A record number of Russian citizens now want the war to end, according to a new poll by the independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Moscow Times reported on June 3.
The poll, conducted between May 22 and 28 across 50 Russian regions, found that 64% of respondents favoured peace negotiations—up six percentage points from March. Meanwhile, support for continuing the war fell to 28%, down from 34% in the same period.
Support for ending the conflict has grown steadily over the past two years. In May 2023, 48% of Russians said the war should continue. By May 2024, that figure had dropped to 43%.
The latest data was published shortly after the second round of direct peace talks between Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul on May 16, raising hopes that a negotiated end to the hostilities could appear soon.
While no ceasefire agreement was reached, the negotiations resulted in a new 1,000 for a 1,000 prisoner exchange and the repatriation of 6,000 bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers.
Levada’s survey also highlights demographic and political divides. Support for peace is highest among women (73%), young people under 24 (77%), and residents of smaller towns and villages (67%). It is also prominent among respondents who believe Russia is moving in the wrong direction (76%) and those who disapprove of President Vladimir Putin’s performance (77%).
Conversely, backing for continued military action is stronger among men (39%), those aged 55 and older (35%), and Moscow residents (40%). Among those who say the country is headed in the right direction, 32% support the war, as do 30% of those who approve of Putin’s leadership.
A majority—73%—of respondents said Russia and Ukraine should address the “root causes” of the conflict before agreeing to a ceasefire – a phrase often repeated by Putin as the reason to delay ceasefire talks. Just 18% believed a truce should come first.
Only 3% of those surveyed viewed Russia as an obstacle to peace, while 36% blamed Ukraine and 36% pointed to European countries. 14% said the United States bore responsibility for blocking peace efforts.
Putin remains popular
While support for bringing the war to end may be rising, as the conflict moves into its fourth year, that has not affected Putin’s personal popularity.
The level of trust in Putin among the Russian public remains steady and is currently 81%, while 82% of respondents approve of his job performance, a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) showed between May 23-25 of 1,500 respondents, TASS reported on May 30.
A total of 57% of those polled said they approved of the Russian government’s handling of the country (a 1% increase), while 61% approved of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s performance (a 3% increase).
Support for the government also remains unusually strong with some fluctuations. The ruling United Russia party fell by 2% to 46%. Support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) rose by 1% to 8%, while support for the [right wing nationalist] Liberal Democratic Party of Russia remained at 10%. The A Just Russia-For Truth party’s support held steady at 3%, while support for the New People party increased by 1% to 2%.
Declassified British files shed further light on the controversial question as to what assurances were made to Russia by U.K. officials about the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe.
The documents show then Prime Minister John Major telling Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in February 1997 that “if he were Russian he too would be concerned by the possibility that NATO might move up to Russia’s borders.”
But Major added that “NATO has no intention of doing this” and was “not seeking to box in Russia.”
Briefing notes drawn up by No. 10 Downing Street [the prime minister’s office] for Major’s phone call with Primakov stated: “We are not seeking to encircle Russia with NATO members.”
Primakov in 1991. (RIA Novosti archive /Prihodko / Wikimedia Commons /CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0)
The following month, Major wrote to Russian President Boris Yeltsin saying: “I am well aware of Russian concern that NATO enlargement may mean that NATO forces will effectively move nearer your own borders. I well understand the fears that may be aroused in Russia.”
However, he added:
“But let me assure you that such fears are quite without foundation.”
The reason was that
“NATO has no intention of stationing large conventional forces or nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.”
Major also reassured Yeltsin that NATO would only deploy “a modest amount of NATO infrastructure… such as storage facilities and command and control arrangements.”
The declassified files released to the National Archives covering 1996-97 are full of references by U.K. officials to Russian “concern,” “negative attitudes,” “fears,” “hostility” and “resentment” about NATO enlargement.
At the time, NATO’s expansion was being considered for only a small number of central European countries, not former states in the old Soviet Union, such as Ukraine — which was an even more sensitive issue to Moscow.
An August 1996 paper drawn up by Downing Street clearly noted Russia’s policy of “not allowing Ukraine or the Baltic States to join NATO.”
‘Enlarge NATO anyway’
Major in February 1993, during a visit to the Clinton White House. (White House Photograph Office/Wikimedia Commons /Public Domain)
U.K. officials believed the Russians reluctantly “tacitly accept that enlargement will go ahead” — subject to their opposition to nuclear and conventional force deployments — “but cannot say so publicly.”
