Russia Matters, 10/6/23

1. Putin has shot down proposals to lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use in Russia’s doctrinal documents, but called for Russia to de-ratify the CTBT. When asked by Sergei Karaganov at the Valdai Club meeting on Oct. 5 whether Russia should “modify the doctrine on using nuclear weapons, lowering the nuclear threshold,” Putin said: “[T]here are two reasons stipulated in the Russian Military Doctrine for the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia. The first is the use of nuclear weapons against us, which would entail a so-called retaliatory strike … The second reason for the potential use of these weapons is an existential threat to the Russian state.” “Do we need to change this? Why would we? Everything can be changed, but I just don’t see that we need to,” Putin asserted. While rejecting a lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, Putin made clear in his Valdai remarks that he was not going to abandon nuclear saber-rattling altogether. “The United States signed the treaty [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty] without ratifying it, while we both signed and ratified it. As a matter of principle, we can offer a tit-for-tat response in our relations with the United States,” he said. Putin’s decision to stick to the doctrinal language on the conditions for first use is remarkable, given that he has previously said Russia can initiate a nuclear strike when its “territorial integrity,” “sovereignty,” and the “safety of our people” are threatened (none of these threats are explicitly identified in Russia’s military doctrine as conditions for use of nuclear weapons). That the Russian commander-in-chief has publicly rejected the suggestion by Karaganov—who sits on the scientific council of the Russian Security Council, which is run by Putin’s hawkish confidant, Nikolai Patrushev—to lower the threshold, on paper, may also indicate Putin’s decision to conclude internal debates on this issue. That said, Putin’s call for de-ratifying the CTBT indicates that, at the very least, he is not going to stop invoking Russia’s nuclear weapons in his attempts to coerce the West. In the run-up to this call, Russian officials and pundits had made a number of statements on resuming nuclear tests, while top officials visited a former nuclear test site, where construction has been going on,  in what, in hindsight, looks like a coordinated campaign meant to prepare internal and external audiences for Putin’s announcement on CTBT.

See full transcript of Putin’s remarks at the Valdai Conference on 10/5/23 here.