By Jeff Childers, Substack, 5/3/25

Jeff Childers is an attorney and conservative commentator based in Florida.

Another corporate media narrative has been wadded up and thrown away now that its usefulness has expired. This week, the Wall Street Journal ran an astonishing bit of narrative turnabout, in a new limited hangout headlined, “The Russian Military Moves That Have Europe on Edge.” Ukraine-flag-in-bio types cried themselves to sleep last night.

For Portland readers, who may have missed the last four years of Proxy War narrative spinning, the media has constantly assured everyone that Russia has only gained ground in Ukraine through mountains of dead soldiers and piles of droned military equipment. According to media, Moscow’s mad dictator only progressed by irrationally shoveling Russian bodies into a Gettysburg-style sausage-grinder of his own creation, while the plucky Ukrainian defenders pick enemy soldiers off by the dozens.

But now they tell us that Russia’s army is bigger than ever. “Putin has ordered the military to expand its ranks,” the Journal admitted, “to as many as 1.5 million troops, up from around one million before the Ukraine invasion.” It pointed out that, before the invasion in 2021, Russia had built only about 40 total of its flagship T-90M battle tanks. But now, explained the story, “it is producing nearly 300 a year.”

“Russia’s recent production of military equipment,” it added flatly, “has more than made up for what it is losing in Ukraine.”

That was an astonishing narrative pivot. But the irony got even thicker. According to the Journal, most of Russia’s new tanks and other equipment aren’t even being deployed to Ukraine. Russia is stockpiling them. “Almost none are being sent to the front line in Ukraine, but are staying on Russian soil for later use,” said one Finnish official.

In other words, Russia hasn’t yet committed its best effort to the fight. Behold this stunning admission: “Most of what is being sent to the front line in Ukraine is old and refurbished Soviet-era arms.” The Russians are battling Ukraine with one arm held behind their back.

The article did not explain how Ukraine can possibly win if Russia decides to start trying.

🚀 If NATO fought the Proxy War to starve Russia through a war of attrition, it failed. “The Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated,” General Christopher Cavoli, commander of U.S. forces in Europe, bluntly told a Senate committee this month. “In fact, the Russian army, which has borne the brunt of combat, is today larger than it was at the beginning of the war.”

Weird. Russia is winning by losing so much. Media somehow holds an irresolvable logical conundrum, one posed by simultaneously believing that “Russia is throwing all its men and material at the war” but also that “Russia’s army is getting bigger by the minute.”

🚀 The new narrative pivot isn’t accidental. It is a feeble and obvious attempt to scare Western officials into doubling down on the Proxy War, based on the insane notion that doing even more of the same failed military strategy will somehow bring the Russian bear to heel, instead of just making its army swell even bigger and become even more well-equipped, or possibly leading to a catastrophic defeat in Ukraine when Russia decides to finally get down to business.

Also omitted by the article was any discussion of how Biden’s idiotic policy of letting Ukraine fire anti-personnel missiles over Russian beaches may have contributed to the buildup. Nor did it speculate about what the Russian people might be thinking of constant European threats to send armies of EU “peacekeepers” to help Ukraine kill more Russians.

Speaking of those threats, what is even more bizarre about all the bellicose European braggadocio is their utter inability to follow through with the threats. Consider this remarkable headline from this week’s Times of London:

Compare that puny 25,000 best-case estimate to Russia’s experienced 1.5 million-man army.

The 25,000 figure emerged from a series of “emergency” EU meetings to counter the Russian Menace. “The discussions,” the Times reported without a scrap of irony, “expose how reliant Britain and Europe are on the US when it comes to providing a serious deterrent to Russia.”

🚀 In a related story, this week the Times also ran another limited hangout story, this one describing how deeply Great Britain is up to its stiff neck in the Proxy War. It was headlined, “The untold story of British military chiefs’ crucial role in Ukraine.” The sub-headline explained, “The extent of the UK’s involvement in the 2023 spring offensive against Russia — the last-minute dashes to Kyiv, battle plans and intelligence — has remained largely hidden. Until now.”