In December 1996, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told Major in private: “Russia could not stop NATO enlarging, but this would create a fragile situation which could explode.”
Major assured him: “We did not wish to do anything to unsettle Russia.”
The files show that Britain was intent on expanding NATO to include “some” central/eastern European countries.
A policy paper drawn up in September 1996 said U.K. objectives were “to enlarge NATO to the East” and “secure Russian acquiescence in enlargement … But if Russian acquiescence is not possible, for NATO to enlarge anyway.”
The paper was drawn up by Foreign Office official Matthew Rycroft, who in 2003 would be former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s private secretary during the war in Iraq.
‘Full Account of Russia’s Place’
Yeltsin waving at reporters in Moscow in August 1991. (Kremlin.ru /Wikimedia Commons /CC BY 4.0)
In the month Blair succeeded Major as prime minister, May 1997, Britain’s ambassador to Russia, Andrew Wood, cabled London saying: “NATO enlargement [is] a painful issue with domestic implications.”
He added: “The Russians are virtually at one in regarding the coming enlargement of NATO as a humiliating defeat, and in supposing that the West either consciously or unconsciously intends it to be seen as such.”
However, Yeltsin also conveyed, in a phone call with Blair the same month, that he understood that “there was no turning back” on enlargement. But he again insisted that nuclear weapons should not be sited in new NATO members and that there should be “no permanent deployment of conventional forces.”
A British prime minister again offered assurances to Moscow. A briefing for Blair’s meeting with Yeltsin in May 1997 stated on the subject of NATO enlargement: “We will not allow Russia’s legitimate security interests to be damaged in this process.”
It added that “an enlarged NATO will mean more security in Central Europe. This is in Russian as well as NATO interests.”
Blair told Yeltsin “he was aware of the view Russia took on NATO enlargement” and that “arrangements for the future had to take full account of Russia’s place and weight in Europe.”
Later that year, in October, Yeltsin told Blair again in a phone call that “he continued to oppose enlargement of NATO, which was a mistake. Europe should not be divided.”
At the time discussions were taking place about a comprehensive security system for Europe, replacing the old East-West divide and giving Russia a place in that system. It was clear, however, that NATO, led by the U.S., privileged expanding the organisation over bringing in Russia into a new European security architecture.
At NATO’s summit in Madrid in July 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks, and they joined NATO in 1999. A further wave of accession occurred in 2004 when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia all joined NATO.
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen giving a press statement on July 8, 1997, in Madrid, about NATO’s decision to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to begin negotiations to join NATO. National Security Advisor Samuel Burger on left, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on right. (DoD/ R. D. Ward/Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain)
By 2017, NATO had established a “forward presence” policy in eastern Europe, deploying battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO claims this was needed in response to Russia’s “aggressive actions against its neighbours,” notably its [supposed] 2014 invasion of Crimea.
Opposing Ukraine
British files from 2001 show that Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev warned NATO that any further enlargement would be “a major political error” requiring Moscow to take “appropriate steps.”
By 2002, when Britain was supporting a new wave of central/eastern European states becoming members of NATO, Blair’s government was explicitly opposed to Ukraine joining the organisation, the files show.
“We do not support Ukraine’s request to join MAP,” the Foreign Office noted in 2002, referring to NATO’s Membership Action Plan, which provided advice to countries aspiring to join NATO.
Though Kyiv was pushing strongly for an enhanced relationship with NATO, Ukraine’s bid was “premature” in the British view since the country was “far from meeting criteria expected of aspirants.”
The U.K.’s chief diplomat at NATO, Emyr Jones Parry, noted that Ukraine was “on notice that deepening relations with NATO will require more democratic and other reforms.”
But also critical for British officials was the impact on relations with Russia. U.K. strategy was “to steer Ukraine away from any suggestion of membership except in the very long term” given the “serious impact on NATO relations with Russia.”
“Ukraine membership of MAP would greatly complicate our handling of the new Nato-Russia relationship and would raise serious Russian concerns about Nato’s strategy,” reads a 2002 briefing note for the prime minister.
Barrier to Russia
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2000. (Kremlin.ru / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0)
At the time, the Labour government was seeking a “transformed relationship between Russia and the Alliance,” a process which was described as “truly historic.” Indeed Blair was courting Vladimir Putin after MI6 had helped him into power in 2000.
