​Trump’s security guarantees: key to a Ukraine settlement?

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 8/18/25

Are we in for something like a repeat of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles?

US President Donald Trump has offered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky security guarantees that Trump describes as “like Article V” of the NATO Treaty. Zelensky has apparently signed onto the Trump offer and potentially has agreed that some “territorial swaps” will be needed to make a deal with Russia.

Trump has reported to his European interlocutors who came to the White House to back up Zelensky. He told them more or less the same thing, according to reports, and told German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who pushed for an immediate ceasefire, that a ceasefire ahead of a deal was off the table.

We don’t know what security guarantees mean or how they would be implemented. The Russians will be asking a lot of questions about the idea, if they have not already done so. Trump said he would be calling Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as today, [August] 18, 2025, where it is already after midnight as this is written.

Here are the likely questions about security guarantees.

(1) Will the US send troops to Ukraine (as the European so-called “coalition of the willing” wants to do) or will the assurances to Kyiv be political in nature?

(2) Will the US set up any kind of infrastructure in Ukraine as part of the assurances to Ukraine?

(3) While Trump has ruled out any NATO membership for Ukraine, will the Europeans, or some of then, be part of the Trump guarantee?

(4) Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which is the effective collective security provision of the Treaty, requires consensus of all NATO members. Is Trump thinking of a quasi-NATO-like arrangement that also will require consensus for activation? One should note that not all European countries plan to support any troop presence in Ukraine even for security assurances. Specifically, Germany, Italy and Poland have said “no” to proposals from the UK and France.

(5) NATO is a treaty organization that was formally approved by its members, meaning the Treaty was signed and ratified by each country’s legislative authority. If Trump’s security guarantees are not under a treaty format, the deal might not be supported by a future President. If Trump wants to sign a treaty with Ukraine, he will need to convince Congress it is in the US national interest. This may not be as easy as it would seem because many will start to question exactly what would oblige the US to take military action if there is a violation of the final deal on Ukraine. It is obvious these are tricky waters, and the Trump administration will have to skip a lot of rope to sell the idea of an actual guarantee that involves the US military in a war with Russia, which is, as I am sure some have noticed, a nuclear-armed power.

In the United States a treaty, for ratification, needs a two thirds vote in the US Senate. There may well be enough isolationists in Congress to block ratification, if Trump goes for a treaty. Down the road, one is reminded of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles.

There are more recent examples of treaties that ran into trouble. These include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Elimination of All Forces of Discrimination Against Women and the Law of the Sea Convention.

(6) The Russians have demanded a smaller Ukrainian military and a neutral Ukraine. Will this demand be honored in any way?

(7) We don’t yet have any idea on the territories Ukraine will yield, or the actual borders (since the Russians do not control all of Donbas). This will be a tough negotiation, and Putin will be under heavy pressure from his army, which, for the most part, is gaining ground in Donbas and elsewhere.

Trump faces an uphill battle selling US guarantees for Ukraine, notwithstanding whether they require US boots on the ground and if others will join the US, such as the UK and France. In one sense, with a smaller group, the Russians will regard the future risk as greater than the NATO risk because the UK and French are aggressively promoting their participation in armed conflict against Russia. A so-called coalition of some-willing looks like a non-starter for Russia.

All of this means that what looks like a success at the White House may devolve into another casualty of the Ukraine war. The offer of guarantees may fail under scrutiny, either by Russia or by the US Congress.

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Doubts Grow on Ukraine Security Package as Russia Demands a Role (Excerpt)

By Natalia Drozdiak, Bloomberg, 8/21/25

Efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a US-led push to end Russia’s war are running into difficulties almost immediately.

US, Ukrainian and European officials have started hashing out proposals for a post-war plan to protect Ukraine, after White House officials said Russian President Vladimir Putin was open to “Article 5-style” security guarantees for Kyiv, a reference to NATO’s collective defense commitment.

The Kremlin hasn’t confirmed publicly that Putin made such a commitment at his summit with US President Donald Trump in Alaska last week. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Wednesday that Russia should have a say in security arrangements for Ukraine, which could also involve China. Hours later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy ruled out Beijing as a potential guarantor of peace.

Lavrov reiterated the demand on Thursday, saying Moscow had supported a Ukrainian proposal at negotiations in Istanbul shortly after the 2022 invasion began that would have involved the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the US, Russia, China, the UK and France, in security guarantees.

Russia supports guarantees based “on the principle of collective security, on the principles of indivisible security,” Lavrov said. “Anything else, anything unilateral is, of course, an absolutely hopeless undertaking.”

Several senior European officials and diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they viewed Lavrov’s comments as an attempt to stall the process, and expressed doubt that Putin is willing to make a deal. Trump is pressing for Putin and Zelenskiy to meet for direct talks as the next stage of US efforts to reach an end to the war that’s in its fourth year.

Zelenskiy and a delegation of European leaders rushed to the White House on Monday for talks with Trump after the US president rolled out the red carpet for Putin at their summit and appeared to swing toward Russia’s positions on the war. He abandoned demands for Putin to agree to a ceasefire ahead of negotiations and said Ukraine would have to concede territories to Russia as part of a settlement.

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US will play minimum role in Ukraine’s security guarantees – Politico

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/21/25

The Pentagon’s top policy official Elbridge Colby says the US will play a minimal role in any Ukraine security guarantees, Politico reported on August 21.

US President Donald Trump has shifted position in the last month, promising to contribute to the security guarantees being worked out by Ukraine’s European allies ahead of a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but has also made it clear that the US role will be limited.

Trump has revealed few details of what the US role will be but has said Washington will not contribute troops to any peacekeeping force Europe appears to be planning. Colby comments add some clarity and underscore the fact that the lion’s share of the security arrangements will fall to Europe.

There also seems to be some dissent amongst EU leaders on what the best sort of security guarantee would be. While the UK and France are tending towards reviving the idea of sending peacekeepers, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been a lone voice arguing for a true “Nato Article 5-like” guarantee where EU members sign genuine security guarantees and commit to sending troops to Ukraine within 24 hours if Russia were to re-invade Ukraine, Bloomberg reports. The plan does not include Ukraine’s membership in Nato, but does tally with the bilateral security deals that Zelenskiy was hoping for as part of the 2022 Istanbul peace deal.

Meloni first brought up the idea of “Nato-lite” Article 5-like protections for Kyiv in March 2025, but has not been backed by other Nato members. She brought the idea up again in public comments during the White House summit on August 18.

The Article 5-like proposal is one of many options currently being weighed by European leaders ahead of a mooted meeting between Putin and Zelenskiy that also includes peacekeepers, more sanctions, increased weapons supplies, security agreements, long-term economic aid, and land swaps.

Peacekeepers

A decision to send peacekeepers to Ukraine is controversial. The Kremlin has said repeatedly that it will not accept any Nato-backed troops on Ukrainian soil.

