Western missile technology in general, and air-defense systems in particular, are currently at least a decade behind Russia

By Will Schryver, Twitter, 7/19/25

Will Schryver is a geopolitical and military analyst.

As I have pondered these questions over the past few days, I have reached the conclusion that everyone in NATO militaries whose job it is to ascertain the FACTS of anti-ballistic missile performance (Patriot, THAAD, Arrow, SM-3) knows perfectly well that NONE of them have impressed, and the Patriot has been the worst of the bunch.

I understand that claims run from 50% – 95% success rate for Patriot PAC-3 interceptors against Russian Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles.

That is entirely unsubstantiated nonsense.

I have not seen ANY persuasive evidence of those kinds of interception rates — neither in Ukraine nor in Israel.

We have seen multiple videos of US/Israeli systems frantically firing off a dozen or more interceptors, shortly followed by Russian or Iranian ballistic missiles streaking in to hit their targets.

Anyway, with that preface, my point is that western militaries have certainly seen this, and consequently they can’t really have much motivation to hold on tightly to their Patriot systems — especially if they can get a good price for them.

I think the only real problem they have now is a “political optics” issue. Everyone involved has to ACT as though it’s a big sacrifice to relinquish their super-duper fantastic Patriot systems to Ukraine.

You can bet the western arms industry marketers are dangling the “next wunderwaffe” to everyone concerned, and saying: “These new ABM systems we are ready to crank out are world-beating. So ship your rusty Patriots to Ukraine, and you’ll be first in line to receive the next big thing.”

I think western missile technology in general, and air-defense systems in particular, are currently at least a decade behind Russia. Fact is, they always have been. Since the 1950s.

Kyle Anzalone: rotests Erupt in Ukraine After Zelensky Targets Anti-Corruption Orgs

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 7/23/25

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a bill that restricts the work of anti-corruption agencies. In response, Ukrainians took to the streets in Kiev, chanting “corruption equals death.”

The new law gives Kiev significant control over Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the affiliated Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). A statement from the agencies said, “In effect, if this bill becomes law, the head of SAPO will become a nominal figure, while NABU will lose its independence and turn into a subdivision of the prosecutor general’s office.”

Initially, Zelensky defended the law, claiming Ukrainians needed to remain focused on the Russian enemy. “I gathered all heads of Ukraine’s law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies, along with the Prosecutor General. It was a much-needed meeting – a frank and constructive conversation that truly helps,” Zelensky wrote on X. “We all share a common enemy: the Russian occupiers. And defending the Ukrainian state requires a strong enough law enforcement and anti-corruption system – one that ensures a real sense of justice.”

In the streets, Ukrainians chanted “Destroy Russians, not democracy,” indicating that the protesters do not have a pro-Russia objective. Zelensky later posted on X that he would introduce a new bill to ensure the NABU and SAPO can continue to operate.

“I will propose a bill to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that will be the response.” He continued, “It will ensure the strength of the rule of law system, and there will be no Russian influence or interference in the activities of law enforcement. And very importantly – all the norms for the independence of anti-corruption institutions will be in place.”

The anti-corruption street action is the first major protest against Zelensky since Russia invaded the country in 2022.

Moscow Times: So You Want to Travel to Russia. Here’s What You Should Know.

Moscow Times, 7/16/25

Tourism from the West to Russia took a major hit after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Flight bans, banking restrictions and a range of logistical hurdles, as well as overall geopolitical tensions, have made travel more complicated and less appealing for many Western visitors. Even so, thousands of people from countries in Europe and North America still visit Russia each year, alongside growing numbers of tourists from Asia and the Middle East.

If you’re thinking about making the trip, The Moscow Times has put together a list of things you should know before you go.

Is it safe to go?

Whether or not it’s advisable to travel to Russia depends largely on whom you ask. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, most Western governments have strongly advised their citizens against traveling to Russia and have urged those already there to leave immediately. 

The U.S. State Department, for example, cites a range of safety concerns, including “arbitrary enforcement of local laws” and “the risk of harassment or wrongful detention by Russian security officials,” in its guidance for Americans. Similar advisories have been issued by countries including Canada, Britain, France and Germany.

In contrast, countries like China, Brazil and India do not issue comparable warnings. However, even countries generally seen as Russia-friendly, such as Serbia and Hungary, advise their citizens to exercise increased caution when visiting. Their foreign ministries stop short of recommending against all travel to Russia but do caution against visiting areas deemed to pose “high security risks,” likely referring to regions near the Ukrainian border that are regularly targeted by drone attacks.

If you’re considering travel to Russia, it’s essential to first consult your own government’s travel advisories so you can make an informed decision about whether a trip is right for you. While Russia is by and large not an active warzone, parts of the country, particularly in the south and west, experience regular drone and missile strikes that have killed or injured people even far from the front lines. The overall risk in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg remains relatively low, but it is not completely absent.