British officials were impressed with Moscow’s declared support for the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks in September 2001 and sought a new strategic relationship.
Though British officials opposed Ukraine joining NATO at this time, some spotted the country’s geopolitical importance.
Roger Liddle, Blair’s special adviser, wrote that Ukraine played a key role as a supply route for Russian gas. But also Ukraine could act “as a formidable barrier to any resurgence of Russian Imperialism to the West.”
At its Bucharest summit in 2008, NATO pledged that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members.
Mark Curtis is the co-director of Declassified U.K., and the author of five books and many articles on U.K. foreign policy.
NATO’s next summit will be held from 24-25 June at The Hague and almost certainly see the bloc expand upon its preexisting rapid militarization plans. Trump is demanding that all members spend 5% of GDP on defense as soon as possible, which Politico recently reminded everyone in their article about this is divided between 3.5% on “hard military spending” and 1.5% on defense-related issues like cybersecurity. Here are three background briefings on NATO’s rapid militarization plans to bring readers up to speed:
In short, the EU wants to exploit false fears of a future Russian invasion to further centralize the bloc under that pretext, with the “military Schengen” (for facilitating the free flow of troops and equipment between member states) and the €800 billion “ReArm Europe Plan” being its tangible manifestations. The first will create the desired military union while the second will then result in there being an urgent need for some mechanism to organize the division of defense investments between all members.
It’s here where the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is expected to play a major role owing to the lack of any alternatives and the difficulty in getting members to agree on creating a new EU-wide one due to some states’ sovereignty concerns. Per the NSPA’s website, “[its] objective is to obtain the best service or equipment at the best price for the customer by consolidating requirements from multiple nations in a cost-efficient way through its turnkey multinational acquisition framework.”
The problem though is that the NSPA has been embroiled in a procurement scandal over the past month. To their credit, Deutsche Welle published a fair and detailed report about what happened, which can be summarized as employees passing along information to defense contractors in exchange for funds that were partly laundered to them through consultancy companies. The NSPA reportedly initiated the investigation itself, but that might not be sufficient for controlling the damage from this scandal.
While it’ll continue functioning, some member states might now be hesitant to rely more on its services than is absolutely necessary to avoid having to pay more for whatever it is that they’re looking to buy if more corrupt employees unluckily happen to service their request. Of course, the NSPA’s initiative to investigate itself – which led to three arrests thus far and has spread to several countries, including the US – might reassure some states, but few will likely take any more chances than they have to.
If enough NATO members practice this approach in understandable pursuit of their financial self-interest, especially if segments of the public pressure them to do so in order to not risk wasting taxpayers’ hard-earned funds, then this could collectively complicate NATO’s rapid militarization plans. It remains to be seen what effect it’ll ultimately have, but the NSPA’s procurement corruption scandal couldn’t have come at a worse time, and it’s important not to let the elite sweep it under the rug for convenience.
“Ukraine’s expulsion of Hungarian diplomats over a Transcarpathia spy scandal has escalated tensions, with Hungary halting minority rights talks. This rift reflects broader ethnopolitical strains with neighbors like Poland and Romania, which goes to show that the Ukraine’s ultranationalism is a problem well beyond Russian-Ukrainian issues”
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
In a region already fraught with geopolitical complexities, the latest rift between Ukraine and Hungary underscores a troubling pattern of ethnic and diplomatic tensions that threatens Kyiv’s broader regional relationships. The recent expulsion of Hungarian diplomats from Ukraine, following the alleged uncovering of a Budapest-run spy network, has escalated an already strained bilateral dynamic.
Hungary’s subsequent decision to suspend talks on minority rights in Transcarpathia—a region with a significant Hungarian minority—marks yet another low in this increasingly fractious relationship. This development in fact reveals deeper ethnopolitical fault lines that extend beyond the well-documented Russian-Ukrainian conflict, thereby complicating Kyiv’s aspirations for regional cooperation and integration into Europe and the political West.
The alleged spy ring, exposed by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reportedly operated in Transcarpathia, gathering intelligence on local defenses and public sentiment toward potential Hungarian military deployment. Ukraine accuses two former military personnel, directed by a Hungarian officer, of espionage activities that could facilitate territorial ambitions—a charge Budapest vehemently denies.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, known for his nationalist rhetoric and pragmatic relations with Moscow, has framed the accusations as a smear campaign, possibly timed to influence Hungary’s domestic politics, with the upcoming elections. This blunt exchange of accusations has only deepened mistrust, with both nations expelling diplomats and accusing each other of acts of espionage in a tit-for-tat escalation.