The idea of peacekeepers was first floated by French President Emmanuel Macron earlier this year and backed by the UK, two of the leading members of the coalition of the willing. Germany, however, the third leading member of the coalition, has made it clear that it will not participate. Bloomberg previously reported that about ten European countries are willing to commit troops to Ukraine.

The Kremlin has dismissed the peacekeeping security proposals. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on August 20 that Russia should be one of the countries that provides Ukraine security guarantees.

“As for reports that the UK, France, and Germany want to develop collective security guarantees, we support making these guarantees truly reliable,” Lavrov said on August 20 and repeated earlier calls that any deal should be based on the terms agreed in Istanbul in 2022.

“Our delegation then agreed to work out security guarantees involving all permanent members of the UN Security Council — Russia, China, the US, France, and the UK,” he said. “Germany and Turkey were mentioned, as well as others that may be interested in joining this group.”

Zelenskiy has demanded that Russia provide Ukraine with “ironclad” security guarantees and Putin signalled during the Alaska summit on August 15 that he was agreeable to the idea.

EU leaders have flip flopped on the idea of peacekeepers, but it appeared the plan was abandoned in March, deemed to be unworkable thanks to Russia’s objections. Now the idea appears to have been revived in lieu of giving Ukraine true security guarantees.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said on August 20 that the UK was willing to send up to 30,000 soldiers to Ukraine as part of the peacekeeper force.

Europe in the driving seat

Colby’s comments came in response to questions from European military leaders in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Dan Caine on August 20. Defence chiefs from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Finland pushed the US side to disclose what it would provide in troops and air defences to help Ukraine maintain a peace deal with Russia should an agreement be reached, according to a European official cited by Politico.

“There’s the dawning reality that this will be Europe making this happen on the ground,” a Nato diplomat who was briefed on the talks told Politico. “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

Trump on Monday said he was ready to send US troops to Ukraine. But he backtracked next day, suggesting instead that he was open to providing air support for European troops there.

“I don’t know where that leaves us,” a European official told Politico. “Pretty much back to where we were in the spring with the coalition of the willing.”

Trump has tried to withdraw from supporting Ukraine since taking office. He has cancelled all monetary and military support at least twice since taking office but has been pressured into resuming some level of support by the Ukraine supporters in his entourage.

But what support remains, will be minimal. US Secretary for Defence Pete Hegseth announced in July that the Pentagon had stopped all support for Ukraine, although the White House walked the total halt back a week later. As bne IntelliNews reported, Europe has taken on almost the entire burden of supporting Ukraine since the start of the year.

EU officials are sceptical of Colby, who was the force behind Hegseth’s decision to stop supplying Ukraine, arguing that US stockpiles of weapons had fallen to only 25% of what Pentagon’s strategic planning targets demanded for the US’ own defensive needs. Coby has long lobbied for European allies to do more to defend the continent against Russia.

A poll from The Economist/YouGov found that US citizens are deeply divided on the question of US support for Ukraine. A third (32%) of Americans favour increasing military aid, and a fifth (21%) favour maintaining the current amount. Just over half (54%) of those polled said that Europe should be involved in the talks with Russia while just under half (46%) think the US should also be involved.

The poll also found that the results show that 42% would blame Putin for the failure of the talks, while only one in ten would blame Zelenskiy. An additional 11% would blame President Donald Trump, and 17% would blame all of the leaders equally.

The poll also shows strong opposition to Ukrainian territorial concessions: 68% of Americans said Russia should get “none of it,” although the same poll found that 38% of Americans believe Russia will ultimately control “some of” Ukraine’s territory and 30% of Americans believe Russia is more likely to win the conflict, while only 15% believe Ukraine is more likely to win.

Zelenskiy reports that Ukraine now produces between 40% and 50% of all the weapons it needs, but the progress has been largely in the simpler weapons raising the question: can Ukraine go it alone? For now, Kyiv remains entirely dependent on the West for the sophisticated and long-range offensive and defensive items like Patriot, HIMARS and ATACMS missile systems.

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Can Putin Legally Stop The Conflict Without First Controlling All The Disputed Territory?

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/19/25

The Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on this hypothetical scenario due to 2020’s constitutional amendment prohibiting the cession of Russian territory except in certain cases.

RT’s report on Steve Witkoff’s claim that Russia has made “some concessions” on territorial issues, which signal a “significant” shift towards “moderation”, prompted talk about whether Putin can legally stop the special operation without first controlling all the disputed territory that Moscow claims as its own. He himself demanded in June 2024 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces “must be withdrawn from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders at the time of their being part of Ukraine.”

Moreover, the agreements under which Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson joined Russia all describe their administrative boundaries as those that existed “on the day of [their] formation”, thus suggesting that the entirety of their regions are indeed legally considered by Russia to be its own. Putin also famously declared during the signing of those treaties in late September 2022 that “the people living [there] have become our citizens, forever” and that “Russia will not betray [their choice to join it]”.

Nevertheless, Putin could still hypothetically “moderate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution, which entered into force after 2020’s constitutional referendum, stipulates that “Actions (except delimitation, demarcation, and re-demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with adjacent states) aimed at alienating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as calls for such actions, are not permitted.” “Moderation” could thus hypothetically be an “exception”.

To be absolutely clear, no call is being made within this analysis for Russia to “cede” any territory that it considers to be its own, nor have any Russian officials lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim. That said, if Putin concludes for whatever reason that Russia’s national interests are now best served by “moderating” its territorial claims after all that happened since September 2022’s referenda, then any proposed “re-demarcation of the state border” would likely require the Constitutional Court’s approval.

He’s a lawyer by training so it would make sense for him to proactively ask them to rule on the legality of this hypothetical solution to the Ukrainian Conflict. Even if he instead hypothetically proposes retaining his country’s territorial claims but freezing the military phase of the conflict and only advancing those claims through political means, he’d still likely seek their judgement too. They’re the final authority on constitutional issues and these scenarios require their expertise per their connection to Article 67.2.1.

If they hypothetically rule in his favor, the question would then arise about the fate of those living in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of those regions who Putin said “have become our citizens, forever.” They might rule that those who didn’t take part in the referenda, such as the residents of Zaporozhye city, aren’t Russian citizens. Those that did but then fell under Ukrainian control, such as the residents of Kherson city, might be deemed citizens who could move to Russia if Ukraine lets them as part of a deal.

To remind the reader, no Russian officials at the time of this analysis’ publication have lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim that Russia made “some concessions” on territorial issues, so it remains solely a hypothetical scenario for now. Even so, Putin might hypothetically conclude that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a grand compromise), in which case the Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on its legality.

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Declassified notes from Putin’s first presidential summit show parallels with Alaska meeting last week

National Security Archive, 8/21/25

Washington, D.C., August 21, 2025 – Newly declassified notes from Vladimir Putin’s first presidential summit with an American leader reveal some of the constants in the Russian leader’s approach: flattery, banter about sports, appearing to agree while saying nyet, and history lectures, according to documents obtained through a Freedom of Information lawsuit and published today by the National Security Archive.

