By Col (Ret.) Douglas MacGregor and George Beebe, The National Interest, 12/13/21

What happens if Washington attempts to force Russia into concessions over Ukraine through a Reaganesque display of strength, when in fact the United States has a comparatively weak hand to play? That is the unenviable situation that President Joe Biden finds himself in after his video meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin this week and his tough talk about not recognizing any Russian redlines.

The notion that the United States is at a disadvantage in contending with Russia strikes most Americans as far-fetched. After all, America’s gross national product is many times larger than that of Russia, and we dominate the international financial system. Our military is larger and much more capable, our offensive cyber capabilities are unparalleled, and we enjoy the support of a large array of treaty allies and military partners in Europe and around the world. By contrast, Russia has few friends and allies, a middling economy largely dependent on energy exports, and a declining population hit hard by Covid-19. On paper, the United States appears to hold many cards in this high-stakes game.

But in practice, the ability to bring force to bear in specific circumstances matters far more than aggregate measures of national power. When it comes to Ukraine, Russia is better able to move large numbers of combat-ready forces into battle, more familiar with the local terrain, and far more prepared to go to war than is the United States, for which Ukraine is not a matter of existential importance. Russia’s military has a recent track record of success in Syria, not to mention in Ukraine itself. And Moscow has very likely planned for the possibility of draconian U.S. and European sanctions and other punitive measures that Washington might impose in response. If push comes to shove in Ukraine, Russia is very likely to win—and quickly.

Should Moscow opt to invade, a Russian campaign would probably be aimed at effectively turning territory in southeastern Ukraine into an extension of Russia itself. As many as 200,000 Russian ground forces could be arrayed in an arc from north to south along a 600-mile front. Publicly available satellite photos show that the largest concentration of Russian military forces currently lies between Voronezh and Crimea. Forces north and northwest of Kiev may constitute a supporting attack with the goal of preventing Ukrainian forces in and around Kiev from moving south to reinforce Ukrainian defenses from Voronezh to Luhansk and Donetsk. Since the battle would take place on Russia’s geographical doorstep, leaders on both sides would be intimately familiar with the terrain they must fight over.

The Russian maneuver units consist of approximately 100 battalion tactical groups (BTGs): reinforced armored and armored infantry battalions of roughly 750 to 1,000 soldiers including artillery, engineers, and support elements. The vast majority of this force is positioned in southern Russia, capable of striking west across the border with Ukraine along multiple axes with operational objectives south of Kiev along the Dnieper River. Roughly twelve BTGs are positioned to move west along the Black Sea coast toward Odessa, the seizing of which would transform Ukraine into a landlocked state.

The ground maneuver force would operate within the framework of tightly organized intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) elements linked to powerful strike formations. There might be as many as 100 batteries of rocket artillery in the assembled force. These include systems like the BM-30 Smerch, a system often referred to as a high-end conventional weapon of mass destruction (WMD). A single salvo of five BM-30 Smerch’s firing 300mm rockets can destroy an area the size of New York City’s Central Park with the explosive power equal to a one-kiloton nuclear warhead. In addition, the Iskander mobile missile system, M a precision-guided tactical ballistic missile, would attack Ukrainian airfields, operational headquarters, and logistical infrastructure with explosive 1,058-pound conventional warheads carrying HE fragmentation, submunition, penetration, and fuel-air explosive at ranges between 180 and 300 miles.

Meanwhile, at every level—tactical, operational, and strategic—integrated air defenses composed of S-400 and S-500 Russian air and missile defense systems would protect Russian strike and maneuver formations from Ukrainian air and missile attack. Any Ukrainian or NATO manned or unmanned, low-flying, subsonic platform, whether it were a conventional rotorcraft, a tilt-rotor, or a fixed-wing prop/turboprop aircraft, would be highly susceptible to detection, engagement, and destruction.

If Russian forces attack, the skies over Ukrainian forces would be crowded with a mix of Russian surveillance drones, manned aircraft, and, potentially, Russia’s new loitering munitions. These are effectively cruise missiles designed to hover over the battlefield for hours and engage beyond line-of-sight ground targets. These attacks would be rapidly followed by precision-guided rocket artillery fire.

Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that Russian ground forces would reach their operational objectives along the Dnieper River in as little as seventy-two to ninety-six hours. Whether Moscow would decide to press further west and seize the port of Odessa is hard to know, but the action would place Russian forces in close proximity to the pro-Russian Moldovan separatist republic of Transnistria on Romania’s border, rendering Odessa a tempting target.

Kiev’s ability to contend with such a campaign is highly questionable. It is vastly outmanned and outgunned by the Russian military. Its goal would be to retain as much territory east of the Dnieper River as possible while delaying the Russian advance, in the hope that Russian momentum would slow and buy time for immense international pressure on Moscow to halt its offensive.

The Biden administration is reportedly not considering direct military intervention in the event of an invasion of Ukraine. And with good reason—it could do little on the battlefield to counter such moves. The United States has only three combat brigades in Europe, and two of these are lightly armed with antiquated equipment. Although we could realistically employ advanced combat aircraft in Ukraine, they would have to contend with advanced Russian air defenses and formidable Russian electronic jamming capabilities. U.S. air superiority, which has been central to our military operations against lesser powers since the end of the Cold War, would not be assured in Ukraine.

Knowing this, Washington is threatening to impose harsh consequences on Russia outside the battlefield, using “sanctions from hell” and other unspecified measures, in the hope that this will stay Putin’s hand. Unfortunately, it is very likely that the Russians have long anticipated what the United States may do. Along with China, they have prepared for the possibility of being kicked out of the international SWIFT system. They have alternatives to the newly built Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, should Europeans decline to allow its use, and they may even be prepared to choke off their supplies of gas to Europe in mid-winter in retaliation. To deter possible U.S. action against their satellite systems, they have signaled their willingness to take out U.S. satellites by conducting a successful anti-satellite missile test just two weeks ago despite vehement U.S. protests, and they have built land-based backup systems should their own communications and navigation satellites cease operations.

The good news is that Putin almost certainly understands that an invasion of Ukraine would lead to a complete break in relations with the West, rendering Russia in effect a dependent junior partner of China. Moreover, he probably realizes that Russian forces would very likely have to deal with guerrilla resistance in occupied Ukrainian territory, and that unoccupied portions of western Ukraine could become a host for U.S. and NATO forces over the longer term. It is doubtful that these are outcomes he finds appealing. He would probably prefer to find an alternative way to derail a U.S. alliance with Ukraine if Biden is prepared to bargain. But if Washington refuses to recognize that Russian redline, he may well be prepared to fight—and there is not much the United States could do to stop him.

By Dasha Litvinova, AP, 12/13/21

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian authorities on Monday backed away from introducing some of the restrictions for the unvaccinated that were announced a month ago and elicited public outrage all across the vast country where vaccine uptake remains low.

The speaker of the State Duma, Russia’s lower parliament house, on Monday announced the withdrawal of a bill restricting access to domestic and international flights and trains to those who have been fully vaccinated, have recently recovered from COVID-19 or are medically exempt from vaccination.

The bill, along with another outlining similar restrictions in many public places, had been expected to go through the first reading on Thursday, but speaker Vyacheslav Volodin cited “a joint decision by the State Duma and the government” to withdraw it from the parliament’s agenda for now. The other bill is still going forward.

“We need to be balanced when working out these decisions so that the opinion of the people is taken into account,” Volodin said.

The two bills were introduced a month ago, as Russia was struggling with its deadliest and largest surge of COVID-19, which came amid low vaccination rates, lax public attitudes to taking precautions and few restrictions. Officials said the new measures would take effect in February 2022, but the suggested restrictions proved unpopular almost immediately after they were announced.

Russians in different regions started staging protests against the restrictions and launching online petitions against them. Volodin’s own post about the restrictions on the social messaging app Telegram received hundreds of thousands of comments opposing the new measures.

Less than 50% of Russia’s 146-million population has been fully vaccinated so far, even though Russia was among the first in the world to approve and roll out a coronavirus vaccine a year ago. Experts have cited deep-rooted vaccine hesitancy and the vaccine’s rushed approval, as well as the government’s confusing messages about the seriousness of the outbreak.

It remains unclear whether the bill restricting plane and train travel for the unvaccinated will be re-introduced at a future date. Russia’s Transport Ministry told the RBC news site that it would continue working on improving the bill.