Getting a visa

Visa requirements for travel to Russia vary depending on your citizenship. The most reliable source of information is your local Russian consulate or embassy, where you can find the most up-to-date guidance on how to apply. 

Citizens of some countries, including many in the European Union, are eligible for a short-term electronic visa for tourism. Others may not require a visa at all. For U.S. citizens, the application process remains largely unchanged, according to recent travelers who spoke to The Moscow Times. In some cases, wait times may even be shorter due to reduced demand for Russian visas in Western countries.

Traveling to Russia

The easiest and most commonly recommended way to travel to Russia today is by flying through countries such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates, with onward connections to other major cities from Moscow or St. Petersburg. Due to airport closures that have been in place since early 2022, most airports in southern Russia remain inaccessible.

Traveling by land, such as taking a bus from Estonia or Lithuania to the Kaliningrad region and flying to mainland Russia from there, is possible and often cheaper. However, this option comes with additional challenges, including more extensive security screenings at the border as well as restrictions on bringing euro banknotes into Russia.

Among Moscow’s airports, Sheremetyevo is generally considered the most straightforward for international travelers compared to Domodedovo. Pulkovo Airport in St. Petersburg is also widely recommended. Travelers who spoke to The Moscow Times said security checks at Sheremetyevo and Pulkovo are usually less intensive than at Domodedovo, where longer waits and more frequent questioning have been reported. That said, security checks at Sheremetyevo can still take a few hours.

Interviews by border officers can appear random. Some travelers report being questioned nearly every time they cross the border, while others say they have never been questioned. Questions may include the purpose of your visit, your place of stay, your occupation and whether you have traveled to Ukraine.

Border officials also have the authority to request access to your mobile phone. While only a few travelers reported this happening, it is strongly advised not to carry sensitive information or any content related to Ukraine on your phone. Though you have the right to refuse access to your device, doing so could result in being denied entry into the country.

Bringing money into Russia

Since spring 2022, Visa and Mastercard bank cards issued outside of Russia no longer function within the country. Chinese UnionPay cards issued by foreign banks, meanwhile, are still accepted in Russia. For short-term stays, the simplest and most reliable way to bring money into Russia is by carrying cash.

However, travelers should be aware of several important restrictions. The European Union has banned the transportation of euro banknotes into Russia via EU borders as part of sanctions introduced after the invasion of Ukraine. This means that if you’re entering Russia from an EU country, you cannot carry euro cash across the border. That restriction does not apply if you’re entering from a non-EU country, such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates, as Russia itself does not prohibit the import of euros. Regardless of currency, travelers are allowed to bring up to $10,000 (or equivalent) in cash without having to declare it.

For those planning a longer stay, opening a local bank account is recommended. Depositing your cash into a Russian account can make everyday transactions easier, as card and electronic payments are becoming more ubiquitous.

Exchanging foreign currency in major cities is generally straightforward, and some exchange offices offer competitive rates, travelers told The Moscow Times. However, it is crucial to bring only clean, undamaged banknotes, they said. Russian banks and exchange offices often refuse old, marked or torn bills. 

Mobile phone service

Accessing mobile phone service in Russia has become significantly more complicated for foreign nationals. As of July 2025, new regulations require foreigners who wish to sign mobile phone contracts to register with the Unified Biometric System (UBS), a government-run database that collects biometric data.

To do so, foreign citizens must visit a Sberbank branch to submit their biometrics, which include a facial photo and a voice recording. They are also required to obtain a SNILS (the Russian equivalent of a U.S. Social Security number), register on the Gosuslugi public services portal and provide the IMEI number of their mobile device.

To apply for a SNILS, foreigners must visit a branch of the Moi Dokumenti government services office (also known as a “Multifunctional Center”). After submitting the necessary documents and biometrics, and once the SNILS is issued — a process that typically takes several days — foreigners can then visit a mobile service provider to buy a SIM card and phone plan.

This process is lengthy and impractical for short-term visitors. As an alternative, travelers can purchase eSIMs from international providers such as eSIM.sm, although it’s possible that Russian authorities may restrict some of these services in the future. Another option is to check whether your existing mobile provider offers roaming in Russia, though this is often expensive. One Italian traveler told The Moscow Times that his provider recently offered 15GB of data and limited calling in Russia for 30 euros per month.

Accommodation and registration

Western platforms like Airbnb and Booking.com are no longer available in Russia. Russia has its own alternatives for short-term hotel and apartment bookings, with Ostrovok.ru and Sutochno.ru being the most widely used. Travelers can also book directly through hotels, hostels or other types of accommodations. Some hotels allow you to pay in cash on arrival.