The notes written by Strobe Talbott show Putin in his most cooperative and pro-Western period, hoping for full integration of Russia into the European security system and even NATO. Putin emphasizes cooperation on every point, strategic and economic, even when he intends to disagree. Putin is still inexperienced, yet confident and in full command of his brief, freely moving from subject to subject and trying to impress the American president.

The declassified notes published today include extensive color commentary about Putin’s style, psychological assessments of Putin and his rhetorical flourishes, dramatic quotes from Putin about preferring force to negotiations (“giving them what they deserved”), descriptions of Russian motivations and red lines—all the product of close first-hand observation by Strobe Talbott, then deputy secretary of state and fluent in Russian, during the June 2000 summit between Putin and President Bill Clinton at the Kremlin. Talbott was the U.S. notetaker during the three “one-on-ones” (actually 3-on-3 including translators and notetakers) at the 2000 summit, as he had been for most of Clinton’s previous meetings with Yeltsin.

The publication today also includes the formal memorandum of conversation for one of the two plenary sessions during the summit, declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library as the result of a Mandatory Review request by the National Security Archive. Detailed in this memcon is an extraordinary back-and-forth between Putin and Clinton about the possibility of Russia actually joining NATO, a prospect about which Putin says, “I am pleased.”

While the parallels between last week’s Alaska summit and the Moscow summit 25 years ago are not exact, many of the same issues resonate today, although similar detailed notes are unlikely ever to appear from the meeting last week between Putin and President Trump. Putin’s aggressive approach to the Chechen war back then and his endorsement of force over negotiation no doubt rhymes with his current stance on Ukraine, since he was the invader and could stop the war tomorrow if he wanted. The other major subject of the Putin-Clinton conversations—missile defense—remains a front-burner issue today, with President Trump’s newfound interest in building a “Golden Dome” over the U.S.

Read documents here.

By Greg Mitchell, Antiwar.com, 7/31/25

Reprinted on Antiwar with permission from Greg Mitchell’s newsletter Between Rock and a Hard Place.

Just to start briefly: As some know, this is a subject that I have explored in hundreds of articles, and in four books, since 1984, and now in an award-winning film “The Atomic Bowl” that started streaming on PBS.org and PBS apps this week (you can easily watch it via links here), plus: a companion e-book.

Having closely followed and studied American responses to the atomic bomb attacks on Japan (even co-authored a book with Robert Jay Lifton titled “Hiroshima in America”), I have to say that polling on this subject has always been very spotty. What has emerged has generally attested to very strong support in the months and first years after, then a slow decline but still fairly strong or clear majority backing last time I checked.

This week, however, , the venerable Pew Research operation has released a new survey taken in June with what I’d call somewhat encouraging results. In a rare step, they did not just ask yes or no but broke results down by gender and age.

Still, I wish they had asked the question of support for Hiroshima bombing and Nagasaki bombing separately instead of the usual “Hiroshima and Nagasaki” together.

In any event here are a few highlights, directly from Pew:

In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, also conducted on the phone, 56% of Americans said the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified, while 34% said it was not. Unlike in the new survey, the 2015 survey question did not include an explicit “Not sure” response option.

Of course, I would argue that if the question about the Nagasaki bombing was asked separately the results would be interesting. Perhaps more opposition but more likely much more “not sure” (given low awareness among Americans going back, well, almost 80 years). Perhaps my new PBS film will change that, a bit, and you can watch now.

A breakdown of the new poll, again directly from Pew:

»Gender

Men are more likely than women to say the bombings were justified (51% vs. 20%). Women are more likely than men to say the bombings were not justified (36% vs. 25%). Women are also about twice as likely as men to say they aren’t sure (43% vs. 22%).

»Age

Americans ages 65 and older (48%) are more likely than adults in younger age groups to say the bombings were justified. Adults under 30, meanwhile, are considerably more likely to say the bombings were not justified than to say they were justified (44% vs. 27%).

»Party and ideology

About half of Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party (51%) say the bombings were justified, but views differ considerably by ideology. Around six-in-ten conservative Republicans (61%) say the bombings were justified, while a much smaller share (14%) say they were not. Moderate and liberal Republicans, by contrast, are about equally likely to say the use of the bombs was justified as to say it was not justified (35% vs. 31%).

Democrats and Democratic leaners are more likely to say the bombings were not justified than to say they were justified (42% vs. 23%). Liberal Democrats are particularly likely to see the use of the atomic bomb as unjustified – 50% say this.

And ultimately:

Today, most Americans (69%) say the development of nuclear weapons has made the world less safe. Far fewer (10%) say this has made the world safer, according to the Center’s new survey, which was fielded prior to U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June.

Greg Mitchell is the author of a dozen books, including “Hiroshima in America,” and the recent award-winning The Beginning or the End: How Hollywood – and America – Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, and has directed three documentary films since 2021, including two for PBS (plus award-winning “Atomic Cover-up”). He has written widely about the atomic bomb and atomic bombings, and their aftermath, for over forty years. He writes often at Oppenheimer: From Hiroshima to Hollywood.

By Paul Robinson, Russia Post, 7/25/25

Ever since the collapse of communism, Russians have struggled to define their national identity, their country’s place in the world, and the values that should underpin their society. In the early 1990s, the idea that Russia was a European country that should rest on liberal democratic values briefly held centre stage, but this vision was soon abandoned due to disillusionment with the realities of shock therapy and Westernization.

In the mid-1990s, President Boris Yeltsin called for the definition of the ‘Russian Idea’ only to abandon the project once it became clear that nobody could agree what it was. The 1993 constitution forbade the country from having an official ideology (a rule designed to prevent a situation of ideological conformity such as existed under communism), and so efforts to define the ideological foundations of post-Soviet society came largely to a halt.

Cover of the report “A Living Idea – Russia’s Dream. The Russian’s Code in the 21st Century. The Ideological Foundation of the Russian State-Civilization”.

From Ideological Flexibility to a Vision of Russia as a Distinct Civilization

For the most part, Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, has been happy to keep things that way, preferring ideological flexibility over the constraints of a formal state doctrine. Many conservative intellectuals, however, have long been unhappy with this state of affairs, pointing out that any society, if it is to be stable, has to have a commonly agreed understanding of itself and its core values.

As political tensions with the West have grown, the Russian state has increasingly defined Russia in terms of opposition to the West, and in the last few years as an entirely distinct civilization. But that has raised the questions of what defines Russian civilization and makes it distinct, questions to which the state has no easy answers, due to its lack of clear ideological foundations. The process of defining Russian civilization has therefore acquired a new political importance.

Into this political context, there now steps a new report titled ‘A Living Idea – Russia’s Dream. The Russian’s Code in the 21^st Century. The Ideological Foundation of the Russian State-Civilization.’