One may recall that Hungarian-Ukrainian tensions have simmered for years, largely over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Budapest has repeatedly criticized Ukraine’s language and education laws, which discriminate against ethnic Hungarians. Kyiv, in turn, perceives Hungary’s advocacy for its diaspora as a pretext for meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs, thereby fueling suspicions of irredentist ambitions.
The spy scandal has only amplified these concerns, with Ukrainian officials warning that Hungary’s intelligence activities could signal preparations for territorial claims, as suggested by former Ukrainian politician Spiridon Kilinkarov. I’ve commented before about how such concerns are not unfounded in a region where post-Soviet borders remain contested.
This latest spat is in fact not an isolated incident but part of a broader pattern of ethnopolitical friction that hampers Ukraine’s relations with its neighbors. Beyond Hungary, Kyiv faces challenges with Poland, Romania, and others over minority rights and historical grievances.
For instance, Ukrainian-Polish relations are often strained by historical disputes, notably the Volhynia massacres. In September 2024 tensions flared as Kyiv refused to allow exhumation of victims, while officially glorifying (since the 2014 Maidan Revolution) the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—Nazi collaborators responsible for the genocide of Poles—as national heroes.
Romania in turn has expressed concerns about the treatment of its minority in Bukovina (Ukraine), with ethnic and religious tensions growing. Moreover, Greece too has raised similar issues regarding its ethnic kin and their plight in Mariupol and the Donbass region under the notoriously fascist Azov regiment—as well as other Ukrainian military and paramilitary ultra-nationalist elements.
All these tensions, often overshadowed by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, risk angering potential allies at a time when Kyiv seeks regional support. Ukraine’s aggressive nationalist policies, aimed at consolidating a unified national identity, have alienated neighbors who perceive these measures as chauvinistic and exclusionary
Hungary’s response, led by Orbán’s nationalist government, has been characteristically assertive. Orbán, who has positioned himself as a defender of Hungarian minorities abroad, has arguably used the Transcarpathian issue to bolster his domestic standing, especially ahead of elections. His suspension of minority rights talks with Ukraine is likely a calculated move, signaling defiance while appealing to his own base’s nationalist sentiments. The issue further exposes a fracture within the West over the issue of Ukraine and the European Union.
The espionage allegations, whether fully substantiated or not, highlight a deeper issue: the fragility of trust in a region shaped by historical grievances and competing nationalisms. Ukraine’s accusations against Hungary may serve a dual purpose—deflecting domestic criticism of its minority policies while signaling to other neighbors that Kyiv will not tolerate external interference. However, this hardline stance risks backfiring. By expelling Hungarian diplomats and escalating rhetoric, Ukraine may further strain ties with Budapest.
Moreover, the timing of this scandal raises questions about its political motivations. Orbán’s critics argue that Ukraine’s accusations could be leveraged to discredit him domestically, particularly as Hungary approaches elections where his Fidesz party faces growing opposition.
Be as it may, the broader implications of this rift extend beyond bilateral relations. Ukraine’s ethnopolitical challenges, as mentioned, could embolden other neighbors to assert claims if Kyiv’s central authority weakens. In a region where frozen conflicts and disputed borders are unresolved matters, such tensions could destabilize Eastern Europe further.
Such geopolitical problems reflect domestic ethnopolitical civil rights issues. The hard truth is that Ukraine itself faces a civil rights crisis, with policies marginalizing Russian speakers, ethnic Russiand and pro-Russian people, potentially alienating a significant portion of its population post-war, according to Professor Nicolai N. Petro and many other commentators.
Over 40% of Ukrainians, especially in the east and south, have historically viewed Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” in some ways. Petro further highlights restrictions on religious freedom, press, and minority rights, particularly targeting Russophile Ukrainians. Moreover, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church faces crackdowns, and there are laws increasingly limiting use of the Russian language, in a historically bilingual nation.