As before, if you are staying at a hotel, the staff will handle your mandatory registration with the authorities, so no additional steps are needed. However, if you are staying at a private address for several days, you will need to register yourself at a local branch of Moi Dokumenti. 

VPNs

The Russian government has blocked scores of websites and online platforms in recent years, including Instagram and Facebook, making it impossible to access them without a VPN. While many VPN services do still work in Russia, major providers have been blocked, so lesser-known VPNs can often be more reliable. However, the availability of VPNs is constantly changing, so it’s important to consult up-to-date sources online before choosing one.

Travelers are advised to download and set up their VPN before entering Russia, as access to VPN websites may also be restricted once inside the country.

Kit Klarenberg: Case closed after ‘Russian disinfo’ claims led to persecution of NZ journalist

By Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone, 7/13/25

Journalist Mick Hall was accused of slipping “Russian disinformation” into copy at New Zealand’s state broadcaster, sparking an international furor about Kremlin infiltration. Following an intel agency investigation, his name was cleared.

Now, Hall tells The Grayzone how a simple copy editing dispute brought him into Five Eyes’ crosshairs.

Until two years ago, Mick Hall was a fairly obscure journalist publishing wire copy for Radio New Zealand (RNZ), far-removed from media capitals like Washington and London where international opinions are shaped. But in June 2023, Hall suddenly became the target of Five Eyes intelligence agencies when he was accused by Western sources – including his own employer – of inserting “Russian disinformation” into wire stories.

What started with a dispute of Hall’s copy edits turned into an investigation by New Zealand’s Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (NZSIS), which briefed top government officials about its probe. For months afterward, major Western media outlets fretted that Kremlin agents had infiltrated New Zealand’s national broadcaster.

But Hall insisted he had been unfairly accused and defamed by a pro-war element driven into the throes of paranoia by the Ukraine proxy war. In November 2024, he lodged a formal complaint against the NZSIS, demanding to know whether Wellington’s primary intelligence service “acted lawfully and properly” and followed “correct procedure” in its investigation, and if any information gathered about him “was shared appropriately, including with overseas partners.”

On April 9, New Zealand’s Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (NZSIS) published the results of the investigation triggered by Hall’s complaint. The Inspector General report noted its investigation lasted between June 10 and August 11 2023, and was closed due to “no concerns of foreign interference” being identified.

The Inspector General acknowledged the intelligence services’ probe was initiated purely due to public “allegations [emphasis added] of foreign interference,” rather than substantive evidence of any kind, and expressed sympathy that Hall found it “disconcerting to discover” he had “come to the attention of an intelligence agency…particularly as a journalist reporting on conflicts where different views can validly be expressed.” However, it concluded NZSIS’ actions were “necessary and proportionate”, and the agency acted “lawful [sic] and properly.”

Hall’s name had been cleared, but he had been denied any recompense for being smeared as a Kremlin agent, and having his career in national media effectively destroyed.

An ounce of truth

The manufactured scandal surrounding Mick Hall’s copy edits trace back to New York City, where a lawyer and Democratic party hack named Luppe B. Luppen erupted in outrage at something he happened across on RNZ’s website.

In a Twitter/X post, Luppen complained that RNZ had republished a Reuters article authored by the news agency’s Moscow bureau chief Guy Faulconbridge, with “utterly false, Russian propaganda” inserted. Namely, that the February 2014 Maidan “revolution” was in fact a “violent” US-sponsored “colour revolution,” provoking a civil war in eastern and southern Ukraine, during which local “ethnic Russians” were “suppressed.”

Mick Hall was responsible for inserting this wording.

He told The Grayzone, “it always seemed odd to me a New York-based lawyer would come across a republished Reuters story on a small national broadcaster’s website in the South Pacific – I’ve not read too much into it, but it felt strange at the time, and still does.” Nonetheless, Hall believed his changes were legitimate given the story’s content, and stands by his decision to this day.

Since joining RNZ in September 2018 as a “digital journalist” and subeditor, he was responsible for selecting and processing news stories from international news agencies and wire services for republication on the broadcaster’s website. Hall frequently found that copy by the BBC, Reuters, and other prominent Western news services contained extraordinary bias and distortions. He felt compelled to balance the coverage by adding context, or amending and deleting passages which seemed overtly ideological.

When the Ukraine proxy war erupted in February 2022, Hall sensed that Western news agencies were not even attempting to conceal their biases any longer.

Manufactured crisis boomerangs on RNZ

On June 9th 2023, RNZ placed Hall on leave and announced an urgent investigation into his supposedly Kremlin-influenced editing. By this point, the foundations of an international scandal had been laid. For months afterwards, “disinformation experts”, think tank hawks, mainstream ‘journalists’ and politicians whipped up a paranoid, conspiratorial frenzy over Hall’s edits. The BBC, IndependentNew York Times and Reuters cranked up the controversy with blanket coverage. The Guardian’s obsessively anti-Russian Luke Harding took a particularly keen interest.