The report’s primary author is prominent public intellectual Sergei Karaganov, but it is not his work alone. Rather, it is the collective product of numerous individuals from the Council of Foreign and Defence Policy, the Higher School of Economics and its Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy, as well as the journal Russia in Global Affairs.

As such it is perhaps a good reflection of thinking among elements of that part of Russia’s intellectual class that devotes itself to studying foreign and defence policy. Karaganov himself is especially well-known and last year was granted the honour of moderating Putin’s speech to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. Thus, even if this report does not reflect the views of the entire foreign and defence policy community, it certainly represents those of a well-connected segment of it, and as such is worth paying attention to.

The report’s starting point is that Russia is ‘a unique civilizational formation’ and that like any human society it needs a unifying idea. This cannot be Western liberalism, a philosophy spread ‘by liberal-globalistic elites, striving to strengthen their privileged position and to facilitate their control over the masses.’

Russia, according to the report, needs to develop an alternative, something that it has not yet done. Due to the constitutional prohibition, this cannot be a formal state ideology, but it could instead be designated as ‘Russia’s dream’ and as such play much the same role as an official ideology. This dream is necessary in order ‘to save the human in humans, to protect the Russian civilizational code, and to save the world from global thermonuclear war.

“Russia, claim the authors, is a ‘God-bearing country’ with ‘a mission before God and humanity’.”

Sergei Karaganov (center) moderates Vladimir Putin’s address at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. June 2024. Source: Kremlin.ru

The Ideological Roots of Sergey Karaganov’s Report

The report is largely a modernized version of mid-nineteenth century Slavophilism, with hints of Cosmism and Eurasianism, and occasional lines that could have been written by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Ivan Ilyin, or other twentieth century conservative Russian philosophers (see my earlier article in Russia.Post here). There is very little about it that could be said to be intellectually original. One can, for instance, find much the same logic in the writings of Alexander Panarin in the 1990s, such as his book The Russian Alternative. The report is very much part of a Russian tradition.

The Slavophile elements come out strongly in the depiction of the Western world as decadent, materialistic, individualistic, and overly rationalistic, compared to which Russia is portrayed as spiritually oriented, collectivistic, and founded on faith as well as reason. Modern Western civilization, the report says, ‘while making the person’s life more comfortable, destroys many of the functions that make him a person,’ leading to ‘an ever more evident degradation of the person himself.’

Russian philosophy has long been concerned with the issue of what constitutes ‘personhood’ and what makes someone a ‘person’ (the word for which in such philosophical debates was traditionally ‘lichnost’ but in this report for some reason is ‘chelovek’).

The report notes that ‘We are for Personhood (‘Chelovechnost’), true humanism, for preserving the Person in the person, the godly principle in him.’ True personhood relies on connections to God and to the rest of society – ‘a person cannot develop outside the family, society, nature, and country’. With its assaults on religion, the family, patriotism, and so on, Western civilization is thus portrayed as destroying personhood, in contrast to which, Russia, as the defender of religion, family, nation, and so on, is defending what it means to be truly human.

The report is thus in many respects profoundly conservative, although it denies this, saying that the values it promotes are not conservative values but universal human ones. Russia, by promoting these values, is thus defending humanity as a whole, giving Russia a holy global mission, albeit one that is more spiritual than political. Again, this is not exactly novel, but an updated version of the original Slavophilism.

“Russia, in the eyes of the report’s authors, is blessed by God, a fact proven by its recovery from the traumas of the 1990s, a true ‘miracle’ that has ‘only one “scientific” explanation – that God took pity on Russia and forgave her sins’.”

Russia is for Justice Rather than Freedom 

In true Slavophile fashion, the authors portray Russia as resting on different spiritual roots than the West, although they differ from the Slavophiles in viewing Russia as a largely Eastern country, thus showing the influence of later Eurasianist ideas.

‘The main external sources of our identity lie in Byzantium and the Great Mongol empire and not in the West’, claims the report. Russia, it says, has a ‘tradition of sobornost’ and obschinnost’, using a couple of rather untranslatable words to indicate a tradition of collectivism in contrast to individualism.

Russians, says the report, are also distinguished from Westerners by their concern for justice rather than freedom, for their concern for peace, and for their use of force only ‘to defeat endless aggressions’ rather than for ‘looting and enrichment.’ Russia is noted also for the importance it assigns to sovereignty and to a strong state, to the principle of statehood [‘gosudarstvennichestvo’]. And finally, Russians are distinguished by their ‘sense of unity with nature’ and their understanding of the ‘active unity of man and nature.’

As previously stated, none of these claims are in any way novel. They are the long standing core of Slavophile, Cosmist, and Eurasianist mythology. They also lack firm evidential basis – the idea that Russians are more collectivist, more at one with nature, and more concerned with justice than their Western counterparts is, for instance, hard to empirically justify.

Nevertheless, the report uses them to derive the essence of the ‘Russian dream’: service of God manifested in service of fellow humans through society, the family, and the state. This has political ramifications, above all the strengthening of the state, something that is necessary not only for Russia, but also for the world as a whole, since the collective problems of humanity, such as climate change, hunger, and poverty, can only be solved by strong states.

‘Оnly a strong state, resting on the support of a strong society’, the report says, can save humanity from the degrading influence of the negative trends of modern civilization, that deprive the person of many of the functions that make him a person. … The state is needed to counteract the previously mentioned tendencies and the efforts of contemporary globalists liberal elites to destroy the person … [and also] to counteract the efforts of liberal imperialist globalist elites to weaken it in order to seize it and impose its dominance.’

Aleksey Khomyakov, 1804-1860, philosopher and co-founder of the Slavophile movement. Source: Wiki Commons

Western liberal democracy in incompatible with this kind of strong state, claims the report. Liberal democracy can function only in conditions of relative peace and stability and is incompatible with Russia’s particular conditions and the increasingly unstable state of the world.

What is needed instead is a ‘leader democracy’ [‘liderskaia demokratiia’], a term that remains frustratingly undefined, but seems to endorse Russia’s current political system. At the same time, though, the authors stress that this ‘leader democracy’, while authoritarian in terms of central government, should allow for local democracy (an idea that again has Slavophile roots as well as appearing in the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn), and should guarantee freedom of thought since ‘intellectual, spiritual freedom is the undoubted precondition of a country’s prosperity’.

The latter idea reflects a long-standing Russian philosophical concern with ‘inner freedom’, as found in the writings of such diverse writers as Boris Chicherin, Ivan Ilyin, Nikolai Berdiaev, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and others. The report comments that ‘Combining intellectual freedom, freedom of thought, and political authoritarianism is not simple. But Russian history gives examples.’ Unfortunately, it doesn’t say what those are.

“The question that arises from all this is to what extent these views are shared by anyone outside of the report’s authors and especially by anybody in authority.”