The second bill that would allow regional authorities to bar those who can’t provide proof of vaccination, proof of recent recovery from COVID-19 or medical exemption from immunization from many public places starting February is still expected to pass the first reading on Thursday.

Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova, who runs Russia’s state coronavirus task force, said Monday that vaccine certificates will also be issued to Russians who received foreign vaccines or have been inoculated with Sputnik V, one of four domestically developed jabs currently on offer in Russia, in other countries.

To obtain them, however, Russians will have to test positive for coronavirus antibodies, and their vaccine certificates will only be valid for six months instead of a year. Golikova didn’t offer an explanation for this.

Golikova also announced that a total 16 Russians out of 177 who have recently returned to the country from South Africa recently were confirmed to have been infected with omicron — the new variant of coronavirus about which much remains unknown at this point, including whether it is more contagious, whether it can make people more seriously ill and whether it can thwart COVID-19 vaccines.

The first two cases of omicron were reported by Russia just a week ago.

Russian authorities banned for all foreigners traveling from countries in southern Africa and Hong Kong and required all Russian nationals returning from South Africa or neighboring countries to quarantine for 14 days because of the omicron variant, which was first reported by scientists in South Africa.

In all, Russia’s state coronavirus task force has reported more than 10 million confirmed coronavirus cases and 289,483 deaths. However, a report released Friday by the state statistics agency Rosstat, which uses broader criteria, put the overall number of virus-linked deaths between April 2020 and October 2021 to over 537,000 — almost twice the official toll.

Note: This is the text from Russian Foreign Ministry website, posted on 12/10/21, with Google Translate to English.

We note the expression expressed by the President of the United States J. Biden during the December 7 of this year. talks with President Vladimir Putin; readiness to establish a serious dialogue on issues related to ensuring the security of the Russian Federation. Such a dialogue is urgently needed today, when relations between Russia and the collective West continue to deteriorate and have come to a critical point. At the same time, in recent days, various free interpretations of our position have been multiplying. In this regard, we consider it necessary to once again clarify the following.

Whipping up confrontation with our country is absolutely unacceptable. As a pretext, the situation in Ukraine is used, in relation to which the West has taken a course towards encouraging Russophobia, shielding the actions of the Kiev regime to disrupt the Minsk agreements and preparing for a scenario of force in the Donbass.

Instead of curbing their Ukrainian protégés, NATO countries are pushing Kiev to take aggressive steps. There is no other way to interpret the more frequent unscheduled exercises of the United States and its allies in the Black Sea. Aircraft of NATO member states, including strategic bombers, regularly make provocative overflights and dangerous maneuvers near the borders of Russia. The military development of the territory of Ukraine continues, the pumping of the country with weapons.

A course has been taken to draw Ukraine into NATO, which is fraught with the appearance there of strike missile systems with a minimum flight time to Central Russia and other destabilizing weapons. Such irresponsible behavior creates unacceptable threats to our security, provokes serious military risks for all parties involved, up to a large-scale conflict in Europe.

At the same time, it is argued that the question of Ukraine’s hypothetical NATO membership concerns exclusively Kiev and the alliance, and no one should interfere in this process. Let us recall, however, that in addition to the Washington Treaty, NATO countries also have commitments regarding the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, throughout the OSCE area. This principle was first declared in the Helsinki Final Act, and then reaffirmed and strengthened in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, which states: “The security of everyone is inextricably linked with the security of everyone else.” And in 1999, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, the Charter for European Security was adopted, in which it was emphasized that the participating States “will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.”

All of these documents were signed by the top leaders of the OSCE participating States, including all NATO countries. However, in violation of the principle of the indivisibility of security – as well as in violation of the promises made to the Soviet leadership – all these years NATO has consistently moved eastward, ignoring the concerns expressed by Moscow, and each time NATO replenishment added to this bloc a frenzied anti-Russian charge.

We have long drawn attention to the inadmissibility of such a development of events. Over the past decades, it has been suggested more than once to agree on making the principle of equal and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic space legally binding, since the West is clearly not in the mood to fulfill the above-mentioned political obligations. However, we were invariably refused.

In this regard, as President Vladimir Putin emphasizes, we insist on the development – in a specific period of time and on the basis of the principle of equal and indivisible security – serious long-term legal guarantees, excluding any further NATO advance to the east and the deployment of threatening weapons systems in the West. borders of Russia.