Olga Lautman, a Ukrainian nationalist from arms industry-funded think tank CEPA, strongly suggested that Hall was taking orders from the Russian state to insert “disinformation” into RNZ’s output. This libelous conjecture was not helped by RNZ chief Paul Thompson offering a servile public apology, in which he begged for forgiveness for “pro-Kremlin garbage…[ending] up in our stories.” An internal audit identified “inappropriate” edits made by Hall in 49 stories, out of 1,319 he worked on for RNZ in total – exactly 3.71%.

At his lawyer’s suggestion, Hall produced a detailed document listing every story he edited that had been flagged by RNZ for supposedly “inappropriate” tampering. He included personal explanations for why changes were made and passages inserted, along with expert supporting commentary from figures such as economist Jeffrey Sachs and political scientist John Mearsheimer. However, Hall gave up after just 39 stories. “The reasons RNZ flagged the remaining 10 – such as referring to Julian Assange a journalist – were so ridiculous, it seemed a waste of time,” he explained.

RNZ subsequently appointed an independent panel to assess the fiasco. In a bitter irony, the report they published on July 28 2023 was a rebuke to Hall’s accusers. It declared that “not all of the examples of inappropriate editing identified by RNZ were found by the panel to be inappropriate.” Moreover, the panel accepted Hall “genuinely believed he was acting appropriately,” and “was not motivated by any desire to introduce misinformation, disinformation or propaganda.”

While the report accused Hall of several cases of “inappropriate editing,” breaching both RNZ’s editorial policy and its contractual agreement with Reuters, the panel did not conclude this was deliberate, but a well-intentioned effort to add “balance and accuracy into the stories.” Moreover, the edits flagged by the panel as “inappropriate” were usually factual, and contained valuable historical context. For example, Hall amended a May 2022 story about the attempted evacuation of Mariupol to note that Azov Battalion “was widely regarded before the Russian invasion by Western media as a Neo-Nazi military unit.”

That Azov’s extremist background, history and ideology has been obfuscated and whitewashed since the proxy war began is a basic statement of fact. The panel even acknowledged the group’s neo-Nazi links had “been noted, reported on and debated” previously, but bizarrely found Hall’s “uncritical and unexplained inclusion” of this inconvenient truth “had the effect of unbalancing the story.” This was despite the panel admitting, “experienced people operating in good faith can and do disagree” on editorial standards, which are in any event “matters for judgment”.

Conversely, the review was extremely scathing of how Hall’s “errors were framed” by RNZ’s leadership. Their conduct was found to have “contributed to public alarm and reputational damage which the panel believes was not helpful in maintaining public trust.” It furthermore concluded “the wider structure, culture, systems and processes that facilitated what occurred” were the state broadcaster’s responsibility. Grave “gaps” in supervision and training of RNZ’s “busy, poorly resourced digital news team” were identified. For example, “limitations on changing content” from newswires weren’t clearly communicated to staff.

An “intense Western-wide witch hunt over a single person amending newswire copy”

For Hall, many questions about the affair linger today – not least how the Inspector General reached his conclusions. The report states, “much of the information my inquiry has considered is highly classified, which limits the information I can provide you to explain my findings.” It is difficult to conceive what “highly classified” information NZSIS “considered” given the public nature of the allegations against Hall. What’s more, both the independent review panel and NZSIS cleared him of any wrongdoing within two months of the first accusations.

Similarly curious was the vague language which filled the three-page report. For example, it claimed that NZSIS had taken “relatively limited steps” in investigating Hall. Yet it failed to clarify which steps were taken. Confusing matters even further, the Inspector General admitted “NZSIS shared information about the conclusion of its enquiries with interested parties… to allay concerns of foreign interference.” The identity of those “interested parties,” and why it was NZSIS’ responsibility to ameliorate their baseless anxieties, was also unclear.

“We’ll likely never know the answer to any of these mysteries. I lodged my complaint when I learned NZSIS briefed both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office on my case. I also have grounds to believe at least one of Wellington’s Western intelligence partners was given information on me,” Hall tells The Grayzone.

“This was a simple matter of minor procedural errors on my part, and disagreement over editorial standards with RNZ’s management, which could’ve been quietly and professionally resolved internally. Instead, I was thrust into the glare of the international media and the Five Eyes global spying network. The intense Western-wide witch hunt over a single person amending newswire copy at a tiny news outlet could indicate there was some kind of deeper, darker coordination at play. Again though, we’ll probably never know.”

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