It is difficult to say. One should not assume that just because the authors are well-connected, their opinions reflect those of the people actually running the country. Indeed, if they did, the authors wouldn’t have felt it necessary to publish a report saying all these things.

Clearly, this is an effort to convince the authorities of the need to act in the perceived absence of action. Indeed, at one point the report contains a veiled criticism of President Putin for refusing to challenge the constitutional prohibition of an official ideology and for failing to recognize the need for a national idea.

Putin has often been seen as an ideological balancer. He permits intellectual entrepreneurs such as Karaganov to generate ideas and then co-opts the ones that he finds politically suitable, while at the same time rejecting the ones that he doesn’t and refusing to be limited by the confines of a single ideological system.

This report notes that one of the reasons for the lack of a formal state ideology is the resistance of ‘technocrats’ who still ‘dominate in the leading layer of the state’, and that the Presidential Administration has no department specifically devoted to ideological issues. This raises the possibility that Putin and other high state officials may actually be one of the prime barriers against the adoption of the kind of ideological prescripts put forward in this report. When Putin eventually leaves office (as in due course he must, if only due to death), a turn back towards liberalism might be possible, but if this report is anything to go by, a turn in an even more conservative direction might be every bit as likely.

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 8/14/25

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s office released two damning emails yesterday [August 13th], the first being a letter from former DNI James Clapper to former FBI head James Comey, former CIA head John Brennan, and then-NSA chief Michael Rogers. Dated December 22, 2016, Clapper’s letter explains how the chiefs should approach writing a new Intelligence Community Assessment, whose conclusion — that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump — had already been reported:

Mike John Jim;

Understand your concern. It is essential that we (CIA/NSA/FBI/ODNI) be on the same page. and are all supportive of the report — in the highest tradition of “that’s OUR story, and we’re stickin’ to it.” This evening, CIA has provided to the NIC the complete draft generated by the ad hoc fusion cell. We will facilitate as much mutual transparency as possible as we complete the report, but, more time is not negotiable,” We may have to compromise on our “normal” modalities, since we must do this on such a compressed schedule.

This is one project that has to be a team sport.

Jim

Clapper’s email was in response to a note about “concerns” from Rogers, the NSA chief who never upgraded his agency’s confidence level in the “Russia did it for Trump” conclusion from “moderate” to high. The Rogers letter makes it clear that the head of the Pentagon’s most powerful surveillance agency was being asked to sign off on a conclusion without seeing the most “sensitive” intelligence. From Rogers:

I asked my team if they’d had sufficient access to the underlying intelligence and sufficient time to review that intelligence. On both points my team raised concerns… I’m concerned that, given the expedited nature of this activity, my folks aren’t fully comfortable saying that they have had enough time to review all of the intelligence to be absolutely confident in their assessments… I do want to make sure that, when we are asked in the future whether we can absolutely stand behind the paper… I’m concerned we are not there yet.

This is a devastating exchange. It shows that in assembling perhaps the most high-profile group analysis since the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD program, four of America’s most powerful enforcement officials said, “To hell with evidence, let’s just put out a tale and stick with it.”

In the specific context of this scandal, it makes a joke of years of public narratives about Trump, Putin, and Russia. Along with more documents funneled from Kash Patel’s FBI to Just The News asserting that senior Justice Department officials squashed Hillary Clinton corruption investigations, and that Comey gave a middleman access to highly classified information to help plead his case to newspapers like the New York Times, the new Gabbard docs further elucidate how years of Russia mania were built on fraud.

But this cascade of revelations is bringing a more disturbing story into focus. A subtext is the unnerving casualness with which procedural rules were broken. Even before Rogers and the NSA were asked to blindly bless a domestic political probe built in part atop “evidence” from an illegal FISA warrant, the FISA court had begun investigating misuse of the surveillance program. Onetime Trump aide Carter Page is not the only American in a politically sensitive position recently monitored under this dubious legal end-around. There was FISA monitoring of campaign manager Paul Manafort, “non-compliant” use of FISA to investigate the January 6th Capitol breach, even FISA tracking of ordinary Americans overseas applying for benefits.

In the coming weeks you’ll be reading (at Racket, among other places) about wholesale abuse of other surveillance programs. It turns out an alarming number of senior Trump campaign officials from the 2024 cycle were notified about prior FBI surveillance (news about Kash Patel, Dan Scavino, and Jeff Clark receiving such notices has already broken, but more names are coming). Widespread surveillance of congressional officials in a 2017 leak probe was the underlying context of recent revelations suggesting two members, Adam Schiff and Eric Swalwell, approved leaks of classified information.

The legacy press is ignoring the releases both because they paint Donald Trump as a victim of overreach and because the press played such a prominent role in the Russiagate corruption. They’re betraying audiences who might be concerned about the larger pattern coming into relief. That story is about intelligence agencies meddling in domestic politics at all — Trump or no Trump — through a list of forbidden practices. We’re about to find out that far more people in the political world were under routine surveillance than previously thought, including mainstream and independent reporters who communicated with political sources of all stripes.

I’m technically on vacation, but there’s more coming on this front, from players now forced to come forward. Please also tune in to America This Week tomorrow for a review of all the new materials with Walter Kirn, before he appears as a guest with Bill Maher.

YouTube link here.

***

Joint News Conference by Presidents of Russia and the United States

Kremlin website, 8/16/25

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,

We held our talks in a constructive and mutually respectful atmosphere, and they have proved substantive and productive.

I would like to once again thank my US counterpart for the proposal to come to Alaska. It is quite logical to meet here since our countries, albeit separated by oceans, are, in fact, close neighbours. When we stepped out of our planes and greeted each other, I said, “Good afternoon, dear neighbour. I am glad to see you alive and in good health.” I believe it sounds very friendly and neighbourly. Our countries are separated only by the Bering Strait — essentially, there are two islands, one Russian and one American, separated by a mere four kilometres. We are close neighbours, that’s a fact.

It is also important to note that our shared history and many positive events are largely related to Alaska. There is still an enormous cultural legacy preserved since the age of Russian America, with Russian Orthodox churches and more than 700 place-names of Russian origin.

During World War II, Alaska served as the starting point for the legendary air route that delivered lend-lease supplies, including military aircraft and other equipment. It was a dangerous and challenging route over enormous ice-covered territories. Nevertheless, the pilots and experts of both countries did everything they could to bring victory together. They risked and sacrificed their lives for our common victory.

I have just visited the Russian city of Magadan. A monument honouring Russian and American pilots stands there, adorned with the Russian and American flags. I know that here, too, there is a similar monument, and at a war cemetery a few kilometres away from here, there are graves of Soviet pilots who lost their lives in that heroic mission. We appreciate the efforts of US officials and citizens to preserve their memory. This is a dignified and noble undertaking.