Thanks, media. Now you tell us.

Combined with the similar revelations about the U.S.’s critical role in basically running the Ukraine side of the Proxy War, one begins to wonder exactly what the Ukrainians bring to the table, apart from service as patriotic cannon fodder? That’s not nothing; the Ukrainians and their odd mercenaries are the ones doing the dying.

But whose war is it, really?

For reasons that remain imperfectly understood, Ukraine —long the deep state’s crack house— is ground zero of the globalist project. Maybe it’s because Ukraine, with its actor president, is not just a proxy war, but a proxy country. What if corruptocratic Ukraine has no real government at all, but it is only a faux state, a disposable extension of WEF’s global leaders, the EU Commission, U.S. neocons, and their jointly shared fantasies of one-world, Soros-style unified government?

It would explain a lot.

But thanks to having no functioning media at all, we starve for reliable data; we lack the information necessary to understand what, exactly, are the stakes? But it is becoming more and more clear that the West bet the farm on Ukraine’s bread basket, and it backfired spectacularly.

What happens when the Russians finally get aggravated enough and commit their vast and growing reserve forces and brand-new hardware to the battle? I hate to say “We told you so,” but … we told them.

ACURA, 4/18/25

Just The News has exclusively obtained and released nearly 700 pages of declassified FBI documents from the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, following President Trump’s order and FBI Director Kash Patel’s delivery to Congress.

https://www.theohiopressnetwork.com/news/us/breaking-read-the-russia-collusion-memos-president-trump-declassified-and-fbi-director-patel-handed-to/article_050ffa82-7273-4874-b8b1-aab036cba2ad.html

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 4/30/25

Russia has long warned that any unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine of the 30-day sort that Zelensky has proposed could create an opening for NATO to expand its military influence in that country. Hitherto dismissed as a conspiracy theory by the West, Radio Liberty just let the cat out of the bag. The unnamed officials who they cited in their recent article confirmed that they envisage this “buy[ing] the Europeans time to assemble a ‘reassurance force’ in the Western part of Ukraine” and organize “air patrols” there.

Their reported game plan is “keeping the Americans onboard” the peace process, “sequencing” the conflict by clinching a ceasefire that’ll later lead to a lasting peace, and using the aforesaid interim period to carry out the abovementioned military moves for pressuring Russia into more concessions. What’s omitted from Radio Liberty’s article is that Russia has threatened to target Western troops in Ukraine, who Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth earlier said wouldn’t enjoy Article 5 guarantees from the US.

Even if Putin agrees to this concession that’s assessed to be among one of the five significant differences between him and Trump that prompted Trump’s angry post against Putin, Radio Liberty reported that this still wouldn’t lead to de jure European recognition of Russia’s territorial gains. The same goes for them lifting sanctions or returning any of its €200 billion of seized assets. More sanctions might even soon be imposed and the windfall profits from those assets will “bankroll Ukraine’s military needs”.

Given what Radio Liberty revealed, Russia can therefore expect nothing in return from the EU if Putin concedes to allow their troops and aircraft to deploy in and patrol over Western Ukraine. Any hopes of restoring Ukraine’s antebellum buffer state status would be crushed, and it can’t be ruled out that the EU’s zone of military activity could later expand to the Dnieper or beyond. One of the special operation’s goals was to prevent the West’s eastward military expansion so that would be another major concession.

Putin’s decades-long close friend and influential senior aide Nikolay Patrushev just told TASS earlier this week that “For the second year in a row, NATO is holding the largest exercises in decades near our borders, where it is practicing scenarios of offensive actions over a large area – from Vilnius to Odessa, the seizure of the Kaliningrad region, the blocking of shipping in the Baltic and Black Seas, and preventive strikes on the permanent bases of Russian nuclear deterrent forces.”

Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Shoigu told the same outlet several days prior that “Over the past year, the number of military contingents of NATO countries deployed near the western borders of the Russian Federation has increased almost 2.5 times…NATO is moving to a new combat readiness system, which provides for the possibility of deploying a 100,000-strong group of troops near the borders of Russia within 10 days, 300,000 by the end of 30 days, and 800,000 by the end of 180 days.”

When the EU’s prioritization of the Baltic Defence Line and Poland’s complementary East Shield are added to the equation, coupled with plans for expanding the “military Schengen” to speed up the eastward deployment of troops and equipment, the trappings of Operation Barbarossa 2.0 are apparent. Putin can’t influence what NATO does within the bloc’s borders, but he has the power to stop its de facto expansion into Western Ukraine during a ceasefire, which could partially hinder its speculative plans.

Conceding to them, which he might agree to do for the five reasons mentioned in the second half of this analysis here from early March, would lead to Russia’s mutual defense ally Belarus being surrounded by NATO along its northern, western, and then southern flanks. That could make it a tempting future target, but Western aggression might be deterred by the continued deployment of Russia’s Oreshniks and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter of which Belarus has already been authorized to use at its discretion.

Conceding to Western troops in Ukraine in exchange for the economic and strategic benefits that Russia hopes to reap from the US if their nascent “New Détente” takes off after a peace deal would therefore entail conventional security costs that could be managed through the means that were just described. At the same time, however, hardliners like Patrushev, Shoigu, and honorary chairman of Russia’s influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Sergey Karaganov could dissuade him from such a deal.

Putin must therefore decide whether this is an acceptable trade-off or if Russia should risk losing its post-conflict strategic partnership with the US by continuing to oppose NATO’s de facto expansion into Western Ukraine, including via military means if EU forces move into there without Russian approval. His decision will determine not only the future of this conflict, but also Russia’s contingency planning vis-à-vis a possible hot war with NATO, thus making this the defining moment of his quarter-century rule.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 4/16/25

Ukraine extended martial law until 6 August following Zelensky’s request earlier this week, which will prevent elections from being held over the summer like The Economist claimed late last month was a scenario that he was considering in an attempt to give himself an edge over his rivals. This move therefore exposes his fear of losing re-election. It’s not just that he’s very unpopular, but he likely also fears that the US wants to replace him after his infamous fight in the White House.

To that end, the Trump Administration might not turn a blind eye to whatever electoral fraud he could be planning to commit in order to hold onto power, instead refusing to recognize the outcome unless one of his rivals wins. As for who could realistically replace him, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claimed last May that the US had reportedly entered into talks with Petro Poroshenko, Vitaly Klitschko, Andrey Yermak, Valery Zaluzhny, and Dmytro Razumkov.

The New York Times (NYT) just ran a feature article on Poroshenko, who took the opportunity to propose a government of national unity (GNU) almost 18 months after this idea was first floated by Politico in December 2023, but even the article’s author felt obligated to inform readers that he’s unlikely to return to power. Citing unnamed political analysts, they assessed that “Mr. Poroshenko may be angling for an electoral alliance with General Zaluzhny…[who] has remained mostly silent about politics” till now.

Nevertheless, Poroshenko’s NYT feature article succeeded in raising wider awareness of the GNU scenario, which the Trump Administration might seek to advance over the summer. Zelensky continues to irritate Trump, most recently by alleging that Russia has “enormous influence” over the White House and accusing his envoy Steve Witkoff of overstepping his authority in talks with Putin. This comes as Ukraine continues dragging its heels on agreeing to the latest proposed mineral deal with the US.

From the US’ perspective, since the increasingly troublesome Zelensky can’t be democratically replaced through summertime elections, the next best course of action could be to pressure him into forming a GNU that would be filled with figures like Poroshenko who’d be easier for the US to work with. This could also serve to dilute Zelensky’s power in a reversal of the Biden Administration’s policy that saw the US turning a blind eye to his anti-democratic consolidation of power on national security pretexts.