Even the Venice Commission itself has criticized Ukraine’s minority laws, yet officials like Olga Stefanishyna deny the very existence of a Russian minority, despite at least 17.3% of the population identifying as ethnic Russians in the 2001 census—which is to date the only census since Ukraine’s 1991 independence, This marginalization, alongside the banning of “pro-Russian parties”, risks internal and regional conflict.
However, the problem goes beyond Russian-Ukrainian ethnopolitics—being inherent to ultranationalism in post-Maidan Ukraine—and with Hungary’s and Poland’s ongoing quandaries, this will become increasingly clear. The West doesn’t seem ready to have this conversation, but it is about time to acknowledge the issue, as it endangers, as I’ve argued before, the survival of Europe itself.
First a brief discussion of 4 issues: 1) clarification of the term military Keynesianism; 2) why pushing for WW3 is societal suicide; 3) comments on Operation Spiderweb; and 4) the aborted exchange of bodies between Ukraine and Russia.
1–Military Keynesianism— Military Keynesianism refers to the use of war and military spending to stimulate the economy. The US is economically dependent on military spending. Keynesianism refers to John Maynard Keynes a British mathematician and economist who was very influential during the Great Depression, spearheading a revolution in economic thinking, and providing the theoretical basis for Keynesian economics. Keynes opposed setting German reparations payments so high during the Versailles peace conference that followed WW1, and was also involved in the negotiations that established the Bretton Woods system after World War 2. President Richard Nixon withdrew the US from Bretton Woods in 1971 initiating the era of neoliberalism. These issues were discussed in previous Substack’s.
2–World War 3–In the last Substack two reasons were given why the US and NATO could not fight and win WW3 against a peer enemy such as Russia or China: 1) the US and the NATO nations do not have the industrial capacity to produce the weapons needed to fight and win an industrial war, or to even provide the needed logistical support; and 2) since modern weapons were so powerful, a global war would destroy civilization. The basis for this opinion is the reality that in such a war, the US and NATO would probably face defeat, and, rather than accept defeat, would use nuclear (or biological) weapons). Should nuclear weapons be used against either Russia or China, both the USA and the EU would be destroyed in retaliation. Russia and China are very large countries so their capacity to retaliate is unlikely to be destroyed, even by a first strike. A nuclear war of this size would destroy civilization. Avoiding WW3 is the only reasonable option
3–Operation Spiderweb–On June 1st Ukraine launched a drone attack against Russian strategic bombers parked on several bases. The attack is said to have taken 18 months to arrange. It involved hiding drones in wooden houses in trucking containers. An electronic signal opened the roofs of the containers, releasing drones. The container then self-destructed.
Several bases were attacked but not all were hit. Western media has been very congratulatory of Ukraine’s “daring do.” David Ingnatius even exalted “Ukraine’s Dirty War Is Just Getting Started”. The extent of the damage is uncertain. Ukraine claims to have destroyed 40 planes, the US claims 20 hit and 9 destroyed, the alternative media claims only 5 planes destroyed and damaged meaning some will be repaired. Given the ability to fake video and photos it is impossible to know the true facts unless Russia decides to tell us and offers proof. The USSR made hundreds of the planes that were hit (although some had been upgraded) and bone yards contain extra parts, so any loss may not be permanent. Moreover, these types of bombers have been superseded by other means of weapon’s delivery. Russia’s true loss may, or may not, be that significant. The loss of trust, security, and national pride are another matter.
The USA claims not to have been involved in this strike, but as Dmitry Kornev argued in an analysis published in RT, the drone strikes “blended high-tech sabotage, covert infiltration, and satellite-guided timing with the kind of precision that only the world’s most advanced intelligence networks can deliver.” If the USA was not directly involved, a questionable proposition, some western country with access to US data and systems, probably was involved.
The Russian strategic bombers, like similar US bombers, are parked outside, so they could be monitored by satellite, as required by a treaty between the US and the Soviet Union (today Russia) –the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Russia constantly moves these bombers –so Ukraine needed access to up to date satellite information for targeting purposes. The US is the most likely source of this data.
There have been several articles discussing the fact that the US and NATO run, arm, and fund this proxy war against Russia. For example, the CIA has operated throughout Ukraine for years before the SMO started in February 2022. It has also been acknowledged that the war is overseen by NATO and the US out of a military base in Germany, see “The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine”. The US and NATO are Ukraine’s eyes and ears assisting with imaging and SIGNIT intelligence for use in monitoring and targeting. It defies logic to claim that none of the countries in US/NATO alliance participated in this attack–in fact the best description is that this was a limited US first strike on Russia, by proxy.