We will always remember other examples from history when our countries stood together against common enemies in the spirit of combat camaraderie and alliance, rendering each other help and support. I am certain that this legacy will help us restore and develop mutually beneficial and equal ties at this new stage, even in the most challenging conditions.

As you know, Russian-American summit talks have not been held for over four years. That is a long time. This period has proved exceptionally difficult for bilateral relations, and, let’s face it, they have deteriorated to their lowest point since the Cold War. And this does not benefit either our countries or the world in general.

Obviously, sooner or later we had to remedy the situation, to move from confrontation to dialogue, and in this regard, an in-person meeting between the two heads of state was really overdue – of course, with serious and thorough preparations, and this work has been done.

President Trump and I have established very good direct contacts. We have had frank conversations on the phone multiple times. As you know, the US President’s Special Envoy, Mr Witkoff, has visited us in Russia several times. Our aides and heads of foreign ministries have maintained regular contacts.

As you are well aware, the situation around Ukraine is one of the key issues. We acknowledge the commitment of the US administration and President Trump personally to help resolve the Ukrainian conflict, and the President’s willingness to understand the root causes and its origins.

I have repeatedly said that the developments in Ukraine present fundamental threats to Russia’s national security. Moreover, we have always considered the Ukrainian people – and I have said this many times – a brotherly people, no matter how strange it may sound in today’s circumstances. We share the same roots, and the current situation is tragic and deeply painful to us. Therefore, our country is sincerely interested in ending this.

Yet, we are convinced that, for the conflict resolution in Ukraine to be long-term and lasting, all the root causes of the crisis, which have been repeatedly explained, must be eliminated; all of Russia’s legitimate concerns must be taken into account, and a fair security balance must be restored in Europe and the rest of the world.

I agree with President Trump. He said today that Ukraine’s security must be ensured by all means. Of course, we are ready to work on this.

Hopefully, the understanding we have reached will bring us closer to this goal and open up the road to peace in Ukraine.

We hope that Kiev and the European capitals will take the current developments constructively and will neither try to put up obstacles nor attempt to disrupt the emerging progress with provocative acts or behind-the-scenes plots.

By the way, under the new US administration, our bilateral trade has been on the rise. So far, it is a symbolic figure but still, the trade is 20 percent higher. What I am saying is that we have many interesting areas for cooperation.

It is obvious that the Russian-US business and investment partnership holds tremendous potential. Russia and the United States have much to offer each other in trade, energy, digital and high technologies, and space development.

Cooperation in the Arctic and the resumption of region-to-region contacts, including between the Russian Far East and the West Coast of the USA, also appear relevant.

Overall, it is crucial and necessary that our countries turn the page and get back to cooperation.

Symbolically, as I have already said, there is an international date line nearby, on the border between Russia and the United States, where you can literally step from one day into another. I hope that we can do the same in political affairs.

I would like to thank Mr Trump for our joint work and for the friendly and trust-based conversation. The main thing is that there was a commitment on both sides to produce a result. We see that the US President has a clear idea of what he wants to achieve, that he sincerely cares about his country’s prosperity while showing awareness of Russia’s national interests.

I hope that today’s agreements will become a reference point, not only for resolving the Ukrainian problem but also for resuming the pragmatic business relations between Russia and the United States.

To conclude, I would like to add the following. I remember that in 2022, during my last contacts with the former US administration, I tried to convince my former US counterpart that we should not bring the situation to a point fraught with serious repercussions in the form of hostilities, and I said directly at the time that it would be a big mistake.

Today, we hear President Trump saying: “If I had been president, there would have been no war.” I believe it would have been so. I confirm this because President Trump and I have established a generally very good, businesslike and trustworthy contact. And I have every reason to believe that, as we move along this path, we can reach – and the sooner the better – the end of the conflict in Ukraine.

Thank you for the attention.

President of the United States of America Donald Trump: Thank you very much, Mr President. That was very profound, and I will say that I believe we had a very productive meeting.

There were many-many points that we agreed on, most of them, I would say, a couple of big ones that we have not quite gotten there, but we have made some headway. So, there is no deal until there is a deal.

I will call up NATO in a little while. I will call up the various people that I think are appropriate, and I will, of course, call up President Zelensky and tell him about today’s meeting. It is ultimately up to them. They are going to have to agree with [what] Marco [Rubio] and Steve [Witkoff] and some of the great people from the Trump administration who have come here, Scott [Bessent] and John Ratcliffe. Thank you very much. But we have some of our really great leaders. They have been doing a phenomenal job.

We also have some tremendous Russian business representatives here, and I think, you know, everybody wants to deal with us. We have become the hottest country anywhere in the world in a very short period of time. We look forward to that, we look forward to dealing, we are going to try to get this over with.

We really made some great progress today. I have always had a fantastic relationship with President Putin, with Vladimir. We had many tough meetings, good meetings. We were interfered with by the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax. It made it a little bit tougher to deal with, but he understood it. I think he has probably seen things like that during the course of his career. He has seen it all. But we had to put up with the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax. He knew it was a hoax, and I knew it was a hoax, but what was done was very criminal, but it made it harder for us to deal as a country in terms of the business and all of the things that we would like to have dealt with. But we will have a good chance when this is over.

So just to put it very quickly, I am going to start making a few phone calls and tell them what happened. We had an extremely productive meeting, and many points were agreed to. There are just a very few that are left. Some are not that significant. One is probably the most significant, but we have a very good chance of getting there. We did not get here but we have a very good chance of getting there.

I would like to thank President Putin and his entire team, whose faces, who I know, in many cases, otherwise, other than that, whose faces I get to see all the time in the newspapers. You are almost as famous as the boss, but especially this one right over here.

But we had some good meetings over the years, right? Good, productive meetings over the years, and we hope to have that in the future. But let’s do the most productive one right now. We are going to stop, really, five, six, seven thousand, thousands of people a week from being killed, and President Putin wants to see that as much as I do.

So again, Mr President, I would like to thank you very much, and we will speak to you very soon, and probably see you again very soon. Thank you very much, Vladimir.

Vladimir Putin: Next time in Moscow.

Donald Trump: Oh, that is an interesting one. I do not know. I will get a little heat on that one, but I could see it possibly happening. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And thank you all. Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you so much.

***

“No blitzkrieg, no defeat”: What Russia’s commmentariat is saying after the Putin-Trump summit

RT, 8/16/25

The meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska marked their first face-to-face talks since Trump’s return to the White House. The summit began with a brief one-on-one exchange inside Trump’s presidential limousine, followed by extended negotiations involving both delegations. At a subsequent joint press conference, the two leaders described the talks as constructive and signaled an openness to a follow-up round of negotiations.

RT has gathered insights from leading Russian experts on how the outcome of the summit is being perceived in Moscow – highlighting the tone, symbolism, and potential global implications of this long-anticipated encounter.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:

Analogies are always imperfect, but the Alaska summit inevitably brought to mind the first meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Geneva nearly forty years ago. Not because of its substance – if anything, the content was the opposite – but because of its structure. Just like back then, no deal was struck, but the level of communication shifted dramatically.