In the fundamental interests of European security, it is necessary to formally disavow the decision of the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit that “Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members” as contrary to the commitment of the leaders of all OSCE participating States – “not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of others.”

We insist on the legal consolidation of the agreement on the non-deployment by the United States and other NATO countries of strike weapons systems that pose a threat to the Russian Federation on the territory of neighboring countries, both members and not members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

We also insist on receiving a concrete NATO response to our earlier proposals to reduce tensions in Europe, including, in particular:

– withdrawal of areas of operational exercises at an agreed distance from the Russia-NATO contact line;

– coordination of the maximum distance of approach of warships and aircraft to prevent dangerous military activities, primarily in the Baltic and Black Sea regions;

– resumption of a regular dialogue between the defense ministries along the Russia-US and Russia-NATO lines.

We call on Washington to join the unilateral Russian moratorium on the deployment of ground-based INF in Europe, agree and introduce the necessary measures to verify the fulfillment of mutual obligations.

In these areas, Russia will soon submit draft international legal documents to start negotiations in the appropriate formats.

In particular, we will make a comprehensive proposal on legal security guarantees in preparation for the next round of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We will stand for a substantive discussion of the military aspects of ensuring security through the defense ministries with the participation of the foreign ministries of Russia and the NATO countries.

We consider it necessary that the OSCE, where all the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region are represented, should not remain aloof from discussions on resolving European security problems.

We urge you to carefully consider the Russian proposals and begin serious negotiations to reach agreements that ensure a fair and stable balance of interests in our common space.

By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 12/9/21

An unnamed source told The Associated Press that senior US State Department officials told Ukraine that a NATO membership is unlikely to be approved within the next decade, a sign the US is not willing to further escalate tensions with Russia over Ukraine.

Biden administration officials also told AP that the US might pressure Ukraine to give some degree of autonomy to separatists in its eastern Donbas region, a move that would significantly de-escalate tensions in the region.

After the US orchestrated a coup in Kyiv in 2014, separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts rejected the new government and declared their independence. Kyiv rejected the oblasts’ bid for independence, and a war was started, which has killed over 10,000 people.

Since a ceasefire was reached in 2015, there have been occasional major flare-ups, but the war has essentially been at a stalemate. A “special status” for Donbas was agreed upon in the 2015 Minsk Agreements, but it was never defined. The AP report said the US could push Ukraine to give the region more authority on local issues.

President Biden spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by Phone on Thursday and vowed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and repeated warnings that if Russia invades, the US would implement new sanctions against Moscow. In a readout of the call, the White House made no mention of NATO or the push for giving Donbas some autonomy.

Biden spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the Ukraine situation on Tuesday. No breakthroughs were made, but the two leaders agreed to continue a dialogue on the issue. Putin denies that he is planning an invasion but wants guarantees that NATO will not continue to expand further eastward or put missiles in Ukraine that could target Russia.

Biden Plans NATO Talks With Russia to Ease Ukraine Tensions

By Jennifer Epstein and Jennifer Jacobs, Bloomberg, 12/8/21

President Joe Biden said the U.S. and some of its NATO allies plan a meeting with Russia aimed at de-escalating tensions over Ukraine, where they’ll consider Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about the alliance.

Biden said that he hopes by Friday to announce the meeting, which will include “at least four of our major NATO allies.” The subject will be Putin’s issues with the alliance “writ large and whether or not we can work out any accommodation as it relates to bringing down the temperature along the eastern front,” the U.S. president told reporters on Wednesday.

Read full article here.

Russian News Agency TASS Reports Russian Government Unaware of Such Meeting with NATO

MOSCOW, December 9. /TASS/. Russia knows no details concerning a meeting of Russia and NATO officials on Ukraine US President Joe Biden has announced, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told the media on Thursday.

“I know nothing about any such meeting. I did see comments by the US president on this score. I proceed from the assumption that the formats for further talks on the ‘red lines’ our leadership was talking about for the past few days, and also maximally reliable legally binding security guarantees for Russia are subject to further discussion,” Ryabkov said.

He speculated that there was a number of platforms where such discussions might be held.

“At this point, nothing is decided. The US announcements that are made unilaterally do not create a new reality for us. They are just a reminder these issues should be dealt with tightly,” Ryabkov said.

Read full article here.