Unfortunately, there is now ZERO potential for weapon limitation treaties with Russia, or for that matter, with China. The betrayal, and the distrust, is too great. This probably signals the end of any real effort to end the Ukraine war–after all, this attack came one day before another scheduled peace conference. The US and NATO have proven to be unreliable and untrustworthy partners. This is markedly different from the Cold War when trust and reliability levels were much higher.
Every effort is being made to goad Russia into striking outside Ukraine, such a strike could force the US to join the war and turn the Ukraine war into WW3. Russia is very wise not to take the bait. If we survive this era, we should all thank the rational, careful and levelheaded President of Russia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, not the so called “western leadership.”
The lack of concern for the risk of a global nuclear war is very dangerous, it means there is no public pushback against either the Ukraine War or the talk of a wider war. Even the Washington Post is beginning to sound the alarm–see “Why We Should Worry About Nuclear Weapons Again.”
4 –The exchange of bodies between Russia and Ukraine During the last peace negotiation, Russia and Ukraine agreed to an exchange of bodies of deceased soldiers. Russia began publishing lists of names and showed up on the Minsk border with refrigerated trailers for the exchange. Ukraine refused to accept the bodies. Was this refusal because acknowledging 6,000 dead soldiers would contradict Ukraine’s casualty claims, and would require Ukraine to pay their families billions? To prevent this the Ukraine Rada passed a law requiring families to prove the death in court, giving the government two years to pay.
What are human biases, like confirmation bias and group think?
There are so many human biases entire books have been written about them, for example, The Biased Brain lists almost 200 biases, and an entire Cognitive Biases Codex has been set up.
Human biases are closely studied, not only to manipulate people and promote war, but by marketers and politicians. Human biases are poorly understood by most people–but we all have them. Cognitive Biases cause us to make irrational decisions and judgments on the information we process. A Cognitive Bias can be thought of as a programmed error in our brains. These biases can be manipulated, especially when combined with fear, greed, ideology, and the lust for power. Censorship and the manipulation of information through propaganda and fear is a feature of our media, which is often aligned with big business and the national security state.
For today’s essay I want to focus on two; confirmation bias and a combination of several biases that expresses itself in what is known as group think.
Confirmation bias “refers to the tendency of individuals to seek, interpret, and remember information in a way that confirms their pre-existing beliefs or values. This bias leads people to focus on evidence that supports their views while dismissing or undervaluing information that contradicts them. As a result, confirmation bias can create a distorted understanding of reality, reinforce stereotypes and hinder effective communication in diverse settings.”
Group Think “..refers to a mode of thinking in which individual members of small cohesive groups tend to accept a viewpoint or conclusion that represents a perceived group consensus, whether or not the group members believe it to be valid, correct, or optimal. Groupthink reduces the efficiency of collectiveproblem solving within such groups.”
From Britanica: “The eight symptoms of groupthink include an illusion of invulnerability or of the inability to be wrong, the collective rationalization of the group’s decisions, an unquestioned belief in the morality of the group and its choices, stereotyping of the relevant opponents or out-group members, and the presence of “mind guards” who act as barriers to alternative or negative information, as well as self-censorship and an illusion of unanimity. Decision making affected by groupthink neglects possible alternatives and focuses on a narrow number of goals, ignoring the risks involved in a particular decision. It fails to seek out alternative information and is biased in its consideration of that which is available. Once rejected, alternatives are forgotten, and little attention is paid to contingency plans in case the preferred solution fails.
How confirmation bias is used to manipulate people
We are all products of the information environment in which we live. Often it is this very information environment provides the propaganda that creates confirmation bias. Most people get their news from the corporate media. In corporate media, the news is often managed, information is censored, a narrative is created, dissenting points of view are excluded, and the approved narrative is constantly repeated. In the alternative media, all points of view can be found, but some are completely unreliable. The security agencies are also involved in media. The best option is to consult a variety of sources, supplemented by a constant study of history. Unfortunately, history has also been censored and manipulated. The best evidence usually comes from historians who rely on and cite original sources. Unfortunately, historians who contradict the approved narrative may not be able to publish their work. Those who get published may find their careers destroyed. Noam Chomsky has spent a career studying these issues. Ron Unz has conducted a historical re-evaluation in his American Pravda series and discusses many of these issues.