Trump didn’t get the diplomatic blitz he was hoping for. But the meeting didn’t end in rupture either. The positional standoff continues. If we follow the logic of the 1980s, the next milestone might be a “Reykjavik moment” – like in 1986, when no agreement was reached, but the ideas floated were radical and far-reaching. The real breakthrough came later in Washington in 1987 with the signing of the INF Treaty – the same agreement that died in two stages, both under Trump’s presidency.

This time, the pace is faster. This isn’t a Cold War; it’s something hotter. There won’t be year-long pauses between summits. We’ll see follow-ups much sooner – of one kind or another. Critics will try to spin the Alaska meeting as a Trump defeat, arguing that Putin dictated the tempo and set the terms. There’s some truth to that. But if the goal is a sustainable outcome, there’s no alternative to tackling the full scope of issues head-on.

If the process launched in Alaska continues in the same spirit, we could see an outcome that’s the reverse of what followed Geneva. Back then, Reagan pushed to end the Cold War on Washington’s terms – and succeeded. Today, what’s on the table is the end of the post-Cold War era, a time defined by unchallenged US global dominance. That shift isn’t sudden – it’s been building for years – but it’s now reached a climax. And notably, much of the demand for this shift is coming from within the US itself – just as, back in the day, the Soviet push for change came largely from within its own society.

As before, the road is winding. There are plenty of actors – domestic and international – who will try to halt or reverse the momentum. Much will depend on whether both presidents truly believe they’re headed in the right direction.

One last, telling detail: Forty years ago in Geneva, the defining image of change was a joint press conference, where journalists from both sides got to question the leader of the opposing camp for the first time. Openness was seen as a necessary step toward solving deep-rooted problems. This time, the symbolism lies in the absence of questions – neither leader took any. Real diplomacy is trying to retreat into quiet, away from the performative and often destructive media spectacle that has consumed international politics in recent decades. In a way, secrecy is staging a comeback.

Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics:

From the standpoint of Russian interests, the Anchorage summit can be seen as a relative success for Moscow. Two key aspects stand out.

Tactically, Russia managed once again to regain control over the pace of negotiations. The Kremlin defused Trump’s rising irritation – marked by threats and pressure tactics – that had begun to build dangerously. Had that escalation continued, it could have derailed both the Ukraine talks and the broader process of normalizing bilateral relations. From the outset, Moscow approached both tracks with deliberation and patience – partly because of its still-growing battlefield advantage, and partly because the complexity of the issues demands exactly that: no rush, no oversimplification.

Strategically, both sides came out ahead – if only because the existence of meaningful communication between nuclear superpowers is a net positive by definition. Judging by the signals out of Washington, the Trump administration seems to share that view.

The summit also confirmed something I’ve noted before: Trump is genuinely interested in resetting relations with Moscow. He sees negotiations with Russia as a cheaper, more efficient way to achieve his strategic goals in Europe. That’s why he’s open to serious dialogue – even if it doesn’t produce immediate media wins or flashy breakthroughs.

Going forward, the real test of the impact of Anchorage will be how the Trump administration engages with its European allies and with Ukraine. Both will undoubtedly try to pull Trump back into their strategic framework. The tone and substance of those next conversations will tell us a lot about what was really achieved in Alaska.

Vladimir Kornilov, political analyst:

“A Historic Handshake in Alaska” – that was the front-page headline splashed across many European newspapers this morning. To be fair, most of those editions went to press while the summit was still underway, which means their coverage lacked any meaningful analysis. As a result, much of what was published focused on optics – body language, symbolic gestures, red carpets, and so on.

But the real action has been unfolding online and on Western news channels, which have been flooded with hot takes and instant commentary. Many of them verge on panic – some, outright hysteria.

At the core of this reaction is a bitter truth: the West is coming to terms with the collapse of its long-running effort to isolate Russia and its president. That’s the underlying cause of all the wailing in the Western media swamps.

One theme dominates the Western analysis: Russia got what it wanted out of the Alaska summit. That’s the consensus across a wide spectrum of commentators and anchors. Many of them didn’t bother to hide their frustration that they weren’t allowed to ask a single question during the much-anticipated joint press conference between the US and Russian leaders.

Whatever the tangible policy outcomes of the summit may turn out to be, one thing is now beyond dispute: the meeting in Alaska has locked in a new reality on the global stage.

Valentin Bogdanov, VGTRK New York bureau chief:

“From the very first frames of the broadcast from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, one thing was clear: isolation had failed. The red carpet, the honor guard flanked by fighter jets, the handshake, the smiles – it all looked far more like Russia’s return to the world stage than another attempt to shove it off.”

“Russian America” played host to a summit of neighbors – one neighbor applauding the other. On the runway, the two presidential planes were parked as close together as the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait. The symbolism of convergence wasn’t lost – geographically or diplomatically.

It was a day of mourning for those who had bet on failure or scandal. Now they’re nitpicking anything they can get their hands on. Some latched onto the canceled working lunch as proof of a snub. Though, ironically, many of the same voices had just been criticizing Trump for agreeing to that lunch in the first place – calling it a sign of weakness.

Meanwhile, body language experts wasted no time analyzing the subtle choreography from the moment the two presidents appeared on camera – from eye contact to the timing of their handshake. Putin and Trump quickly settled into a shared rhythm. Of course, there will now be a concerted effort – by the usual suspects – to knock them out of sync.

But inside the White House, officials are already discussing a follow-up meeting. According to their thinking, it could be the breakthrough needed to untangle the Ukraine knot. The American end of that knot, it seems, has already started to loosen.

Elena Panina, Director of the Institute for International Political and Economic Strategies:

The three-hour meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson wasn’t just a diplomatic encounter – it was arguably the defining political event of 2025. It will shape not only the foreign policy agendas of the US, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine, but also their domestic political discourse. Every moment – from the ten-minute one-on-one in the US president’s limousine to the closing handshake – has already become fodder for interpretation in the Western press.

Just consider CNN’s reaction: their lead takeaway was that, contrary to standard protocol, the Russian leader – not the host – was the first to speak at the joint press conference. In diplomacy, such details are never trivial. They’re read as subtle signals of power dynamics – either gestures of politeness or expressions of parity.

And politeness, notably, was in abundant supply – something all observers picked up on. Compared to Trump’s meetings over the past six months, this was a dramatic shift. No shouting matches such as with Zelensky, no mocking jabs like those aimed at German Chancellor Merz, and none of the alpha posturing he’s shown with the likes of Ursula von der Leyen or Cyril Ramaphosa. Instead, the tone was marked by deliberate courtesy and mutual respect, with both leaders carefully sidestepping flashpoints.

