downwinders as a major missed opportunity. She remembered back in 2018, when the Santa Fe Opera put on a production of “Dr. Atomic,” an opera about the lead-up to the Trinity Test. When Peter Sellars, who wrote the show’s libretto, found out about the problems faced by downwinders, he invited Cordova and her team to talk about their experiences on stage before each performance. 

At a climactic moment of the show, Sellars portrayed a general arguing with scientists over whether to warn locals about the blast as a group of downwinders quietly watched on from the other side of the stage. “History is about what’s happening to people you’ve never met,” Sellars told RS. “Their bodies are carrying the traces of what you did.”

Sellars says the engagement with locals affected by the blast — most of whom were Latinos or native New Mexicans — helped make the show a hit. “The show was sold out, and the talks were packed,” he remembered.

Despite her lack of luck with the Oppenheimer team, Cordova remains optimistic. She hopes the movie will encourage people to learn more about the impacts of nuclear tests and boost support for her cause. “Every movement that has ever been started has a tipping point,” she said. “This movie could [have been] that tipping point. And it still might be that tipping point.”

This interview aired on 7/19/23. Link here.