One significant feature of the information environment for the last 20 plus years has been the demonization and outright defamation of Russia and her president, Vladimir Putin.
—Vladimir Posner gave a lecture at Yale University in September, 2018 titled “How the United States Created Vladimir Putin” discussing the facts behind the extensive campaign to create a negative image of Putin and Russia. Posner also said he had hired people to examine the archives of the New York Times to locate positive stories from 2015, 2016, and 2017 about Russia or Putin. There were none. This level of negative reporting should be seen as evidence of a successful propaganda campaign intended to build support of a war against Russia.
–On September 25, 2015 John Mearsheimer gave a lecture titled “Why Is Ukraine the West’s Fault”. The lecture did not attract a great deal of attention at the time, but after February of 2022 has over 30 million views. In this lecture Prof Mearsheimer sets out how to resolve the civil war in Ukraine–abandon NATO expansion–guarantee minority rights in Ukraine especially language rights–and provide some autonomy to Eastern Ukraine. These were the basic principles Russia always supported, and were also behind Misk 1 and 2, which were never implemented–in fact Angela Merkel of Germany admitted the agreements were used to buy time to allow Ukraine to re-arm.
To think there was nothing positive to say about Russia or the accomplishments of President Putin is absurd. Julian Assange pointed to the objective of such coverage when he said that every war the US has fought for the last 50 years has been based on lies. This is also the case with the proxy war in Ukraine.
Constant repetition of negative coverage is likely to trigger confirmation bias. Confirmation bias often makes it impossible for people to change their minds about issues and events no matter how much contrary information they are shown. Lies once embedded often cannot be dislodged. Perhaps this is why Mark Twain is claimed to have said, “it’s easier to fool people than to convince them they have been fooled.”
If we consider the entire array of societal rewards and punishments, it becomes obvious that the ability to control information, along with the power to bury or punish those who try to reveal prohibited information, can create false narratives and control our understanding of both current events and history. This information control, when combined with fear, can embed biases that can be manipulated to steer society in desired directions. Wars would never be fought if they weren’t profitable and served to enhance the power of favored groups. This has been the course of history throughout the ages.
How are group think is used to support militarism and war
In 1972, Irving.L. Janis did a study titled Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes. In this study Janis defined “groupthink” as a psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent and appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. Janis used a group dynamics approach to explain aspects of American foreign policy decision making.
Janis found that the results of this small-group phenomenon often spelled disaster and paved the way for some of the major U.S. fiascoes: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. Yet there are cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where group think was avoided. It is through documented portrayal of these cases of the invasion and avoidance of group think that Irving Janis demonstrated his hypothesis and was able to offer suggestions for counteracting group think.
Janis’s work showed how group think was a major issue and made suggestions for avoiding the problems of group think in the future. To date, his suggestions have been ignored. One major issue in the effort to avoid group think is that those who adhere to the group’s narratives are encouraged and promoted, those who do not are excluded and lose influence.
If the past is any indication, U.S. foreign policy makers will learn nothing from another debacle like Ukraine. In the past, decision makers have been able to walk away from the ruins of their poor decisions without any political repercussions. If this is repeated with the Ukraine proxy war, it will reinforce the belief that such a proxy war represents a repeatable formula for sustaining a bloated military, for selling weapons, and for starting wars of convenience. This pattern of U.S. foreign policy failures stretches from North Korea to the present day, with a corresponding trail of death and destruction. The question: how can this destructive pattern be ended before it destroys us all?
Today the cycle of war is in full flower–military Keynesianism rules the day. The US is in a proxy war against Russia, has bombed Yemen, and threatens war against Iraq and China. The US military budget is set to increase the power of confirmation bias and group think is undaunted.
Today is also the anniversary of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, an attack that was apparently designed to allow the US to enter the 1967 war on behalf of Israel,threatening a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. I raise these issues because we again face the risk of nuclear war. Also, the US alliance with Israel is implicated in every war the US has fought since 911, including the current campaign to force the US to go to war with Iran, again, for the security of Israel. Given the financial and political power of the Zionist lobby in the USA concern about war with Iran must be taken seriously.
The risk of that war with Russia, with Iran, or with China could lead to a civilization destroying nuclear war. Together, all these issues again highlight the need for people to put aside their differences, their biases, and come together in a citizen’s movement for reform.