So how should we interpret the abrupt press conference and the canceled lunch? In high-level diplomacy, a lack of formal agreements doesn’t necessarily mean the meeting was empty. On the contrary – it’s clear that on core issues like halting arms shipments to Kiev, easing sanctions on Russia, and opening new channels of sectoral cooperation, Trump simply can’t commit on the spot. Not without congressional approval – and not without running it past his NATO allies.

Of course, Anchorage was no “new Yalta” – no grand endgame like the one that concluded the defining geopolitical chess match of the 20th century. But it might just be something else: a strong, tempo-preserving opening in a new strategic game between Washington and Moscow. A game that could unfold in a series of calculated moves – perhaps not redrawing the global map, but at the very least cooling the hottest points of tension.

The opening move has been made. The real question now is whether Trump can push through the internal and external constraints he faces – so that this debut in Alaska evolves into a full-fledged game.

Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics:

I personally never expected the summit to resolve the war in Ukraine. The conflict is simply the core of a much broader crisis – one that runs through the entire architecture of European security.

What struck me as most important was the spirit of the meeting itself. After 35 years of accumulated tension, the US-Russia confrontation is – at least under Donald Trump – being redirected into a more civilized framework. Each side still operates under its own set of constraints and domestic limitations. But critically, the US has now shelved the idea of pursuing Russia’s “strategic defeat” or attempting to isolate it completely. That shift is profound. Framing the conflict in such absolute, existential terms had made it unsolvable – it took it out of the realm of international relations toward something more akin to a crusade.

This change signals the emergence of a new reality: the conflict remains, and its military-technical phase will likely continue for now. But it’s no longer treated as a moral or existential struggle – it has become a normal, if deeply entrenched, dispute in the history of great power politics. And that makes it solvable.

There are no longer any metaphysical or ideological reasons for it to continue – only diverging interests and circumstantial pressures. In Washington’s case, that pressure stems from a surplus of global commitments and unsustainable strategic wagers. The sooner those burdens are recalibrated, the closer we get to meaningful outcomes.

Ilya Kramnik, military analyst, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council:

A ready-made peace deal is, unfortunately, out of reach right now – largely due to divisions within the West itself.

What comes next is the hardest part. No matter how productive the talks between the Russian and American presidents may have been, peace in Ukraine will require the involvement of European Union countries. That currently seems almost unthinkable, given the public positions of both the EU as a bloc and several key member states individually.

Trump’s own words – “no deal yet” – along with his stated intention to reach out to Zelensky and European leaders, suggest that he understands this reality.

At the same time, it’s clear that the US and Russia have more to discuss beyond the war in Ukraine. Both presidents acknowledged mutual interests across a range of areas, and the existence of ongoing bilateral contacts reinforces that.

So, yes, I expected the two sides to come to some level of understanding – including on issues unrelated to the ongoing conflict. As for ending the war itself, that will require a step-by-step process.

That’s essentially what happened in Anchorage. Now we wait to see how Europe responds – and, of course, what form a draft peace framework might eventually take.

Sergey Poletaev, political commentator:

The most likely outcome was exactly what we got: an agreement to keep talking.

There are two main problems. First, Trump doesn’t see himself as a party to the conflict and wants to remain above the fray. Putin – rightly, in my view – sees it differently. He believes, and continues to insist, that only Trump can make the kind of decisive choices needed to end the war. If some movement on that front occurred in Anchorage, then real progress might now be possible.

The second issue is Europe and Ukraine. For now, both remain committed to continuing the war. And I don’t believe that can be changed through diplomacy alone – it will be decided on the battlefield. Sooner or later, the facts on the ground will shape a new shared reality for all four players: Russia, the US, Europe, and Ukraine.

And based on how things are going, that reality will likely align more closely with Russia’s view than with the Euro-Ukrainian one. That’s when Trump will get his deal – but not before.

Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Valdai Club:

No one realistically expected any breakthrough agreements from this summit, but the overall tone was clearly positive. It ended on an optimistic note, with both sides expressing a willingness to keep moving toward de-escalation and to explore broader areas of cooperation in US-Russia relations. In short, this is a process that’s meant to continue.

I believe both leaders walked away with everything they reasonably could have hoped for. Russia stood firm on its core positions but remained engaged in dialogue. The US, for its part, moved a step closer to the kind of peace it wants – one that lets it stop pouring resources into a geopolitical asset that’s yielding no meaningful political return. In that sense, both sides can count the meeting as a win.

There won’t be any immediate sanctions. At the very least, we’re likely to see a few weeks of status quo. What happens after that will depend on whether the dialogue continues in a stable, productive fashion. If concrete discussions follow – especially around terms for a settlement – and those discussions begin to bear fruit, we might even see a modestly positive shift on the sanctions front.

But if the process stalls or collapses for any reason, the risk of renewed pressure will rise. In that case, we’re likely to see the so-called “secondary tariffs” that Trump has previously floated – higher duties on third countries that buy Russian raw materials. We could also see new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector to some degree.

That said, it’s worth noting that the US and its allies have already imposed a substantial range of restrictions on Russia. Moscow is not easily intimidated by new escalation measures. Still, that doesn’t mean further sanctions are off the table – they remain a real possibility.

Pavel Dubravsky, political commentator:

Russia came out of the summit looking stronger than the United States. Trump may have declared the meeting a “ten out of ten,” but in reality, he seemed tired – and frustrated.

That’s likely because he had two clear goals going into Anchorage. The first was to secure a hard “no” from Moscow and then walk away from the Ukraine peace track entirely, spinning it as a win for his base: “I’m cutting your taxes, I’m cutting your foreign entanglements – look, I didn’t waste time or money on this.” The second, far more ambitious goal was to clinch a deal – a ceasefire of some kind, even a temporary one. A one-month pause, a symbolic step, anything he could present as diplomatic momentum. But he left empty-handed.

In contrast, the Russian side struck a composed and strategic posture. They demonstrated an understanding of global diplomacy, but also sensitivity to US domestic politics. They even made gestures toward Ukraine’s internal dynamics, calling on Kiev and European allies not to derail the talks. That tone – measured and outward-looking – was a diplomatic win in itself.

One of the most notable developments was Putin’s language shift: for the first time, he openly spoke about Ukraine’s own security. It seems likely this was something Trump pushed for, and Putin agreed to engage on. That signals potential future discussions on issues like territorial arrangements and security guarantees – topics that were long considered off-limits.

Whether Trump is willing to travel to Moscow remains uncertain – it could carry political risks for him. But what’s already clear is that Russia has broken out of a narrow diplomatic box. For the past three years, Western powers insisted on speaking to Russia only about Ukraine. That principle guided both the EU and the previous US administration. Now, the agenda has widened.

Ukraine is no longer the sole topic on the table. That shift in itself is a major accomplishment for Russian diplomacy – reframing the dialogue and reshaping how Moscow is perceived in international politics today.