The pretext could be that any Russian-US breakthrough on resolving the Ukrainian Conflict requires the approval of a politically inclusive Ukrainian government given Zelensky’s questionable legitimacy after remaining in power following the expiry of his term last May and the enormity of what’s being proposed. In pursuit of this goal, the US could threaten to once again suspend its military and intelligence aid to Ukraine unless Zelensky speedily assembles a GNU that’s acceptable to the Trump Administration.

The purpose would be to push through a ceasefire for lifting martial law, finally holding elections, and ultimately replacing Zelensky. The GNU could also help prevent the fraud that he might be planning to commit if he decides to run again under these much more politically difficult circumstances, especially if they invite the US to supervise their efforts, both before and during the vote. Through these means, the US could therefore still get rid of Zelensky, who might think that extending martial law will prevent this.

Russia Matters, 5/2/25

1. In the week of April 22–29, Russia gained 14 square miles (the equivalent of just over half of Manhattan island)—a major slow-down as compared to the previous week’s 40 square miles gained, according to the April 30, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As for Ukrainian forces, they controlled only 3 square miles of Russia’s Kursk region as of April 28, according to ISW’s data, compared to 482 square miles they claimed to have captured last August. Moreover, chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed in his report to Vladimir Putin earlier this week that Russian forces had completed pushing the Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region¹ even though Ukrainian officials denied this claim.
2. Inferring lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war, the U.S. Army is “embarking on its largest overhaul since the end of the Cold War, with plans to equip each of its combat divisions with around 1,000 drones and to shed outmoded weapons and other equipment,” according to Wall Street Journal’s April 30 report. One day after that disclosure by Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg reported that Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth wants the U.S. Army to increase its use of drones as part of a broad overhaul of the military’s largest service.
3. Confusion continued to reign this week with regard to whether Russia and Ukraine can be brought together to agree on a durable ceasefire,² to say nothing of a full-fledged peace deal, as the U.S. signaled a possible end to its mediation. On April 25, Trump wrote after Putin had hosted his envoy Steve Witkoff for talks that “they are very close to a deal, and the two sides should now meet, at very high levels, to ‘finish it off.’” On April 26, however, Trump appeared to have changed his tack, writing that maybe Putin “doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along.” To hear Trump’s deputy, JD Vance, tell Fox TV on May 1, there is a “very large gap” between the positions of Ukraine and Russia regarding the end of the war. Marco Rubio—who on May 9 may become the first U.S. government minister to pay a public visit Moscow in years—concurred with Vance’s assessment, acknowledging in an interview on the same day that “they’re still far apart.” It also remained unclear in what capacity the U.S. may continue to pursue peace. On May 1, the State Department’s Tammy Bruce told reporters that the U.S. “will not be the mediators” going forward.
4. On April 30, the Trump administration finally secured an agreement with Ukraine, giving the U.S. preferential access to the country’s contested natural resources—such as aluminum, graphite, oil and natural gas.³ The agreement establishes the “United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund” that Washington and Kyiv will pay into to fund development, infrastructure and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine, according to ISW. The text of the agreement made no mention of the security guarantees that Kyiv had long sought, though part of the fund’s income will go to reimbursing the U.S. for future military assistance to Ukraine,⁴ according to Bloomberg. Neither does the deal cover Ukraine’s nuclear power producer Energoatom, which will remain in Ukrainian state ownership, Bloomberg reported.⁵ Accessing Ukraine’s minerals won’t be easy, according to experts interviewed by the U.S. press. For one, maps showing trillions of dollars of mineral deposits scattered across Ukraine are based largely on outdated studies, and proper surveys could take several years to complete, according to experts interviewed by Wall Street Journal and New York Times. Also, somewhere between 20% and 40% of Ukraine’s deposits are critical minerals located in areas of the country currently under Russian occupation, George Ingall of Benchmark Minerals Intelligence told Wall Street Journal.